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ABSTRACT 
Despite the sharp increase in global spend on cybersecurity during this decade, the 
extent and impact of serious cyber breaches are escalating. This can, in part, be 
ascribed to current approaches not proactively engaging morphing threats. It is clear 
that conventional, defensive cybersecurity solutions alone no longer offer adequate 
protection against threats posed by actors such as nation states, crime syndicates, 
corporate spies, terrorists, hacktivists and rogue individuals. There is growing 
acceptance that a multidisciplinary approach, which coherently combines offensive and 
defensive thrusts, is required to effectively secure cyber assets. For state and non-state 
actors with sizable cyber interests, cyber counterintelligence (CCI) offers such a 
practicable approach. Concurrent with the growing interest in CCI in corporate 
boardrooms and the corridors of governments, CCI is emerging as a field of academic 
enquiry.  
Both the effective practice and academic progression of CCI depend on sound theory. 
Yet, in the consulted literature, purposeful attempts to advance a theory for CCI are 
limited and fragmented. More specifically, and considering CCI’s incipient academic 
status, there is a need for an overarching conceptual framework for CCI (FCCI). In 
addition to guiding practice, such a framework can be a baseline for further 
multidisciplinary academic enquiry.  
The aim of this thesis is to advance such a conceptual framework. The framework 
consists of eight notional building blocks essential to an academically credible and 
practically useful FCCI. In line with CCI’s multidisciplinary nature, the FCCI’s design 
draws on various academic fields.  
However, the FCCI and its building blocks cannot be explicated in detail within the 
confines of a thesis. Only the essential contours of, and rationale behind, the FCCI’s 
design are therefore provided. The FCCI is qualified as an exploratory postulation, 
hopefully constructive to practice and academic discourse.  
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PART 1  
FOUNDATION AND CONFIGURATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
 
 
Part 1 starts with outlining the academic and practical need for a conceptual framework 
for cyber counterintelligence (FCCI). This is followed by the stating of the research 
problem, research questions and hypothesis. We then advance the essential features 
of a conceptual framework to which our FCCI should comply. To inform the FCCI’s 
design, an evaluative literature study is also conducted. Part 1 consists of the following 
chapters: 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
 Chapter 2: Features and Configuration of the Conceptual Framework for Cyber 
Counterintelligence  
 Chapter 3: Evaluative Literature Study 
  
2 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Despite a sharp increase in global spend on cybersecurity during this decade, the 
extent and impact of serious cyber breaches are escalating. This can, in part, be 
ascribed to current approaches not proactively engaging morphing threats. Several of 
the most serious breaches are the result of, or can at the very least be closely linked to, 
actors (governments, criminal syndicates, business entities) utilising the cyberspace as 
a primary conduit for executing intelligence and counterintelligence operations 
(Prunckun 2018; Stech & Heckman 2018; Buchanan 2016; Duvenage, Jaquire & von 
Solms 2018a). Some quotes attesting to this escalating trend are:  
 “Nonstate entities, including international terrorist groups and transnational 
organized crime organizations, will continue to employ and potentially improve 
their intelligence capabilities, which include human, cyber, and technical means. 
Like state intelligence services, these non-state entities recruit human sources 
and conduct physical and technical surveillance to facilitate their activities and 
avoid detection and capture.” – Director of National Intelligence, United States of 
America (US) (Coats 2018) 
 “The primary motivation behind global cyber activity has now shifted from 
disparate activities carried out by individuals, groups and criminal gangs 
pursuing short-term financial gain to skilled adversaries driven by broader 
agendas.” (Crowdstrike 2016) 
  “[D]istinguishing criminal gangs from nation-state actors [is] a challenge…Tools 
and tradecraft become harder to tell apart…some financial threat groups that we 
track exhibit traits that look more like state-sponsored APT activity.” (Mandiant – 
FireEye 2015) 
The signature role of counterintelligence (CI) and its subset cyber counterintelligence 
(CCI) is precisely the pro-active anticipation, detection, analysis, engagement, 
exploitation and neutralisation of such threats. Properly conceptualised and 
implemented as part of CI, CCI is a practicable approach for governments, businesses 
and other sizable entities. The demand for, and on, CCI is sure to increase. Of late, 
3 
CCI’s growing significance in especially larger companies is increasingly clear (Panda 
Security Labs 2018).  
Effective CCI practice presupposes a sound theoretical foundation. Theoretical 
constructs are not ‘nice to have’ academic ‘toys’. Theoretical constructs, such as 
frameworks and models, condition our thinking and our approach to practice. Poor 
theory leads to poor practice. Consequently, within intelligence and CI the price for poor 
theory is ultimately paid in costly failures and damaging breaches. 
Herein also lays the glitch. As an academic field and formalised area of academic 
research, CCI is in its infancy and even the agenda for its development has in various 
respects not been set. One of the priority items on this agenda ought to be an 
overarching conceptual framework which (albeit tentatively) defines, describes and 
relates key constructs (building blocks). In this regard, Krishnan (2009) righty asserts 
that an academic discipline “should have theories and concepts that can organise 
accumulated specialist knowledge effectively”.  
CCI’s under-theorised status stands in sharp contrast to the rich and expansive body of 
literature focused on the closely related field of information warfare and its subset cyber 
warfare. A few examples of such works – spanning more than two decades – include 
those by Molander, Riddle & Wilson (1996), Denning (1999), Kopp (2000), Hutchinson 
& Warren (2001), Jones, Kovacich & Luzwick (2002), Hutchinson (2006), Armistead 
(2004), Clarke & Knake (2010), Armistead (2010), van Niekerk & Maharaj (2011), 
Warren (2013), Andress & Winterfeld (2014), Janczewski & Caelli (2016) and 
Buchanan (2016).  
The theoretical paucity on CCI should be viewed within the context of the persisting 
theoretical poverty of CI in general. As a pillar of state security, CI has been practised 
and described for millennia. Some enduring CI principles were, for example, recorded 
in 500 B.C. by the much-quoted Sun Tzu in a subsection devoted to the use of spies 
and counterspies (Duvenage & von Soms 2015, Giles 2002). This said, there is 
surprisingly few works in the public domain which explain multidisciplinary CI’s theory 
and practice – be it within government or in the corporate world (Prunckun 2012, 2014). 
Consequently – and even within well-resourced, developed countries such as the US – 
“CI remains little known or understood among scholars or practitioners of national 
security and policymaking” (Van Cleave 2007). The few works which explain 
multidisciplinary CI theory and practice (e.g. Prunckun 2012, 2014; Duvenage 2011) do 
not venture into any detail on CCI. 
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CCI is, of course, a much more recent branch of CI. CCI existed de facto in the state 
security apparatus of countries such as the US “since the introduction of IT to 
intelligence, defence and national security” (cf. French & Kim 2009, Stone & Tucker 
1988). It was, however, only in the late 1990s that CCI crystallised as a formalised CI 
field within the state apparatus (French & Kim 2009). Currently, CCI is practised by 
various governments’ security apparatus, a fast-growing number of corporates and a 
few cybersecurity vendors that offer such specialised services. Although CCI is 
integrated in the training curriculum of institutions such as military and intelligence 
academies, the curriculum content is not publically available. Furthermore, publically 
available literature on CCI in general and peer-reviewed academic research in 
particular remains very limited (Stech & Heckman 2018, Justiniano 2017). While a few 
commendable CCI frameworks/models have indeed been advanced, these 
frameworks/models expound very specific CCI aspects such as institutional maturity 
(Jaquire 2018), processes (Fieber 2015), training (Black 2014) and CCI's role in hybrid 
warfare (Justiniano 2017). These works do not attempt an overarching framework for 
structuring CCI as an emerging subdiscipline (Black 2014, Fieber 2015, Jaquire 2018, 
Stech & Heckman 2018). As matters currently stand, academic contributions to CCI are 
therefore not only scarce but – in the absence of an overarching framework – also 
conceptually fragmented. This scarcity of literature on CCI is further expanded on in 
Chapter 3.  
So far, we have outlined the practical and academic need for a conceptual framework 
for CCI. This was followed by a very cursory overview of consulted literature which 
showed that, as far as could be ascertained, no such framework currently exists. This 
finding is central to the study’s problem statement advanced in the next section.  
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In the preceding section, we positioned the design of a conceptual FCCI as a practical 
and academic imperative. Yet, at least in as far as the consulted literature is concerned, 
such an overarching framework does not exist.  
This leads us to the primary problem statement of this research: In the literature 
studied, no overarching conceptual CCI framework that can provide a premise for 
establishing CCI as an academic subdiscipline, topic of instruction and research field 
could be found.  
Flowing from the problem statement, the central research questions are threefold:  
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(1) What academically credible conceptual framework can be advanced to 
notionally structure CCI? 
(2) What should the features and components of the framework be, and how should 
they be configured? 
(3) Can conceptual constructs derived from Intelligence Studies (notably statutory 
intelligence and counterintelligence) be usefully applied to CCI and thus to the 
FCCI's design? 
1.3 HYPOTHESES 
The thesis’s primary hypothesis is that an academic credible conceptual Framework 
for Cyber Counterintelligence can be designed by means of an inductive, qualitative 
methodology. By postulating the critical notional constructs which comprise CCI and by 
outlying the constructs’ relations, the framework can narratively and graphically explain 
what CCI is and how it ‘works’.   
Accompanying the central hypothesis, the thesis’ two secondary hypotheses are:   
 Criteria can be formulated to derive the FCCI's features, components and 
configuration.  
 Conceptual constructs from Intelligence Studies can be applied to CCI and 
utilised for the FCCI's design. 
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVE  
The study’s main aim is to design an integrated conceptual framework for notionally 
structuring CCI as an emerging, multidisciplinary field of enquiry. This will be referred to 
throughout the thesis as the Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence (FCCI). For the 
purposes of this chapter, a ‘conceptual framework’ is tentatively defined as a construct 
which coherently explains – narratively and graphically – what CCI is, what its essential 
components are, how these components relate and thus how CCI ‘works’ (cf. Miles & 
Huberman 1994, Jabareen 2009). Such a framework will constitute a novel contribution 
which will add significantly to the very limited body of published academic knowledge in 
this field. Since it structures and adds to existing knowledge, our FCCI is intended to 
aid further research and theory building.  
In pursuance of the primary aim, the study’s primary objective is to construct the FCCI 
as a conceptual framework for notionally structuring CCI as an emerging, 
multidisciplinary field of enquiry. This construction will follow an inductive qualitative 
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methodology, within the realist paradigm, and will include an evaluative literature study 
to develop the FCCI and its components.  
1.5 RESEARCH APPROACH AND STRUCTURE  
In order to achieve the stated aim and objective, this thesis is divided into six parts.  
Part 1, which consists of Chapters 1 to 3, lays the foundation for the design of our FCCI. 
To ensure the design of an academically credible FCCI, the notion of a ‘conceptual 
framework’ is examined in Chapter 2 to arrive at criteria with which the FCCI should 
comply. These criteria are then used to guide (a) the identification of the FCCI’s main 
components and (b) an appropriate approach to design these components. In Chapter 3, 
we forward an evaluative literature study in order to (a) substantiate the problem 
statement and study objective, (b) position the thesis within the context of existing 
research, and (c) identify aspects in the literature useful to the construction to our FCCI.  
Building on Part 1, in Part 2 of the thesis, we advance our integrated FCCI and the 
reasoning behind its sequential block-by-block construction. Part 2 consists of one 
chapter, namely Chapter 4.  
In Part 3, we discuss the eight building blocks of our FCCI and sequentially construct our 
FCCI. Part 3 consists of nine chapters (Chapters 5–13). The buildings blocks advanced 
in these chapters, which respectively and collectively explain what CCI is and how it 
works, are as follow: 
 Building Block 1: Theoretical anchor 
 Building Block 2: Organisation  
 Building Block 3: Intelligence  
 Building Block 4: Counterintelligence  
 Building Block 5: Cyber Counterintelligence 
 Building Block 6.1: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix – Horizontal plane  
 Building Block 6.2: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix – Vertical plane  
 Building Block 7: Delineation  
 Building Block 8: Cyber Counterintelligence Process  
Part 4 applies the FCCI (constructed in Part 3) as an organisational training concept. 
Practically, this entails a high-level proposition on utilising the FCCI as a tool in an 
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organisation’s CCI training and awareness programme. Part 4 consists of one chapter, 
namely Chapter 14 
In Part 5, we conclude the thesis with Chapter 15 by assessing the research questions, 
testing the hypotheses, appraising the FCCI research's significance and proposing 
areas for further CCI research. 
In summary, the thesis’s chapter division (which is discussed further in Section 2.3 of 
Chapter 2) is as follows: 
Table 1: Structure of the thesis (Author) 
PART 1: FOUNDATION AND CONFIGURATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
In these chapters, the need for and purpose of 
our FCCI are motivated. We explain the 
essential features of a conceptual framework to 
which our FCCI should comply as well as the 
methodological approach required to construct 
an academically credible FCCI.  
Chapter 2 Features and Configuration of 
the Conceptual Framework for 
Cyber Counterintelligence  
Chapter 3 Evaluative Literature Study  
PART 2: OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE – 
BLUEPRINT AND DESIGN LOGIC  
Chapter 4 
 
Overview of the Integrated 
Framework for Cyber 
Counterintelligence  
 
This part is a high-level overview of our 
integrated FCCI. By means of graphics, the 
FCCI's eight building blocks and the synergy 
between these blocks are shown. The 
integrated FCCI is, by way of analogy, the 
'blueprint' of the thesis, the end-product of the 
research. It can, also by of way of comparison, 
be seen as the 'final destination' of the 
research.  
As a supplement to the blueprint, the design 
logic concisely explains the reasoning behind 
the FCCI's block-by-block construction. This 
design logic is thus a cursory step-by-step 
'construction manual' to guide the reader to the 
final destination.  
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PART 3 : EXPLICATION OF THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
Chapter 5  Building Block 1: Theoretical Anchor 
 
 
In these chapters, the 
various aspects that 
respectively and 
collectively explain what 
CCI is, and how it works, 
are described. 
Chapter 6 Building Block 2: Organisation  
Chapter 7 Building Block 3: Intelligence  
Chapter 8 Building Block 4: Counterintelligence  
Chapter 9 Building Block 5: Cyber Counterintelligence 
Chapter 10 Building Block 6.1: CCI Matrix – Horizontal plane 
Chapter 11  Building Block 6.2: CCI Matrix – Vertical plane 
Chapter 12 Building Block 7: Delineation  
Chapter 13 Building Block 8: Cyber Counterintelligence Process 
PART 4: THE FCCI AS AN ORGANISATIONAL TRAINING TOOL 
Chapter 14 The FCCI’s as an Organisational Training Tool  This chapter explores the 
FFCI’s application as a 
tool for an organisation’s 
CCI training and 
awareness programme.  
PART 5: CASE STUDY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter 15 Evaluation and Conclusion Here the problem statement, research 
questions and hypotheses are 
evaluated, and areas for further 
research on CCI are highlighted. Given 
the requirements for a doctoral thesis, 
we also observe on our FCCI's 
research's significance.  
In this section, we explained the structural approach of the study by outlining the five 
parts and the different chapters which comprise the thesis. In the next section, papers 
9 
and articles leading up to and flowing from our research to design our FCCI are 
discussed. 
1.6 RESEARCH LEADING UP TO AND FLOWING FROM THE 
THESIS  
This thesis forms part of a CCI research project at the University of Johannesburg’s 
Centre for Cyber Security. Details of this project can be viewed on the centre’s website 
at http://www.cybersecurity.org.za. Peer-reviewed papers and articles published and 
leading up to the thesis are:  
 Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms. S.H. (2013) ‘The case for cyber 
counterintelligence’ in Published Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop 
on ICT Uses in Warfare and the Safeguarding of Peace, Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Pretoria, South Africa, November (See 
Annexure A). 
 Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms. S.H. (2014) ‘Cyber counterintelligence: Putting 
counterintelligence in cyber counterintelligence’ in Published Proceedings of the 
13th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Piraeus, Greece, 
July (See Annexure B). 
 Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms. S.H. (2015) ‘Cyber counterintelligence: Back to 
the future’, Journal of Information Warfare, 13(4):42–56 (See Annexure C). 
 Duvenage, P.C., von Solms, S.H. & Corregedor, M. (2015) ‘The cyber 
counterintelligence process – A conceptual overview and theoretical proposition’ 
in Published Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare 
and Security, Hatfield, UK, July (See Annexure D). 
 Duvenage, P.C., Jaquire, V.J. & von Solms, S.H. (2016) ‘Conceptualising cyber 
counterintelligence – Two tentative building blocks’ in Published Proceedings of 
the 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Munich, 
Germany, June (See Annexure E). 
 Duvenage, P.C., Sithole, T.G. & von Solms, S.H. (2017) ‘A conceptual 
framework for cyber counterintelligence – Theory that really matters’ in 
Published Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Dublin, Ireland, June (See Annexure F). 
 Duvenage, P.C., Jaquire, V.J. & von Solms, S.H. (2018a) ‘A selective literature 
review on cyber counterintelligence’ in Published Proceedings of the 17th 
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European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Oslo, Norway, June (See 
Annexure G). 
 Duvenage, P.C., Jaquire, V.J. & von Solms, S.H. (2018b) ‘Towards a literature 
review on cyber counterintelligence’ in Journal of Information Warfare, 17(4): 11-
25 (See Annexure H). 
 Jaquire, V.J., Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms, S.H. (2018) ‘Building the CCI dream 
team’ in Published Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security, Oslo, Norway, June (See Annexure I). 
 Sithole, T.G., Duvenage, P.C., Jaquire, V.J. & von Solms, S. H. (2019) ‘Eating 
the elephant – A structural outline of cyber counterintelligence awareness and 
training’ in Published Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on 
Cyberwarfare and Security, Stellenbosch, South Africa, February (See 
Annexure J). 
 Duvenage, P.C., Jaquire, V. J. & von Solms, S.H. (2019) ‘A cyber 
counterintelligence matrix for outsmarting your adversaries' in Published 
Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 
Coimbra, Portugal, July (See Annexure K). 
 van Niekerk, B., Ramluckan, T. & Duvenage, P.C. (2019) ‘An analysis of 
selected cyber intelligence texts' in Published Proceedings of the 18th European 
Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Coimbra, Portugal, July (See 
Annexure L). 
This thesis is categorically qualified as relying for content on, and as containing 
verbatim extracts, from the above-mentioned research. However, to arrive at the 
coherent FCCI presented in the thesis, we not only consolidated previous research – 
which include several original CCI constructs – but also offer substantial further 
syntheses as well as further novel contributions. 1 
In addition to the peer-review of the research outlined above, some key aspects of the 
thesis were included in papers/presentations on CCI at pre-eminent, non-academic 
events for information technology (IT) executives and practitioners. While the 
proceedings of these events were not published and academically peer reviewed2, 
                                                                
1  The author's contributions to the above listed research are quantified per "Annexures" on pages 194 – 
195. 
2 Since the proceedings of these events were not published and formally peer reviewed, they are 
not included in the thesis's reference section.  
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verbal and other interaction during these events were invaluable in configuring the 
FCCI’s design to practice. These events included:  
 Van Niekerk, B. & Duvenage, P.C. (2016) ‘Cyber intelligence and 
counterintelligence’, Information System Control and Audit Association (ISACA) 
Annual Conference (South African Chapter), Kempton Park, South Africa, 
August. 
 Duvenage, P.C. (2015) ‘Cyber counterintelligence – The silver bullet?’, GovCon/ 
AfricaCon, South African Government, Pretoria, South Africa, November. 
 Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms, S.H. (2014) ‘Cyber counterintelligence – What is 
it and what has recent history taught us?', IT Web Security Summit, Sandton, 
South Africa, May.  
 Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms, S.H. (2013) ‘Business cyber counterintelligence’, 
(ISC)2 Secure Johannesburg Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa .  
Throughout the thesis, CCI is emphasised and explained as an integral part of 
multidisciplinary CI. To this end, this thesis draws on, and contains extracts from, the 
following peer-reviewed contributions on CI by the author:  
 Duvenage, P.C. (2013) ‘Counterintelligence’ in Prunckun, H. (ed.), Intelligence 
and private investigation: Developing sophisticated methods for conducting 
inquiries, Charles C. Thomas Publishers, Illinois, US.  
 Duvenage, P.C. & Hough, M. (2011) ‘The conceptual structuring of the 
intelligence and the counterintelligence processes: Enduring holy grails or 
crumbling axioms – Quo vadis?’ in Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 33(1).  
 Duvenage, P.C. (2011) Open-source environmental scanning and risk 
assessment in the statutory counterespionage milieu, unpublished DPhil thesis, 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. 
In this section, we highlighted completed and ongoing research by the author drawn on 
for this thesis. In the next section, the chapter is summarised and concluded.  
1.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we introduced the primary problem statement, research questions and 
hypotheses of the study. The dire practical and academic need for an FCCI was 
emphasised. We argued that an FCCI is essential for establishing CCI as an academic 
subdiscipline, a topic of instruction and a research field. Moving from the hypothesis 
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that the FCCI can be constructed by inductive qualitative means, we outlined the basic 
structural approach to be followed. We then proceeded to highlighting peer-reviewed 
research drawn on for this thesis.  
To ensure that the FCCI we construct is academically credible, we have to be clear 
regarding what a conceptual framework is and what its features are. These aspects are 
examined in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 2  
FEATURES AND CONFIGURATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 1, the study’s problem statement, research questions, hypotheses, research 
objective and approach were advanced. In this chapter, the primary objective of the 
study, namely the design of our conceptual FCCI, is further unpacked and concretised.  
To be academically credible, the design of our FCCI needs to be clear in terms of what a 
conceptual framework is, what it should consist of and what it should do. In the interest 
of simplicity, these three questions are reduced to one central question that will guide the 
first content part of this chapter (Section 2.2), namely what are the features that the 
FCCI should have? To address this central question, in Section 2.2 we move from an 
examination of the notion of a conceptual framework in general to pertinent features that 
our FCCI should have. To this end, Section 2.2 comprises the following: 
 Subsection 2.2.1: Context 1 – Features of a conceptual framework as a qualitative 
research design tool 
 Subsection 2.2.2: Context 2 – Features of the conceptual framework as a construct 
aiding multidisciplinary research 
 Subsection 2.2.3: Context 3 – Features of the conceptual framework centred on 
Cyber Counterintelligence as an emerging Intelligence Studies field 
 Subsection 2.2.4: Integrated postulation on the criteria for a framework for Cyber 
Counterintelligence 
In the second content part of this chapter (Section 2.3), the features identified above 
are used as criteria to configure the design of the FCCI. Practically, this entails using the 
identified criteria to (a) determine the FCCI’s components and (b) configure an 
academically credible approach to construct these components. These components are 
then discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis by means of a tabulated outline. 
This outline is presented in Section 2.3 with the heading “Configuring our conceptual 
framework for cyber counterintelligence”. Graphically, we can map the chapter's flow as 
follows: 
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Figure 1: Layout and logic of Chapter 2 (Author) 
In this section, we discussed our approach to the chapter. In the next section, the 
notion of a conceptual framework is examined in three contexts ( in Figure 1) in order 
to identify features and then arrive at criteria ( in Figure 1) with which the FCCI 
should comply. 
2.2 FEATURES OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Given the infancy of CCI as an academic field, it is unsurprising that no reference to 
criteria for an FCCI could be found in the literature we consulted. Consequently, such 
requirements have to be derived by first looking at conceptual frameworks and their 
characteristics in other contexts. To this end, we follow a funnel approach in examining 

CHAPTER 2: CENTRAL QUESTION 
To be ACADEMICALLY CREDIBLE,  what 
should our FFCI  be able to do and of 
what should it consist ?

To answer this question, we need to establish
FEATURES that the FCCI should have.

We identify these FEATURES by examining 
the notion of  a  conceptual framework in 
THREE CONTEXTS, namely:
Context 1: Qualitative research 
tool/instrument (Subsection 2.2.1)
Context 2: Multidisciplinary research 
instrument  (Subsection 2.2.2) 
Context 3: Instrument used within CCI 
(Subsection 2.2.3)

By combining the
three sets of
FEATURES derived
from the three
contexts, we arrive at
a total of 11 CRITERIA
with which the FCCI
should comply
(Subsection 2.2.4).

We then     apply 
these    11 
CRITERIA to 
CONFIGURE our 
FCCI  
(Subsection 2.3).
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conceptual frameworks within three contexts, moving from the general to the specific. 
After each subsection, features for the FCCI are deduced.  
2.2.1 CONTEXT 1: FEATURES OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AS A QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN TOOL  
In the literature that we consulted, the term ‘conceptual framework’ is widely used as 
referring to a notional construct in the design and structuring of qualitative research – 
notably master’s and doctoral studies. In this context, the term ‘conceptual framework’ 
denotes a tentative postulation which combines the ideas around, and dimensions of, a 
phenomena that is to be researched. Smyth (2004) concisely defines a conceptual 
framework as “a conception or model of what is out there that you plan to study”. 
Maxwell (2012) describes a study’s conceptual framework as the “system of concepts, 
assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your 
research.” Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994) posit a conceptual framework as a 
visual or written product which “explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the 
main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts, or variables – and the presumed 
relationships among them”. While these definitions differ in exact wording, they all 
convey the idea of a conceptual framework as a preliminary construct which combines 
various components (concepts, factors, theories, etc.) and provides a coherent view of 
the research object. A conceptual framework is, in other words, both an overarching 
concept that binds underlying concepts (ideas, concepts, factors, theories, etc.) and the 
collective of the overarching and the underlying concepts.  
In addition to tentatively delineating the referent object (what is going to be studied), a 
conceptual framework advances initial explanations as to “what is going with these 
things and why” (Maxwell 2012). While existing theories and research are considered in 
its design, a sound conceptual framework thus adds insights. In this regard, Maxwell 
(2012) states: “…a conceptual framework for your research is something that is 
constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but the 
structure, the overall coherence, is something that you build, not something that exist 
ready-made.”  
The abovementioned insights a conceptual framework provides attest to its value as a 
qualitative research design tool which directs initial research phases (Smyth 2004). 
Early in the research process, a conceptual framework aids the development of 
relevant research questions, the selection of research methods and managing validity 
threats to the research project (Maxwell 2012). Insights the conceptual framework 
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provide regarding the deficiencies of existing research could, for example, guide the 
formulation of both research goals and research questions. Research questions, in turn, 
determine research methods and the validity of research. Maxwell (2012) depicts this 
relation between a conceptual framework and other aspects of research design as 
follows:  
 
Figure 2: Interactive Model of Research Design (Maxwell 2012) 
Since a conceptual framework delineates concepts and posits relationships between 
them, the conceptual framework is in itself a tentative theory. If used as a qualitative 
design tool in the early stage of research, a conceptual framework has as primary 
sources (1) the researcher’s experiential knowledge, (2) existing theory and research, 
(3) pilot and exploratory research, and (4) “thought experiments” which include 
synthesis and speculative model building (Maxwell 2012, Smyth 2004).  
While the FCCI advanced in this thesis is indeed exploratory in nature, it is the end 
result of a doctoral study and not a design tool for pilot research. Consequently, we 
cannot summarily and unqualified apply the characteristics of a conceptual framework 
(in the context of a pilot research design tool) to the FFCI. Nonetheless, the foregoing 
discussion does convey generic characteristics which transcend specific contexts and 
can thus be applied with circumspection to the FCCI. With this qualification, we can 
state that a qualitative conceptual framework generally would have the following 
features:  
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 The framework advances an overall schema which delineates a study object or 
field. This schema synthesises underlying concepts to provide a coherent view of 
the study object. 
 It has as components both the overarching schema and underlying (constituent) 
concepts. These constituent concepts describe the research object’s salient 
facets. 
 It describes components narratively and/or visually. Constructs aiding such 
narrative/visual description include definitions, classifications, diagrams, 
taxonomies and models.  
 It postulates the links and relations between the concepts.  
 It is derived through a qualitative process which draws on the researcher’s 
experiential knowledge, existing theory and research, as well as new research 
and theory. 
In this section, we examined the notion of a conceptual framework in the context of a 
qualitative research design tool and derived certain features which the FCCI should 
have. A central finding is that a conceptual framework’s components could consist of an 
overarching schema and constituent concepts (which can be presented visually and 
narratively). In the next section, we examine a conceptual framework within the context 
of multidisciplinary research.  
2.2.2 CONTEXT 2: FEATURES OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AS A CONSTRUCT 
AIDING MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH  
The use of a conceptual framework is of course not limited to that of a research design 
tool. The creation of a conceptual framework can also be the final outcome (end 
product) of research activities which range from papers and articles to master’s and 
doctoral studies. This doctoral study is a case in point. Such ‘end-product’ conceptual 
frameworks are proving particularly useful in contemporary research which increasingly 
deals with phenomena that are intrinsically interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary 
(Junghans & Olsson 2012). Since the FCCI deals with a field which (as will be shown in 
Chapters 7 and 8) is intrinsically multidisciplinary, the application of conceptual 
frameworks within the context of multidisciplinary research and the implications 
thereof for the FCCI’s design warrant further examination.  
It is important to note that the notion ‘conceptual framework’ retains its core meaning 
when applied to the multidisciplinary ‘end-product’ context. This is clear from the 
following definition provided by Jabareen (2009) in a multidisciplinary setting: “A 
[c]onceptual framework is…a network, or a ‘plane’ of interlinked concepts that together 
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provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena...Conceptual 
frameworks are not merely collections of concepts but, rather, constructs in which each 
concept plays an integral role.” More often than not, multidisciplinary phenomena “do 
not even have a skeletal framework” that can logically structure academic enquiry 
(Jabareen 2009). Therefore, there is a need for a notional structure which can on the 
one hand systemise existing knowledge (literature) and on the other hand direct further 
multidisciplinary academic enquiry (Junghans & Olsson 2012). A properly constructed 
conceptual framework can fill this void by establishing a ‘scaffold’ for evolving research 
(cf. Smyth 2004).  
Compared to the use of a conceptual framework as a research design tool (discussed 
in Subsection 2.2.1), producing a multidisciplinary framework as the end product is 
considerably more extensive and meticulous. Typically a qualitative methodology is 
followed. In the case of a multidisciplinary conceptual framework, such a qualitative 
methodology could consists of the following phases: (1) mapping of sources (2) 
extensive survey and categorisation of data (3) identification and naming of concepts, 
(4) deconstruction and categorisation of concepts (5) integration of concepts, (6) 
synthesis of concepts in a framework, (7) validating the framework, and (8) dynamical 
revision and modification of the conceptual framework (Jabareen 2009). As will be 
observed, this methodology entails creating new concepts through a process of 
considering but moving beyond existing thinking. Through this process, existing 
concepts are reconfigured and where applicable new ones are created.  
While the compilation of a conceptual framework involves theorisation, it is important 
that it also takes into account and reflect real-world practice (Junghans & Olsson 2012, 
Jabareen 2009). When the phenomenon being studied is linked to a profession or 
professions, the need for a conceptual framework to be synchronised with practice is 
even more imperative (cf. Junghans & Olsson 2012). Essentially it can be stated that 
practice should inform theory and theory should be relevant to practice.  
We can deduct from the discussion above that a conceptual framework within the 
multidisciplinary context has the following features:  
 A specific research area is demarcated and a comprehensive understanding 
thereof is provided. 
 Existing concepts are considered but also surpassed by designing novel 
constructs. Therefore, a framework’s building blocks comprise existing concepts, 
reconfigured concepts and new constructs.  
19 
 Existing knowledge and literature are structured in a manner conducive to further 
research. 
 The practice(s) of the related profession(s) are accounted for and reflected.  
 It is an artefact subject to modification.  
In this section, we examined the requirements for a conceptual framework within the 
context of multidisciplinary research. In the next section, features stemming from the 
FCCI's location within CCI as an emerging field of enquiry are identified.  
2.2.3 CONTEXT 3: FEATURES OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CENTRED ON 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS AN EMERGING INTELLIGENCE STUDIES 
FIELD  
In Part 2 of this thesis, we show that although CCI is multidisciplinary in nature, its 
primary conceptual taproots are in the academic discipline of Intelligence Studies. As 
suggested by the term itself (‘cyber counterintelligence’), CCI is more specifically 
located within the Intelligence Studies specialisation area of counterintelligence (CI). On 
a conceptual level, CCI concerns the application of CI constructs and principles to the 
cybersphere. On the level of practical execution, however, CCI is simultaneously very 
much dependent on the cyber-related disciplines of computer science and informatics. 
Since we focus here on deriving features on a conceptual level, CCI’s location within CI 
and Intelligence Studies is pertinent.  
The fact that our FCCI deals with an emerging field (CCI) within a discipline 
(Intelligence Studies) poses challenges arising from demarcating a crystallising 
academic subject. This has four interrelated implications for the design of the 
conceptual framework.  
(1) The framework has to duly consider existing intelligence/CI theoretical constructs 
and concepts when deriving the components of the FCCI. As stated in Section 
2.2, this does not imply that existing constructs are merely ‘copied’ and applied to 
the FCCI. Rather, existing constructs should be considered and evaluated, and 
those of value ought be refined or incorporated in novel concepts that explain 
CCI. 
(2) The FCCI has to clearly position CCI as a notional subset of intelligence and CI. 
Apart from conceptual clarity, such positioning also has the utility of interlocking 
CI and CCI when it comes to the practical execution of these functions.  
(3) As implied in the last statement, the FFCI’s design has to compute the fact that 
Intelligence Studies is the academic complement to the CI profession which has 
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CCI as a rapidly expanding specialisation field. Therefore, the FCCI as a 
theoretical artefact should not be about the generation of theory for theory’s sake. 
It should, to reiterate the point made in Section 2.3, reflect practice. While a 
conceptual framework is not a ‘manual’ to a profession, it ought to be more than 
abstract theory. Ultimately such frameworks condition our thinking and our 
approach to practice (cf. Duvenage & von Solms 2013). Thus, the FCCI’s 
components should be selected and designed to sufficiently explain how CCI 
works.  
(4) To aid CCI’s evolvement as an academic field, the FCCI has to provide a scaffold 
for organising “accumulated specialist knowledge effectively” (Krishnan 2009).  
From the aforementioned, we can assert that a conceptual framework within the 
context of CCI as an emerging intelligence and CI field have the following features:  
 It notionally and concretely positions CCI as a subset of intelligence and CI. 
 On a theoretical level, it draws on Intelligence Studies with due consideration of 
the imperatives posed by the practical execution of CCI which relies on the 
computer science and informatics disciplines.  
 It selects and designs components that explain how CCI works. 
 It provides a premise for organising accumulating subject knowledge effectively.  
In this section, we derived features from the conceptual framework’s focus on CCI as 
an emerging Intelligence Studies field. In the next section, we present a consolidated 
postulation on the criteria with which the FCCI should comply.  
2.2.4 INTEGRATED POSTULATION ON THE CRITERIA FOR A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Thus far in this chapter, we inferred features of a conceptual framework from three 
contexts that vary from the general to the specific. In order to be useful for our FCCI’s 
design, features from these different contexts have to be integrated and applied to our 
FCCI. In so doing, the features constitute criteria with which our FCCI should comply. In 
the interest of simplicity, we then cluster the criteria according to those pertaining to the 
purpose of our FCCI and those dealing with its components and design. Accordingly, 
this subsection consists of the following: 
2.2.4.1. Criteria pertaining to the purpose of the FCCI. 
2.2.4.2. Criteria for the components and design of the framework for FCCI. 
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To enable easier reference later in this chapter (Section 2.3, Table 2), criteria are not 
numbered per subsection but by following a continuous numbering format (1–11).  
2.2.4.1 Criteria pertaining to the FCCI’s purpose  
Flowing from the above, the following can be postulated as criteria with which the 
FCCI’s purpose should comply:  
(1) Provide a comprehensive and coherent understanding of what CCI is, of what it 
comprises and how it works.  
(2) Serve as a conceptual template for modelling CCI practice and its synergetic 
execution with broader CI.  
(3) Contribute to establishing CCI as an academic field. This should be done with 
due reference to its relation with intelligence and CI as well as with computer 
science and informatics.  
(4) Establish a premise for organising accumulating CCI subject knowledge. 
2.2.4.2 Criteria for the FCCI’s components and design  
The FCCI’s effectiveness in attaining its purpose depends on a sound design which 
identifies, incorporates and links various conceptual constructs (components). In 
respect of its components, the FCCI is required to:  
(5) Advance an overarching schema which narratively and/or graphically provides a 
coherent understanding of CCI. The schema must establish a notional nexus which 
not only binds the framework’s constituent components, but interlocks CCI with CI. 
(6) Contain constituent concepts (building blocks) that describe salient CCI aspects. 
Whereas the overarching schema is pitched at a theoretical level of higher 
abstraction, constituent concepts should be more concrete in that they reflect CCI 
practice. It must explain more concretely what CCI is and how it works. Practically 
this means that constituent parts should explain CCI tools, processes, execution 
and postures. 
(7) Describe components narratively and, if possible, visually. Constructs aiding such 
narrative/visual description should include definitions, classifications, diagrams, 
taxonomies and models. 
(8) In support of the overarching schema, provide additional postulations which explain 
the links between the various constituents as well as CCI’s interlock with existing 
theory, intelligence and CI.  
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(9) In the design of components, consider but also move beyond existing concepts 
by designing novel constructs. Therefore, a framework’s building blocks could 
comprise existing concepts, reconfigured concepts and new constructs.  
(10) Be derived at through a qualitative process which draws on the researcher’s 
experiential knowledge, existing theory and research as well as new research and 
theory. 
(11) Be qualified as a tentative artefact that is subject to validation and constant 
modification. 
This section concludes the first part of the chapter which is aimed at formulating criteria 
for the FCCI’s design. This was done through an examination of the notion of a 
conceptual framework in different contexts. Using these features and applying them to 
CCI, we inferred 11 specific criteria for an FCCI. In the next section, we employ these 
criteria to design and configure our FCCI in an academically credible manner.  
2.3 CONFIGURING OUR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
In the preceding section, 11 criteria with which the FCCI should comply were forwarded. 
These criteria are critical since they provide a footing for designing an FCCI that is 
academically sound. Using these criteria as a yardstick, we can proceed to identify 
concepts that are essential in explaining and notionally structuring CCI. In practical 
terms, these concepts are our FCCI’s components, which are twofold:  
(1) An overarching schema (i.e. the integrated FCCI – Chapter 4), and 
(2) Building blocks (i.e. the individual components of the FCCI – Chapters 5-13) 
We arrange these components in a logically sequential manner in chapters. The 
outcome of this process is an outline of our FCCI’s configuration as provided in Table 
2 below. To ensure that our FCCI is academically credible and grounded, in the 
table’s ‘Criteria Met’ column, these building blocks are measured against the 11 
criteria arrived at in Subsection 2.2.4. This is done by referring to the numbers 
assigned to the criteria.  
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Table 2: Outline of the FCCI’s Configuration (Source: Author) 
CHAPTER DESCRIPTION CRITERIA MET 
PART 1: FOUNDATION AND CONFIGURATION OF THE FCCI 
1 Introduction  Not applicable. 
2 Features and Configuration of the FCCI 
3 Evaluative Literature Study 3, 4, 10 
PART 2: OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED FCCI – BLUEPRINT AND DESIGN LOGIC  
4 Overview of the integrated FCCI  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11 
 
PART 3 : EXPLICATION OF THE FCCI's BUILDING BLOCKS 
5 Building Block 1: Theoretical Anchor 
 
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10  
6 Building Block 2: Organisation  
7 Building Block 3: Intelligence  
8 Building Block 4: Counterintelligence  
9 Building Block 5: Cyber Counterintelligence 
10 Building Block 6.1: CCI Matrix – horizontal plane 
11 Building Block 6.2: CCI Matrix – vertical plane 
12 Building Block 7: Delineation  
13 Building Block 8 : CCI Process 
PART 4: THE FCCI AS AN ORGANISATIONAL TRAINING TOOL 
14 The FCCI’s as an Organisational Training Tool  2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
PART 5: CASE STUDY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
15 Evaluation and Conclusion 3, 4, 10, 11 
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This section gave practically effect to the criteria with which the FCCI should comply by 
presenting a tabulated configuration of the framework. Table 2 shows that the FFCI 
complies with the 11 criteria which an academically credible FCCI should meet.  
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter’s primary aim was to concretise the study’s primary objective, namely 
designing an academically credible FCCI. To achieve this aim, the approach to and 
design of the FCCI have to comply with academically justifiable criteria. To this end, we 
examined the notion of a conceptual framework in three contexts to identify salient 
features. These features were consolidated and applied to CCI, thereby arriving at a 
consolidated list of criteria. We then used these criteria to evaluate the academic 
credibility of the FCCI's components, consisting of the integrated FCCI (overarching 
schema) and its building blocks. In the next chapter, we provide an overview of the 
relevant literature with the aim of establishing a structured base for our research.   
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CHAPTER 3  
EVALUATIVE LITERATURE STUDY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the preceding chapter, we concretised the study’s primary objective (namely the 
design of our FCCI). We alluded to the requirement that our FCCI should be based on, 
and move beyond, existing research and thinking. This research and thinking are of 
course reflected in existing literature on CCI. The primary aim with Chapter 3 - which 
incorporates Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2018a, 2018b - is to offer an evaluative 
study of CCI literature. To this end, the chapter comprises: 
 Section 3.2, which details the purpose and importance of an appraisal of CCI 
literature 
 Section 3.3, where we qualify the scope and nature of the literature review 
 Section 3.4, which explains the structural approach to the literature review  
 Sections 3.5 - 3.8, where CCI contributions are assessed in the following 
categories: 
 Section 3.5: Academic papers and articles  
 Section 3.6: Master's and doctoral studies  
 Section 3.7: Books 
 Section 3.8: Other literature 
In this section, we introduced the chapter's aim and outlined the approach we will 
follow. In the next section, we examine the purpose and importance of a CCI literature 
review. 
3.2 PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF A LITERATURE REVIEW 
ON CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Although a literature review is a standard component of dissertations and theses, such 
an appraisal is of particular importance for the design of our FCCI for the following 
reasons: 
 The study's problem statement and primary objective are premised on the 
assertion that in consulted literature, there is no overarching, conceptual CCI 
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framework. The literature review, which is more comprehensive than the cursory 
overview in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1), is aimed at corroborating our assertion about 
the current lack of an FCCI. In other words, a comprehensive literature review is 
necessary to substantiate the problem statement and objective of the study.  
 In Chapter 2 (Subsection 2.2.4 – Criteria for the FCCI’s components and design) 
a qualitative methodology that includes an evaluative literature study was 
identified as a requirement for our FCCI to be academically credible.  . 
 The contextualisation of the study against existing CCI research is necessary to 
substantiate the assertion that this doctoral thesis constitutes a significant 
contribution to the study field.  
 Since CCI is an emerging field, with a relatively limited body of knowledge, a 
selective assessment of existing literature is realistically feasible and can provide 
a 'scaffold' for positioning this study and adding future contributions to this field. 
This scaffold will thus complement our FCCI in structuring existing knowledge 
in a manner conducive for further research.  
 Because it deals with salient research done thus far, a literature review offers an 
insight into CCI's academic origin, emergence and development. In doing so, a 
literature view could provide some contours of CCI’s history. Observing on ICT 
and cybersecurity more generally, Caelli, Liu and Longley (2013) state: 
For any discipline to be regarded as a professional undertaking by 
which its members may be treated as true “professionals”, practitioners 
must clearly understand that discipline’s history as well as the place 
and significance of that history in current practice as well as its 
relevance to available technologies and artefacts at the time. 
This is also true for CCI. As is the case with other academic subjects, the historic 
self-awareness a literature overview provides could thus contribute to 
consolidating CCI as a distinctive subdiscipline.  
 As the literature review identifies research projects/institutions focused on CCI, it 
could aid academic interaction in this field. 
In this section, we discussed the purpose and importance of a literature review on CCI. 
In the subsequent section, we stipulate some qualifications to the review.  
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3.3 QUALIFYING THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
While a comprehensive literature review is necessary, it is not the study’s primary aim. 
Therefore, and within the confines a thesis chapter, the review is explicitly qualified as 
being a ‘selective’ assessment of ‘available’ literature. In line with this qualification, 
the literature review we advance in this chapter limits its focus in the following five 
respects:  
(1) 'Available literature' is deemed as works in the public domain. Due cognisance 
is taken of the fact that state security structures internationally generate and 
possess CCI-relevant research and training material, of which some are 
unclassified, but not freely available. The same applies to some corporate 
entities and cybersecurity vendors which, for various considerations, do not 
openly share CCI material. Such material is categorically excluded from this 
review.  
(2) ‘Available literature' is secondly deemed as referring to work published in 
English. Although cursory reference will be made to a few works in other 
languages, the search which informed the review did not purposefully cover 
untranslated CCI-research.  
(3) The literature review is furthermore ‘selective’ in that it predominantly focuses on 
material which explicitly addresses CCI. While overlapping themes (such as 
cyber denial and deception, insider threat mitigation, cyber intelligence and 
cyber threat intelligence) are important to CCI, a review of such literature would 
distract from the chapter’s aim.   
(4) The literature review is ‘selective’ in that it does not purport be an inventory of all 
CCI-focused work in English. Instead, in terms of academic works the review 
reflects on peer-reviewed, published work featured in selected platforms, 
namely: Scopus, EBSCO, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(I.E.E.E.E.) Explore, Springer Link, Google Scholar and Proquest.  
(5) Lastly, the literature review only covers salient contributions published up to 
Augusts 2018.  
 
Moving from the foregoing calibration of the CCI literature overview’s selective scope, 
the next section explains the structural approach to be followed.  
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3.4 STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO THE LITERATURE REVIEW  
A literature review should, of course, be structured in a manner optimally achieving its 
purpose and benefits. Given this literature review’s earlier stated purpose and benefits 
(Section 3.2), we considered a structuring per either (a) literature category or (b) 
chronologically – that is, in order of publication. On the one hand, the conventional 
approach of dividing reviews per literature category (for example,  articles, master’s and 
doctoral studies, books) would arguably be the best suited to plot existing, and to 
provide a scaffold for positioning future, CCI research. On the other hand, a 
chronological literature review would be more effective to convey CCI’s academic origin 
and development. To draw on the advantages both these options offer, we opted for a 
hybrid approach which incorporates a chronological thread with literature type. 
Practically, this means that the review is structured overall per the literature categories, 
namely peer-reviewed articles and papers, master’s and doctoral studies, books and 
other literature. However, and since the bulk of CCI academic work was produced per 
peer-reviewed articles and papers, this literature category (i.e. peer-reviewed articles 
and papers) is presented  chronologically in order to so convey CCI's origin and 
evolution. Where necessary for chronological coherence, our discussion of ‘peer-
reviewed articles and papers’ will also refer to publications from other literature types. 
This hybrid structural approach to the selective CCI literature review is depicted in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Structural Approach to the Literature Review on CCI (Adapted from 
Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2018b) 
LITERATURE CATEGORIES
Peer-reviewed articles and papers
(Subsection 3.5) 
Subsection 3.5 provides the
chronological thread of CCI’s
development. This is done by reviewing
predominantly articles and papers.
Where necessary for chronological
coherence, reference is also made to
other literature categories.
Each of these sections (Sections 3.6 to 3.8) appraises a
specific literature category and builds on the
chronological thread of CCI 's development provided
per Subsection 3.5.
Masters' and 
doctoral studies
(Subsection 3.6)
Books
(Subsection 
3.7)
Other 
literature
(Subsection 
3.8) 
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Thus far in the chapter, we have discussed the CCI literature review’s purpose, scope 
and the approach to be followed. In accordance, with the discussed approach we now 
proceed with discussing CCI literature per category.  
 
To assist the reader in tracking the direct relevance of literature to our FCC’s design, 
FCCI will be highlighted in red bold font in Sections 3.5 – 3.8, pages 30 - 41. 
 
3.5 PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLES AND PAPERS  
In line with Figure 3, this Section contours CCI’s evolvement with specific reference to 
peer-review articles and papers. Although somewhat of an over-simplification, CCI’s 
progression as a distinctive academic subdiscipline consists of the following phases: 
 Subsection 3.5.1: Foundational phase (pre-2009) 
 Subsection 3.5.2: Cyber Counterintelligence’s emergence as an academic 
research theme (2009 -2012) 
 Subsection 3.5.3 Cyber Counterintelligence crystallisation as a distinctive 
academic subdiscipline (2012 – present). 
3.5.1 FOUNDATIONAL PHASE (PRE-2009) 
As far as could be surmised from available literature, the explicit term ‘cyber 
counterintelligence’ first emerged in the US statutory security establishment during the 
early 2000s (see US 2004, French & Kim 2009). Prior to the 2000s, however, CCI was 
practiced in the statutory security establishment of the US and the security structures of 
some other countries. In this regard, French and Kim (2009) rightly assert that “cyber CI 
has existed de facto since the introduction of IT to intelligence, defence, and national 
security and has grown as FISs [Foreign Intelligence Services] have embraced cyber 
tradecraft.”  
Concurrent with CCI’s de facto existence in statutory security circles, a few sporadic 
academic articles in the 1980 and 1990s expounded key CCI notions - although without 
using the actual term ‘cyber counterintelligence’. Such notions included the advocating 
of an integrated CI approach, which not only has defensive and offensive missions, but 
also synchronises human and technical resources. The earliest peer-reviewed article 
found in consulted literature referring to such application of a CI approach to the IT 
realm is contained in the electronic library of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (I.E.E.E.). This item, authored by Stone and Tucker (1988), is entitled 
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‘Counterintelligence and Unified Technical Security Programs in Security Technology’. 
The authors expound effective CI as “unified multi-disciplinary concept” consisting of 
“proactive and defensive” missions. Stone and Tucker (1988) further argue that 
“advanced technology” is part of the multi-disciplinary CI entirety and thus serves both 
“proactive” (offensive) and defensive missions.  
In a related further contribution in the I.E.E.E. library, Stone and Bluitt (1993) further 
expanded on the idea of executing “advanced technological countermeasures” as part 
of “a pervasive counterintelligence (CI) mandate.” Also Stone and Bluitt (1993) directed 
their paper specifically at the US statutory CI effort.  
While both papers (Stone & Tucker 1988, Stone & Bluitt 1993) centre on rectifying 
perceived deficiencies in the US national CI endeavour thirty years ago, their key 
contentions on CI as “unified multi-disciplinary concept” of which “technological” 
measures are a part, hold relevance up to this day. Consequently, these early works 
have contextual and conceptual bearing on our FCCI’s design.  
No articles or papers of direct CCI-relevance were found in consulted databases for the 
seven-year period 1994 – 2001. The mid-1990s did, however, see the emergence and 
exponential growth of literature in the field of information warfare. Such books, to 
name a few, include those by Molander, Riddle & Wilson (1996), Molander et al. (1998), 
Denning (1999), Kopp (2000), Hutchinson & Warren (2002), Jones, Kovacich & Luzwick 
(2002), Armistead (2004) as well as Hutchinson (2006). The launching of specialised 
conferences and journals (such as the Journal of Information Warfare) further attested 
to the growing prominence of information warfare (and later on to that of its subset 
cyber warfare). For the overwhelming part, works on information warfare make scant 
reference to counterintelligence and vice versa.  
 The first peer-reviewed article identified that specifically employs the term “cyber” in 
conjunction with “counterintelligence” appeared in a 2002 issue of the Journal of 
Information Warfare. As suggested by the title of their article ‘Dominating the attacker: 
Use of intelligence and counterintelligence in cyber warfare’, Davey and Armstrong 
(2002) examine Intelligence and CI's role in augmenting cyber warfare. Cyber warfare 
in turn, is firmly positioned as a subset of information warfare. By “employing 
intelligence and counterintelligence techniques that are superior to those of the 
attacker,” argue Davey and Armstrong (2002), the “cyber warfare defender” is more 
likely to prevail. Davy and Armstrong (2002) urge a more “aggressive” posture that 
includes deception. One such example cited, is allowing the “attacker [to] gain access 
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to information that is actually incorrect, thus providing incorrect intelligence.” In respect 
of CCI’s conceptual evolvement and especially CCI's relation to cyber warfare, the 
contribution of Davy and Armstrong (2002) represents a milestone and is – similar to 
those by Stone and Tucker (1988) and Stone and Bluitt (1993) - of contextual and 
conceptual importance to our FCCI’s design. 
Our survey found no CCI-relevant publications for the next five years (2002-2008). 
Thus, in as far as consulted databases are concerned, CCI’s foundational phase was 
characterised by a few sporadic academic contributions.  
3.5.2 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE’S EMERGENCE AS A RESEARCH THEME (2009 -
2012) 
Following a sporadic foundational phase, 2009 marked CCI’s emergence as a specific 
research theme attracting growing interest. In that year, a seminal article appeared in 
the launch edition of the National Intelligence Journal (French & Kim 2009). This was 
the first academic publication (in consulted literature) to use the term "cyber 
counterintelligence.” In this article, entitled ‘Acknowledging the revolution: The urgent 
need for cyber counterintelligence’, French and Kim (2009) call on the US intelligence 
community to move away from the notion that CCI is mostly part of “defensive 
Information Warfare.” Instead, French and Kim (2009) urge the US to be more active 
and offensive in its approach to CCI. The work's relevance extends beyond the US 
context. French and Kim (2009) explicitly define CCI, explain CCI’s missions within the 
context of CI, and offer various other insights on aspects useful to the further 
development within this field in general and our FCCI in particular. Such aspects 
include the role of CCI in information warfare, critical infrastructure protection as well as 
the CCI process and strategy.  
No other peer-reviewed articles and papers were found in consulted literature for the 
2009-2012 period. It must however be emphasised strongly that the absence of 
academic articles on CCI in consulted literature, belies CCI’s emergence as a research 
theme two reasons. Firstly, there were several CCI contributions during this period in 
other literature categories (see Section 3.8 entitled ‘Other literature’)  and in 
publications not covered by this article’s selective review (see for example US Naval 
War College 2018, Library Guidelines on “Counterintelligence: Cyber Threat”). 
Secondly, the nature and extent of academic contributions on CCI from 2013 onward, 
strongly suggest that CCI attracted research interest in the preceding years (2009-
2012). Phrased differently, research was done in the 2009-2012 but the fruits thereof, in 
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the main, only reflected from 2013 onward. The initiation of CCI research at the 
University of Johannesburg in 2012 serves as one such example (University of 
Johannesburg, 2018a).  
3.5.3 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRYSTALLISATION AS AN ACADEMIC 
SUBDISCIPLINE (2013– present)  
As from 2013, a consistent stream of peer-reviewed papers and articles signalled CCI’s 
emergence as an academic subdiscipline. Indicative in this regard, the European 
Conference on Cyberwarfare and Security (ECCWS) in 2014, for the first time since its 
inception in 2001, featured a dedicated 'Cyber Intelligence – Cyber Counterintelligence' 
track. Internationally, significant contributions in English were made by researchers 
from the US, Australia, Sweden and South Africa.  
3.5.3.1   Contributions from the United States  
The bulk of academic contributions from the US stemmed from Utica College. Utica is 
a leading academic institution in the cybersecurity field and holds designations of 
academic excellence from the US National Security Agency, the US Department of 
Defense as well as the US Department of Homeland Security (Utica 2018). The 
college's Master of Science Cybersecurity programme offers CCI as a specialisation 
subject. This programme resulted in several “capstone project” papers (comparable to 
mini-dissertations in other countries) as well as a master's dissertation, with CCI as a 
specific focus (Knowles 2013, Black 2014, Fieber 2015, Putnam 2015, Justiniano 
2017). Since these contributions flow from a master’s programme, they are later 
discussed in more detail in Section 3.6 (‘Master’s and doctoral studies’). Suffice to state 
here that this Utica research constitutes indispensable contributions to CCI and our 
FCCI on the conceptual, theoretical and praxis levels.  
Also in the USA, the concept of CCI has been attracting interest from researchers at the 
Mitre Corporation. The Mitre Corporation is a prominent US federally funded institution 
with an estimated revenue of $1.4 billion (Bloomberg 2018). It provides "systems 
engineering, research and development, and information technology support" to US 
government departments such as the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Homeland Security (Bloomberg 2018). Mitre's prioritised areas of research include 
cybersecurity, emerging and disruptive technologies, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance" (Bloomberg 2018). In recent years, Mitre researchers have been 
pioneering work on denial and deception in cyber defence (Heckman et al. 2015). 
Branching out from their research on denial and deception, the “applications of cyber 
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counterintelligence” to "active cyber defense” was subsequently examined (Heckman et 
al. 2015; Stech & Heckman 2018). Flowing from this research Stech and Heckman 
(2018) contribute a book chapter, which is undoubtedly one of the most incisive and 
significant works on CCI to date. Its contribution to our FCCI is highlighted in Section 
3.7 (‘Books’). 
3.5.3.2   Contribution from Australia 
Subsection 3.5.1 pointed out Davy and Armstrong’s (2002) contribution as an important 
milestone in CCI's conceptual evolvement. As far as could be ascertained from 
consulted sources, CCI did not feature as a specialised theme within Australian 
academic circles before 2018. While Australian academics continued to make leading 
contributions to information warfare, also this literature for the most part made scant or 
no reference to counterintelligence more generally.  
However, in 2018 Stech and Heckman’s (2018) chapter was included in a book 
compiled under editorship of Australian academic Hank Prunckun. Prunckun is a 
leading academic authority in Intelligence Studies (notably on counterintelligence) and 
he is extensively cited in this thesis (Prunckun 2012, 2014, 2018). His book, further 
discussed in Section 3.7 of this thesis, hopefully signals growing academic interest in 
CCI also in Australian academic circles.  
3.5.3.3   Contribution from Sweden  
Albeit considerably more limited in scope than the research in the US, papers delivered 
at two I.E.E.E. endorsed conferences in 2013 reflected growing interest also outside the 
USA. In August 2013, at the European Intelligence & Security Informatics Conference 
in Sweden, Sigholm and Bang (2013) submitted a paper entitled ‘Towards offensive 
cyber counterintelligence: Adopting a target-centric view on advanced persistent 
threats.’ Moving from a statutory military perspective, the paper is primarily aimed to 
advance a “comprehensive process that bridges the gap between the various actors 
involved in CCI.” Sigholm and Bang (2013) present this model to specifically configure 
the “offensive CCI attribution process.” On closer scrutiny, this model does not actually 
deal with the whole “offensive CCI attribution process"; instead, it is limited to an all-
source information flow and analysis architecture to be employed for attribution 
purpose. Nonetheless, Sigholm and Bang’s (2013) work was informative to the CCI 
process we constructed as an FCCI building block (See Chapter 13).  
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3.5.3.4  Contributions from South Africa 
On the heels of Sigholm and Bang in 2013, Duvenage and von Solms (2013) presented 
‘The case for cyber counterintelligence’ at the I.E.E.E. endorsed 5th International 
Conference on Adaptive Science and Technology hosted in South Africa. The paper 
defines key CCI concepts and advance conceptual constructs which explain CCI and its 
relation to CI. Duvenage and von Solms’ (2013) paper formed part of a dedicated CCI 
research project initiated in 2012 at the University of Johannesburg’s Cybersecurity 
Centre (UJCC) from which several other contributions would follow (University of 
Johannesburg 2018a). UJCC’s website describes the project’s aim as establishing CCI 
as a multi-disciplinary field of academic enquiry within the South African context 
(University of Johannesburg 2018a). To this end, the UJCC project pursues two 
complementary, yet parallel research streams, aimed respectively at: 
1) Designing an overarching framework for conceptualising and explicating CCI as 
a distinctive academic field of enquiry, and; 
2) developing a framework for a CCI maturity model for application by state and 
non-state actors within developing countries.  
The FCCI advanced in this thesis is a direct outcome of the first research stream. 
Building on Duvenage and von Solms (2013), this research stream progressively 
advanced conceptual constructs to academically explain what CCI is, how it works and 
how it dovetails with other academic disciplines and theory. Such notional constructs, 
include a CCI-posture matrix model, CCI process model as well as a taxonomy of CCI 
tactics, tools, techniques and procedures (TTTPs). These notional constructs were 
submitted per the following peer-reviewed papers and a journal article:   
 Duvenage and von Solms (2014) ‘Putting counterintelligence in cyber 
counterintelligence’ in the Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on 
Cyber Warfare and Security, Piraeus, Greece.  
 Duvenage and von Solms (2015) ‘Cyber counterintelligence: Back to the future’ 
in the Journal of Information Warfare.   
 Duvenage, von Solms and Corregedor (2015) ‘The cyber counterintelligence 
process – a conceptual overview and theoretical proposition’ in the Proceedings 
of the 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Hatfield, 
United Kingdom.   
 Duvenage, Jaquire and von Solms (2016) ‘Conceptualising cyber 
counterintelligence – two tentative building blocks’ in the Proceedings of the 15th 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Munich, Germany. 
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The above mentioned works developed constituent parts of an FCCI, but did not as yet 
advances an overarching FCCI. In 2017, these works were synthesised with the 
forwarding of an overarching FCCI in a paper entitled ‘A conceptual framework for 
cyber counterintelligence – theory that really matters' (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 
2017). This paper subjected this thesis's core contentions for peer review to the 16th 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (See Annexure F). The positive 
feedback from the peer-review process described the paper, and by extension the 
thesis, as laying the foundations for a structured CCI approach.  
UJCC’s second research stream, to recapitulate, aims to develop a CCI maturity model 
with emphasis on governments and non-state actors in emerging countries (University 
of Johannesburg 2018a). The research stream adapted central elements of our FCCI, 
for application to a CCI maturity model (Jaquire 2018). Peer-reviewed papers on a 
framework for a CCI maturity model which affirms the utility of our FCCI are as follow: 
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017a) ‘Towards a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model’ in the Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security, Wright State University, Air Force Institute of Technology, 
Dayton (US).   
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017b) ‘Developing a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model for developing countries’ in the Proceedings of the 2017 IST–Africa 
Conference, Windhoek, Namibia.  
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017c) ‘Cultivating a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model’ Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Dublin, Ireland. 
 Jaquire, V.J., Duvenage, P.C. & von Solms, S.H. (2018) ‘Building the CCI 
dream team’ in the Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security, Oslo, Norway, June. 
3.5.3.5  Contributions from other countries 
 As was observed in Section 3.3, we did not cover or purposefully review literature in 
other languages. Nonetheless, we noted notifications of citations of our research (e.g. 
Duvenage & von Solms 2014, Duvenage & von Solms 2015) in some other languages. 
These citations not only point to a wider academic interest in CI but also suggest the 
utility of our FCCI. Two such examples are citations of our FCCI research in the 
following articles featured in publications linked to the state security structures of 
respectively Italy and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC):  
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 Huang , Z (2015) 分析了网络反情报的形成和发展的背景, 总结归纳了网络反情报的对抗性, 技
术性和隐蔽性特点. 提出在现代网络安全威胁形势下. 网络反情报具有保护网络重要信息, 打击网络
恐怖主义等非法 活动, 掌控敌对方网络情报活动等作用. 认为将网络反情报的理论和技术引入情报体
制 和 工 作   [‘Background, Characteristics and Significance of Cyber 
Counterintelligence’] in Information Research, Issue 12, People's Public Security 
University of China. 
  Teti, A (2016) ‘Cyber counterintelligence – Il controspionaggio nel cyberspazio’ 
[‘Cyber Counterintelligence – counterespionage in cyberspace’] Gnosis - Italian 
Intelligence Magazine, Information and Internal Security Agency, 4 (16).   
In this section, we examined CCI’s academic evolvement at the hand of an overview of 
peer-reviewed articles and papers. Specific reference was made to the pertinence of 
this research to our FCCI’s design. In the next section, master’s and doctoral research 
focused on CCI are explored.  
3.6 MASTER'S AND DOCTORAL STUDIES  
The search term ‘cyber counterintelligence’ (and variations thereof) showed numerous 
master’s and doctoral studies of possible relevance to a CCI literature review. On closer 
analysis, however, most of these studies do not have CCI as a primary focus and CCI 
is not explored in depth. Instead, CCI is cursorily referred to as part of the broader 
statutory CI mandate and mostly addressed within challenges faced by the US 
Intelligence community. Ferguson’s (2012) thesis entitled Increasing the effectiveness 
of U.S. counterintelligence: Domestic and international micro-restructuring initiatives to 
mitigate cyber espionage serves as one such example. For the reasons mentioned, 
studies such as this do not contain elements directly applicable to the construction of 
our FCCI.  
3.6.1 MASTER’S RESEARCH AT UTICA COLLEGE  
Bucking this trend, master’s studies completed at Utica College from 2013 onwards 
delivered contributions that are pioneering and invaluable in respect of CCI’s academic 
crystallisation and evolvement. While conducted within the context of US national 
interests and security, these studies have application and academic relevance much 
wider than the US. On the whole, important contributions are made to explicating CCI 
on the conceptual, theoretical and praxis levels. Consequently, these studies were also 
highly informative and useful to our FCCI’s design. The following are some examples: 
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 In his research entitled Applying computer network operations for offensive 
counterintelligence efforts, Knowles (2013) identifies key aspects of Computer 
Network Operations (CNO). These aspects are then aligned with the broader 
intelligence and CI processes. In so doing “counterintelligence skills and 
techniques” are leveraged to “assimilate cyber activities” into an organisation’s 
Intelligence endeavour.   
 Boawn's (2014) capstone paper entitled Cyber counterintelligence, defending 
the United States' information technology and communications critical 
infrastructure from Chinese threats argues for offensive CCI featuring more 
centrally in the US intelligence community's defences "against Chinese cyber 
aggression" targeting the US' "critical infrastructure and key resources" (Boawn 
2014). The study’s definitions of CCI-related concepts and his description of CCI 
execution draw on existing research. Boawn (2014) does not set out to and 
does not offer an overarching schema which explains CCI. Neither does he 
advance novel CCI constructs. Nonetheless, his research offers insights on 
CCI's role in critical information technology and communications infrastructure 
more generally. 
 Effective CCI, argues Black (2014), is multidisciplinary and involves unique skill 
sets. In his thesis, entitled The complexity of cyber counterintelligence training, 
Black (2014) proceeds with identifying the implications thereof for CCI training. 
Black then advances two useful notional constructs namely (1) a CCI training 
model and (2) a CCI training proficiency path. 
 As suggested by the research title, Putnam’s (2015) Digital mirrors casting 
cyber shadows - the confluence of cyber technology, psychology, and 
counterintelligence emphasises CCI’s multidisciplinary nature. Putnam (2015) 
points out that a successful CI (and thus CCI) programme should consider the 
opportunities that technology presents as well as certain psychological 
“principles of persuasions” and motivation. The study details some offensive and 
defensive CCI applications of these opportunities and principles. Emphasis is 
placed in this regard on optimising the CCI targeting and the recruitment 
processes.  
 The interplay between practice and theory which characterises Utica College’s 
research is reflected in Fieber’s (2015) commendable contribution The Iranian 
computer network operations threat to U.S. critical infrastructures. Fieber (2015) 
analyses “the Iranian computer network operations (CNO) threat to U.S. critical 
infrastructures” and proceeds with recommending defensive measures to 
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mitigate this threat. The paper culminates in a handy proposition on a phased, 
CCI process model “designed to mitigate conditions favorable to the attacker 
and restore the advantage to the organizational defenders” (Fieber 2015) 
 In a further outstanding contribution, Justiniano (2017), with the research title 
Advancing the capacity of a theatre special operations command (TSOC) to 
counter hybrid warfare threats in the cyber gray zone, examines CCI's role in 
the US military milieu with a focus on the hybrid threats posed by Russia and 
the role of CCI in mitigating and engaging this threat. Justiniano’s (2017) 
research is indispensable reading for examining CCI’s role in hybrid warfare 
more generally. The study identifies critical CCI roles and skillsets before 
proceeding to propositions on integrating CCI with the US “Cyber Mission 
Assurance (C-MA)” process in a manner supportive of “Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC).”  
As reflected from the preceding review and as will be seen in subsequent chapters, 
Utica’s research offers useful insights, and in some instances contributions, to our 
FCCI, on the conceptual, theoretical and praxis levels. Utica’s research include  
propositions on conceptual frameworks and models that explain aspects of CCI - such 
as CCI training (Black 2014), the CCI process (Fieber 2015) and various constructs for 
optimising CCI in countering hybrid warfare (Justiniano 2017). 
Unlike our FCCI, these studies do not advance an overarching conceptual framework 
which structure’s and expounds CCI as a distinctive subdiscipline.  
3.6.2  DOCTORAL RESEARCH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG  
In a similar vein, Jaquire’s (2018) a doctoral thesis completed at the University of 
Johannesburg is specifically focused on a specific aspect of CCI, namely A framework 
for a cyber counterintelligence maturity model. Like the preceding papers (Jaquire & 
von Solms 2017a-c), the thesis adapts central elements of our FCCI for constructing 
the maturity framework.  
The preceding two sections (Section 3.5 and Section 3.6) focused on academic, peer-
reviewed literature which range from papers and articles to master’s and doctoral 
studies. In next section, we assess books published on CCI. 
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3.7 BOOKS  
The past two decades has seen an exponential rise in the number of books from 
reputable publishers dealing with information warfare (see Section 3.5.1) and 
cybersecurity. However, until very recently, even outstanding books that address 
aspects of high relevance to CCI make scant reference to CI and CCI. One such 
example is Heckman et al.’s (2015) Cyber denial, deception and counter deception – A 
framework for supporting active cyber defense. Despite this work arguably setting the 
standard for future works on cyber denial and deception in general, only four sentences 
in the entire book mentions the term 'counterintelligence' and there is no mention of 
‘cyber counterintelligence’.  
The first book identified by the survey conducted for this thesis, which has a significant 
CCI focus, was published in 2012 with the title Reverse deception – Organized cyber 
threat counter-exploitation (Bodmer et al. 2012). Pitched as practicable guide for "IT 
security professionals”, Bodmer et al.’s (2012) work is highly significant also from an 
academic perspective. The book comprehensively examines the role of CCI in 
countering cyber threats through the engagement of hostile actors. In addition to CCI 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), the authors also explore CCI on a 
conceptual level. This includes postulations on CI missions was well as CCI's interface 
with CI and other Intelligence fields. In nutshell, Bodmer et al. (2012) is essential 
reading for any researcher interested in CCI. It is also extensively used and referenced 
in the design of our FCCI throughout the thesis.  
 At least in as consulted literature is concerned, the next book to include a pertinent and 
significant CCI focus was under the editorship of Prunckun (2018) and entitled Cyber 
Weaponry Issues and Implications of Digital Arms. While the book has several chapters 
useful to CCI, Chapter Two is pertinently dedicated to CCI. Under the title, ‘Human 
Nature and Cyber Weaponry: Use of Denial and Deception in Cyber 
Counterintelligence’, Stech and Heckman (2018) advance a masterful contribution 
which anyone serious about CCI has to consult. Stech and Heckman (2018) primarily 
aim to advance a “cyber counterintelligence framework in active cyber defences”. This 
system is “referred to as the cyber deception chain, to mitigate cyber spy actions within 
the cyber espionage ‘kill chain’ ” (Stech & Heckman 2018). To lay a foundation for their 
CCI framework, Stech and Heckman 2018) explain the need for CCI. They proceed 
with appraising CI definitions, status and existing frameworks with a view on application 
to active defense in CCI. Stech and Heckman (2018) furthermore observe the existing 
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body of CCI academic research. Proceeding from this basis, they present a CCI 
framework for “active cyber defense” (Stech & Heckman 2018). Stech and Heckman 
(2018) extensively cite, and incorporate notions advanced in, our FCCI research 
(Duvenage & von Solms 2014; Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015; Duvenage, 
Jaquire & von Solms 2016). A building block of our FCCI, namely the CCI Matrix (see 
Chapter 10, Section 10.4) is at the core of Stech and Heckman’s (2018) framework. 
Their work demonstrates the matrix's application by means a hypothetical case 
involving North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Russian Federation (Stech 
& Heckman 2018). Although published during the finalisation phase of our FCCI 
research, Stech and Heckman’s (2018) work nonetheless added considerable value to 
this thesis. (Please see Chapter 10 for more detail). 
This section evaluated salient books pertinent to CCI and our FCCI's design. We now 
proceed with evaluating other literature forms.  
3.8 OTHER LITERATURE  
Especially during the past eight years, there has been an upsurge in literature dealing 
with “threat intelligence,” “cyber intelligence” and “cyber threat intelligence”. 
Cybersecurity vendors, which are increasingly modelling their products and services on 
concepts, derived from the state security and intelligence realms in part fuel this 
upsurge. In contrast to the bourgeoning discourse on for example 'threat intelligence' 
and 'cyber intelligence', contributions to CCI are more limited but growing. In the main, 
contributions offer high-level explanations of what CCI is and point to the advantages 
that CCI practices could have in proactively addressing cyber insecurity. While 
‘commercial’, such works nonetheless contribute to explicating CCI in concrete terms 
and, in some instances, are consequently also of academic value. In this regard, works 
by Bardin (2011), Farchi (2012) and Lee (2014) can be singled out.  
The following examples of article headlines give a sense of the nature of contributions 
in commercial online literature: 
 ‘Cyber counter intelligence’, in Defense Tech Magazine (Carrol 2009). 
 ‘Ten commandments of cyber counterintelligence’ by Bardin (2011), first 
featured on the IDG News Service's online platform CSO Online.  
 ‘Offensive counter-intelligence and cyberwarfare – A paradigm shift in 
information security’ on the Information System Control and Audit Association 
(ISACA) website (Farchi 2012). 
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 ‘To thwart hackers, firms salting their servers with fake data’, in The Washington 
Post (Nakashima 2013) 
 ‘Cyber counter-intelligence makes a difference’, featured on the South African 
ITWeb website (von Solms 2014).  
 ‘Cyber counterintelligence: From theory to practice’ by Lee (2014), first 
published on the website of the cybersecurity vendor Tripwire.  
 ‘Shifting paradigms: The case for cyber counter-intelligence’, in 
InformationWeek (Firestone 2015). 
 ‘Counter-intelligence techniques may help firms protect themselves against 
cyber-attacks’, published in The Economist (2015). 
In our construction of the FCCI, we found CCI literature, such as those cited above, to 
be useful in delineating key concepts and principles but less pertinent to the actual 
design of our overarching FCCI.  
This section reviewed some examples of other literature on CCI. In section to follow, 
the article concludes with findings and observations on the way forward. 
3.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter was aimed at providing an overview and evaluating existing literature on 
CCI. We found that, apart from a paper directly flowing leading up to this thesis 
(Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017), no overarching conceptual FCCI exists in the 
surveyed literature. Consequently, we validated the thesis’s problem statement and the 
objective to construct such an FCCI. The evaluative literature review we advanced is 
also central to this thesis’s inductive qualitative methodology and its academic 
credibility (See Chapter 1, Section 1.4 and Chapter 2, Section 2.2).  
It is clear from the literature review that our research leading up to the FCCI constitutes 
a significant contribution to the field.3  Furthermore, since we followed a structured 
approach to the literature review, a 'scaffold' has been established to which further 
research on CCI as an emerging academic field can be added. The review’s usefulness 
in this regard was confirmed by the successful peer-review and presentation thereof at 
the 17th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security with the tile ‘A selective 
                                                                
3 This assertion is substantiated in more detail in Chapter 13 (Subsection 13.6.5). 
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literature review on cyber counterintelligence’ (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 
(2018a). Subsequently, an expanded version was published per invitation in the Journal 
for Information Warfare with the title ‘Towards a literature review on cyber 
counterintelligence’ (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2018b).  
The literature review concludes Part 1 of the thesis during which the foundation was 
laid for the FCCI’s construction. In the next chapters (Chapters 4–13), we present the 
FCCI and its eight notional building blocks.    
43 
PART 2  
HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
 
 
Part 2 presents a high-level overview of our integrated FCCI. By means of graphics and 
narratives, the FCCI's eight building blocks and the synergy between these blocks are 
shown. The integrated FCCI is the 'blueprint' of the rest of the thesis. As supplement to 
the ‘blueprint’, the design logic we present concisely explains the reasoning behind the 
FCCI's block-by-block construction. This design logic is a cursory step-by-step 
'construction manual' to guide the reader. Part 2 consists of Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the first part of this thesis (Chapters 1–3), we laid the foundation for presenting our 
FCCI. This second part of the thesis (Chapter 4) contains:  
(1) a high-level overview of our integrated FCCI, and 
(2) the condensed logic for constructing our FCCI block by block in the chapters to 
follow (i.e. Chapters 5–13) 
In the high-level overview, we synergistically combine the FCCI's building blocks into 
an integrated FCCI. Our integrated FCCI is, to use an analogy, the blueprint for the 
end product of this thesis's 'assembly line'. This high-level overview of the integrated 
FCCI thus gives the reader a preview of the study's final destination.  
The condensed logic, to extend the analogy, is a bird's eye view of the main points of 
the assembly line for constructing our FCCI. The condensed logic is thus the narrative 
explicated step-by-step 'manual' which explains to the reader (in broad terms) how we 
will arrive at the final destination. 
Being the study’s 'manual', the reader can thus refer back to this chapter for clarity in 
reading subsequent chapters (Chapters 5–13). This chapter draws on, and contains 
verbatim extracts from, the peer-reviewed paper by Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 
(2017), which is attached to this thesis as Annexure F. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 4.2: Overview of the integrated framework for cyber counterintelligence 
 Section 4.3: Sequential design logic of the framework for cyber 
counterintelligence 
 Section 4.4: Conclusion  
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4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.5) and Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), we referred to the eight building 
blocks of our FCCI. We mentioned that each of these building blocks is essential to 
explain different dimensions of effective CCI. Viewed separately and on their own, each 
building block can however explain fully neither CCI's respective dimensions nor CCI as 
a whole. The explanatory power of the FCCI as an academic construct, as well as its 
usefulness in CCI practice, lies in the synergy between its eight building blocks. In this 
case, the whole (integrated FCCI) is indeed more than the sum of its parts (building 
blocks). 
This integrated synergy can graphically be presented as follows: 
 
Figure 4: Integrated FCCI (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017)  
In this section, we emphasised the importance of synergistically integrating the various 
CCI building blocks. We then graphically depicted the integrated FCCI to serve as a 
'blueprint' and preview of the thesis's 'destination'. In the next section, we provide the 
condensed logic behind the FCCI's block-by-block construction. 
4.3 SEQUENTIAL DESIGN LOGIC OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Whereas we integrated the CCI's building blocks in Section 4.2, a cursory explanation 
of the logic of the FCCI require us to 'deconstruct' Figure 4 and then 'reassemble' the 
FFCI block by block. To explain the logic, broad reference is made to the substance of 
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each building block. Inevitably, this results in some duplication in Chapters 5 to 13. 
Likewise, graphical depictions of the addition of FCCI building blocks in this chapter 
(Figures 5–13) are repeated in subsequent chapters (5–13).  
Since this chapter is intended to guide the reader through the rest of the thesis, we link 
the building blocks with the specific chapters devoted to their detailed discussion. This 
is done by stipulating the applicable chapter in brackets for each heading, for 
example:  
4.3.1 Building Block 1: Theoretical Anchor (Chapter 5) 
In this subsection, we explicated our approach to discussing the FCCI's sequential 
design logic. We now proceed with the block-by-block assembly and explanation of the 
sequential logic of our FCCI. 
4.3.1  BUILDING BLOCK 1: THEORETICAL ANCHOR (CHAPTER 5)  
In Chapter 5, we start by anchoring our FCCI in theory. This is necessary since an 
academic credible FCCI has to be anchored in and build upon existing theory (see 
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2). This theoretical anchoring is therefore the FCCI’s first 
building block. Building Block 1 positions the FCCI as part of the existing theoretical 
discourse and advances the core theoretical contentions on which we base the FCCI's 
subsequent building blocks. Graphically, the FCCI's theoretical anchor can be depicted 
as follows:  
Figure 5: Building Block 1 – Theoretical Anchor (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 
2017) 
4.3.2  BUILDING BLOCK 2: ORGANISATION (CHAPTER 6)  
CCI ultimately exists because of, and has to be configured in accordance with, the 
interests of the ‘organisation’ it serves. This generic concept of an organisation refers to 
various types of entities, ranging from nation states and multinational corporates to 
smaller businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Since it is CCI's 
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raison d'être, the organisation is Building Block 2 of our FCCI and is discussed in 
Chapter 6. Graphically, we can depict the addition of this building block as follows: 
Figure 6: Building Block 2 –Organisation (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
4.3.3  BUILDING BLOCK 3: INTELLIGENCE (CHAPTER 7)  
While it is an indispensable instrument, CCI cannot secure and pursue an 
organisation’s interests all by and for itself. It has to be done as part of an 
organisation’s intelligence endeavour. By way of analogy, CCI is but one ‘tool type’ 
within an organisation’s intelligence ‘toolkit’. Therefore, intelligence is advanced and 
discussed in Chapter 7 as Building Block 3 of our FCCI. The addition of intelligence 
as a building block can graphically be illustrated as follows:  
Figure 7: Building Block 3 – Intelligence (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
In Chapter 7, we show CCI to be interlinked with all three primary elements of 
intelligence, namely: (1) positive intelligence, (2) CI and (3) covert action.  
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4.3.4  BUILDING BLOCK 4: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CHAPTER 8)  
Although it is indeed interlinked with all three primary elements of intelligence, CCI is 
per definition and in practice a subset of CI. By way of analogy, CCI is one of the ‘tool 
types’ within the CI ‘toolset’. Practically and conceptually, CCI is thus interwoven with 
the whole of the multidisciplinary CI effort. In other words, CCI is not a neat 
compartment within CI; it involves, and requires the clarity of all the other CI fields. 
Consequently, CI constitutes Building Block 4 of the FCCI. Given its importance to our 
FCCI, this building block is one of the building blocks most comprehensively discussed 
in this thesis (Chapter 8). This includes outlining a four-sector CI matrix consisting of 
offensive–defensive and passive–active axes. The CI matrix is explained in this chapter 
with a view to its application to CCI per Building Block 6 later on (in Chapters 11 and 
12). Graphically, the addition of CI as the FCCI’s fourth building block can be depicted 
as follows: 
 
Figure 8: Building Block 4 – CI (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
4.3.5  BUILDING BLOCK 5: CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CHAPTER 9)  
While firmly dovetailed with multidisciplinary CI, CCI is above all a technical tool type. 
The CCI tool type, which we advance as Building Block 5 of our FCCI, comprises an 
extensive range of tools (technologies, measures and techniques). Most of these tools 
are not unique to CCI. What is unique is the application thereof in combination with 
other CI tools and in a manner best achieving CI’s defensive and offensive missions. 
The addition of this building block can be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 9: Building Block 5 – CCI (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
4.3.6  BUILDING BLOCK 6: CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATRIX (CHAPTER 10 
AND CHAPTER 11)  
In Subsection 4.3.5 (Building Block 5), we noted that CCI tools can be deployed in 
offensive and defensive modes. A significant part of these tools can also be deployed in 
a passive and active mode. Optimally, CCI requires the employment of tools in all of the 
said modes. Effective CCI furthermore requires synergetic execution on the technical-
tactical, operational and strategic levels.  
To conceptually aid this complex task we add the following four-quadrant, three-tiered 
matrix as Building Block 6 of our FCCI: 
 
 Figure 10: CCI Matrix (Author) 
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As depicted in Figure 10, the matrix’s horizontal plane, explains CCI’s passive-
defensive and active-offensive modes. This horizontal plane is discussed in Chapter 10. 
Chapter 11 proceeds with explaining the three-levels on which CCI functions as the 
matrix’s vertical plane.  
Graphically, the addition of the matrix to our FCCI looks like this: 
 
 
Figure 11: Building Block 6 – Application of the CCI Matrix (Duvenage, Sithole & 
von Solms 2017) 
4.3.7  BUILDING BLOCK 7: DELINEATION (CHAPTER 12) 
Even with all the previous building blocks in place, an organisation would seldom be 
able or legally allowed to execute the entire CCI endeavour on its own. Even nation 
states have to cooperate with non-state actors to achieve national goals. Consequently, 
effective CCI requires cooperation with other actors and delineating respective roles. 
Delineation is also important in the academic context. Treating CCI as a too wide and 
encompassing field will result in loss of focus. Simultaneously, CCI must be clear in 
terms of its relation with various other academic subjects and the areas of 
multidisciplinary research.  
We can illustrate the addition of delineation and cooperation as the next building block 
of the FCCI as follows:  
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Figure 12: Building Block 7 – Delineation (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
4.3.8  BUILDING BLOCK 8: CCI   PROCESS (CHAPTER 13) 
The foregoing building blocks provide nearly all of the ‘parts’ necessary to academically 
explain and practically execute CCI. However, at this juncture, these parts – and thus 
the FCCI – are still ‘static’. They lack the dynamism that synergistically combines and 
drives these different parts as an integrated process. Consequently, a CCI process 
model is proposed as the last building block of the FCCI. The addition of the CCI 
process as the eighth and last building block of our FCCI can be depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 13: Building Block 8 – CCI Process (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
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4.4 CONCLUSION  
Whereas we integrated the CCI's building blocks in Section 4.2, a cursory explanation 
of the logic of the FCCI required as to 'de-construct' the integrated FCCI and the 
explain the building blocks.     
In Part 2 of the thesis, which comprises Chapter 4, we thus presented the integrated 
FCCI and then briefly explained the logic behind its eight building blocks. This is 
intended to serve as a guide to the reader for the purpose of the more detailed 
explication of the FCCI’s building blocks in Part 3 of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
53 
PART 3 
EXPLICATION OF THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE 
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
In Part 3, we discuss the eight building blocks of our FCCI and sequentially construct 
the framework. The building blocks advanced in these chapters, which respectively and 
collectively explain what CCI is and how it works, are as follows: 
 Chapter  5 - Building Block 1: Theoretical anchor 
 Chapter  6 - Building Block 2: Organisation  
 Chapter  7 - Building Block 3: Intelligence  
 Chapter  8 - Building Block 4: Counterintelligence  
 Chapter  9 - Building Block 5: Cyber Counterintelligence 
 Chapter 10 - Building Block 6.1: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix – Horizontal 
plane. 
 Chapter 11 - Building Block 6.2: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix – Vertical 
plane. 
 Chapter 12 - Building Block 7: Delineation  
 Chapter 13 - Building Block 8: Cyber Counterintelligence Process  
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CHAPTER 5 
BUILDING BLOCK 1 – THEORETICAL ANCHOR 
  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Part 2 (Chapter 4) provided an overview of the integrated FCCI. In Part 3, which consist 
of Chapter 5 – 13, we proceed with discussing each of the FCCI’s respective building 
blocks.  
Throughout the thesis thus far, we emphasised the fact that our FCCI is a theoretical 
construct. Without negating CCI’s multidisciplinary nature, we contended that the FCCI 
has its primary taproot within Intelligence Studies theory (see for example Section 1.1 
of Chapter 1 and Section 2.2 of Chapter 2). In this chapter, we position FCCI within the 
context of Intelligence Studies theory by means of the following sections: 
 Section 5.2: Theoretical anchor – Why it is needed and important as a building 
block  
 Section 5.3: Challenges in designing a theoretical anchor as a building block 
 Section 5.4: Qualifications for and approach to designing the building block 
 Section 5.5: Explicating a theoretical anchor as the first building block  
 Section 5.6: Conclusion  
Graphically represented, the positioning of a theoretical anchor as the FCCI’s first 
building block is as follows:  
 
Figure 14: Building Block 1 – Theoretical Anchor (Duvenage, Sithole & von 
Solms, 2017)   
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5.2 THEORETICAL ANCHOR – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND 
IMPORTANT AS A BUILDING BLOCK  
A theoretical anchor is needed and important for two interrelated sets of reasons, 
namely: 
(1) Academic reasons, and 
(2) Practical imperatives  
5.2.1 ACADEMIC REASONS 
The theoretical anchoring of our FCCI is necessary because it is required by academic 
exactitude and sound methodology. As a theoretical construct, our FCCI cannot be a 
loose-standing, theoretical island. In line with the requirements discussed in Chapter 2, 
our FCCI should coherently make clear what CCI is and how it works. To be coherent, 
logical and academically credible, this begins with fundamental notions of intelligence 
theory. Intelligence theory is overlaid on international relations theory in general, and 
the concept of 'national security' specifically. This means that our FCCI should reflect 
such thinking. Moreover, cognisance of long-established "international relationship 
scholarship" notions will aid us not only in design the FCCI, but also in properly 
understanding and appraising contemporary cybersecurity issues (Buchanan 2016).  
Clearly then, to be academically credible, the FCCI has to duly consider and position 
itself as part of the existing theoretical discourse. Such anchoring provides a nexus for 
linking CCI with other academic fields and discourses. Properly designed, Building 
Block 1 acts as the central notional node that binds all further FCCI theory. It is the 
anchor to which we can constantly refer back when designing further FCCI building 
blocks.  
5.2.2 PRACTICAL IMPERATIVES  
The anchoring of our FCCI in theory is also important from a practical point of view. 
Theory is often regarded as abstract thinking that has little bearing on, or use in, the 
‘real world’. Theory may even be deemed to be the opposite of practice. This is of 
course not the case – theory is highly relevant to practice and practice ought to inform 
theory. In the words of Lewin (as cited in Greenwald 2012): "There is nothing so 
practical as a good theory." This is especially the case for a complex field such as 
intelligence, and thus CCI (see Chapter 7 for the link between intelligence and CCI). 
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Commenting on the importance of theory, Betts (2004) asserts “intelligence failures” to 
be, for a significant part, the “result of bad theory”. Within CCI, the price of poor theory 
will ultimately be paid through more costly failures and damaging breaches. Theoretical 
constructs are thus clearly not ‘nice to have’ academic ‘toys’. These constructs, which 
include frameworks and models, condition our thinking and our approach to practice. To 
summarise, effective CCI practice presupposes a sound theoretical foundation. Our 
FCCI is precisely an attempt to establish such a foundation by linking CCI with existing 
intelligence theory. To this end, the chapter draws on earlier peer-reviewed CI research 
by the author (Duvenage & Hough 2011 and Duvenage 2011). 
In this section, we highlighted the academic and practical imperatives of having a 
theoretical anchor as the first building block of our FCCI. In the next section, we 
highlight challenges in designing a theoretical anchor as an FCCI building block.  
5.3 CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING A THEORETICAL ANCHOR AS 
A BUILDING BLOCK  
Firstly, and contrary to what might be expected, Intelligence Studies is a relatively 
new discipline and is critically under-theorised (Johnson 2007). Moreover, in Chapter 
1 (Section 1.1), we noted this theoretical paucity to be even more acute in relation to CI 
and CCI. For reasons noted (in Subsection 5.2.1), Intelligence – and thus ultimately our 
FCCI – cannot be discussed without reference to theoretical thinking within Intelligence 
Studies' mother discipline of Political Science and notably the specialisation field (within 
Political Science) of International Relations.  
Our second challenge is that neither International Relations nor Intelligence theory 
is a homogenous body of thought. Not only are there various levels of theory, but the 
discourse is one of opposing meta-paradigms, multiple competing schools of thought 
and highly contested definitions.  
On a meta-paradigmatic level, for example, positivists ontologically and epistemically 
hold reality as existing objectively from the scholar. The latter can therefore de-link 
himself/herself and conduct analysis that reflects the “real world” (van den Berg 2018; 
Du Plessis, 2001). Post-positivists assume a directly opposing position. 
Epistemologically and ontologically, the researcher cannot be de-linked from and 
pronounce an objective reality (Sterling-Folker 2006). 
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Moving from these two meta-paradigms (and hybrids thereof), a wide-array of schools 
of thought exist within International Relations theory. These include, to name but a few, 
realism, liberalism, constructivism, radicalism and post-structuralism. Moreover, within 
each of these schools, there are several streams of thinking. Within realism, classic and 
neo-realism are examples of such streams. Neo-realism, in turn, comprises proponents 
of offensive neo-realism and defensive neo-realism (Lomans 2017). Within the confines 
of our FCCI, these different schools of thought (and their respective streams) cannot be 
discussed in detail. These two challenges shaped our approach, which is discussed in 
the next section. 
5.4 QUALIFICATIONS FOR AND APPROACH TO DESIGNING 
THE BUILDING BLOCK  
To meet the said challenges, we have opted to assume a theoretical position (neo-
realism) which in our view best explains intelligence, CI and thus ultimately our FCCI. 
We do so with four qualifications.  
Firstly, we assume a 'generic' neo-realist position without weighing the merits of 
other schools of thought or reflecting the different neo-realists streams. This does not 
imply a dogmatic conformation to all the core contentions of neo-realism or negation of 
the insight other schools may render if applied to CCI. 
Secondly, we are duly cognisant of the fact that realist theorists "generally do not place 
non-state actors at the center of their theoretical propositions." (Laksman 2013) 
Realism is (in respect of international relations) focused on the nation state, while this 
study is aimed at presenting the FCCI as a general framework to also guide the CCI 
endeavours of other types of entities and actors (henceforth referred to as the 
organisation). In a similar vein, and within the context of this thesis, actors in 
opposition to the own organisation can include diverse state actors, non-state actors 
(e.g. business, criminal and activist entities) and even individuals.  
 
Cognisance is taken of the fact that, at least normatively, an organisation other than 
nation states (or collectives thereof such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
[NATO]) is not supposed to exercise some intrusive, disruptive and destructive actions 
legally reserved for the security apparatus of states. Since there are definite differences 
between the powers of nation states and other organisations, neo-realist contentions 
can admittedly not be blindly applied to a generic FCCI. These differences between 
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states and other organisations are accounted for in our FCCI design (Chapter 12, 
Building Block 7 – Delineation). For the purposes of our discussion in this chapter, we 
discuss FCCI concepts in generic terms in order to apply them to both the state and 
mutatis mutandis to other organisations. With this qualification, and as long as it is done 
in an academically sound manner, we deem neo-realism as offering a workable 
premise to start explaining CCI in general and the FCCI in particular.4  
 
Thirdly, we present our ‘theoretical anchor’ by means of a layered approach. We 
followed this layered approach with the qualification that levels of theory overlap and 
are mutually supportive. Postulations on the paradigmatic, grand- and meso-theory 
levels are shown in this Subsection (see Figure 15 on the next page) as well as in 
Section 5.5 to be abstract and broad in scope. Theories’ different purposes are aptly 
summarised by Gill (2006) in his distinction between “theories of intelligence” and 
“theories for intelligence”. Theories of intelligence, says Gill (2006), are developed to 
“help academics research intelligence, come to understand it, and better explain it”. 
Theories of intelligence “relate immediately to the needs of practitioners”... In one sense 
there is no conflict between these two. A good theory of intelligence should, by 
definition, be useful for intelligence”.  
Fourthly, we recognise that ‘definitions’ are essentially a part of theory. In the interest 
of logical presentation, we offer denotative definitions later when presenting Building 
Blocks 3, 4 and 5 (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). In presenting the theoretical anchor in this 
chapter, for reasons of simplicity, we delineate concepts enumeratively.5  
With these qualifications, we can depict the contours of a theoretical anchor as our 
FCCI's first building block as follows: 
  
Please see next page for Figure 15. 
                                                                
4  For a detailed discussion on why realism and neo-realism, in our view, best explain 
intelligence, CI and (by implication) CCI, please refer to Lomans 2017, Duvenage and Hough 
2011, and Duvenage 2011. Also see Laksman (2013) for realism and its focus on non-state 
actors. 
 
5 Denotative definitions, such as those in dictionaries, describe a concept/object by means of a 
narrative description. A definition can also be enumerative. In contrast to a denotative definition, 
an enumerative definition describes the attributes of a concept and in this manner “conveys an 
‘idea’ of the thing defined” (De Vos 2006). 
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Figure 15: Contours of Building Block 1 – Theoretical Anchoring of the FCCI 
(adapted from Duvenage 2011 and Duvenage & Hough 2011) 
In this section, we outlined our approach to the theoretical anchoring as our FCCI's first 
building block. We discussed the challenges and qualifications pertaining to such a 
theoretical contextualisation. We concluded by graphically depicting Building Block 1's 
contours per Figure 15. In the next section, we discuss this building block in more 
detail.  
5.5 EXPLICATING THE THEORETICAL ANCHOR AS THE FIRST 
BUILDING BLOCK  
In this section, we narratively expound the FCCI's theoretical anchoring as Building 
Block 1. In line with the graphical depiction (Figure 15), the following aspects are 
addressed:  
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            -See Subsection 5.5.5 
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 -See Subsection 5.5.3 
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 -See Subsection 5.5.4 
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           See Subsection  5.5.1 
   PARADIGMATIC                                       
         See Subsection 5.5.2 
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(1) Meta-paradigmatic stance – Objectivity and reality ( in Figure 15) 
(2) Paradigmatic stance: The state’s quest for power, survival and prosperity ( in 
Figure 15) 
(3) Grand theory: Intelligence as a vital interest and category of state power (in 
Figure 15) 
(4) Counterintelligence as a meso-theory ( in Figure 15) 
(5) Our framework for Cyber Counterintelligence as a proposition on the micro-
theory and praxis levels ( and  in Figure 15) 
5.5.1  META-PARADIGMATIC STANCE: OBJECTIVITY AND REALITY  
As was noted in Section 5.4, we take neo-realism as the theoretical premise for our 
FCCI. On a meta-paradigmatic level, neo-realism is overlaid on a positivistic stance 
(see  in Figure 15). Positivism essentially states that an objective world (reality) 
exists separately from the researcher/practitioner. Therefore, as researchers and 
practitioners, we can (relatively) objectively observe and described this reality. Applied 
to our FCCI, we assert that our framework can relatively objectively identify, describe 
and guide the proactive mitigation of ‘real’ threats and risks to the organisation.  
5.5.2  PARADIGMATIC STANCE: THE STATE’S QUEST FOR POWER, SURVIVAL AND 
PROSPERITY  
On a paradigmatic level (see  in Figure 15), the neo-realist approach concerns itself 
with the nation state and its quest for power, survival and prosperity. Central neo-realist 
contentions are as follows (Taylor 2007; Snow 2004; Sterling-Folker 2006; Hough 2006; 
Johnson 2003, Duvenage 2011): 
 The (nation) state is the primary referent object of national security.  
 The state is a rational, sovereign and self-interested entity driven by the pursuit 
for national security (survival and prosperity).  
 The state pursues its interests based on its national security perception. This 
perception is typically embodied in the government’s policies, objectives and 
strategy. 
 Interests are pursued in an anarchic environment of intense competition and 
conflict with other self-interested actors. Although cooperation between actors 
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occurs, such cooperation is not of an altruistic nature. It is motivated by the self-
centred interests of the respective role-players and will only be sustained for as 
long as it serves the actors' self-centred agendas.  
 Its quest for survival and prosperity requires of the state to protect and expand its 
vital interests. These vital interest are pursued (against other actors) in the 
political, social, technological, economic, military, ecological (environmental) and 
informational sectors. Interests in these sectors do not operate in isolation from 
one another; they overlap and are interdependent.  
 The state’s relative power ultimately determines its success in pursuing its 
security and interests. This power vests in various categories, of which the most 
important are political/diplomatic, economic, military and informational. 
Consequently power is both an aim and a requisite for expanding prosperity and 
maintaining security.  
 While it may offensively strive to maximise its power (power maximisation), the 
state may also opt to defensively pursue security maximisation through for 
example moderate policies.6 
In this section, our main neo-realist contentions on a paradigmatic level were outlined. 
In the next section, we extend these contentions to the grand theory level.  
5.5.3  GRAND THEORY: INTELLIGENCE AS A VITAL INTEREST AND CATEGORY OF 
STATE POWER 
A grand theory of intelligence should provide a broad understanding of what intelligence 
is and how it functions (see  in Figure 15). In addition to binding theories on lower 
levels of abstraction (i.e. meso-, micro- and praxis theories), a grand theory ought to 
describe intelligence as a phenomenon by presenting overarching similarities and 
differences in specific contexts of time and place (Treverton et al. 2006). As suggested 
earlier, the road to a theoretical corpus of this nature is proving to be long and the 
progress incremental. While this discourse is gaining momentum, the following 
statement by Johnson (2007) still rings true: “Overall, the studies on intelligence theory 
find that the discipline remains in its infancy, holding great promise for scholars 
interested in blazing new trails.” In a similar vein, Duvenage and Hough (2011) assert: 
                                                                
6  We duly note that these two positions are, strictly speaking, the opposing contentions of 
offensive and defensive neo-realist (cf. Lomans 2017). For our purposes, however, the positions 
are not viewed as mutually exclusive.  
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“So incipient is this discourse that a considerable segment thereof revolves around the 
methodology and avenues that should be followed in the construction of this road.” 
While there are some contributions by postmodernist and critical-realist, most attempts 
to construct a grand theory of intelligence are imbedded in realism (cf. Prunckun 2012, 
Duvenage & Hough 2011, Taylor 2007, Gill & Phythian 2006). It is beyond the scope of 
this study to review incipient, individual contributions to a grand theory of intelligence 
and we serve the purpose by forwarding some main contentions which enjoy relatively 
broad acceptance in realists (including neo-realist) circles (Prunckun 2012, Johnson 
2006, Taylor 2007, Bernhardt 2003, Duvenage 2011):  
 Intelligence is underpinned by the self-centred, power-seeking nature of the 
state and the hostility of the environment in which it pursues survival and 
prosperity.  
 Intelligence epitomises information’s dual denotations in neo-realist theory, 
namely that it is simultaneously a class of vital interests and a category of 
power. 
 On the one hand, information is a class of vital interest that the state seeks to 
protect and advance. This is one of intelligence’s primary roles. In fact, 
intelligence’s reason for existence is to provide the state with actionable 
information on risks, threats and opportunities (Bernhardt 2003). This actionable 
information includes adversarial secrets.  
 One the other hand, information is a category, and intelligence an 
instrument, of state power. In addition to providing actionable information, 
intelligence actively engages adversaries in the information sphere. In 
providing intelligence and engaging adversaries, intelligence supports and 
maximises the other categories of state power. In this sense, intelligence 
maximises the state’s power in pursuing vital interests in the political, social, 
technological, economic, military, ecological (environmental) and information 
sectors. This engagement in the information sphere extends to information 
warfare. Information warfare and intelligence pursue, in tandem, the goal of 
“information superiority” (cƒ. Denning 1999, Hutchinson & Warren 2001, Davey 
&  Armstrong 2002 and Duvenage 2011). 
In the paragraphs above, we highlighted some neo-realist contentions on a grand 
theory of intelligence. In the next subsection, we extend this theorisation to CI. 
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5.5.4  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A MESO-THEORY  
Given the incipiency of the discourse on a grand theory of intelligence, contributions on 
CI theory is unsurprisingly even more limited (see  in Figure 15). Notable attempts 
are those of Prunckun (2012, 2014), Duvenage (2011), Taylor (2007), and Shulsky and 
Schmitt (2002). All the cited attempts ascribe to realism/neo-realism and are built on the 
notion that CI is an element of intelligence. This is aptly summarised by Shulsky and 
Schmitt (2002): “Once we understand that intelligence is part of a struggle between 
countries, we see why counterintelligence is not an afterthought but is rather an integral 
part of it.”  
Applied mutatis mutandis to the context of this study and an organisation, four neo-
realist assumptions (applied to an organisation) underlying the existence of CI as 
proposed by Taylor (2007) and described in Duvenage (2011) are:  
(1) An organisation possesses information that if compromised to an adversary will 
negatively impact its security. 
(2) An organisation has an intelligence capacity/structure(s) that collects and 
analyses information. The organisation strives to protect this information from 
unauthorised disclosure and tampering. 
(3) Adversaries attempt to access other organisations’ information/intelligence.  
(4) A low level of trustworthiness must be assumed in respect of most people. 
 
Moving from and adding to these assumptions, recent neo-realist contributions posit CI 
as having the primary missions of offense and defence (cf. Prunckun 2012, Duvenage 
2011, Taylor 2007, Shulsky & Schmitt 2002). The defensive and offensive missions 7 
are viewed as distinguishable but inseparable. They function in synergy to execute two 
primary foci (Duvenage 2011; Prunckun 2012, 2014):  
 Focus 1: CI’s first focus is to protect, defensively and offensively, the integrity of 
the own vital informational interest.  
 Focus 2: CI aims to compromise the informational integrity of adversaries. Like 
intelligence, CI is thus part of informational power. As reflected in our later 
discussions on CI as a building block of our FCCI (Chapter 8), the interlink 
between CI’s foci and its missions remains poorly understood up to this day.  
                                                                
7 Offensive and defensive missions are not identical to, and should not be confused with, the 
earlier discussed offensive and defensive neo-realist theorisation streams.  
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In this section, we outlined some contours of a neo-realist theory of CI. Since our later 
discussion (in Chapter 8: Building Block 4 – Counterintelligence) expands and 
concretises the foregoing theory as an FCCI building block, this subsection was very 
condensed in its overview. In the next section, we explain our FCCI as a postulation on 
the micro- and praxis theory levels.  
5.5.5 OUR FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A PROPOSITION 
ON THE MICRO- AND PRAXIS THEORY LEVELS  
To reiterate, our FCCI is a theory of intelligence since it pertains to the immediate 
needs of practitioners. In a finer distinction, theories of intelligence can be divided in 
micro- and praxis theories (cf. Duvenage & Hough 2011, Duvenage 2011). Micro-
theories typically deal with a specialised area of expertise in a manner which link 
practice with theories on higher levels of abstraction (i.e. with grand and meso-
theories). As suggested by the term, ‘praxis’ postulations describe concretely the 
TTTPs employed in practice. (See and  in Figure 15.) 
In addition to dovetailing praxis with higher theories, micro-theory’s purpose is to 
provide a ‘scaffold’ to structure existing knowledge and aid further research on the 
execution of a specialisation field – in this case CCI. As we explained in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.2), our FCCI is a conceptual framework with precisely this purpose. 
However, our FCCI is not a ‘pure’ micro-theory. It is also a model to be used in 
performing ‘actual’ CCI work practically (praxis). In explaining our FCCI later on, CCI 
TTTPs (process) are detailed in Chapters 9, 10, 11 and 13. In this respect, our FCCI 
therefore also contains elements of praxis postulations. (This is depicted in and   
in Figure 15.) 
In this section, we explained our FCCI as a theoretical proposition that spans the micro- 
and praxis levels. This proposition is the final contour of our FCCI's first building block.  
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we set out to present a theoretical anchor as our FCCI's first building 
block. We emphasised that to be academically credible and practically useful, the FCCI 
has to be duly considered and positioned as part of the existing theoretical discourse. 
Such anchoring inter alia provides a nexus for linking CCI with other academic fields.  
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To this end, we contoured Building Block 1 by discussing various levels of theory 
ranging from the meta-paradigmatic to the praxis level. Albeit very cursory, we 
illustrated the way in which our thinking on higher levels of abstraction (meta-, 
paradigmatic, grand and meso-levels) impacts our approach to the functional and 
practical levels (i.e. micro- and praxis level).   
With our FCCI theoretically anchored, we now proceed to the next chapter, where we 
discuss the organisation as Building Block 2.   
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CHAPTER 6 
BUILDING BLOCK 2 – ORGANISATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
If 'theory' is our FCCI's anchor, then the organisation is its pivot. Ultimately, and as 
will be shown in the rest of this and other chapters (notably Chapters 9–13), CCI exists 
because of and for the organisation it serves. As was observed in Chapter 5 (Section 
5.4) ‘organisation’ - within the context of its use here - is an extendable term which 
could denote state actors, non-state actors (e.g. business, criminal, terrorist and activist 
entities) and even individuals. Therefore, the nature of the organisation and its needs 
shape the CCI endeavour. Clearly then, we cannot conceptually structure and 
understand CCI if we do not understand the organisation it serves. Accordingly, in this 
chapter, the organisation is advanced as our FCCI's second building block. Graphically, 
the addition of the organisation as our FCCI's pivot and Building Block 2 can be 
depicted as follows: 
 
 
Figure 16: Building Block 2 – Organisation (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms, 
2017) 
 
To present the organisation as our FCCI's second build block, the rest of this chapter is 
structured as follows:  
 Section 6.2: Organisation – Why it is needed and important as a building block 
 Section 6.3: Central aspects pertinent to the organisation  as a building block  
 Section 6.4: Demarcating the organisation's informational interests 
 Section 6.5: Organisational risk management and its relation to CCI  
 Section 6.6: Summary and conclusion  
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6.2 ORGANISATION – WHY IS IT NEEDED AND IMPORTANT AS A 
BUILDING BLOCK 
The organisation is advanced as the FCCI’s pivot and second building block for 
reasons of theory and practicality.  
In line with our neo-realist theoretical position, the organisation and the pursuance of its 
interests predominate. Seen through this lens, CCI is ultimately about maximising the 
organisation’s power by protecting and advancing its interests. Therefore, and as 
mentioned earlier (Section 6.1), CCI exists because of and for the organisation it 
serves. In applying the neo-realist notion, we view the organisation as a self-interested 
actor driven by the need to secure and expand its interests. The organisation does this 
in conflict and competition with other actors (adversaries) and in a hostile environment. 
Also practically, effective CCI crucially depends on profound knowledge of the 
organisation. If treated as an 'add-on' or 'plug in', CCI will imperil rather than benefit the 
organisation it is supposed to benefit. Effective CCI needs to be part of the 
organisational 'DNA'. Consequently, sound CCI does not start with on-the-network 
actions; it starts with a profound understanding of the organisation itself, its 
strategy, its competition and the environment in which it operates. Against 
sophisticated adversaries, for example, the organisation’s staging of honeynets and the 
content filling of honeypots, honeyfiles and honeytokens have to be attuned to the 
organisation itself, its adversaries and its environment (Bodmer et al. 2012; Duvenage, 
Sithole & von Solms 2017). Clearly then, CCI is not an afterthought to, but an integral 
part of, organisational strategy Intelligence and CI. Graphically, this synergetic dynamic 
can be depicted as follows: 
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Figure 17: CCI in the context of Strategy, Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
(Duvenage & von Solms 2014) 
As neo-realism puts the state at the centre of security and prosperity, our FCCI posits 
the more generic concept of an organisation as the pivot of the framework. This 
understanding shapes CCI on all levels, namely strategic, operational, tactical and 
technical. (See Chapter 11 for a discussion of these different CCI levels within the 
organisation.) The positioning of the organisation as the FCCI's second building block 
furthermore provides a nexus for contributions to CCI from other academic fields such 
as Business Studies and Management Science.  
6.3 CENTRAL ASPECTS PERTINENT TO THE ORGANISATION 
AS A BUILDING BLOCK  
Since the aforementioned CCI levels are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11, we 
can for our purpose here assert in more general terms that the design of the CCI 
endeavour starts with clear understanding of the following organisational aspects 
(see Duvenage 2011): 
 The organisation's vision, objectives and strategy which in effect concretise the 
vital interests that the organisation aspire to protect and procure in order to be more 
safe and prosperous.  
 Organisational strengths (including the vital interests it possesses) and 
weaknesses (vulnerabilities). 
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 The environment in which the organisation functions. Of particular importance are 
the actual/potential impact of current, as well as anticipated trends, in the 
organisation reaching its objectives and expanding its prosperity. Since it will 
decisively influence the organisation's CCI endeavour; the legal, regulatory and 
governance context within which the organisation operates is equally important. 
(See Section 6.4 and Building Block 7: Delineation per Chapter 12, Subsection 
11.3.1) 
 Actual and potential competitors/adversaries and, in this instance, the 
implications/impact thereof for the organisation attaining its objectives.  
 
Moving from these central organisational aspects, the next section reflects on the 
importance of demarcating an organisation's informational interest.  
6.4 DEMARCATING THE ORGANISATION'S INFORMATIONAL 
INTERESTS 
An understanding of the above mentioned general aspects is foundational to ascertaining 
what ought to lie at the heart of intelligence, CI and CCI efforts, namely clear 
demarcating what the organisation's informational interests are. These informational 
interests, to apply the neo-realist theory forwarded earlier in this chapter as well as in 
Chapter 5, comprise the following interrelated facets (as described in Duvenage 2011): 
(1) Informational interests encompass the informational assets which the organisation 
possesses, values and protects. This encompasses the whole body of information 
at the organisation's avail that is necessary for its survival, prosperity as well as the 
expansion of its vital interests in other areas. These informational assets are of both 
a tangible and intangible nature, and denote the systems, institutions, processes and 
people that gather, store, process, communicate and otherwise use information.  
(2) Informational interests refer to the (informational) assets the organisation aspires 
to procure (such as information on, and secrets of, adversaries or better technology 
to protect itself).  
(3) Informational interests pertain to the conditions that the organisation seeks to 
maintain or realise (e.g. gaining a competitive edge over an adversary by obtaining 
information, augmenting the organisation's own informational security or 
undermining the informational integrity of an adversary through deception). 
 
70 
The informational interests outlined in this section are not mere theoretical notions of 
academic significance only. The FCCI's subsequent building blocks concretise these 
interests to the essential end goals directing organisational strategy, intelligence, CI 
and CCI.  
6.5 ORGANISATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND ITS RELATION 
TO CCI  
Chapters 7 to 13 will show intelligence, CI and CCI to for a substantial part entail the 
identification, anticipation and mitigation of risks to organisations. Various terms used in 
in these chapters are commonly associated with the multi-disciplinary field of risk 
management and include: 'threats' 'vulnerabilities' 'assets' and 'impact' (Bernhardt 
2003; Ruighaver Warren & Ahmad 2011, Duvenage 2011, Harvard 2018). While risk 
management is not new to Intelligence studies and Information Security (Bernhardt 
2003, Ruighaver Warren & Ahmad 2011, Duvenage 2011), it has been gaining traction 
in recent years within the cybersecurity field specifically. Attesting to this trend is the 
offering of courses such as Harvard University’s short course certificate in cybersecurity 
risk management (Harvard 2018). The said course culminates in the compilation of an 
organisational cyber risk mitigation strategy which has the following elements (Harvard 
2018): 
 Organisation's vision (for implementing a cyber-risk mitigation strategy) 
 Organisation's 'strategic goals and objectives (to reduce risks) 
 Metrics  
 Threat actors and methods of attack  
 Business critical assets (systems, networks and data) 
 Cybersecurity governance and leadership    
 Protective technologies  
 Legal considerations  
 Incident response plan. 
All of the above-noted risk mitigation elements are indispensable in moving from a 
reactive to proactive cybersecurity posture. As suggested earlier, risk identification 
mitigation and management are central to intelligence, CI and CCI. Accordingly, 
‘threats’, ‘vulnerabilities’, ‘impact ‘and ‘risks’ feature prominently in the CCI process we 
advanced in Chapter 13. (The reader is requested to now compare Figure 41 on 
page 142 of the thesis.) However, as Figure 41 and other subsequent chapters will 
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show, CCI goes beyond proactive risk management in that it also aims to (1) identify 
and exploit opportunities; and (2) adds an offensive dimension to both active and 
passive modes. CCI does so, to reiterate one of the thesis's recurring themes, as part 
of the organisational strategy as well as its intelligence and CI endeavours. CCI thus 
stands in a symbiotic relationship with organisational risk management as these as are 
distinguishable yet inseparable constructs. 
In this section we discussed the relationship between organisational management and 
CCI. We now proceed with reflecting on the impact of organisational type on CCI.  
6.6 IMPACT OF ORGANISATIONAL TYPE ON THE CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENDEAVOUR   
The nature of an organisation will self-evidently shape its vision, objectives strategy, 
informational interests and security posture. The security posture of a non-state actor 
(e.g. publishing company) would, for example, in various respects differ from that of a 
state actor (e.g. statutory intelligence service). Organisational type thus shapes the 
whole of the CCI endeavour from ‘soft’ issues such as organisational CCI awareness 
(Chapter 14) to the sharp offensive cutting end of CCI operations (Chapters 9, 10, 11 
and 13). For this reason, the delineation of the CCI endeavour in accordance with the 
organisational type is of the utmost importance. 
6.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter advanced the organisation as the FCCI’s second building block. We 
commenced with stating the academic and practical imperatives for postulating the 
organisation as the FCCI's pivotal building block. We proceeded with discussing 
aspects central to configuring this building block such as organisational vision, 
objectives and strategy. Subsequently, the importance of demarcating organisational 
informational interests and relationship between CI and organisational risk 
management were discussed. We then reflected very cursory on the impact of 
organisational type on the CCI endeavour.  
Of course, CCI does not ascertain and pursue an organisation's informational interests 
by and for itself. This is done as part of an organisation’s intelligence endeavour. In the 
next chapter, we therefore propose intelligence as the FCCI’s subsequent building 
block.   
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CHAPTER 7  
BUILDING BLOCK 3 – INTELLIGENCE 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 6, we posited the organisation as Building Block 2 and the pivot of our FCCI. 
Now we move forwards to Building Block 3, namely an organisation's intelligence 
endeavour. We cannot conceptually structure and understand CCI if we do not 
understand intelligence, of which CCI forms part. To this end, this chapter is structured 
as follows: 
 Section 7.2: Intelligence – Why it is needed and important as a building block 
 Section 7.3: Essential contours of intelligence as a building block   
○ Subsection 7.3.1: Contour 1 – Definition of intelligence 
○ Subsection 7.3.2: Contour 2 – Intelligence trident (elements)  
○ Subsection 7.3.3: Contour 3 – Intelligence functions  
○ Subsection 7.3.4: Contour 4: Intelligence conduits 
 Section 7.4: Conclusion  
Graphically, the addition of intelligence as an FCCI building block can be depicted as 
follows: 
 
Figure 18: Building Block 3 – Intelligence (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
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7.2 INTELLIGENCE – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND IMPORTANT AS A 
BUILDING BLOCK  
While it is an indispensable organisational instrument, we concluded in Chapter 6 
(Section 6.4) that CCI cannot secure and pursue an organisation’s interests all by 
and for itself. This has to be done as part of an organisation’s intelligence 
endeavour. CCI, by way of analogy, is but one ‘tool’ within an organisation’s 
intelligence ‘toolkit’. Academia and practitioners who are serious about CCI therefore 
have to have a sound grasp of the intelligence 'toolkit' as well as intelligence’s three 
respective ‘toolsets’, namely the elements of positive intelligence, covert action and CI. 
While essentially part of CI (discussed in Chapter 8), CCI benefits and is dependent on 
positive intelligence and covert action. In a similar vein, effective CCI depends on all the 
major intelligence functions such as management, analysis and collection. Therefore, 
these intelligence elements and functions have to be part of the construction of our 
FCCI.  
A thorough exploration of the notion 'intelligence' is important to this study because CI 
and CCI are extensions of the own organisation's intelligence endeavour. To a 
significant degree, CI and CCI are about engaging and countering hostile intelligence 
activities. By examining the notion 'intelligence', we will thus also be better at 
understanding that which CCI engages and counters – namely hostile 
intelligence actions. A thorough examination of the concept 'intelligence' will therefore 
aid the explanation of CI and CCI later on in this thesis.  
In this section, we explained the importance of intelligence as Building Block 3 of our 
FCCI. In the next section, we expound this building block.  
7.3 ESSENTIAL CONTOURS OF INTELLIGENCE AS BUILDING 
BLOCK 2 OF THE FCCI  
As reflected in Section 7.2 (Paragraph 1), intelligence is a multifaceted endeavour but 
only its most salient and relevant features can be touched on in this thesis. In the 
interest of simplicity, we have identified four aspects of intelligence critical to 
understanding and informing effective CCI. For our purposes, we present these aspects 
as the essential contours of intelligence – and thus the contours of the third building 
block of our FCCI, namely: 
 Contour 1: Definition of intelligence  
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 Contour 2: Intelligence trident (i.e. the three intelligence ‘toolsets’)  
 Contour 3: Intelligence functions  
 Contour 4: Intelligence conduits  
We now proceed with discussing each of these contours and in doing so, expound this 
building block. 
7.3.1 CONTOUR 1: DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
Within Intelligence Studies, the term 'intelligence' is hotly contested and there is no 
single definition which is universally accepted. Over decades, and within statutory 
intelligence circles, there has however developed relatively broad-based agreement 
with Kent's (1949, 1966) seminal assertion that 'intelligence' denotes a specific type of 
"knowledge", "organisation" and "activity", and the combination of these three (Kent 
1949, 1966).8  Few would dispute the notion that 'intelligence' relates to actionable 
knowledge provided to an organisation by a structure established for this purpose 
(Godson 2001). In emphasising the activity facet of intelligence, Lowenthal (2012) 
offers the following useful "working concept" for describing intelligence:  
Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important 
to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to 
policymakers, the products of that process; the safeguarding of this 
information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of 
operations as requested by lawful authorities. 
As noted earlier (Chapters 1 and 5) our aim is that the FCCI should be an instrument 
with wider application than just nation states and their governments and intelligence 
structures. Therefore, we have to formulate a definition relevant to the generic concept 
                                                                
8 In his book Strategic intelligence for American world policy, Kent (1949) pioneered the idea of 
intelligence as “knowledge”, “organization” and “activity”. Contemporised by various authors 
(Lowenthal 2010; Johnson 2004; Shulsky & Schmitt 2002), the three facets identified by Kent 
essentially remain the core of current descriptions. Kent positioned intelligence as that 
“specialized knowledge” which is indispensable to a nation state’s “welfare and security” (Kent 
1949, 1966). This specialised knowledge is produced by a state structure(s) of “living people” 
that is institutionally geared towards delivering such knowledge (Kent 1949, 1966). The 
organisation acquires and provides the specialised knowledge through the execution of certain 
activities such as collection and analysis (Kent 1949). In a more comprehensive sense, 
intelligence can lastly be seen as a combination of the three facets mentioned above. 
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of an organisation which will tie intelligence to the preceding Building Blocks 1 and 2. 
With this in mind, we define our FCCI’s ‘intelligence’ building block as follows: 
Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important 
to an Organisation's vital interests (security and prosperity) are requested, 
collected, analysed, and provided to the decision makers, the products of 
that process; the safeguarding and advancement of informational interests 
by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of other sanctioned 
informational operations.  
In this Subsection, we advanced a definition of intelligence as Contour 1 of our FCCI's 
intelligence building block. In the next subsection, we further explain intelligence by 
means of Contour 2, the intelligence trident (elements).  
7.3.2 INTELLIGENCE CONTOUR 2: INTELLIGENCE TRIDENT (ELEMENTS) 
Implicit to Lowenthal's (2010) definition above (Subsection7.3.1) is the notion that until 
recently enjoyed near axiomatic acceptance in Intelligence Studies. This axiom holds 
that intelligence comprises four "major elements" (also referred to as "functions" and 
"disciplines"), namely collection, analysis, covert action and CI (Codevilla 1992; Godson 
2001). For various reasons, this subcategorisation of intelligence into these four 
elements is more confusing than helpful (Van den Bergh 2015; Duvenage & Hough 
2011). For one, this subcategorisation does not assist in clarifying the juxtaposed use of 
‘intelligence’ as an abbreviated reference to the concept ‘positive intelligence’ 
(Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015; Sims 2009; Bodmer et al. 2012; Duvenage 
& Hough 2011). This categorisation is furthermore not attuned to contemporary 
intelligence practice (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015; Duvenage & Hough 
2011) and consequently not useful to describe the intelligence building block of 
our FCCI. 
To simplify and clarify intelligence's elements, we ascribe to an alternative proposition 
advanced by Duvenage and Hough (2011) and later developed for application to CCI 
by Duvenage, von Solms and Corregedor (2015). This proposition distinguishes 
between intelligence elements (positive intelligence, covert action and CI) and 
intelligence functions (such as management, analysis and collection). Accordingly, we 
now discuss the intelligence elements as the second contour and intelligence functions 
as the third contour of Building Block 3.  
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We posit intelligence as consisting of three main elements, namely positive intelligence, 
covert action and CI. Collectively, the elements constituting the intelligence trident can 
graphically be depicted as follows: 
 
Figure 19: Intelligence Trident (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015) 
In narratively explaining this graph, the main elements can concisely be described as 
follows (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015):  
 Element 1. Positive intelligence is primarily aimed at providing information “to 
facilitate one’s own side achieving its ends” (Bodmer et al. 2012). This information 
varies from analysed open sources to an opponent’s secrets obtained through 
espionage. As noted above, ‘intelligence’ is frequently used interchangeably as 
referring to ‘positive intelligence’, with the context determining what meaning is 
implied (Sims 2009). From our explanation in the two bullet points directly 
following this one, it is abundantly clear that intelligence is about much more than 
delivering actionable knowledge about opponents and the environment. It also 
entails covert action and CI – whether executed by state or non-state actors..  
 Element 2. Covert action targets an adversary by influencing events, conditions, 
individuals, groups or institutions to the benefit of the client and in a manner not 
attributable to the sponsor or at least offering plausible deniability (Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregedor 2015). To this end, measures instituted "are to one degree 
or another secret (hidden) or covert (disguised)" (Godson 2001). In the context of 
state security, covert action can include action such as military and intelligence 
interventions and support. In state intelligence structures, covert action mostly 
INTELLIGENCE
Positive Intelligence
(Element 1)
Covert Action
(Element 2) 
Counterintelligence
(Element 3)
Offensive Defensive
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relates to informational actions such as propaganda, deception and 
disinformation (Godson 2001). In the business environment, some forms of 
deception and “perception management” could in effect be forms of covert action 
(Francq 2000). 
 Element 3. CI is an abbreviated form of countering hostile intelligence activities. 
CI defensively and offensively guards against adversarial intelligence (i.e. hostile 
positive, CI and covert action) operations (Duvenage, Von Solms & Corregedor 
2015; Prunckun 2012; Sims 2009). CI thus pertains to the safeguarding of the 
own organisation's weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well as the active 
engagement of adversaries.  
 
It must be emphasised that the above elements should not be construed as silos. 
Intelligence involves the execution of these primary elements in a mutually supportive 
and overlapping manner. For example, CI (and thus CCI) not only safeguards the 
positive intelligence and covert action elements, but delivers information useful to both. 
Similarly, positive intelligence renders information of high relevance to CI/CCI. CI/CCI in 
turn relies on (informational) covert action to degrade adversarial intelligence efforts. 
In explicating intelligence as a building block of our FCCI, we have in this 
subsection discussed the three primary intelligence elements as the second contour. 
We explained the relation between CI and other elements. This relation is relevant to 
the construction of our FCCI since effective CCI, as a subset of CI, depends on 
synergy with the positive intelligence and covert action elements. In the next 
subsection, we explain some intelligence functions which bind, and are performed, in all 
the three intelligence elements (see Figures 19 and 20). 
7.3.3 INTELLIGENCE CONTOUR 3: INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS  
The intelligence functions which bind, and are performed, in all the three intelligence 
elements constitute the third contour of our FCCI’s intelligence building block. Such 
specialised intelligence functions, which are also performed in CCI, were noted in 
Subsection 7.3.2 to include management, analysis and collection. These functions are 
critical to ensure that intelligence (and thus CCI) is aligned with, and executed to the 
optimal benefit of, the organisation. Phrased differently, these functions synergise the 
intelligence elements (positive intelligence, covert action and CI) to optimally pursue 
an organisation's interests, goals and strategy (IGS). Diagrammatically this relationship 
can be depicted as follows: 
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Figure 20: Positioning of Intelligence Functions (Adapted from Duvenage, Sithole 
& von Solms 2017) 
Of these functions, analysis and collection are performed by the own organisation as 
part of the collective intelligence process and within all the respective elements. 
Conversely, when collection and analysis are performed by adversaries, these 
functions are countered by the own organisation’s CI and CCI effort. Since an 
understanding of these functions is pertinent to subsequent building blocks of the FCCI, 
we now discuss the collection and analysis functions in more detail.  
(1) Collection  
Collection refers to the procurement of information from three primary categories of 
sources, namely open, grey and clandestine sources. Open-source intelligence 
(OSINT) pertains to information that is publicly and freely available, such as in 
newspapers and books, on the surface web, in academic journals and publications, as 
open-source high resolution imagery, in radio and television broadcasts, on certain 
governmental databases, in business reports and the like (Quiggin 2007). In the cyber 
realm, some forms of threat intelligence are open sourced.  
Opinions on what grey collection comprises are divided (Steele 2007). For our 
purposes, collection of information from grey sources pertains to those not freely 
available, though not (a) requiring the employment of clandestine methods and (b) the 
targeting classified sources. The use of databases, privileged in the sense that payment 
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for access is required, serves as an example. Within the cybersphere, customised 
threat intelligence platforms and streams are deemed as grey sources. Grey-sources 
also include information generated by methods not illegal and clandestine but in some 
instances male fide.  
Clandestine or secret collection pertains to the procurement of secret or proprietary 
information without the sanction of the owner(s) and typically in a manner seeking to 
avoid detection (i.e. obfuscating the collection effort and/or its real intentions). Although 
it is somewhat of an oversimplification, by far the larger part of clandestine/secret 
collection of information can be described by the term ‘espionage’.  
The result of the whole collection effort, which combines all three collection categories, 
is referred to as all-source information. Effective CCI, as will be shown in Chapter 13, 
has integrated all-source information at its core.  
(2) Analysis 
All-source information, however comprehensively and widely gathered, is just that – 
information and not intelligence. Information in its raw form has limited utility value and 
is subjected to a second intelligence function, namely analysis. Analysis involves the 
conversion of collected information into descriptions, explanations, assessments and 
conclusions (Bernhardt 2003). The analysis product is delivered to clients in written 
format or verbally (Bruneau & Dombroski 2004). As elaborated on in Chapters 10, 11 
and 13, the products emanating from CCI analysis can be stratified as being on the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels.  
These levels mirror the organisational layers on which statutory security structures (as 
well as other state and non-state entities, such as businesses) often function. Tactical 
intelligence is mostly descriptive, directed to line functionaries and is focused on 
immediate situations and actions. Operational intelligence deals with the assessment of 
CCI programmes, operations and projects. It is, for the most part, directed to middle 
management. Strategic intelligence is broader in scope, usually integrating several 
sources of information and has as its aim to inform the executive management. The 
outcome of the analysis process therefore directs the organisation internally and 
externally. This is especially true in CI and CCI (see Table 7 in Chapter 11).  
The information collected and analysed to produce intelligence is typically derived 
through a combination of two primary conduits, namely human and technical. Several 
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recent 'cyber' breaches have illustrated role-players to have employed cyber measures 
in tandem with other technical and human intelligence conduits The ongoing revelations 
by the whistleblower Edward Snowden on the Five Eyes intelligence activities as well 
as the 2016 breach of the US Democratic Party Convention are but two examples 
(Duvenage & von Solms 2015; Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017). The unpacking 
of these conduits is therefore clearly essential to the contouring of intelligence as the 
intelligence building block of our FCCI and is discussed in the next subsection as 
Contour 4: Intelligence conduits.  
7.3.4  INTELLIGENCE CONTOUR 4: INTELLIGENCE CONDUITS  
As noted above, information collected and analysed to produce intelligence products is 
typically derived through a combination of the human and technical conduits/vectors. If 
used with the ‘positive intelligence’ denotation, these vectors are referred to by the 
acronyms HUMINT (human intelligence) and TECHINT (technical intelligence). What is 
sometimes overlooked (as suggested in Subsection 7.3.3) is that these conduits are 
also the vectors for executing the other intelligence elements, namely covert action 
and CI (cf. Lowenthal 2012, Bruneau & Dombroski 2004). An intelligence structure 
could, for example, use a human asset to gather positive intelligence (spying), conduct 
covert action (agent of influence) and perform a CI role (double agent). In a similar vein, 
various fields in TECHINT can serve the purposes of positive intelligence, CI and covert 
action.  
The cybersphere (as shown in Table 3 below) is but one such TECHINT field. Other 
overlapping TECHINT fields include signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Although the 
taxonomy of TECHINT is useful to conceptualise TECHINT and contextualise cyber 
intelligence (CYBINT), these TECHINT fields are for the most part closely interlinked 
and overlapping. With this qualification, the following table contains a taxonomy of 
prominent TECHINT fields. 
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 Table 3: Taxonomy of TECHINT Fields (adapted from Duvenage 2011) 
 SIGINT 
SIGINT essentially refers to the interception of various types of electronic signals. Some forms 
of SIGINT (explained below) are COMINT, ELINT, FISINT and TELINT. 
Communication 
intelligence 
COMINT Interception of communications between two or more 
parties. 
Electronic intelligence ELINT Interception of (non-communication) electronic signals, 
such as radar and navigation systems.  
Foreign instrumentation 
signals intelligence  
FISINT Monitoring of electronic magnetic emissions, notably 
pertaining to aerospace, surface and subsurface 
systems. 
Telemetry intelligence  TELINT Collection of data streams relayed by systems on, for 
example, their location, speed, status and other 
performance metrics. TELINT therefore constitutes a 
subcategory of FISINT. 
IMINT 
In its most basic form, IMINT can be viewed as information gleaned from ‘pictures’. Such 
pictures can be conventional photographs (PHOTINT) or imagines based on spectrum 
radiation (e.g. infrared). IMINT can be collected by, among others, satellites (SATINT), 
conventional aeroplatforms (such as airplanes) and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
MASINT 
Lowenthal (2012) aptly remarks on the “arcane debate that rages” between those who view 
MASINT as a distinctive technical collection subdiscipline, and others who consider it “simply 
as a product, or even by-product, of SIGINT and other collection disciplines”. Basically, 
MASINT refers to information gathered and analysed as it pertains to a ‘signature’ (such as 
emissions, sounds, radiation and movement).  
Indicated below are some of the vast array of ‘MASINTs’: 
LASINT Laser intelligence 
DMPINT Dynamic measurement photography  
IRINT Infrared intelligence  
ELECTRO-OPINT Electronic, optical intelligence 
 CYBINT  
CYBINT is information derived from and pertaining to computers, computer networks and 
systems. Since computers (of varying complexity and capacity) are increasingly imbedded in 
other systems, CYBINT overlaps with all technical fields.  
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Read with Section 7.3, Table 3 will enable us to contextualise and (in Chapter 9) 
employ CCI as part of the boarder intelligence endeavour. Table 3 is also central to a 
meaningful understanding of our definition of CCI in Section 9.3 (Chapter 9), where we 
state that CCI pertains to the engagement of adversarial intelligence actions where 
cyber is a primary conduit (i.e. CYBINT) and/or where cyber assets are targeted 
through TECHINT or HUMINT. With a view to our discussion in Chapter 9, we can 
graphically summarise this Section and contextualise both CYBINT and CCI as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: CYBINT and CCI in the Context of Intelligence (Author)  
7.4 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we advanced intelligence as a building block of our FCCI. 9  We 
conceptually structured intelligence by providing the four contours: (1) a definition, (2) 
the intelligence trident (elements), (3) intelligence functions and (4) intelligence 
conduits. We emphasised that CCI is executed within the context of the own 
organisation's intelligence endeavour. Likewise, CCI is central to countering the whole 
of the adversarial intelligence endeavour. In both respects, the importance of 
performing CCI in synergy with multidisciplinary CI cannot be overstated. Therefore, CI 
is advanced in the next chapter as a distinctive building block of our FCCI.   
                                                                
9 This chapter is based on, and contains verbatim extracts from Duvenage 2011, Duvenage & Hough 
2011, Duvenage 2013, and Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015.  
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CHAPTER 8 
BUILDING BLOCK 4 – COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the preceding chapter, we pointed out the critical importance of CCI being 
understood and performed as part of multidisciplinary CI. In this section, we advance CI 
as the subsequent building block of our FCCI. We can, after all, not conceptually 
structure and understand CCI if we do not understand CI, of which CCI is part. As is 
depicted in the figure below, this building block includes a four-sector CI matrix with 
offensive–defensive and passive–active axes.  
 
Figure 22: Building Block 4 – Counterintelligence (Duvenage, Sithole & von 
Solms 2017) 
In respect of this chapter's structure, discusses the need and importance of CI as a 
building block of the FCCI in Section 8.2. Sections 8.3 to 8.5 are then devoted to 
explicating CI as Building Block 4 of our FCCI. This is done by discussing the three 
contours we deem essential to explaining CI, namely: 
 Contour 1: Definition of counterintelligence (Section 8.3) 
o Counterintelligence as a contested concept (Subsection 8.3.1) 
o Working definition of counterintelligence (Subsection 8.3.2) 
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 Contour 2: Notional structure and principles of counterintelligence, which include 
a four-sector counterintelligence matrix (Section  8.4) 
 Contour 3: Measures and tools of counterintelligence (Section 8.5) 
o Multipurpose nature of counterintelligence measures (Subsection 8.5.1) 
o Physical security (Subsection 8.5.2) 
o Information and technological systems security (Subsection  8.5.3) 
o Personnel security (Subsection  8.5.4) 
o Counterintelligence monitoring, investigation and collection (Subsection  
8.5.5) 
o Counterintelligence exploitation, deception and neutralisation 
(Subsection 8.5.6) 
 
We summarise and conclude the chapter in Section 8.6.  
8.2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND 
IMPORTANT AS A BUILDING BLOCK 
In order to explicate CI as a building block of our FCCI, we have to conceptually explain 
CI in considerably more detail than has thus far been done in this study. A more 
detailed explanation of CI, which extends beyond a mere demarcation of its interaction 
with CCI, is required for two reasons: 
(1) CCI is interwoven and inseparably linked with the entire multidisciplinary CI effort. 
In other words, CCI is not a neat compartment within CI. As will be demonstrated 
in Chapters 10, 11 and 13, CCI involves all the other CI fields.  
(2) CCI is modelled on and derives much of its terminology from CI. Phrased 
differently: applied to the cybersphere, ‘traditional’ CI theory and practice provide 
a ‘conceptual template’ for moulding CCI.  
To further explain CI as an FCCI building block, we now discuss the following three 
contours which we deem essential to describing CI, namely: 
 Contour 1: Definition of counterintelligence (Section 8.3) 
 Contour 2: Notional structure and principles of counterintelligence (Section 8.4) 
 Contour 3: Measures and tools of counterintelligence (Section 8.5) 
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8.3 CONTOUR 1: DEFINITION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
We commence explaining CI as a building block of our FCCI with a definition of CI as 
the first contour. To this end, we firstly remark on the contested nature of defining CI 
(Subsection 8.3.1). We then offer our own working definition (Subsection 8.3.2).  
8.3.1 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A CONTESTED CONCEPT  
CI is notoriously difficult to define, since it is relevant to so many of an organisation’s 
activities. The following observation by a CI veteran, nearly four decades ago, endures 
to this day:  
It is not easy, nor can one feel confident, to re-enter this world where, it has been 
said, the tortuous logic of counterintelligence prevails...Unfortunately, there seems 
to be no easy way to explain counterintelligence...Because effective 
counterintelligence is a combination of so many aspects... (Miler 1980) 
Part of CI's "torturous logic" is the ongoing discourse over CI's offensive and 
defensive dimensions. Duvenage and von Solms (2013) describe this discourse as 
follows:  
For some, counterintelligence is all about spies catching and rooting out 
enemy spies. For others, counterintelligence centres on security measures 
such as computer passwords, restrictions on the use of computing 
equipment, security guards, access control and the like. This is also a 
skewed view. Counterintelligence is both of these aspects and much more.  
For the most part, CI is poorly understood even within statutory intelligence structures. 
This is attested to by an earlier cited observation by Michelle Van Cleave (formerly US 
national counterintelligence executive):  
[I]ntelligence studies are now part of most serious International Relations 
departments and are integrated into the curriculum at our nation's war 
colleges. But the role of counterintelligence remains little known or 
understood among scholars or practitioners of national security and 
policymaking. (Van Cleave 2007)  
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Since it is not well understood by all practitioners in foremost statutory intelligence 
agencies, the conceptual confusion over CI in the academic and corporate worlds are 
unsurprising.  
In this subsection, we pointed out the difficulty of defining and explaining CI. It is 
necessary to be cognisant of this because challenges to define and explain CI impact 
the delineation of CCI and thus the construction of our FCCI.  
8.3.2 WORKING DEFINITION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
Recognising these challenges, and although it will inevitably be contested, this thesis 
requires a tentative working definition to delineate CI as a building block of our 
FCCI. Expanding on earlier contributions (Duvenage & von Solms 2013; Duvenage, 
Jaquire & von Solms 2016), we thus define CI as follows: 
CI denotes the collective of measures an organisation undertakes to 
identify, deter, exploit, degrade, neutralise and protect against adversarial 
intelligence activities and internal risks deemed as detrimental or potentially 
detrimental to the organisation’s vital informational interests and the 
pursuance thereof.  
While the definition captures CI's essence, it can for reasons of brevity not reflect 
certain key principles which underpins and notionally structure CI. This notional 
structuring and assumptions are important because they impact the way we practice 
CI and CCI. A notionally structuring of CI, for example, not only contextualises CCI but 
also provides the conceptual template (mentioned in Subsection 8.3.1) to mould CCI in 
Chapters 9-11 and 13. 
In this section, we defined CI and highlighted the necessity of notionally structuring CI.  
8.4 CONTOUR 2: NOTIONAL STRUCTURING AND PRINCIPLES 
OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
Following on the working definition provided in Subsection 8.3.2, in this section, we 
show the notional structure of CI by means of a diagram (Figure 23) and explain the 
principles underpinning the diagram. This is an attempt to explicate "effective 
counterintelligence" and its "tortuously logic" as plainly as possible (cf. Miler 1980).  
As a starting point, we provide the following diagram of a notional structure of CI: 
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Figure 23: Notional structure of Counterintelligence (adapted from 
Duvenage 2011 and Duvenage & Hough 2011) 
While not exhaustive, there are seven CI principles which underpin and explain Figure 
23.10 The reader shall benefit by looking at Figure 23 after reading each of the following 
principles (Prunckun 2012; Godson 2001; Duvenage 2011; Duvenage & Hough 2011):  
 Principle 1: CI protects the confidentiality-integrity-availability (C-I-A) of 
the own organisation's vital informational interests. 'Integrity' here refers to 
information's veracity and reliability, while 'confidentiality' pertains to guarding 
                                                                
10 To maintain argumentative logic, the explanation of principles overlap with assertions made 
earlier in this thesis.   
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against unauthorised disclosure of information. Availability denotes the effective 
working of systems, repositories and processes pertaining to such information.  
 Principle 2: Information resides in systems (including physical records and IT 
systems), processes (such as communication) and human beings, and depends 
on technologies. Institutions and individuals are the custodians of information. CI 
therefore safeguards the relevant institutions, systems, technologies and 
processes. It also ensures the integrity of human beings who have access to the 
information.  
 Principle 3: CI guards against internal risks (weaknesses and vulnerabilities) 
and exploits external threats as well as opportunities. The compromising of 
information through human negligence or insecure systems is an example of an 
internal risk.  
 Principle 4: CI seeks to exploit adversaries by breaching their informational 
assets' C-I-A and by exploiting their vulnerabilities and weaknesses.  
 Principle 5: External threats are posed by adversaries that seek or attempt to 
breach the own organisation's C-I-A. These adversarial actions assume 
various forms and can broadly be clustered into espionage (intelligence), aspects 
of covert action (deception and disinformation), and the disruption or manipulation 
of information through for example hostile cyber activities. Adversaries include 
opposing nation states, entities in private enterprise, NGOs, entities in the mass 
media, terrorist and extremist groupings, and unaffiliated individuals/groups. In 
contemporary reality, these role-players as well as the clusters of adversarial 
actions are interwoven in an intricate web. 
 Principle 6: CI's defensive and offensive missions are informed by 
intelligence 11  (i.e. the collection and analysis of all-source information). 
Some of this information is collected and assessed by CI. Effective CI, however, 
also benefits in this regard from information provided by the other elements (see 
Subsection 7.3.2 of Chapter 7). Likewise, CI generates information of value to 
positive intelligence and covert action. For its part, offensive CI uses aspects of 
covert action to influence and mislead espionage adversaries. Offensive CI and 
                                                                
11  'Intelligence' as used here should not be confused with the 'intelligence' building block 
(Chapter 7) or 'positive intelligence' (Subsection 7.3.2 of Chapter 7). 'Intelligence' as used here 
is a general term which denotes collection and analysis to produce actionable information. The 
use of the term 'intelligence' in the literature is not only ambiguous, but highly contested. For a 
more detailed clarification on the ambiguous uses of the term, please see Subsection 7.3.2 
(Chapter 7) as well as Section 2 in Duvenage, von Solms and Corregedor 2015.  
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the informational aspects of covert action are in fact sometimes nearly 
indistinguishable. In all cases, the analysis of collected information is critical. In 
this regard, Godson (2001) asserts: “Perhaps the queen of the counterintelligence 
chess board is counterintelligence analysis, both offensive and defensive.”  
In what could be confusing, CI is thus deemed to have two primary missions 
(offense and defence), but three thrusts (offense, defence and intelligence). To 
clarify this point, with a view to elaborating further in Chapter 9 (Section 9.4), we 
can tabulate this distinction as follows: 
Table 4: Counterintelligence Thrusts and Primary Missions (Author) 
  
CI Thrusts 
 
CI Primary Missions 
 
Offense  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence 
 
 
 
 
x 
 Principle 7: CI has four modes (postures) which are executed in accordance 
with a four-sector matrix. Figure 23 shows both offensive and defensive CI 
measures, with each having an active and a passive dimension. As a result, CI 
has four modes, namely passive–defensive, active-–defensive, passive–
offensive and active–offensive. Although the interplay offensive–defensive is 
further explained in Subsection 8.5.1 below, for the purposes of explaining CI 
principles, we can summarise the four modes as follows: 
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Table 5: Four-sector Counterintelligence Matrix (adapted from Duvenage & von 
Solms 2013, as compiled from narratives in Prunckun 2012, Sims 2009 and 
Godson 2001) 
DEFENSIVE MODE 
Denies adversaries access to and generates information about adversaries. 
Passive Defence 
Denies the adversary access to 
information through physical security 
measures and other security 
systems.  
Active Defence 
The active collection of information on the adversary to 
determine its sponsor, modus operandi, network and 
targets. Methods include physical and electronic 
surveillance, dangles, double agents, moles and 
electronic tapping.  
OFFENSIVE MODE 
Primarily aim at manipulating, degrading, controlling and neutralising adversaries. 
Generates information on adversaries. 
Passive Offensive 
Reveals to the adversary what you 
want them to see. This could range 
from selective exposure of actual 
information to decoys and dummies. 
The adversary is thus left to draw its 
own inferences and interpretations.  
Active Offensive 
The adversary is fed with disinformation and its 
interpretation thereof manipulated. Disinformation can 
be channelled through for example double agents and 
‘moles’.  
Active-offensive CI could include some forms of Covert 
Action. Covert action, in its use here, denotes the 
targeting of an adversary through the influencing of 
events, conditions, individuals, groups or institutions to 
the benefit of a sponsor in a manner not attributable to 
the sponsor or offering plausible deniability. Influencing 
is achieved through measures that vary from 
paramilitary and political actions to propaganda and 
intelligence assistance.  
Both passive-offensive and active-offensive modes generate information on adversaries. 
In this section, we notionally structured CI by means of a graphic depiction and 
discussing its underlying principles. The notional structuring constitutes Contour 2 
of CI as an FCCI building block. In Chapters 9 to 13, this general notional structuring of 
CI is applied more practically and specifically to CCI. In Chapter 10 (Table 6 and Figure 
31), for example, the above matrix is applied to CCI.  
We now proceed with examining, as Contour 3 of the FCCI’s CI building block, the 
clusters of CI measures. 
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8.5 CONTOUR 3: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES AND 
TOOLS  
An examination of CI measures, wider than just those in the cyber realm, is necessary 
since these other methods support CCI (see Chapter 13). Furthermore, and as 
mentioned earlier, several CCI means and measures are modelled on long-established 
concepts that include denial, deception, honeypots and double agents.  
In our explanation of CI means and methods, we firstly observe the multifunctional 
nature of CI measures and then proceed to explain the various clusters of CI measures. 
To this end, this Section is structured as follows: 
 Subsection 8.5.1 – Multipurpose nature of counterintelligence measures  
 Subsection 8.5.2 – Cluster 1: Physical security  
 Subsection 8.5.3 – Cluster 2: Information and technological systems 
security 
 Subsection 8.5.4 – Cluster 3: Personnel security  
 Subsection 8.5.5 – Cluster 4: Counterintelligence monitoring, investigation 
and collection  
 Subsection 8.5.6 – Cluster 5: Counterintelligence exploitation, deception 
and neutralisation  
8.5.1 MULTIPURPOSE NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES  
Since it aids conceptualisation and discussion, we typically group CI measures in 
different clusters such as physical security, information and systems security, personnel 
security, monitoring, investigation and collection as well as exploitation, deception and 
neutralisation. From our discussion in Section 8.4, it should be clear that clusters of CI 
measures are not watertight compartments serving only one of the defensive, 
offensive or intelligence CI thrusts. Measurers deployed defensively can 
simultaneously provide information and act as triggers to alert the offensive side of CI. 
Similarly, offensive instruments (e.g. a double agent used for deception) can render 
information useful to the proactive configuration of defences. Likewise, various 
measures can be deployed passively and/or actively.  
This interplay can be explained by means of the well-known sword-and-shield 
analogy. CI employs measures relatively non-aggressively (the shield) and aggressively 
(the sword). In combat, the sword and the shield function in synergy (Duvenage & von 
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Solms 2015, Duvenage 2011). “The shield is primarily designed for defence but in the 
hand of a master can be used offensively too. Similarly, the sword is an offensive 
weapon (stab and cut) that can also defend (block) from an attack. Employed against 
an enemy the sword and shield reveals information on such an adversary's weapons 
and skills. This information is continuously used to redirect the use of the own sword 
and shield (Duvenage & von Solms 2015, Duvenage 201).  
With the qualification advanced above on the multifunctional nature of CI measures, we 
will now discuss the various clusters.  The discussion of these clusters builds on, 
and contain extracts from, previous research by the author (Duvenage 2011, 
Duvenage  2013).  
8.5.2  CLUSTER 1: PHYSICAL SECURITY  
"Physical security has historically been dominated by “police”-type management, 
processes and enforcement approaches. This type of physical security relies on a 
combination of measures, on a lighter note referred to as "gates, guards, guns and 
dogs" (Francq 2000). Although this police-type function is still required, today’s security 
vulnerabilities are increasingly technical in nature and related to IT systems, software, 
and hardware (Taylor 2007). 
Physical security is directed towards the facilities where information is produced and 
stored, as well as the physical safety of infrastructure and equipment to store and relay 
information. For nation states, the physical security of the whole national critical 
informational infrastructure thus ought to be of the highest concern. For smaller 
organisations, physical security is narrower in scope and include access and movement 
control, perimeter security, alarm systems, safes and vaults, fire prevention measures, 
key control, control of the removal and transfer of information and equipment, and the 
physical security of the organisational ICT infrastructure (within their control). 
8.5.3  CLUSTER 2: INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS SECURITY 
As suggested above, there is an overlap and inseparability between 'physical security' 
and what in this study are termed ‘information and technological systems security’. 
‘Systems’, as used in this context, is deemed to refer to a variety of information and 
communication systems. For ease of reference, we henceforth use the acronym 
INSYSEC for information and technological systems security. 
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In our view, the use of the acronym ‘INSYSEC’ will clarify the confusion caused by the 
sometimes dogmatic use of long-established terminologies. Such dogmatic 
conceptualisations are not congruent with the converged reality presented by 
contemporary practice. Illustrative of the latter is the separation of CI into the distinctive 
subfunctions of ‘information security’ (INFOSEC, which is sometimes erroneously 
deemed synonymous with ‘computer security’); ‘technical security countermeasures’ 
(TSCMs); communication security (COMSEC) and cyber security (CYBSEC). 
Technological advances have blurred the distinction between the security of information 
(in whatever format) and the security of systems. Communication and information 
systems are by and large an aggregate. Against this background, this thesis posits 
INFOSEC, TSCMs, COMSEC and CYBSEC all as dimensions of INSYSEC.  
As part of INSYSEC, ‘information security’ pertains inter alia to the classification, 
distribution and control of access to information and systems. Access to such 
information will be determined by the level of security clearance an individual has as 
well as the relevance of the information to his/her line function (Taylor 2007). The latter 
is usually defined as the need-to-know or compartmentalisation principle (Wettering 
2000). Information classification and the need-to-know principle provide parameters 
according to which personnel are given access to information and computer, 
communications and other systems.  
System security is, however, far more encompassing than mere internal access to 
systems. In addition to limiting access to authorised users (‘confidentiality’), its other 
two primary goals are the ‘integrity’ and ‘availability’ of information/communication 
systems (Crampton et al. 2006). Phrased differently, system security has CI’s earlier 
noted threefold aim, namely to protect against (i) compromising information 
(unauthorised access to information), (ii) integrity violation (altering information through 
replacement and manipulation) and (iii) denial of service (which results in systems 
being wholly or partially incapacitated for the intended users) (Crampton et al. 2006). 
The reasons for the existence of these systems are the storage, processing, retrieval 
and communication of information. From this line of reasoning, it is clear that COMSEC 
is an integral part of INSYSEC. In addition to securing cyber systems, COMSEC 
safeguards other electronic communication instruments. COMSEC thus overlaps with 
cyber security (CYBSEC). Similarly, TSCM is not – as projected by authors such as 
Wettering (2000) – a distinct and separate “collection of technical efforts to detect the 
technical penetrations of facilities by foreign intelligence services to collect intelligence”. 
Resulting from the integration of systems outlined, TSCMs are interwoven with several 
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dimensions of INSYSEC. For this reason, effective vulnerability and penetration 
testing should gauge the security of INSYSEC in its entirety and not only that of 
computer systems.  
As part of our explanation or discussion of CI measures, in this subsection, we outlined 
INSYSEC and contextualised CYBSEC. In the next subsection, we focus on personnel 
security. 
8.5.4 CLUSTER 3: PERSONNEL SECURITY  
“However well protected by other measures, the fidelity of personnel with actual or 
potential access to sensitive information and systems remains arguably the most critical 
factor of CI” (Duvenage 2011). Over decades, the most damaging breaches within 
statuary intelligence services internationally followed ‘insiders’ volunteering their 
services to foreign intelligence services, and multiple others involved foreign 
intelligence services’ recruitment of ‘insiders’ (Duvenage 2011; Taylor 2007). Recently, 
whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning have illustrated the 
impact of publicised breaches of information on statutory state security. Numerous 
other breaches resulted from negligent 'insider' actions. It is, for example, suspected 
that the compromising of a US National Security Agency ‘cyber weapons arsenal’ by 
the Shadow Brokers group in 2016 resulted (at least in part) from an operative’s 
negligent actions. Currently, 'insiders' – whether intentionally or through negligence – 
are behind the vast majority of the most severe cyber breaches (IBM 2016).  
Pre-employment and in-service personnel security are consequently of self-evident 
significance. Methods used as part of determining the security competence and 
suitability of personnel include biographical verification, criminal record checks, lifestyle 
and financial analysis, interviews and polygraph tests. Simultaneously, awareness 
programmes (including cybersecurity skilling) are indispensable CI tools. 
Complementing the latter, proactive cyber measures aimed at mitigating the insider 
threat include decoys, tripwires and honeynets. 
In the preceding paragraphs, we examined personnel security as a cluster of CI 
measures. In the next subsection, the focus is on CI monitoring, investigation and 
collection as a further cluster of such measures. 
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8.5.5 CLUSTER 4: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MONITORING, INVESTIGATION 
AND COLLECTION  
To detect breaches and/or adversarial intelligence activities, CI relies on a range of 
detection and monitoring measures. Should indications of a breach and/or adversarial 
intelligence activities be detected, CI would not summarily ‘plug the leak’. The further 
monitoring and investigating of the leak could, for example, expose other undiscovered 
adversarial espionage agents and networks.  
Effective exploitation of ‘holes in the fence’ presupposes sound information and 
intelligence. Consequently CI could opt for continued monitoring and the further 
collection of information through investigation. In such collection, investigation and 
monitoring, human and technical means are combined.  
Surveillance is one of the most common CI collection methods and demonstrates the 
interaction between technical and human dimensions. Although reality is more complex, 
three subcategories of surveillance can be distinguished conceptually. These are: (a) 
static surveillance, (b) mobile surveillance and (c) electronic/digital surveillance (cf. 
Prunckun 2012). Cyber surveillance is an exponential growing subset of electric/digital 
surveillance. The integration of digital devices in personal lives and contemporary 
society exponentially increases the reach of cyber surveillance on individuals and 
organisations. Cyber surveillance includes on-the-network actions. The ‘fishbowling’ of 
suspected cyberespionage could for one render invaluable information. A “fishbowl” is 
described by Mena (2003) as the action to “contain, isolate, and monitor an 
unauthorized user within a system in order to gain information about the user”.  
In addition to surveillance, CI monitoring, investigation and collection traditionally relied 
and will continue to rely on a range of human sources. HUMINT sources include, but 
are not limited to, peripheral agents, agents-in-place, access agents, ‘moles’, defectors, 
double agents, multiturned agents (e.g. triple agents), agent provocateurs, ‘walk-in’ 
agents, agents of influence, witting/unwitting agents, penetration agents, infiltration 
agents, false-flag agents, ‘sleepers’ and ‘honeypots/ravens’. These different descriptors 
of sources are not mutually exclusive. Under certain conditions, a human source can for 
example be typified simultaneously as a mole, a defector and a double agent. If such a 
person used sexual allure to achieve ends, he/she can also be described as a honeypot 
(female) or raven (male). These agents can be recruited through the cold, 
developmental or combined approach, and their utilisation can be witting or unwitting. 
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Their recruitment and handling can furthermore be done under own, false and 
combined flag. 
Technological advances increasingly facilitate the acquisition and utilisation of 
human sources. The recruitment of human assets on cyber platforms serve as one 
such example. In addition, technological advances enable the creation and utilisation of 
‘sock puppets’ (fake cyber persona, sometimes automated) which engage with 
adversarial entities (Lee 2014d; Bardin 2011). Sock puppets and avatars are as varied 
as conventional human sources and can serve various collection and monitoring 
purposes. On the one hand, their effectiveness depends on the application of time-
tested HUMINT techniques of recruitment and handling. On the other hand, their 
efficiency is increasingly bolstered by advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI).  
It should be emphasised that besides HUMINT and Cyber Intelligence, CI should 
benefit from the own organisation’s collection, also from other technical domains 
(SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT). 
In this subsection, we described CI monitoring, collection and investigation as a cluster 
of CI measures. In the next subsection, we focus on the CI exploitation, deception and 
neutralisation cluster of measures.  
8.5.6 CLUSTER 5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION, DECEPTION AND 
NEUTRALISATION  
Even if CI monitoring, collection and investigation have extensively and beyond a 
reasonable doubt identified an adversarial espionage network, a subsequent ‘plug of 
the leak’ would still not necessarily be the next step. Instead, the organisation can opt 
for continued monitoring to be accompanied by the deception of and ‘feeding’ of 
disinformation to an adversary. The ultimate prize is influencing the adversary through 
deception of its intelligence effort and for the benefit of the own organisation. This is 
fittingly encapsulated in the following observation by Codevilla (1992): "Action against 
the enemy through the enemy’s own intelligence is the very consummation of 
CI." To this end, CI (as noted earlier) uses aspects of informational covert action.  
In the case of HUMINT, this deception could be achieved by ‘feeding’ information to an 
adversarial espionage network. In a similar manner, misleading information can be 
relayed through technical channels known to be targeted by an adversary, namely 
CYBINT, SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT. 
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Disinformation/denial and deception can also be pursued by means of, for example, 
double agents or/and agents of influence – be it in the ‘real’ or digital realms. (The 
application of such tools within the cyber realm is discussed in Chapters 9-11). 
Although neutralisation can partially be accomplished through exploitation and 
deception, CI operations eventually conclude with a distinctive neutralisation and 
termination phase. This process is described in more detail in Chapter 13 (the CCI 
process). Suffice to state here that CI termination can either be opted for (at the 
initiative of the own organisation) or imposed by circumstances. In the case of a nation 
state, termination can take various forms, such as prosecution, expulsion, public 
exposure, diplomatic protest and -under certain circumstances- acts of physical harm 
(including elimination/assassination).  
Which form will be opted for ought to balance short-term benefits with longer-term 
advantages. In this regard, Hulnick (2007) asserts: 
Finally, in the last step of the counterintelligence process, authorities often 
make public claims of success, a rare step in intelligence work. Normally 
intelligence managers try hard to keep successes secret so that they might 
be repeated. An oft-quoted CIA saying is, "The secret of our success is the 
secret of our success." In cases in which intelligence has been gathered 
successfully, it is critical to protect sources and methods. In 
counterintelligence, however, the claim of success, when the case has 
ended, could be used to convince the public that the government is ever 
watchful and actually doing something with the billions of dollars spent on 
intelligence. 
Also in the case of organisations other than nation states, the distinctive advantages of 
termination options should be considered. If executed skilfully, protected termination 
and neutralisation could provide the ‘seeds’ for a subsequent 'generation' of CI 
operations (Duvenage & Hough 2011).  
In the preceding section, we outlined the CI measures and found that these measures 
are as diverse as the threats confronting the organisation. CI was found to be a 
multidisciplinary endeavour requiring the synergetic employment of measures. In order 
to aid our discussion, we conceptually clustered the measures. However, in their 
practical execution, the measures are part of a multifaceted entirety which constitutes 
Contour 3 of CI as the fourth building block of our FCCI.  
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8.6  CONCLUSION  
The discussion of CI measures above formed part of our unpacking of CI as a building 
block of our FCCI.12 In advancing this building block, we discussed three contours 
essential to demarcating CI, namely: (1) a definition of CI, (2) discussion of CI’s notional 
structuring and principles, and (3) discussion of CI methods. Throughout the 
discussion, it was clear that CI in the cybersphere is inextricably interwoven with CI in 
other fields. Moreover, in the rest of this thesis, effective CCI will be shown as being 
modelled on CI.  
In the next chapter, we present CCI as a further building block of our FCCI. 
  
                                                                
12This chapter is based on, and contains verbatim extracts from Duvenage 2011; Duvenage & Hough 
2011; Duvenage 2013; Duvenage & von Solms 2014; Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015.  
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CHAPTER 9 
BUILDING BLOCK 5 – CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE   
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the preceding chapter (Chapter 8), we forwarded CI as Building Block 4 of our FCCI. 
We positioned CCI as part of the broader multidisciplinary CI endeavour (see Section 8.5 
of Chapter 8). In this chapter, the focus is on explicating the central and defining building 
block of our FCCI, namely CCI. We do this by defining and describing CCI with specific 
reference to the wide array of tools available to CCI. The addition of CCI as Building 
Block 5 of our FCCI can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 24: Building Block 5 – Cyber Counterintelligence (Duvenage, Sithole & von 
Solms 2017)  
To explain CCI as Building Block 5 of the FCCI, the rest of this chapter is structured as 
follows:  
 Section 9.2: Cyber Counterintelligence– Why it is needed and important as a 
building block 
 Section 9.3: Defining Cyber Counterintelligence 
 Section 9.4: Cursory overview of Cyber Counterintelligence tools  
 Section 9.5: Conclusion 
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9.2 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND 
IMPORTANT AS A BUILDING BLOCK 
To illustrate the interlock between CI and CCI, the preceding diagram (Figure 24) 
deliberately depicts CI and CCI in the same 'ring' and on the same level. This is done to 
graphically reflect this thesis’s recurring theme, namely that CCI is but a tool type within 
the broader CI toolset. As is clear from the term "cyber counterintelligence”, this 
building block of our FCCI explicates CCI as a predominantly – but not exclusively – 
technical toolset "relating to, or involving computers or computer networks" (Merriam-
Webster  2017).  
While intrinsically linked with broader CI, CCI is thus a distinctive specialisation field. 
This distinctive specialisation field is the essential descriptor and defining element of a 
CONCEPTUAL FCCI. Phrased differently, we cannot have a conceptual FCCI without 
CCI as a central building block. Consequently, the importance of CCI as a building 
block of the FCCI is self-evident and its importance can hardly be overemphasised.  
In this section, we discussed the need for and importance of CCI as a building block of 
our FCCI. In the next section, we commence our description of this building block by 
examining some existing definitions of CCI and offering our own definition.  
9.3  DEFINITION OF CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
 As suggested in the last paragraph of the preceding section, a description of CCI ought 
logically to start with a definition of CCI. One of the earliest definitions of CCI found for 
this study was advanced by the US Department of Defence (US 2001) which described 
CCI as "[m]easures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use 
cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence 
service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and 
intentions".  
This definition is useful in that it qualifies CCI as pertaining to (a) the adversarial use of 
cyber means and (b) the adversarial targeting of cyber assets also through other 
traditional methods (HUMINT and TECHINT). Given the multiplicity of hostile cyber 
actors, in our view CCI can however not be limited to "foreign intelligence services”.  
Recognising threat actors other than foreign intelligence services, Carroll (2009) 
describes CCI as:  
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…all efforts made by one intelligence organization to prevent adversaries, 
enemy intelligence organizations or criminal organizations from gathering 
and collecting sensitive digital information or intelligence about them via 
computers, networks and associated equipment. CCI are measures to 
identify, penetrate, or neutralize computer operations that use cyber 
weapons as a means and mechanism to collect information. (emphasis 
added) 
What the above, and other definitions of CCI in the literature we consulted, lack is 
categorically linking CCI with multidisciplinary CI. Therefore, and building on our earlier 
contributions (Duvenage & von Solms, 2014; Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 
2015), this thesis defines CCI as the subset of multidisciplinary CI aimed at 
detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and neutralising 
adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A of 
valued information assets through cyber means.  
In this section, we concisely overviewed some definitions of CCI and concluded by 
forwarding our own definition. In the next section, we explain CCI in more practical 
terms by discussing some standards, technologies, tactics, measures and procedures.  
9.4 CURSORY OVERVIEW OF CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
TOOLS  
9.4.1  INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 
The CCI toolset comprises an extensive range of standards/guidelines/frameworks, 
technologies, tools, tactics, measures, techniques and procedures. In the interest of 
simplicity, in this thesis, 'tools' will henceforth be used as a generic term referring to 
the collective of 'standards/guidelines/frameworks', 'technologies', 'tools', 'tactics', 
'measures', 'techniques' and 'procedures'. However, in cases where more specificity is 
required, the pertinent applicable term (e.g. ‘techniques’ when referring to 
'cryptanalysis', 'binary obfuscation', 'click jacking', etc.) will be used.  
Most of the tools are not unique to CCI. What is unique, within the context of this thesis, 
is their application in combination with other CI tools – and in a manner best achieving 
CI’s three main thrusts of defence, offense and intelligence (i.e. the collection and 
analysis of information). These main CI thrusts were discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 
8.4, Principle 6), graphically illustrated in Figures 23 and Table 4 (Chapter 8), and are 
thus not further elaborated on here. 
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CCI's pursuance of these three main thrusts incorporates tools, models and 
approaches advanced in the fields of 'Active Cyber Defence' and 'Cyber Denial and 
Deception'. This synergy is, for example, illustrated by Stech and Heckman's (2018) 
'Cyber Counterintelligence Framework in Active Defense' and Fieber's (2015) 
'Organizational CI Process Model' - both of which are discussed later on (in Chapters 
10 and 13 respectively).  
It is important to reiterate that the aim of this thesis is to advance a conceptual 
framework and not a manual for CCI work. Consequently, a detailed discussion of CCI 
tools falls outside the focus of this thesis. As stated in Chapter 2 (Subsection 2.2.2), our 
emphasis is rather on providing a skeletal structure which can on the one hand 
systemise existing knowledge and on the other hand direct further academic enquiry. 
Accordingly, this section provides a cursory overview of CCI tools in a manner useful to 
the conceptual structuring of CCI. To this end, the rest of the Subsection is structured 
as follows: 
 Subsection 9.4.2: Cyber counterintelligence tools – Defensive thrust 
 Subsection 9.4.3: Cyber counterintelligence tools – Offensive thrust  
   Subsection 9.4.4: Cyber counterintelligence tools – Intelligence thrust 
 Subsection 9.4.5: Basic taxonomy of cyber counterintelligence tools  
 9.4.2  CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TOOLS: DEFENSIVE THRUST  
The defensive end of the CCI tools spectrum is typically premised on cybersecurity 
standards, guidelines and frameworks prescribed by transnational institutions, 
governmental bodies and industry. Duvenage, Sithole and von Solms (2017) cite as 
examples those prescribed in/by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies, International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), Information Technology Infrastructure Library, International 
Society for Automation, International Electro-technical Commission, Web Application 
Security Project and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Serving as 
further illustration are the guidelines advanced per the US Department of Defence’s 
Security Technical Implementation Guides as well as the technical-security 
configuration guides of the US National Security Agency and similar bodies (Duvenage, 
Sithole & von Solms 2017). 
  
As the FCCI's predominantly technical toolset, the CCI building block (and the 
subsequent blocks discussed in Chapters 10 to 13) has to be configured with due 
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consideration of – but also distinctly move beyond – these cybersecurity standards, 
guidelines and frameworks. Flowing from these standards, guidelines and frameworks, 
tools associated with CCI's defensive thrust pertain to physical defensive, 
personnel/user defensive and system defensive techniques (see  in Figure 28, pages 
107-108. These tools thus overlap substantially with three clusters of CI tools described 
in Chapter 8 (Section 8.5), namely: physical security (Cluster 1), IT systems security 
(Cluster 2) and personnel security (Cluster 3). Emphasising the IT systems security 
cluster, Jaquire (2018) cites the following as examples of specific defensive CCI 
techniques: 
  
  
Figure 25: A Non-comprehensive Illustration of Defensive CCI Techniques 
(adapted from Jaquire 2018)   
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In this subsection, we discussed the defensive thrust of CCI. This defensive thrust is 
depicted in Figure 28 as  (pages 107-108). We now proceed with outlining CCI’s 
offensive thrust.  
9.4.3  CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TOOLS: OFFENSIVE THRUST  
CCI’s offensive thrust comprises various tools and actions that actively target and 
exploit opponents' systems. Offensive CCI tools thus forms part of CI Cluster 4 (CI 
monitoring, investigation and collection) and CI Cluster 5 (CI exploitation, deception and 
neutralisation). These clusters were discussed in Chapter 8 under Sections 8.5.5 and 
8.5.6. Examples of CCI tools deployed offensively are mentioned in Figure 28 (pages 
107-108) in the columns under the heading Offensive Thrust (marked as ). 
Complementary to the tools mentioned in Figure 26, Jaquire (2018) cites Heckman et 
al. (2012) and illustrates offensive CCI with reference to the following techniques:  
  
Figure 26: Non-comprehensive Illustration of Offensive CCI Techniques (adapted 
from Jaquire 2018, Heckman et al. 2012)   
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In line with the multipurpose nature of CI measures in general (Subsection 8.5.1 of 
Chapter 8), and CCI, these tools can mostly not be compartmentalised as serving only 
the offensive thrust. They can, in part, also be defensive. The sword-and-shield analogy 
explained earlier (Subsection 8.5.1 of Chapter 8) in relation to CI measures generally 
therefore applies to CCI tools. With reference to CCI techniques, Jaquire (2017) 
selectively illustrates this overlap as follows: 
  
Figure 27: Non-comprehensive Illustration of the Overlap between Offensive and 
Defensive CCI Techniques (adapted from Jaquire 2018)  
9.4.4  CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TOOLS:  INTELLIGENCE THRUST 
Whether deployed defensively and/or offensively, CCI tools are also used to collect 
data and information which are analysed to produce actionable intelligence. In this 
respect, these tools thus serve CCI's intelligence thrust.13 This is depicted in Figure 28 
(pages 107 -108) which shows the Intelligence Thrust as marked ③.  
In addition to, and often overlapping with defensive and offensive tools, there has of 
late been an explosion in the market of products and services specifically aimed at 
providing "intelligence'' of various kinds (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016). Threat 
intelligence in particular has evolved in a “catchall term for a vast array of different 
technologies, methodologies and ideas” (Schoeman 2015). Depending on the vendor, 
                                                                
13  'Intelligence' as used here should not be confused with the 'intelligence' building block 
(Chapter 7) or 'positive intelligence' (Subsection 7.3.2 of Chapter 7). 'Intelligence' as used here 
is a general term which denotes collection and analysis to produce actionable information.  
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threat intelligence can denote one or more of feed-, research- and platform-driven 
products (Schoeman 2015). For some 'threat intelligence' is just relabelled anti-virus 
signatures at a much higher cost, while for others it means an overarching approach 
central to an organisation’s strategy (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016). Similar to 
other technical tools, threat intelligence technologies and methodologies should form 
part of a balanced CCI approach. For a more detailed discussion on the relationship 
between CCI and threat intelligence, see Annexure E (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 
2016).  
In the preceding subsections (9.4.2–9.4.4), we discussed CCI tools from the 
perspective of the offensive, defensive and intelligence thrusts. In the next subsection, 
we propose a basic taxonomy which accommodates these three thrusts in an 
integrated postulation on CCI-relevant tools.  
9.4.5  BASIC TAXONOMY OF CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TOOLS  
The nature of a taxonomy of CCI tools is self-evidently influenced by the level of 
appraisal. For reasons discussed in the introduction (Subsection 9.4.1), we took a high-
level approach in compiling a basic taxonomy of CCI tools. In addition to being qualified 
as basic, the taxonomy does not purport to be comprehensive or exhaustive, but rather 
it is illustrative. It should be emphasised that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly 
central to various tools and is thus not discussed separately within the taxonomy’s 
subsets. With these caveats, the taxonomy advanced in this thesis is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Please turn to the next two pages for Figure 28. 
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.  DEFENSIVE THRUST 
Passive                                                                                                                                                            Active 
                       Deny                                                    Detect                                Collect & Analyse   ( ③Intelligence Thrust) 
Standards, guidelines and frameworks 
Physical Defensive Personnel/User Defensive System Defensive 
Protects  against: 
 Unauthorised access to 
facilities and systems 
 In loco theft of data, hardware 
 Introduction of malware 
through physical access to 
systems 
 Unauthorised altering or 
destruction of data 
 Physical destruction or access 
denial 
 Unauthorised reading 
(acoustic, visual, radiation, 
analogue, signals) 
 While not conventionally seen 
as a Physical Defence, supply-
chain management has a 
physical defensive function.  It 
is also part of System Defences 
as an enabler. 
Consists of aspects such as: 
 IT and user personnel vetting, re-
vetting, confidentiality agreements 
and monitoring 
 Personnel security measures, 
BYOD user parameters or 
exclusions 
 User programmes in cyber security 
that cover policy and procedures 
for the handling of security-related 
incidents, malfunctions and 
recovery. 
 Overlapping with system defences, 
the use of software decoys and 
traps to mitigate the insider threat  
 Investigations focussed on cyber 
security incidents involving 
personnel.  Could also include 
digital forensic investigations. 
 
Comprises a combination of: 
 Hardware  and software such as:  
 Network perimeter-based security 
(filters, certain firewalls, IDS and IPS 
etc.)  
 Malware scanners.  
 Integrated automated systems/tools 
(that collect and evaluate information 
about devices connected to a network, 
activities thereon – inclusive of 
intrusions). Examples of such tools, 
discussed further on in the Figure are 
decoys, honeypots and behavioural 
analyses toolsets.  
 Overlapping with the latter, depending 
on its configuration, a honeynet can be 
defensive or offensive in type/mode. 
The term fish bowling denotes the 
defensive configuration.  
 Processes (such as supply-chain 
management are also in part system 
defences). 
 Vulnerability assessments, penetration 
testing and verification testing (on 
products, systems, software and secure 
code). 
 Incident and threat monitoring, 
identification, investigation and response. 
A CERT is per definition defensive – 
although it might contain offensive 
elements in its responsive action.  
 Port level security and BYOD regulation in 
as far as network interfacing is concerned 
(Also part of Personnel Defences).  
  Commercial Cyber Threat Intelligence products, services and platforms.   
 Analysis of data and information and through automated and human means. 
 
 The use of software decoys to mitigate the insider threat is an overlap between 
personnel and system defensive measures. They are mostly active CCI means.  
 Investigations focussed on internal cyber 
security incidents involving personnel.  May 
include digital forensic investigations. 
 Investigations of external cyber 
intrusions could be part passive 
and part active system defence. 
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OFFENSIVE THRUST  
 Passive                                                                                                                                                                                                   Active  
           Collect  & Analyse   (③Intelligence Thrust)           Disrupt                   Exploit                                             Destroy  
 Collection of information on and the 
monitoring/surveillance of the cyber sphere 
to detect cyber adversaries and their 
exploitation of the cyber sphere in a 
manner that is not own-network restricted 
– (i.e. requires more than deployment of 
systems described under defensive mode). 
Could, depending on configuration also 
include IDS/IPS, honey-client applications 
(as opposed to host-based honeypots), 
luring and some forms of data mining.   
 The recruitment and handling of virtual 
agents on underground forums ( true or 
false flag) that can serve the purpose of 
enticement, collection and/or exploitation. 
(Some ‘virtual’ agents can also develop into 
HUMINT assets).  
 Analysis of information and data through 
automated and human means. 
Measures taken to exploit and 
neutralise adversaries activities in 
the cyber sphere: 
 System and honeynet 
configured offensively with the 
aim of enticing, exploiting and 
deceiving adversaries. False 
information is displayed to 
adversarial reconnaissance tools, 
network scanners and listeners, 
etc. This has as one of its aims to 
lead adversaries in the direction 
of your own preference. 
 Tarpits and black holes. 
 Utilisation of virtual agents for 
offensive purposes. 
Cyber warfare, in the full extent of the 
term, is typically excluded from the 
mandate of civilian intelligence 
communities. A cyber warfare capability 
should be flexible and allow utilisation 
without, or in conjunction with, kinetic war. 
Nevertheless, a top class civilian CCI outfit 
will need to have the authority and capacity 
to very selectively conduct operations that 
have cyber warfare characteristics, utilising 
cyberwarfare- related techniques. Such 
cyber CCI operations will share 
characteristics with covert action. (Covert 
action aims to influence role-players, 
conditions and events without revealing the 
sponsors identity.) 
Within business, the use of offensive 
measures will be determined by the 
legislative and regulatory framework within 
which the entity operates.  
Cyberespionage on adversaries. Distinguishable from own-system collection (IPS, IDS, honeynets etc) on the basis 
that adversarial networks are targeted actively and exploited in accordance with strategic and operational objectives.   
 
 
Figure 28: Basic Taxonomy of CCI Tools (adapted from Duvenage, von Solms & 
Corregedor 2015 
It would have been noticed that the taxonomy in Figure 28 also provides for a passive–
active range in respect of both the defensive and offensive thrusts. This range is 
indicated in both instances with purple font and a two-pointed purple arrow (  ). 
As a perusal of the taxonomy in Figure 28 will confirm, tools at the active end of the 
spectrum are, in comparison to passive tools, decidedly more 'aggressive' and involve 
the active engagement of adversaries. The interplay between passive-active and 
defensive-offensive tools is further discussed in the next chapters (Chapters 10-11).  
9.5 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we advanced and described CCI as a building block of our FCCI. We 
defined CCI and gave a high-level overview of CCI tools with reference to CCI's 
offensive, defensive and intelligence thrusts. This high-level overview was consolidated 
into a taxonomy. In the next chapter, we add the CCI matrix as a further FCCI building 
block. 
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CHAPTER 10 
BUILDING BLOCK 6.1 – CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
MATRIX: HORIZONTAL PLANE  
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 9, we posited CCI as the fifth building block of our FCCI. Moving from this, 
this chapter forwards a CCI matrix as the sixth building block of our FCCI. We show 
that this matrix is crucial to academically explaining and practically executing CCI.  
It will be recalled that an offensive-defensive matrix has partially been explained in a 
broader counterintelligence context in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4, Figure 23). In this 
chapter (Chapter 10) we expand and apply this matrix to the cyber sphere. Graphically, 
the addition of this matrix as Building Block 6 of our FCCI looks like this: 
 
Figure 29: Building Block 6 – Application of the CCI Matrix (Duvenage, Sithole & 
von Solms 2017) 
To facilitate to an easier reading experience, we divided the design of the CCI matrix in 
two chapters. Chapter 10 explains the CCI matrix's composition and its horizontal 
plane, while Chapter 11 presents the matrix's vertical plane.  Since it consists of both a 
vertical and a horizontal plane, the CCI matrix is a three-dimensional construct. This 
is further explained in Section 10.3.  
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Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 are in part based on - and contain verbal extracts from 
Duvenage, Jaquire and von Solms (2019). This paper accompanies the thesis as 
Annexure K. 
The rest of Chapter 10 is structured as follows:  
 Section 10.2: Cyber counterintelligence matrix – Why it is needed and important 
as a building block 
 Section 10.3: Overview of the cyber counterintelligence matrix's composition  
 Section 10.4: Matrix's horizontal plane – Cyber counterintelligence modes 
o Subsection 10.4.1:  Recapitulating the Four-Sector Counterintelligence 
Matrix  
o Subsection 10.4.2:  Application of the CI Matrix to CCI  
o Subsection 10.4.3: The CCI Matrix in Practice – A Hypothetical Case 
Study 
 Section 10.5: Conclusion  
10.2 CCI MATRIX – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND IMPORTANT AS A 
BUILDING BLOCK  
Thus far, it is clear to the reader that CCI is intricate and complex. Consequently, CCI's 
conceptual structuring and practical execution pose several challenges. Of these, the 
following interrelated challenges are pertinent to this chapter: 
 How can the wide array of CCI tools (Section 9.4 of Chapter 9) be optimally 
utilised and synchronised with other CI measures (Section 8.5 of Chapter 8)? 
 How can CCI be integrated and aligned with the broader organisational 
intelligence and CI endeavour on all the different organisational layers? 
 How does CCI's execution on the different organisational layers differ and how 
are they related? 
 Seeing that the organisation is the FCCI's pivot (Section 6.1 of Chapter 6), what 
notional aid can be forwarded to assist in best configuring its CCI posture in 
accordance with its interests, goals and strategy (Figure 16 in Chapter 6 and 
Figure 20 in Chapter 7 )? 
As suggested above, a conceptual 'solution' to the above challenges is of both practical 
and academic importance. Therefore, our FCCI should have, as one of its building 
blocks, a notional construct that meets these challenges. (See Subsection 2.2.4 of 
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Chapter 2 for the FCCI’s criteria.) We advance the CCI matrix as this notional construct 
and as the sixth building block of our FCCI.  
10.3 OVERVIEW OF THE MATRIX'S COMPOSITION  
This building block consists of the CCI matrix, which has a vertical and horizontal plane. 
Graphically depicted, the three-dimensional CCI matrix is as follows:  
 
 Figure 30: CCI Matrix (Author) 
The CCI matrix's horizontal plane depicts the four quadrants which represent the CCI 
posture's four modes, namely: 
(1) Passive-defensive  
(2) Active-defensive  
(3) Active-offensive  
(4) Passive-offensive 
 
The matrix's vertical plane (i.e. Figure 30's three layers) integrates CCI with the 
broader organisational, intelligence and CI endeavour at the various levels on which 
CCI functions. This is done by describing CCI's execution on three organisational 
levels/layers, namely:  
(1) Strategic 
(2) Operational 
(3) Tactical/Technical  
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In this section, we briefly outlined the composition of the CCI matrix. In the next section, 
the CCI matrix's horizontal plane is explained in more detail.  
10.4 HORIZONTAL PLANE OF THE MATRIX: CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MODES  
The explication of the matrix's horizontal plane consists of: 
 Subsection 10.4.1: Recapitulating the four-sector counterintelligence matrix 
 Subsection 10.4.2: Application of the counterintelligence matrix to cyber 
counterintelligence  
 Subsection 10.4.3: The CCI matrix in practice – a hypothetical case study  
10.4.1  RECAPITULATING THE FOUR-SECTOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATRIX  
In our discussion of both CI tools generally (Section 8.5 of Chapter 8) and CCI 
specifically (Section 9.4 of Chapter 9), we firstly noted that tools can be used for 
defensive and/or offensive purposes. Secondly, we asserted that both offensive and 
defensive tools can be deployed passively and/or actively. Flowing from these two 
assertions, we derived four modes for classifying CI and CCI tools, namely: passive–
defensive, active-defensive, passive-offensive and active-offensive.14 In doing so, we 
applied CI's Principle 7 (which holds that "CI has four modes which are executed in 
accordance with a four-sector matrix") to the CCI environment. This principle was 
discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4) and explained by means of the following table 
(next page):  
  
                                                                
14 These four modes were shown in Chapter 8 (Table 5) as the four quadrants of the CI matrix. 
For our purpose here, 'quadrants' and 'modes' are identical and the terms are thus used 
interchangeably. 
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Table 5: Four-sector Counterintelligence Matrix (Author) 
DEFENSIVE MODE 
Denies adversaries access to and generates information about adversaries. 
Passive Defence 
Denies the adversary access to 
information through physical security 
measures and other security systems.  
Active Defence 
The active collection of information on the adversary to 
determine its sponsor, modus operandi, network and targets. 
Methods include physical and electronic surveillance, dangles, 
double agents, moles and electronic tapping.  
OFFENSIVE MODE 
Primarily aim at manipulating, degrading, controlling and neutralising adversaries. Generates 
information on adversaries. 
Passive Offensive 
Reveals to the adversary what you want 
them to see. This could range from 
selective exposure of actual information 
to decoys and dummies. The adversary is 
thus left to draw its own inferences and 
interpretations.  
Active Offensive 
The adversary is fed with disinformation and its interpretation 
thereof manipulated. Disinformation can be channelled 
through for example double agents and ‘moles’.  
Active-offensive CI could include some forms of Covert 
Action. Covert action, in its use here, denotes the targeting of 
an adversary through the influencing of events, conditions, 
individuals, groups or institutions to the benefit of a sponsor 
in a manner not attributable to the sponsor or offering 
plausible deniability. Influencing is achieved through 
measures that vary from paramilitary and political actions to 
propaganda and intelligence assistance.  
Both passive-offensive and active-offensive modes generate information on adversaries. 
 
10.4.2  APPLICATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATRIX TO CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
The four-sector CI matrix is applicable to the full spectrum of CCI tools. At the one end 
of the spectrum, conventional intrusion prevention systems (IPS)/intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) serve as examples of passive–defensive tools. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a cyber weapon designed to destroy, disrupt or manipulate an opponent's 
systems constitutes an active-offensive tool. CCI tools can seldom be pigeonholed as 
having only a defensive or offensive purpose, or as being either active or passive. For 
the most part, to reiterate one of this study's recurring emphases, tools are useful to 
two or more of the four modes. A honeynet, for example, can be used passive-
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offensively (e.g. to feed disinformation to an adversary) and active-defensively (e.g. to 
collect information on an opponent). Graphically, this can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
Figure 31: Some CCI Tools Plotted on the CCI Matrix's Horizontal Plane (Author) 
As an academic construct, Figure 31 is useful for the categorisation of CCI tools and to 
explain their relationship with CI tools in fields other than the cyber field. In CCI 
practice, Figure 31 could have the following three uses: 
(1) Ensure each CCI tool is utilised to maximum effect. Since most tools can 
have more than one purpose, they should be measured against the CCI matrix 
with the question ‘In addition to its initially intended role, in what other modes can 
the tool be used?’ Figure 31, for example, depicts a honeynet deployed in both 
the active-defensive and passive-offensive modes. To expand on the example 
used in Figure 31. A honeynet can (if required and depending on circumstances) 
also be used to facilitate hacking back and the deployment of cyber weapons 
(active-offensive). If otherwise configured, a honeynet could furthermore be 
deployed in tandem with IDS/IPS (passive-defensive). In this hypothetical 
example, a honeynet is therefore relevant to all four modes. 
(2) Synchronise CCI tools/actions with other CI tools/actions. The plotting of CCI 
and other CI tools/actions in Figure 31 will aid the synchronisation of efforts and 
thus optimise the effectiveness and integration of the CI efforts. The feeding of 
disinformation through a human agent, to use the example depicted in Figure 31 
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(passive-offensive mode), should be congruent with disinformation 'planted' in an 
organisation's honeynet. Incongruences between these two 'feeds' of 
disinformation could comprise both CI HUMINT and CCI operations. Similarly, the 
CCI matrix can be utilised to plot and synchronise CCI tools and actions with 
those in other TECHINT areas (see Table 3, Taxonomy of Technical Intelligence 
Fields, in Chapter 7).  
(3) Configure the CCI posture in accordance with the type and needs of a 
specific organisation. In Chapter 6 (Sections 6.2 and 6.3) and Chapter 7, we 
showed CCI's raison d'être to be an organisation's interests, goals and strategy 
(IGS). Consequently, the organisation's IGS will ultimately determine the 
configuration of the CCI posture. Statutory military and intelligence services, for 
example, will typically have a substantial amount of resources directed to the 
active-offensive mode. The same will not be the case in relation to, for example, a 
NGO involved in humanitarian aid. Figure 31 can accordingly be used as a 
template for plotting and appropriately configuring an organisation's CCI posture. 
(For a more detailed application of the CCI matrix in configuring an organisation's 
CCI posture, please see Figure 3 in Annexure K on page 327 of the thesis).  
10.4.3  THE CCI MATRIX IN PRACTICE – A HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY  
As will be discussed in the more detail in the next Section (10.5), the configuration of 
the organisation’s CCI posture on the strategic (interests, goals and strategy) and 
operational levels shapes CCI activities on the tactical-technical level. This point, as 
well as the application of our CCI matrix, are illustrated by Stech and Heckman’s (2018) 
proposition on a "Cyber Counterintelligence Framework in Active Defense". Utilising a 
hypothetical case study of a NATO CCI campaign against “advanced persistent threat 
actors associated with Russia, known as APT28 and APT29”, Stech and Heckman 
(2018) pose the following as NATO’s strategic CCI goal and operational objectives: 
 “Support NATO strategic deception goal: convince Russian authorities their 
cyber intelligence supports propaganda but is not ready for kinetic war against 
NATO; 
 Active & Passive CCI Defense: Reduce and eliminate effectiveness of APT28 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for espionage; Eliminate or counter APT28 
and APT29 malware and tradecraft; 
 Passive CCI Offense: Poison APT28 and APT29 intelligence stream with 
deception materials; eliminate, corrupt, or covertly take over control of attackers' 
command and control; and 
116 
 Active CCI Offense: Feed Russian espionage units with false information (e.g. 
feed APT29 false information about actions and effects of APT28, and vice 
versa). 
 Support apparent intrusion successes with cyber and non-cyber strategic NATO 
deception operations.” 
In extending the strategic goal and operational objectives to the tactical-technical level, 
Stech and Heckman (2018) apply our four-sector matrix – advanced earlier in this 
thesis per Table 5 and Figure  31)  – as follows: 
Table 6: Hypothetical NATO Cyber CI Operations against cyber espionage threat 
(Stech & Heckman 2018)  
Modes Passive Cyber CI Active Cyber CI 
Defensive 
mode 
Deny access and collect on espionage threat 
Passive defense: Active defense: 
Harden endpoint and server 
configurations 
Gather intelligence on on-going 
intrusions 
Use honeypots to gather late-stage 
implants and unpatched exploits 
Share actionable indicators 
across NATO intelligence 
partners Share indicators to force infrastructure 
and "toolkit" rotations 
Offensive 
Mode 
Manipulate, degrade, control and neutralize espionage threat 
Passive offensive: Active offensive: 
Use honeypots to deliver 
deception materials 
Counter-hack hop points and control 
servers 
Trolling "bait victims" to lure attackers to 
controlled boxes 
Sinkhole APT28 hop points 
Identify APT28 operatives Operating controlled boxes as double 
agents to inject beacons, double-hacked 
backdoors, etc. into APT28 control 
environment 
The hypothetical case study provides a high-level illustration of the CCI matrix’s (Table 
5) application in guiding an integrated and coherent CCI operation. The application and 
implications of the matrix are discussed in more detail in Annexure K (pages 322 – 
330).  
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10.5 CONCLUSION   
In this chapter, we explained the CCI matrix's horizontal plane and illustrated three 
applications thereof. While the CCI's matrix's four modes are based on a time-tested CI 
principle (Chapter 8, Section 8.4 – Principle 7), in this chapter  we further developed the 
concept for application to CCI and imposed the four-mode quadrant as the horizontal 
plane of the FCCI's matrix. Subsequently, we illustrated the application of our four-
mode matrix by citing Stech & Heckman’s (2018) hypothetical NATO case study. We 
mentioned the four-mode matrix’s application on the strategic, operational and tactical-
technical levels. The next chapter presents these three levels as the CCI matrix’s 
vertical plane.  
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CHAPTER 11 
BUILDING BLOCK 6.2 – CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
MATRIX: VERTICAL PLANE  
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 10 we explained the CCI matrix's composition and its horizontal plane. In 
this chapter we advance the CCI matrix's vertical plane. The CCI matrix's vertical plane 
explains the various levels on which CCI functions and integrates CCI with the broader 
organisational intelligence and CI endeavour. As was the case with the development of 
the horizontal plane, we based our design of the vertical plane on an established 
intelligence study notion, namely the three levels/layers of execution (strategic, 
operational and tactical/technical).  
11.2 APPROACH AND PREMISE  
Effective CCI is not only multifaceted but also stratified (Duvenage, Jaquire & von 
Solms 2016). To be optimal, CCI has to involve all organisational layers, from the C-
suite to line functionaries (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016). The levels 
conventionally ascribed to statutory intelligence (namely strategic, operational and 
tactical) provide a useful approach for also explaining CCI (see Subsection 7.3.3.2 of 
Chapter 7). These levels are described comprehensively in literature dealing with cyber 
intelligence/security and cyber threat intelligence. Such works of note include those by 
Mattern (et al. 2014), Friedman and Bouchard (2015), Chismon and Ruks (2015), as 
well as a series of papers compiled by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance 
(INSA 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). We could, however, find no reference in these 
works to CCI levels.  
Although the cited works do not refer to CCI, they partially informed the tabulated 
synopsis of CCI's levels of execution below (Table 7). These works were also used for 
the subsequent narrative description of the CCI levels (Sections 11.5.2–11.5.4).   
The tabulated synopsis, which provides a reference point and premise for the rest of 
the chapter, can be depicted as follows:   
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Table 7: Synopsis of the Levels of CCI Execution (adapted from Duvenage, 
Jaquire & von Solms 2016) 
 
  
 Strategic   Operational  Tactical/Technical ③ 
CI mission 
 Advance and protect organisational interests through defence against and the 
offensive engagement of adversarial intelligence activities. This is achieved through 
the following functions: detect, deny, deter, deceive, degrade and/or disrupt. 
CCI mission 
 As above, when the adversary uses cyber as a conduit or a cyber asset as a target. 
Leadership  
 
 C-level   Senior and middle 
management  
 Line and team leaders 
Interface with CI 
 Organisational, intelligence 
and CI strategies 
 All-source CI feed 
 Multidisciplinary 
programmes and 
operations 
 Multidisciplinary 
projects and 
continuous line-
functional interaction  
Referent objects 
 
 Organisation’s ‘crown 
jewels’ 
 Critical information and 
cyber-assets sought (e.g. 
adversary’s ‘crown jewels’) 
 Conditions (competitive 
advantage) 
 People, processes, 
systems, procedures 
(personal security, ICT 
architecture and supply-
chain management)  
 Own intelligence 
programme 
 Systems, networks and 
devices 
 Network operations 
 Security operation 
 CIA (confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability) 
Interrogatives  
 Who, why?  Who, where, when, 
how? 
 What, how? 
Level of adver-
sarial role-player 
on which CCI 
focuses 
 Sponsors, opponents and 
Intelligence capacity 
 Intelligence structures, 
groups and campaigns 
 Individuals, TTPs, 
incidents and actions 
(on-the-network) 
Indicators of 
targeting  
and compromise  
 Geo-political, 
sector/industry ‘flags’ 
 Analogous events  
 Adversarial strategy and 
business decisions 
 
 Operational disruption 
 Organisational and/or 
revenue decline 
 Information leakage 
 Breach in the C-I-A of 
cyber and/or 
information security 
milieu 
 Identification of 
malicious code, 
intrusion and threat 
exploitation 
Analysis output  
 High-level, strategic 
appraisals 
 Strategic warning and 
advisories  
 Operational reports (CCI 
operations, threat, 
damage and 
vulnerability 
assessments, alerts and 
warnings) 
 Trend analyses  
 Tactical and technical 
information reports 
 Alerts and warnings 
 
Tools – means, 
methods and 
measures 
(offensive, 
defensive & 
collection) 
 Multidiscipline CI 
 Strategic direction of 
means, methods and 
measures 
 As in Figure 28: A basic taxonomy of CCI tools 
(Chapter 9)  
 Interlocked with operational and tactical CI 
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Strategic  Operational  Tactical/Technical ③ 
Cyber threat 
intelligence  
(sourced) 
 White papers, non-
commissioned and non-
commissioned research 
 Platforms  Data feeds 
Skill sets required 
(line-functional) 
 Sound knowledge of 
business and industry 
 Specialised knowledge and 
skills in intelligence, 
multidisciplinary CI and CCI 
 Strategic analysis and 
management 
 
 Multi-disciplinary CI 
 CCI operational and/or 
technical specialisation 
 Operational 
management 
 Elements of both 
strategic and tactical 
 
 ICT and information 
security 
 Systems, software 
development, scripting 
and  
programming 
 CCI and CCI technical 
specialisation 
 Ethical hacking 
 Technical cyber 
defence and collection 
 Humanities, social 
sciences and languages 
 HUMINT 
 Engineering and 
reverse engineering 
Table 7 cannot be discussed in detail in the confines of a thesis chapter. Therefore, the 
subsequent sections (11.5.2–11.5.4) do not rigidly mirror Table 7 but are rather aimed 
at narratively explaining CCI levels in broad terms.  
In this section, we introduced the vertical plane of the CCI matrix. This plane consists of 
CCI levels of execution. To guide our further discussion, we then provided a tabulated 
synopsis of the different levels of CCI (Table 7). Starting with the strategic level, we 
now proceed with discussing each of these levels. This discussion is in part based on,  
and contains verbal extracts from, Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016.  
11.3 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ON THE STRATEGIC 
LEVEL           (IN TABLE 7)  
In his benchmark work on CI, Prunckun (2012) rightly asserts that “executive 
responsibility” is the “first and highest tenant” of CI. For CCI to be successful, the 
organisation’s executive management (C-suite) will have to understand and sanction 
CCI’s missions to advance and protect organisational interests through defence against 
the exploitation of adversarial, cyber-related intelligence activities (cf. INSA 2014b, 
Chismon & Ruks 2015). Practically, the C-level executive assigned with leading the CI 
aspect will be responsible for also directing the CCI effort. The executive’s 
responsibilities include obtaining the collective executive management’s approval of 
CCI strategy, priorities, resourcing (funding, infrastructure, equipment, human 
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Motivation and 
Decision to Act
• Financial Gain
• Politics
• Harass or 
Embarrass, for 
the lulz
Determine 
Objective
• Steal Data
• Destroy Data
• Manipulate 
Data
Select Avenue of  
Approach
• Network               
- Website                 
- E-mail
• Insider
• Supply Chain
Acquire 
Capability
• Build
• Hire
• Use Existing 
Capability
Develop Access
• Insider
• Compromise 
Supply Chain
• SQL Injection
• Spear Phishing
Implement 
Actions
• Establish 
Presence on 
Target
• Move Laterally 
on Network
• Steal Data
• Destroy Data
• Manipulate 
Data
• Cover Tracks
Assess
• Were Actions 
Successful?
• Were Actions 
Sufficient?
• Were Objectives 
Satisfied?
Restrike
• Yes
• No
resources, skills development/acquisition, etc.). In some instances, the executive would 
selectively also seek endorsement – normally from the chief executive officer – for high-
risk and high-cost programmes. The actual CCI work on a strategic level will be 
performed by a team consisting of seasoned CCI specialists, multidisciplinary CI 
specialists, strategic analysts (business and CI) and various other experts relevant to 
the organisation's core business. To ensure a synergetic approach, some of these 
specialists and experts will be representatives from the operational CCI level.  
CCI informs the C-suite mainly through high-level products and presentations that 
include estimates, threat and risk assessments, and advisories. These products are 
informed by appraisal all-source CI operational reports as well as an extensive all-
source scanning of the macro-environment for CCI-relevant trends and drivers that 
could affect the organisation (INSA 2014b). External CTI products sourced would 
mainly be White Papers as well as commissioned and non-commissioned research 
papers (Chismon & Ruks 2015). A thorough knowledge of organisational strategy and 
planning is imperative, as is a clear grasp of the organisation’s information-related 
assets critical for it to exist and prosper – commonly referred to as the ‘crown jewels’ 
(INSA 2014b). It is these assets that CCI protects from adversarial intelligence activities 
and it is the organisational strategy that CCI should advance through the exploitation of 
adversaries in the cybersphere.  
Strategic CCI differs from that on the operational and tactical level in that it takes a 
wider view of the macro-environment and a longer term view of the actual or potential 
emergence of threats (Bodmer et al. 2012; Mattern et al. 2014). Strategic CCI would for 
instance identify intelligence principals/sponsors that have plausible motive, intent and 
capacity to target the own organisation through cyber means. In respect of adversarial 
progression, strategic CCI is thus focused on the first phase of adversarial progression, 
namely "Motivation and Decision to Act" (see Figure 32). 
Figure 32: Adversarial Pathway to an Attack (INSA 2013)  
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It is important to note that the intelligence principals or sponsors will not necessarily 
execute the actual intelligence activities but they are the ultimate benefactors (such as 
a nation state). The actual implementers of hostile cyber as well as associated tactics 
are those that carry out the task of operational and tactical CCI. While the implementers 
will determine the operational and tactical avenue of approach, the strategic decisions 
(e.g. to pursue objectives by human and/or technical means) in this regard will be taken 
by the intelligence principal. 
Strategic CCI is furthermore tasked with detecting high-level indicators that the 
organisation is being targeted or has been compromised. The focus in this regard is 
inter alia on competitors’ business decisions, products launched and markets entered. 
Similarly, strategic CCI should identify drivers and trends suggesting a rise in the risk of 
internal compromise (insider threat). Equally important is the detection that 
organisational strategy and decision making are unduly influenced by deceptive, 
adversarial cyber operations. Strategic CCI will advise on countermeasures to best 
exploit adversarial cyber activities to the benefit of the organisation. To be successful, 
cyber counterdeception and exploitation have to be fully synchronised with such actions 
in other CI fields (such as agent and double agents operations). Therefore, it is 
imperative that CCI ensures that countermeasures are aligned with CI and 
organisational strategy (INSA 2014b). The insights CCI provides are not only of value to 
the C-level; they are critical to direct actions on the operational and tactical levels. The 
design and filling of honeypots on the operational and tactical levels, for example, will 
ultimately be informed by strategic CCI decisions on the nature and direction of 
counterdeception (cf. Bodmer et al. 2012).  
In this subsection, we discussed the execution of CCI on the strategic level. To 
recapitulate, this was done since the strategic level is part of the CCI matrix's vertical 
plane (see Figure 30). We now proceed with describing CCI on the operational level.  
11.4 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ON THE OPERATIONAL 
LEVEL       ( IN TABLE 7)  
As on the strategic level, CCI on the operational level pursues CCI’s central missions of 
defensively and offensively advancing CI-relevant interests in the cybersphere. 
Adherence to the missions at all three levels ensures a coherent approach and an 
optimised CCI effort.  
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Operational CCI is driven by senior and middle management as well as by specialists in 
the field of CCI operations and analysis. It functions as a conduit and advisory to C-
level leadership in matters such as CCI strategic objectives, financials, financial 
projections and other resource requirements, projects, statistics and reporting. 
Operational leadership is responsible, among others, for the following main functions 
(INSA 2014a; Mattern et al. 2014): 
 Operationalise the CCI strategy as set jointly by the executive management, 
operational management and CCI experts. 
 Develop and implement CCI structures and acquire resources.  
 Develop and implement operational plans and identify focus areas. 
 Drive daily operations and ensure performance.  
Operational CCI is responsible for safeguarding the people, processes, procedures and 
systems in which the organisation’s critical cyber-related assets reside. Consequently, it 
includes a wide spectrum of organisational functions such as personal security, 
physical security, procurement, supply chain management, ICT-user management and 
much more. In addition to conducting CCI operations against adversaries (discussed 
below), it safeguards the organisation’s own information and cyber intelligence 
operations. It provides operational cyber counterintelligence reports on operations, 
cyber threats and threat actors, damage and vulnerabilities (as identified through 
assessments), alerts, warnings and trends to strategic CCI, line-functional managers, 
analysts and CCI specialist (Riley 2015). It also self-analyses the reports’ output with a 
view to driving reports’ outcomes to action (INSA 2013, 2014a).  
Operational CCI interfaces with the larger CI function through multidisciplinary 
programmes and operations, specifically focusing on the cyber part of CI. Its main 
concern pertains to who the adversaries are; their location or the place from where they 
operate; their timelines; and their capabilities (such as the ability to utilise or develop 
malware), intentions (either pronounced or unpronounced) and modus operandi 
(Chismon & Ruks 2015). Together with this, it is concerned with the adversaries’ 
intelligence structures and their intelligence campaigns (either planned or existing). 
With regard to a traditional defensive approach, CCI also focuses on a proactive and 
reactive function to identify indicators of targeting and compromise (emanating from the 
cyber field). These are indicators such as a disruption in the organisational operations, 
organisational decline or a decline in organisational revenue, and/or information 
leakage. From a reactive perspective, it focuses on these indicators of change and acts 
124 
accordingly to counter such instances by identifying its origin and addressing the 
compromise (by either defensive or offensive means). From a proactive approach, it 
identifies such possible capabilities and campaigns and addresses threats (by either 
defensive or offensive means) (Farchi 2012; Bardin 2011).  
Operational CCI is persistently seeking exploitable opportunities presented by 
adversarial cyber campaigns, operations and actions. Through counteroperations, 
these opportunities are pursued either proactively or reactively – depending on the 
circumstances.  
The skill sets required to capacitate operational CCI are multidisciplinary and include 
elements such as general management, advanced operational management, CCI 
analysis, cybersecurity, cyberdefence and offensive CCI techniques, and other fields of 
technical expertise (Bodmer et al. 2012). 
In this subsection, we explained the execution of CCI on the operational level. This was 
done as part of describing the CCI matrix's vertical plane (see Figure 30 and Table 7). 
Moving from the operational level, we now progress to detailing CCI on the 
tactical/technical level. 
11.5 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ON THE TACTICAL AND 
TECHNICAL LEVELS      (③ IN TABLE 7)  
Tactical and technical CCI is aimed at achieving the organisation's CCI missions by 
tactical and technical means. It is driven and executed by line-functional leadership as 
well as team leaders, role leaders, CCI technical and tactical experts, security analysts 
and other technical personnel. It has an advisory responsibility to both the operational 
and executive management that includes matters such as CCI threats and 
opportunities, defensive and offensive measures, systems and toolsets, CCI analyses 
and financials (Riley 2015; INSA 2013, 2015). This advisory responsibility is usually 
fulfilled by submitting tactical products to the operational and, in some instances, 
directly to the strategic CCI level. Prior to submission to the executive, tactical CCI 
inputs are normally contextualised at the operational and strategic levels. (For ease of 
reading, and unless otherwise stated, the term 'tactical CCI' in the rest of this 
subsection refers to both tactical and technical CCI). 
Tactical CCI is responsible, among others, for the following main functions (INSA 2015; 
Lee 2014b): 
 Concretise operational direction into action. 
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 Identify, design and implement systems, toolsets and reporting mechanisms (both 
defensive and offensive). 
 Carry out tactical taskings in line with CCI operational objectives, through 
combined technical and HUMINT measures. 
 Identify, analyse and action CCI threats and opportunities. 
Tactical CCI involves the daily management, configuration (including identification 
and/or compromise in the case of offensive measure implementation) of both defensive 
and offensive systems, networks, devices, network operations and security operations 
(INSA 2015). It is aimed at ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
organisation’s cyber and information security environment, as a defensive tactic and 
measure. In the case of an offensive or exploit tactics (that must be congruent with 
operational objectives and the organisational strategy), tactical CCI strives to degrade 
the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of an adversary’s cyber and information 
security environment. 
It interfaces with the larger CI function through multidisciplinary projects and continuous 
line-functional interaction. Tactical and operational CCI have a shared focus on on-the-
network threats and/or opportunities, threat actors’ capabilities or possible capabilities, 
as well as the deployment and expansion of capabilities. Tactical CCI is concerned with 
engaging individual groups or individuals, their specific network actions, specific tactics, 
techniques and procedures, and specific technical issues such as malware signatures 
(Chismon & Ruks 2015). 
Tactical CCI processes feed into information reports and focus on specific issues such 
as breaches, the identification and/or creation of malicious code, intrusion, threat and 
exploitation. The process leads to the compilation of tactical and technical reports, 
alerts, warnings, defensive and offensive solution and action reports, campaign 
proposals, analyses and interpretations. These are provided to CCI analysts, tactical 
leadership, operational leadership and the executive in the manner described above 
(Friedman & Bouchard 2015). 
The skill sets required for tactical CCI are, as is the case with strategic and operational 
CCI, multidisciplinary. They include elements of tactical and line-functional 
management, ICT security, development of systems and software, programming, 
scripting, developing offensive and defensive toolsets, CCI technical specialisation, 
HUMINT and intelligence collection, as well as language and social science expertise 
(used in, for example, the penetration of hacking forums), ethical hacking, technical 
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defensive and offensive measures, as well as reverse engineering (Bodmer et al. 
2012). 
In this section, we explicated the execution of CCI on the tactical and technical levels. 
This was done as part of the description of the CCI matrix's vertical plane and followed 
on a description of CCI on the strategic and operational levels. We now proceed with 
summarising and concluding this chapter.  
11.6 CONCLUSION  
In Chapters 10 and 11, we advanced the sixth building block of our FCCI (namely a CCI 
matrix comprising two planes). We demonstrated the CCI matrix as essential to 
explaining and optimising inter alia:  
 The use and synchronisation of CCI tools 
 CCI's levels of execution  
 The integration of CCI with the organisational intelligence and CI endeavour 
 The configuration of an organisation's CCI posture 
In the next chapter, we propose delineation as the penultimate building block of our 
FCCI.  
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CHAPTER 12 
BUILDING BLOCK 7 – DELINEATION 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter, we described the CCI matrix as Building Block 6 of our FCCI. 
In this chapter, we forward our FCCI’s seventh and penultimate building block, namely 
delineation. The following aspects are addressed: 
 Section 12.2: Delineation – Why it is needed and important as a building block. 
 Section 12.3: Some building block contours 
o Subsection 12.3.1: Contour 1 – Delineation of cyber counterintelligence in 
practice  
o Subsection 12.3.2: Contour 2 – Delineating cyber counterintelligence as a 
multifaceted academic field 
 Section 12.4: Conclusion  
Graphically, the addition of delineation as an FFCI building block can be illustrated as 
follows:  
 
Figure 33: Building Block 7 – Delineation (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017) 
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12.2 DELINEATION – WHY IT IS NEEDED AND IMPORTANT AS A 
BUILDING BLOCK  
By its very nature, the cybersphere is one of interconnected reality. Even with all the 
previous building blocks in place, an organisation would seldom be able – or legally 
allowed –in practice to execute the whole of the CCI endeavour on its own (Duvenage, 
Sithole & von Solms 2017). Business entities would, for example, be legally prohibited 
and generally not have the resources to undertake some active-offensive cyber 
campaigns undertaken by nation states. In a similar vein, a nation state could be 
necessitated to cooperate not only with other nation states but also with non-state 
actors in order to achieve national goals. These goals could compel cooperation on 
CCI. Consequently, and although ultimately driven by each actor’s self-centred interests 
(see Section 6.2 of Chapter 6), effective CCI requires cooperation with other actors and 
a delineation of respective roles.  
Delineation is also important in the academic context. Treating CCI as a too wide and 
encompassing field will result in loss of focus (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 2017). 
Simultaneously, CCI must be clear on its overlaps with various other academic fields 
and on the areas of multidisciplinary research.  
12.3 SOME BUILDING BLOCK CONTOURS  
Of all the FCCI's building blocks, the design of delineation is described as the most 
cursory, and admittedly requires much further research and refinement. Accordingly, in 
Chapter 15 (Section 15.5), we pose delineation as a priority item on the future research 
agenda. In this chapter, we make observations about the design of the delineation 
building block by means of two contours. In line with the distinction drawn in Section 
12.2, we structure these contours as pertaining to CCI in practice and CCI in the 
academic sphere. 
12.3.1 CONTOUR 1 – DELINEATION OF CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN 
PRACTICE  
In respect of CCI practice, the delineation building block typically consists of a narrative 
description of areas of responsibilities and cooperation (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms 
2017). As far as we could ascertain, there are no specific description of CCI 
responsibility demarcation in international agreements between nation states in 
multinational bodies (such as NATO, the European Union or the African Union). There 
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are, however, various agreements and other documentation on cooperation in respect 
of security (including military and combating crime) and cybersecurity. Consequently, 
the delineation of CCI on an interstate level will be derived from a deductive appraisal 
of such agreements and documents. Since CCI’s signature role is the countering of 
cyber espionage, international law and convention applicable to the latter should of 
course also be duly considered. In this regard, the Tallinn Manual’s rule 66 on “cyber 
espionage” is of particular relevance (Schmitt 2013). 
In as far as the role of the state in CCI within a particular nation state is concerned (i.e. 
nationally), the legislation, governance frameworks, regulatory stipulations and 
executive directives of that country need to be considered. Should CCI not be 
mentioned by name, the demarcation of CCI responsibilities will be derived from the 
legislation, regulatory stipulations and executive directives on CI. Since CCI is a 
relatively new field, the demarcation of respective CCI functions and functioning also 
within specific arms of the state's apparatus and/or in the arena where it operates, 
would often not be defined in detail. This assertion, as well as the value of conceptual 
constructs to clarify CCI roles, is capably illustrated by Justiniano's (2017) earlier 
mentioned master's project entitled 'Advancing the capacity of a theater special 
operations command (TSOC) to counter hybrid warfare threats in the cyber gray zone.'  
 
Legislation, regulatory stipulations and executive directives will be decisive in also 
demarcating the nature and extent of CCI functions of non-state actors within a 
particular country. In certain respects, the country's state security apparatus could be 
partially reliant on the cooperation of non-state actors. Simultaneously, and as was 
noted in the introduction (Section 12.2), non-state actors could be legally prohibited and 
not have the resources to undertake some active-offensive cyber campaigns. In this 
regard Fieber (2015) states: 
While private organizations may certainly apply counterintelligence 
principles with the scope of their operations, legal authorities may limit the 
extent to which organizations may directly affect an external threat. In that 
light, close coordination and collaboration ... [with the applicable state 
security structures] ... are highly recommended   
In the case of multinational non-state actors cooperation is more complex and 
delineation could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
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In this subsection, we examined the delineation of CCI in practice. We now proceed 
with discussing delineation within the academic context.  
12.3.2 CONTOUR 2: DELINEATING CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A MULTI-
FACETTED ACADEMIC FIELD 
Throughout the thesis, we highlighted CCI as a multifaceted and drawing on several 
academic fields. These include: Intelligence Studies and International Relations (both 
part of Political Science), Computer Science, Informatics, Business Studies, Law, 
Knowledge Management, Sociology, Forensic Science, Psychology, History and 
Linguistics. Being the multidisciplinary field that it is, CCI cannot be rigidly demarcated. 
Rather, it is a mosaic of overlapping academic interests. A principle challenge in 
establishing CCI as an academic field lies in identifying, describing and examining 
these overlaps.  
12.4 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we explained delineation as an FCCI building block. In the next chapter, 
we discuss the FCCI's last building block – the CCI process.   
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CHAPTER 13 
BUILDING BLOCK 8 – CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
PROCESS  
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 
In this chapter, we submit the CCI process as our FCCI's last building block. The addition 
of the CCI process building block can be depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 34: Building Block 8 – CCI Process (Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms, 2017) 
It is practically and academically infeasible to attempt to describe the CCI process in all 
its detail. The notional structuring of CCI calls for a simplification at a higher level of 
abstraction. At this higher level, a bird's eye view emerges of the process that 
coherently binds and drives the work of CCI. A process model is a construct that can 
offer this bird's eye view.  
As process models in general, the CCI process model should be presented as a 
construct acting as “idealizations of processes that are more subtle and more complex 
in practice” (Berkowitz & Goodman 2000). A model ought to be simultaneously 
congruent with reality and an idealised, simplified representation of reality. It 
parsimoniously explains a process that encompasses diverse activities and elements. 
Since it is an idealisation, a model is “an aim point, of what the process should look like 
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if everything goes as planned” (Lowenthal 2012). Academically, a process model 
serves as a notional concept for theorising and a premise or soundboard for research. 
More practically, a model provides a template for the organised execution of functions 
and activities. 
A process model typically consists of graphically depicted and narratively explained 
step-by-step actions. An academically credible CCI process model cannot be presented 
as 'standalone'. It should consider some existing postulations on not only the CCI 
process, but also other process models in related fields. This broader approach is 
reflected in our structuring of the rest of the chapter, namely: 
 Section 13.2: CCI process model – Why it is Needed and Important as a building 
block 
 Section 13.3: Overview of some existing process models  
o Subsection 13.3.1: Existing propositions on the cyber counterintelligence 
process 
o Subsection 13.3.2: Propositions on the cyber intelligence and cyber threat 
intelligence processes. 
o Subsection 13.3.3: Are there other alternatives in Intelligence Studies and 
Business Intelligence useful to constructing a CCI process model?   
 Section 13.4: Proposal for a CCI process model  
 Section 13.5: The CCI process model and institutional maturity  
 Section 13.6: Conclusion 
In explaining the above, this chapter draws on, and contains verbal extracts from  
Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015, Duvenage & Hough 2011 as well as 
Duvenage  2011.  
In this section, we introduced the CCI process as a building block and explained the 
approach followed in the chapter with regard to its construction. We now proceed with 
discussing the need for, and importance of, the building block.  
13.2 CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCESS MODEL – WHY 
IT IS NEEDED AND IMPORTANT AS A BUILDING BLOCK  
Properly contextualised, the foregoing seven building blocks (Chapter 5–12) provide all 
the ‘parts’ necessary to academically explain and practically execute CCI. At this 
juncture, these parts – and thus the FCCI – are still ‘static’. They lack the dynamism 
that synergistically combines and drives these different parts as an integrated process 
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(Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). Consequently, a description of the CCI 
process is needed as the FCCI's last building block. For reasons noted in Section 13.1 
this is best done by considering some existing process propositions and then designing 
a CCI process model most suited to our FCCI.  
Extending from Section 13.1, we can infer two further reasons for the importance of a 
CCI process model. Firstly, on an academic level, a process model serves as a notional 
concept for directing and delineating further research on CCI. Secondly, on a practical 
level, the conceptual outline of the process provides an organising template for 
performing CCI work in practice. On both counts, the CCI process model is (to 
paraphrase an earlier assertion in Section 13.1) an idealisation and aim point of what 
the CCI process should look like to be optimally effective when everything goes as 
planned.  
We now proceed with reviewing some existing propositions on the CCI and related 
processes.  
13.3 OVERVIEW OF SOME EXISTING PROCESS MODELS   
From the outset, the CCI process needs to be distinguished from the cybersecurity 
process. Over the years, the term ‘cybersecurity’ process has come to denote the 
cluster of compliance-driven activities in which the technical aspects predominate. The 
implementation and adoption practices prescribed by ISO 27001 and ISO 22301 were, 
and are still, seen as providing cybersecurity processes for all types of entities 
(Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). While critically important, such processes 
are wholly insufficient on their own in safeguarding and advancing organisational 
interests.  
13.3.1  EXISTING PROPOSITIONS ON THE CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCESS  
In as far as the consulted academic and published literature is concerned, contributions 
on models that pertinently deal with the CCI process are rare. For example, one of the 
most authoritative works on CCI, Bodmer et al.’s (2012) Reverse deception – 
Organized cyber threat counter-exploitation does not advance such a process. Two 
notable academic works that do address the CCI process are Sigholm and Bang’s 
paper (2013) 'Towards offensive cyber counterintelligence' and Fieber’s (2015) 
master's capstone The Iranian computer network operations threat to U.S. critical 
infrastructures. In the two subsections that follow we appraise these two contributions.  
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13.3.1.1 Offensive CCI Attribution Process  
With the qualification that their paper is placed within a statutory military context, 
Sigholm and Bang (2013) set out to offer a “comprehensive process that bridges the 
gap between the various actors involved in CCI”. The work subscribes to Clark’s (2004) 
“Target-centric Intelligence Process” which was specifically advanced for statutory 
intelligence analysis (i.e. not the whole range of intelligence and CI functions). 
Graphically, Clark’s model – which is foundational to Sigholm and Bang's (2013) 
proposition – can be depicted as follows: 
 
Figure 35: Target-centric Intelligence Process (Clark 2004) 
 
Drawing on Clark's (2004) model, Sigholm and Bang (2013) postulate a model for the 
“offensive CCI attribution process”. Rather than an overarching “comprehensive” CCI 
process, their proposition is on closer examination limited to one aspect of the CCI 
process (namely attribution) and more specifically an information flow and analysis 
architecture to be employed for this (attribution) purpose. In their proposal, offensive 
CCI is neither incorporated into defensive CCI nor is it dovetailed with the broader CI 
process. This is illustrated by the following diagram they provide (Sigholm & Bang 
2013): 
 
Please see next page for Figure 36. 
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 Figure 36: Layout of the Offensive CCI Attribution Process (Sigholm & Bang 
2013) 
 
Subsequent to Sigholm and Bang's (2013) proposition, an outstanding and more 
comprehensive CCI process model was advanced by Fieber (2015). This model is 
discussed in the next subsection.  
13.3.1.2 Organisational CI model in cyberspace  
Fieber (2015) rests his proposition on two key contentions which also underpin our 
proposal on a CCI process model (See Section 13.4). Firstly, asserts Fieber (2015), the 
CCI process spans across “domains” in the sense that it “incorporates both technical 
and non-technical countermeasures”. Secondly, CCI “mirrors the conventional CI 
process and the two cannot be separated” (Fieber 2015). Fieber (2015) proceeds with 
postulating the “general phases” of the CI/CCI process as (1) assess; (2) identify; (3) 
exploit; and (4) neutralise. Fieber (2015) then overlaps the CI process's phases with the 
stages of the “active cyber defense cycle”. The stages of the "active cyber defense 
cycle", as described by Fieber (2015) are: (1) asset identification and network security 
monitoring; (2) incident response; (3) threat and environment manipulation; and (4) 
threat intelligence consumption. Fieber (2015) graphically depicts the resultant 
“organizational CI process model” as follows:  
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Figure 37: Organizational counterintelligence model to deny adversaries the 
opportunity to achieve effects in cyberspace (Fieber 2015)  
Fieber (2015) continues with substantiating his model with reference to the countering 
of Iranian “cross-domain threats”.  
Parallel and independent research at the University of Johannesburg also aimed at 
designing a CCI process model (Duvenage, von Solms, & Corregedor 2015). Predating 
Fieber’s (2015) capstone project’s publication (in August) by two months, the outcome  
of the University of Johannesburg's research was published in June 2015 as part of the 
Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security 
(Duvenage, von Solms, & Corregedor 2015). In their paper titled, 'The cyber 
counterintelligence process – A conceptual overview and theoretical proposition’, 
Duvenage, von Solms and Corregedor (2015) propose a CCI process that is more 
granulated than Fieber's (2015). Duvenage, von Solms and Corregedor's (2015) model, 
which is presented in Section 13.4 of this chapter, is based on an appraisal of existing 
processes models not only within CCI, but also pertinent proposals in the related fields 
of 'cyber intelligence, 'cyber threat intelligence', Business Intelligence and Intelligence 
 
 
  
Exploit 
 Investigation 
 Coordination w/  
     partners 
 Collection 
 Education Threat and  
Environmental 
Manipulation 
Neutralize 
 Deception 
 Deterrence  
 Termination 
 Education 
Threat  
Intelligence  
Consumption 
Assess 
 Vulnerabilities 
 Adversarial   
capability 
 Resources  
    available 
 Analysis and  
recommendations 
Asset 
Identification 
and Network  
Security 
Monitoring 
Incident 
Response 
Identify 
 Reporting 
 Education 
 Liaison 
 Investigation 
137 
Studies. Since an appraisal of propositions in related fields is congruent with the 
academic rigour required of a doctoral l thesis, the next two subsections comprise: 
 Subsection 13.3.2: Positions on the 'cyber intelligence' and 'cyber threat 
intelligence' processes 
 Subsection 13.3.3:  Alternatives in Intelligence Studies and Business 
Intelligence 
 
13.3.2 PROPOSITIONS ON THE CYBER INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER THREAT 
INTELLIGENCE PROCESSES  
The literature published by cybersecurity entities offering CCI services do in some 
instances contain references to the CCI process. These vendors’ contributions are 
cursory, aimed at expanding market share, and not substantiated academic research. 
None of the promotional publications reviewed purport to offer a model specifically 
linked to the CCI process (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). However, as 
noted earlier, 'cyber intelligence' and 'cyber threat intelligence' should be examined for 
insights useful to the design of our CCI process model. Consequently, we now proceed 
with propositions with these tags. 
  
Process propositions under the tags ‘cyber intelligence’ and ‘cyber threat intelligence’ 
are certainly not in short supply. Various of these propositions strongly draw in their 
descriptions of the ‘cyber intelligence’ process on what is known in Intelligence Studies 
as the traditional intelligence cycle (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). As it 
has done for more than 60 years within Intelligence Studies and statutory intelligence 
practice (Hulnick 2007), the traditional intelligence cycle now strongly influences 
thinking on processes in the cyber realm. Reduced to its essence, the intelligence cycle 
comprises the activities of direction, collection, analysis and dissemination. Graphically 
Figure 38 depicts the intelligence cycle as follows:  
 
Please see next page for Figure 38. 
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Figure 38: Traditional Intelligence Cycle (Author) 
Within the cybersecurity sphere, subscription to the intelligence cycle varies from 
simple adoptions at one end of the spectrum to customised expansions at the other end 
of the spectrum. Serving as an example of a simple adoption is VeriSign’s (2012) 
Establishing formal cyber intelligence capability (White Paper) which states: “To 
successfully mount and implement an intelligence capability, it’s essential to understand 
the intelligence lifecycle model … [the]…Traditional Intelligence Cycle comprise of 
Direction, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination.” This description concurs exactly with 
the cycle depicted in Figure 38.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, KPMG (2013) advances the following customised, 
expanded proposition as a basic intelligence operating model for “cyber threat 
intelligence” – graphically depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 39: Basic Intelligence Operating Model (KPMG 2013)  
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As would have been noted, the intelligence cycle in its simple or expanded format does 
not explain or even mention CI or CCI. As is the case in Intelligence Studies, 
proponents of this cycle in the cybersecurity realm may argue or imply that CI (and by 
implication CCI) is performed throughout the cycle (cƒ. Lee 2014a–e, VeriSign 2012). 
The CI process, proponents argue, mirrors and protects the intelligence cycle 
(Duvenage & Hough 2011). In reality, these counterintelligence-throughout-the-cycle 
and counterintelligence-follows-the-cycle positions simply do not work. The intelligence 
cycle was originally conceived to explain positive intelligence, but is not particularly 
good at that either (Duvenage & Hough 2011). The following observation by Arthur 
Hulnick (2007), a distinguished intelligence practitioner and Intelligence Studies 
scholar, is just as applicable to the cyber field:  
…[t]he intelligence cycle is a flawed vision, and thus poor theory. One need 
only ask those who have toiled in the fields of 
intelligence...[C]ounterintelligence follows an entire different and unique 
path of its own...It has nothing to do with the intelligence cycle. Instead 
there is counterintelligence methodology that is unique...So when one looks 
at the pattern of counterintelligence functions, it does not look at all like the 
intelligence cycle.  
If the intelligence cycle does not work for CI generally, it can of course not work in the 
cyber realm generally and for CCI specifically.  
In this section, we overviewed propositions on the CI and cyber threat intelligence 
process models for possible use in designing our CCI process model. We found various 
such models to be based on the flawed, traditional intelligence cycle orientating from 
Intelligence Studies. We conclude that such models do not accurately depict the CI 
process and can thus not be applied to the CCI process. In the next section, we 
examine the question whether there are other alternatives that can inform our design of 
the CCI process model.  
13.3.3 ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AND BUSINESS 
INTELLIGENCE THAT ARE USEFUL FOR CONSTRUCTING A CYBER 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCESS MODEL?  
Contrary to what might have been expected, no current postulations offer a quick-fix 
solution. Endeavours within Intelligence Studies over the past two decades to offer 
alternatives remain overwhelmingly directed at positive intelligence (cf. Johnson 2007, 
Lowenthal 2012, Clark 2004). One of the few propositions pertinently advanced for CI is 
that by Hulnick (2007). He proposes a “counterintelligence model” comprising a five-
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clustered “pattern”, namely “identification”, “penetration”, “exploitation”, “interdiction” 
and “claim success”. Summarised, Hulnick’s (2007) description of the phases of the CI 
model is as follows: 
 Identification of espionage adversaries 
 Penetration of adversarial espionage intelligence structures 
 Exploitation, which refers to the collection of information (on adversaries) and the 
institution of measures such as deception 
 Interdiction, which ensues when the “the case is turned over to law enforcement” 
 Public declarations by state authorities of successful counterintelligence actions 
Hulnick (2007) explicitly limits the model above to “active counterintelligence”, but adds 
the qualification that “defensive measures in counterintelligence” do not fit into “either 
the traditional intelligence cycle or the model [he] just described.” Within state security 
structures, these long-established defensive measures are commonly referred to as 
operational security (OPSEC) and comprise the following five steps (US 1996): 
(1) Identify critical information and other assets.  
(2) Analyse threats. 
(3) Determine vulnerabilities.  
(4) Assess risks.  
(5) Develop and implement countermeasures.  
Effective CI and thus CCI require the integrated execution of offensive/active and 
defensive/passive modes. They are, after all, different sides of the same coin. Are there 
examples of integrative proposals which combine defensive and offensive CI 
dimensions? While none could be found in conventional Intelligence Studies, 
propositions exist within Business Intelligence which attempt to combine the offensive 
and defensive missions. A seminal model in this regard was forwarded by Nolan 
(1997). While copyright restriction prevents inclusion of Nolan’s graphical depiction in 
this paper, subsequent Business Intelligence propositions convey the same thinking. 
The following proposal by Brouard (2004) shown in the following figure is an example: 
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Figure 40: Intelligence Gathering and Protection Intelligence Process (Brouard 
2004) 
Such models are a useful contribution in their conceptual integration of subprocesses 
and the additional risk assessment methodology. Nonetheless, they insufficiently reflect 
the nature of the defensive and offensive CI mission. They are also not granulated 
enough to serve either as an aiming point for practical execution or as a sounding 
board for further academic exploration.  
Drawing on our examination of some existing process models, we now proceed to 
advancing our own CCI process model.  
13.4  PROPOSAL FOR A CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
PROCESS MODEL  
We propose a model that combines the respective steps of offensive and defensive CI 
(and thus CCI) in a single process. Within this process, the defensive and offensive 
subprocesses (while for the large part intertwined) also follow a distinctive pattern of 
steps. The detailed description of both the subprocesses is an extensive task – 
especially within the confines of a thesis already advancing several other notional 
constructs. Therefore, this section narratively describes only the offensive subprocess.  
CCI, to re-emphasise, is executed as part of the broader CI process. The CCI process 
thus looks, works with and is inseparable from the CI process. Graphically, the CCI 
process can be depicted as follows: 
  
142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Cyber Counterintelligence Process Model (Adapted from Duvenage, 
von Solms & Corregedor 2015 and Duvenage & Hough 2011) 
Although Figure 41 shows a linear sequence (i.e. neat finalisation of one step, directly 
followed by the execution of the subsequent steps), the CCI process is in reality 
multidirectional with steps being repeated and crisscrossing. This qualification also 
applies to the narrative description of the model in the paragraphs that follow. 
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Step 1: Derive requirements (terms of reference) 
Like CI in general, CCI is not an end in itself. It serves the interest of a particular client, 
be it a government or a business. The client expects its CI apparatus to not only 
safeguard its vital interests and objectives, but also to actively advance these. Ideally, 
CCI (as part of the broader CI process) would commence with the client clearly 
expressing its expectations. These would include what cyber assets should be 
protected and what CCI should do to proactively promote government or company 
interests. While the soliciting of CCI services from a specialised company might come 
with a neatly packaged ‘wishlist’ with clear-cut, all-encompassing requirements and 
priorities, this is very rarely the case. CI and CCI requirements are mostly derived and 
not received. They are derived through a meticulous appraisal of the client’s objectives, 
intentions and strategy. Preferably these should be contained in terms of reference 
(ToR) endorsed by the client and in stating the obvious within the parameters of legal 
jurisdictions.  
Step 2: Identify assets to be protected and interests to be advanced 
Resources are finite and CCI can only execute its signature role to defend and 
neutralise in a highly prioritised and selective manner. Ascertaining what assets and 
interests in the information cybersphere are worthy to protect and advance by 
expending precious resources is the right place to start. In the case of nation states (or 
other sizable role-players), these information cyber assets and interests (identified on 
the basis of the ToR) are threefold:  
(1) Assets the state possesses which are central to survival and prosperity (such as 
critical bodies of information, systems and infrastructure)  
(2) Assets the state aspires to procure by cyber means (such as the secrets of 
adversaries)  
(3) Interests refer to the conditions the state seeks to realise (e.g. gaining a 
competitive edge over an adversary by obtaining such secrets, adding additional 
layers to its defences or offensively undermining the C-I-A of adversarial systems)  
Step 3: Initial vulnerability assessment and firstline defence 
Although there are exceptions, CI doctrine requires offensive action to be preceded by 
solid defence. Applied to CCI, the identification of real and aspirational assets and 
interests described above is therefore followed by ascertaining vulnerabilities in 
defensive, cybersecurity measures which protect these assets and interest. This 
compliance driven-process would typically result in remedial action in relation to cyber-, 
information, physical and personal security. It thus also involves CI specialisation fields 
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other than CCI. This subprocess is again performed, but more exhaustively, as part of 
Step 6.2. However, care should be taken not to summarily close all the ‘holes’ in the 
cyber ‘fences’. Some of these could be exploited for offensive purposes (such as 
deception) later on in Step 6).  
Step 4: Environmental scanning – Identify threat agents (actual and potential) 
In the assessment just performed, we mostly considered internal weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. Effective CI has to safeguard against and also engage external threats. 
While opponents (competitors and adversaries) are common threat actors, risks can 
also be posed by technological and socio-political developments. While all of these are 
not of concern to CI and CCI, they are considered inferring actual and potential threat- 
agents (of CI relevance). A common pitfall is to identify threat agents mainly on the 
basis of actors known to be active, adversarial and well capacitated. The result is a self-
feeding, atrophic CCI process with risks posed by threat actors going undetected. The 
importance of innovative environmental scanning, directed by the ToR, and aimed at 
identifying potential threat agents can thus hardly be overemphasised.  
Step 5: Integrated risk assessment and strategy  
Considering the external and internal threats as well as vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
identified in the preceding steps, the CCI process proceeds to an integrated risk 
assessment. The risk assessment pronounces on what CCI measures are obsolete, 
which require modification and in which areas they are lacking. Decisions on CCI are 
formulated as part of a broader CI strategy which combines defensive and offensive 
dimensions. As suggested earlier, a balance has to be maintained between (to 
paraphrase Nolan 1997) the defensive CI task to 'close holes in the fence’, and 
offensive CI that seeks to exploit the offensive opportunities that vulnerabilities offer. 
Step 6: Design and implement CCI measures and programmes  
While offensive and defensive CCI are designed and implemented in synergy, the 
subprocess each has a unique mission and thus pattern of execution. This chapter, as 
noted earlier, is limited to narratively describing the offensive pattern (Step 6.1, Figure 
41) which consists of the following six substeps: 
(1) Substep 6.1.1: Institute/reconfigure indicators and collection instruments. Since 
espionage is both a precursor and end goal of sophisticated cyber breaches, the 
offensive subprocess commences with instituting and/or reconfiguring (a) 
indicators of adversarial cyberespionage and (b) own collection instruments. 
Whatever form these instruments take (honeynets, tarpits, footholds in relevant 
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online communities and sites, etc.), they will be developed and are constantly fine 
tuned around those assets most prized by opponents. In Steps 6.1.3 and 6.1.4, 
these instruments will be accustomed even further to best collect on and then 
engage targets.   
(2) Substep 6.1.2: Identify and prioritise intelligence opponents. In addition to 
information obtained through the preceding step, CCI will draw on the broader, 
all-source CI picture to identify those opponents actually and potentially to be 
targeting the own entity though intelligence actions such of espionage, covert 
action, and so on. Even the well-resourced entities cannot offensively focus on all 
known and suspected opponents. Consequently, only prioritized opponents are 
elevated to actual/potential adversaries and pursued through further offensive 
action. 
(3) Substep 6.1.3: In-depth ‘profiling’ of adversaries to arrive at targets. These 
offensive actions firstly entail the focused collection of information on and 
subsequent in-depth profiling of adversaries. The focused collection of 
information involves high-risk and high-cost measures and could include 
cyberespionage. One of the crucial CCI collection requirements is to ascertain the 
instrumentalities and proxies an adversary uses for intelligence activities. To this 
end, information procured through other conduits such as HUMINT and other 
TECHINT are also used. Depending on various factors, some of these 
adversaries, their proxies or campaigns not suited to offensive exploitation will be 
handed over to be dealt with by defensive CCI.  
(4) Substep 6.1.4: Engagement and exploitation of targets. As is clear from the 
above, the acquisition of targets (prioritised adversaries and their proxies) for 
offensive action is an exhaustive process. In certain respects, the acquisition of 
targets is the most complex part of CCI work. To adopt a target-centric-type view 
like that of Clarke (2004) at the start of the process would thus clearly be a gross 
oversimplification that skips critical segments of CCI methodology. The 
engagement and exploitation of targets are at the core of offensive CCI. This 
exploitation can take myriad forms and include escalated (more aggressive) 
collection, deception, manipulation, disinformation and disruption of hostile 
intelligence activities. The ideal aim of CCI is to degrade and control the 
adversary through his own cyberaction. The following observation by Codevilla 
(1992) rings true also in respect of CCI: “Action against the enemy through the 
enemy’s own intelligence is the very consummation of CI.” Usually this is best 
achieved by combining CCI with other forms of offensive CI. Deception through 
honeynets could, for example, be supplemented by means of disinformation fed 
146 
to an adversary through a human double agent. Although not strictly part of 
civilian CCI, offensive actions could in the military context include pre-emptively 
lining the digital battle for cyberwar.  
(5) Sub-step 6.1.5: Neutralisation and termination. While the targets are to a certain 
level neutralised through exploitation, offensive CCI operations typically have a 
'neutralisation and termination' phase at the end of their 'life-cycle'. Such 
termination can either be opted for (i.e. at own initiative at a predetermined time) 
or necessitated by circumstances (such as indications that an operation has been 
compromised). Whatever the case, termination should be planned for in advance 
and utilising various scenarios. Termination thus planned has two purposes. 
Firstly, it delivers the final neutralisation ‘blow’ to the adversaries’ campaigns 
being engaged. Secondly, if executed skilfully, it could provide the 'seeds' for 
subsequent 'generation' of CCI operations. 
(6) Sub-step 6.1.6: Acclamation, reflection and identification of further opportunities. 
As with CI generally, CCI success ought to be followed by acclamation. 
Acclamations are of two kinds. Firstly, public acclamation involves citing aspects 
of the successful countering of malicious cyber intelligence activities (such as 
organised cybercrime). In democratic countries, such claiming of success is vital 
in justifying in the public eye the billions spent on intelligence, CI and CCI work. 
Furthermore, public acclamation can be part of degrading an adversary. 
Secondly, acclamation can be limited on the basis of the need-to-know principle. 
Sometimes entities “try hard to keep successes secret so that they might be 
repeated. An oft-quoted CIA saying is, ‘The secret of our success is the secret of 
our success.’“ (Hulnick 2007). From a management perspective, peer 
commendation is imperative in ensuring continued devotion to CI, which is an 
exhaustive task conducted in secret over a long period of time. Whatever 
acclamation opted for, CCI operations are assessed for lessons learned and to 
identify opportunities for further exploitation. 
Step 7: Monitor, synchronise and redirect 
Although indicated as a separate step in the interest of simplicity, CCI is continuously 
monitored and synchronised and redirected in accordance with the broader CI and 
intelligence effort. The latter, in turn, ought to be dovetailed with an entity’s objectives 
and strategy. Intelligence and CI of any kind are instruments, not ends in themselves. 
The intelligence and insights gained through this endeavour influence objectives and 
strategy, and thus eventually the ToR of the ongoing intelligence process of which CCI 
is but a part.  
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 In this section, a high-level proposition on a CCI process model was advanced. As will 
be observed, our model is considerably more detailed than, but share essential features 
with, Fieber's (2015) proposition. In the next section observations are made on the 
relationship between the CCI process model and institutional maturity.  
13.5  THE CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCESS MODEL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL MATURITY 
In the context of its use in this thesis and chapter, the term 'process model' refers to the 
range of activities an institution performs to execute its core business. The optimal 
execution of the CCI process presupposes advanced levels of institutional maturity in 
respect of structures, people, technologies, policies and procedures as well as skills 
development (Jaquire, Duvenage & von Solms 2018). Attaining such CCI institutional 
maturity is in itself an on-going process that would by its very nature differ, in form and 
content, from the CCI process model advanced in this chapter. A detailed discussion of 
CCI maturity will distract from the thesis's focus. This thesis was qualified as advancing 
a high-level, overarching CCI framework. Furthermore, CCI maturity has been the focus 
of a dedicated research stream at the University of Johannesburg that recently 
culminated in the completion of a separate doctoral study (University of Johannesburg 
2018; Jaquire 2018; Jaquire & von Solms 2017 a-c). For purposes of our FCCI's 
design, we thus note the importance of CCI maturity, but do not elaborate further on 
this aspect.   
This section observed on the relation between our FCCI's eight building block (the CCI 
process) and CCI maturity. We now proceed with concluding the chapter. 
13.6 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we explained the importance of a CCI process model as our FCCI's final 
building block. We examined some existing process models and, with the exception of 
Fieber's model (2015), found these to be insufficient for explaining CCI. In the main, 
these models do not compute CCI's defensive and offensive CCI missions. Moreover, 
they are not granulated enough to serve as an aimpoint for the practical execution of 
CCI or a sounding board for directing academic research. Therefore, we proceeded 
with postulating a CCI process model which gives a bird’s eye view of the overarching 
process that coherently binds and drives CCI. Employed as an FCCI building block, the 
CCI process model we designed synergistically combines and adds 'dynamism' to the 
preceding seven building blocks of our FCCI.  
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This chapter concludes the construction of our FCCI and thus Part 3 of the thesis. We 
now proceed to Part 4, which apply the integrated FCCI as an organisational training 
tool (Chapter 14).  
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PART 4  
THE FCCI AS AN ORGANISATIONAL TRAINING TOOL 
 
 
Part 4 explores the FFCI’s application as a tool for an organisation’s CCI training and 
awareness programme. It consists of Chapter 14. 
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CHAPTER 14 
THE FCCI AS AN ORGANISATIONAL TRAINING TOOL 
 
14.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapters 4-13 we presented the FCCI and its components. Throughout the thesis we 
emphasised the requirement for our FCCI to not only serve an academic construct, but 
also to have practical application. Albeit cursory, Chapters 10-13 did illustrate some 
aspects of our FCCI’s practical application through, for example, our proposition on the 
CCI process and the CCI matrix’s illustration by means of a case study. This was done 
to validate the thesis primary hypothesis that a credible framework can be designed to 
explain what CCI is and how ‘it works’. In explaining the thesis’s problem statement 
(Chapter 1), we furthermore suggested that a key measure of our FCCI academic 
credibility would be the contribution it makes to structuring CCI as a “topic of 
instruction”. More concretely, this means that to be credible our FCCI (advanced in 
preceding chapters) should have practical use in CCI training. The aim of this chapter is 
precisely this – namely to illustrate the FCCI as a conceptual construct practically useful 
to an organisation’s CCI Awareness and Training Programme (ATP). This chapter 
expands on peer-reviewed research by Sithole, Duvenage, Jaquire and von Solms 
(2019). 
CCI, and even more so CCI training, are niche fields not necessarily familiar to all 
readers of this thesis. Therefore, for the discussion of our FCCI as part of an ATP to 
make sense, the chapter first needs to provide some background on the broader 
concept of CCI Awareness, Education and Training (AET) and its complexities more 
generally. This is done per Section 14.2. 
Moving from this broader base, the chapter then proceeds with Section 14.3. In this 
section we shall more specifically discuss a CCI Awareness and Training 
Programme (ATP) as a subset of CCI AET. As part of this discussion we advance a 
proposal on a generic organisational CCI ATP which incorporates our FCCI as a 
training tool.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 14.2: Cyber Counterintelligence Awareness  Education and Training (CCI 
AET):  Concept and Complexity  
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o Subsection  14.2.1: Conceptualising organisational CCI AET   
o Subsection  14.2.2: The importance of considering organisational context 
in designing CCI AET   
o Subsection  14.2.3: The role of the FCCI in CCI AET   
 
 Section 14.3: Towards an Organisational  Cyber Counterintelligence Awareness  
and Training Programme (CCI ATP) 
o Subsection  14.2.1: Conceptualising an organisational CCI Awareness 
and Training Programme (ATP)  
o Subsection  14.2.2: The FCCI as a CCI Awareness and Training 
Programme (ATP) tool 
o Subsection  14.2.3: The CCI Awareness and Training Programme’s 
(ATP’S) Design and Implementation process  
o Subsection 14.2.4: A cursory overview of a CCI Awareness and Training 
Programme (ATP) 
 Section 14.4: Conclusion 
14.2 CYBER CI AWARENESS  EDUCATION AND TRAINING (CCI 
AET):  CONCEPT AND COMPLEXITY)  
 
In order to establish a foundation for presenting a CCI ATP (in Section 14.2), this 
section examines the concept and complexities of CCI Awareness, Education and 
Training (AET) more generally.  
14.2.1 CONCEPTUALISING ORGANISATIONAL CCI AET   
CCI's effective implementation and execution above all requires a skilled CCI workforce 
and CCI-conscious employees. Such awareness and skilling is best achieved as part of 
a coherent broad-based CCI awareness, education and training (AET) endeavour. As 
AETs in general, a CCI AET is not a single, uniform “training” program but have three 
distinct functions, namely 'awareness', 'education' and 'training' (Kissel & Wilson 2010). 
Each CCI AET function differs in target group, specific objectives, outcomes, content 
and approaches (Kissel & Wilson 2010).  
These functions can be differentiated in more detail as follow:  
 Awareness is about being cognisant or knowledgeable of a situation or one’s 
surroundings. Awareness constitutes an AET's critical base function - the first line 
of defence that affords employees with an opportunity to learn about the 
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importance of personal security as well as protecting an organisation’s critical 
information systems assets. The NIST Special Publication 800-16 defines an 
awareness as “a learning process that sets the stage for training by changing 
individual and organisational attitudes to realise the importance of security and 
the adverse consequences of its failure” (de Zafra et al 1998).  
 Education denotes the facilitation of learning or teaching and the gaining of 
knowledge. Caballero (2017) describes education as “a formal curriculum created 
for the purpose of educating individuals in a broad array of security topics that will 
build a body of knowledge essential for a career in information security”. For 
purpose of this chapter, 'education' is deemed as a function provided by tertiary 
and training institutions outside the organisation. It is thus not a function provided 
by the organisation for the organisation. 
 Training pertains to the acquisition of competence (knowledge, skills and 
attitude) to improve performance and enhance expertise for a specific job or 
function. Amankwa, Loock and Kritzinger (2014) define training as “any 
endeavour that is undertaken to ensure that every employee is equipped with the 
information security skills and information security knowledge specific to their 
roles and responsibilities by using practical instructional methods such as 
seminars and workshops”.  
This subsection explained a CCI AET’s three functions. In the subsection to follow we 
examine the importance of organisational context in shaping the CCI AET endeavour.  
14.2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT IN 
DESIGNING CCI AET   
Like the CCI endeavour in general, effective CCI AET is not a standalone 'plug in' or 
'add on'. The design of CCI AET should consider the following aspects of organisational 
context which are unpacked in this section:  
 Subsection  14.2.2.1: Organisational  objectives, strategy, intelligence and 
counterintelligence endeavours  
 Subsection  14.2.2.2: Organisational type, maturity and the requirements for 
CCI AET  
14.2.2.1 Organisational objectives, strategy, intelligence and counterintelligence 
endeavours    
The design of a sound CCI AET duly considers the wider organisational strategy, 
intelligence and CCI efforts. This interconnectedness, which underlines the 
organisational synergy we have expounded in Chapter 6, shapes the CCI AET's design 
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and consequently the use of our FCCI as part CCI AET. For purposes of this chapter, 
the said synergy can be depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 42: Organisational Strategy, CI and Cyber (adapted from Duvenage & von 
Solms  2013, Sithole et al 2019) 15  
Implicit to Figure 42 above, is the notion that CCI AET should extend beyond 
conventional cyber security awareness and training. Instead, CCI AET is a combination 
of traditional CI and cyber security as well as advanced technical abilities (Black 2014, 
Van Derwerken & Ubell 2011).  In keeping with the thesis’s key contentions, Figure 42 
shows CCI as being proactive and including offensive dimensions. It therefore 
encompasses, but is wider than typical cyber risk management and conventional, 
specialised cyber security measures. Furthermore, CCI requires a sound understanding 
of the organisational intelligence and counterintelligence endeavours. CCI thus cuts 
across multiple disciplines and involves several skillsets (Black 2014, Van Derwerken & 
Ubell 2011). CCI AET draws an all these disciplines and skillsets – with self-evident 
implications for the complexity of its design.  
In this subsection, we examined the importance to a CCI AET’s design of organisational 
objectives, strategy, intelligence and CI. In the next subsection we explore the impact of 
organisational type and maturity on CCI AET.     
                                                                
15 As will be observed, Figure 42  is a redesign of Figure 17 featured in Chapter 6.  
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14.2.2.2 Nature of the organisation and its CCI maturity  
Organisations differ vastly not only in their missions (‘main business’), but also in size, 
resources and their workforces’ CCI-relevant skilling and awareness. Therefore, there 
is no 'one-size-fits-all' CCI AET. Instead, a CCI ATP's design should be congruent with 
the organisation's unique features.  
A CCI AET, as suggested above, considers its workforce’s existing CCI expertise and 
the target group, that is, asks does the organisation have an assigned CCI team? If not, 
does the organisation need to train the existing CI personnel in cyber or the existing 
cyber workforce in CI, or should new personnel be recruited specifically for the CCI 
function?  Of course not all organisations can afford a highly skilled specialised CCI 
team. In fact, the majority of medium and smaller organisations will not have such a 
dedicated team. This does not exclude CCI from the organisational cybersecurity 
approach. On the contrary, it reinforces such a need. In this regard, Jaquire, Duvenage 
and von Solms (2018) state:” CCI is not necessarily a separate structure. It is rather a 
manner for existing and some new functionalities within the organisation to work 
together in a multi-disciplinary approach to achieve the CCI strategic vision and desired 
outcomes.”  
Moreover, employees in general remain the weakest link in the organisational armour 
and continue to be the main reason of data breaches resulting from cyber incidents 
(Thomason 2013, Monk et al. 2010, Dtex 2017). Since it is important that every 
employee knows and understands their roles and responsibilities, a CCI AET has to, at 
the very least, provide for CCI awareness to all employees regardless of occupational 
group. The various levels of CCI proficiency are further discussed per Subsection 
14.3.1.  
14.2.3 THE ROLE OF THE FCCI IN CCI AET   
In the preceding two sections we explained the complexity of CCI AET and the 
challenges posed by the organisational context. These challenges include the wide 
diversity of topics to be considered for inclusion in CCI AET. Ostensibly the complexity 
and diversity of CCI AET poses a mammoth task. However, reduced to its essence and 
regardless of the organisational context, the aim of CCI AET remains the transfer of 
awareness, skills and knowledge of ‘what CCI is and how it works’. In preceding 
chapters, we advanced our FCCI and contended that this framework (consisting of 
eight building blocks) indeed explains ‘what CCI is and how it works’. Consequently, 
the FCCI and its eight building blocks can be utilised as modular components to design 
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CCI AET. To substantiate the assertion of the FCCI's usefulness to CCI AET, the next 
section incorporates the FCCI as part of an organisational CCI awareness and training 
programme (CCI ATP).  
14.3 TOWARDS AND ORGANISATIONAL CCI AWARENESS AND 
TRAINING PROGRAMME (ATP) 
The preceding section provided a cursory overview of CCI AET and its complexity. 
Progressing from this general overview, this section advances the outlines of a CCI 
awareness and training programme (APT) with specific reference to the utilisation of the 
FCCI.  This section is structured as follows: 
 Subsection  14.3.1: Conceptualising an organisational CCI Awareness and 
Training Programme (ATP) 
 Subsection  14.3.2: The FCCI as a  CCI ATP tool 
 Subsection  14.3.3: The CCI  ATP’s  design and implementation process  
 Subsection  14.3.4: A cursory overview of a CCI ATP 
14.3.1 CONCEPTUALISING AN ORGANISATIONAL CCI AWARENESS AND TRAINING 
PROGRAMME (ATP)  
As noted in the chapter’s introduction (Section 14.1), an organisational CCI awareness 
and training programme (ATP) is located within the broader notion of CCI AET. 
Phrased differently, an organisational CCI APT is a subset of CCI AET.  A CCI ATP 
specifically excludes ‘education’, since the latter is deemed as a function provided by 
tertiary and training institutions outside the organisation. As denoted by its composite 
terms, the CCI ATP thus consists of ‘awareness’ and ‘training’. The 'training' 
function is sub-dividable to three further proficiency levels namely: fundamental, 
functional and advanced. These resultant four proficiency levels (tiers) of our CCI ATP 
can graphically be depicted as follow (on the next page):  
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Figure 43: The structuring of Cyber Counterintelligence Awareness and Training 
(Sithole et al. 2019) 
 
This subsection advanced a high-level conceptualisation of a four-tiered CCI ATP. In 
the subsection to follow, we examine the use of the FCCI as a tool within a CCI ATP.  
 
14.3.2 THE FCCI AS CCI AWARENESS AND TRAINING PROGRAMME (ATP) TOOL 
 It will be observed that the CCI ATP per Figure 43 assumes different content and 
target groups. A further notion underpinning the figure is that the content and/or the 
depth/detail to which this is covered will vary from target group to target group. The red 
arrows in Figure 43 depicts this progression in depth and detail from very elementary 
(Tier 1) to highly advanced (Tier 4).   
 
As with CCI AET of which it is a subset, the CCI ATP’s content selection and the level 
at which it is pitched, will differ according to nature and needs of a particular 
organisation. Such selection and the development of a CCI ATP is an intricate and 
challenging process. It is also a process which can conceptually benefit from the 
application of our FCCI as a tool for the selection of CONTENT and PITCH (i.e. from 
'very elementary' to 'highly advanced'). The application of our FCCI as such a training 
tool can graphically be outlined as follows: 
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Table 8: Outlining the application of the FCCI as a training tool (Author) 
  LEVEL OF AWARENESS AND TRAINING = ‘PITCH’ 
# 
 
F 
C 
C 
I 
 
B 
U 
I 
L 
D 
I 
N 
G 
 
B 
L 
O 
C 
K 
S 
MODULAR 
CONTENT 
Very 
elementary  
 Highly  
Advanced/Detailed  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
1 
Theory  
          
 
2 
Organisation  
          
 
3 
Intelligence  
          
 
4 
Counter- 
intelligence  
          
 
5 
Cyber CI 
          
 
6 
CCI Matrix  
          
 
7 
Delineation  
          
 
8 
CCI Process 
          
This subsection explored the application of the FCCI as a tool to conceptually calibrate 
a CCI ATP. This application is more practically illustrated in Subsection 14.3.4. Prior to 
the said illustration, we first proceed with positioning the FCCI as part of the CCI ATP 
design and implementation process.  
14.3.3 THE CCI AWARENESS AND TRAINING PROGRAMME (ATP) DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS  
 The design and implementation of a CCI ATP, of which our FCCI forms part, can 
graphically be depicted as follows (on the next page): 
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Figure 44: The CCI ATP design and implementation Process (Sithole et al 2019, 
adapted from MacCauvlei Learning Academy, 2016) 
The four critical steps, depicted in Figure 44 comprise the following (adapted from 
MacCauvlei Learning Academy, 2016): 
1) An awareness and training needs analysis determines the organisation’s 
awareness and training needs according to the strategic objectives. It looks at 
the skills and knowledge required by the workforce generally and the CCI team 
specifically, with due cognisance of the organisation's strategy well as its 
objectives 
2) . The programme design and development derives the programme objectives 
from the training needs and then designs and develops the training material. It 
determines content, the duration of the programme, the training methods and 
techniques. The three proficiencies of CCI training (fundamental, functional and 
advanced – see Figure 43) will be designed according to the functional 
specialisations such as CCI collection, CCI analysis, CCI investigation, CCI 
offensive and CCI defensive. To this end the design phase will apply the FCCI 
as a tool to determine content and pitch (See Figure 44 above). 
  3) The programme implementation, communicates the training implementation 
to the respective target groups and their management echelons. Various 
training methods can be used for the implementation of awareness and training, 
such as classroom, online, practical, simulations, on-the-job training and so on. 
1
Awareness and 
Training Needs 
Analysis
2
Programme Design 
and Development
3
Programme 
Implementation
4
Programme 
Evaluation and 
Follow-up
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4) Programme evaluation and follow-up appraises the effectiveness of the 
programme in terms of the increase in knowledge and skills and the 
improvement of attitude on the job as a result of the awareness and training 
programme. Follow-ups are done in the workplace after a certain period about 
the sustainability of knowledge, skills and attitude.  
In this section, we advanced a structured process which can be applied for the design 
and implementation of a CCI ATP. In the next section, we provide a cursory overview of 
the CCI ATP design and development process's outcome.  
14.3.4 A CURSORY OVERVIEW OF A CCI AWARENESS AND TRAINING PROGRAMME 
(ATP)  
The CCI ATP's design per the processes described above will a detailed curriculum. 
For self-evident reasons, such a curriculum cannot not be discussed at length in this 
thesis. Therefore, we suffice with a cursory overview of the CCI ATP and a high-level 
application of the FCCI as tool. The overview and application are categorically 
qualified as very selectively illustrative and do not in any way purport to reflect all 
dimensions and content of a CCI ATP.  
14.3.4.1 CCI Awareness – the first line of defence and offence (See Tier 1 – Figure 
43: The structuring of Cyber Counterintelligence Awareness and Training) 
A CCI awareness programme is a first line of defence and a foundation for the stronger 
cyber security posture of an organisation. Since employees cannot protect information 
systems against something they are oblivious of, CCI awareness is foundational to 
enlightening employees of the cyber threats faced individually and as an organisation. It 
affords employees with an opportunity to learn about the importance of personal 
security as well as protecting the organisation’s critical information systems assets. CCI 
awareness conveys the possible cyber risks and threats faced by the organisation and 
provides skills to mitigate basic cyber-related risks and counter cyber threats (Roper, 
Grau & Fischer 2006). Simultaneously, and even at this very basic level , employees 
are sensitise that suspected and actual incidents do not only pose risks, but may 
also present the organisation with exploitable opportunities. This mind set should 
be reflected in incident identification , - handling and -reporting procedures   
The key elements of CCI awareness are as follow:  
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1) Description: A blended cyber security and CI awareness programme that 
increases employee awareness on the cyber threat landscape, type of 
adversaries and their techniques, and provide appropriate countermeasures. The 
emphasis is on personal and workplace practices which will limit the risk of 
individuals being exploited as an attack vector.  
2) Target group: All employees including new employees, contractors and, in some 
instances, third-party service providers. 
3) Objectives: After completing the awareness, individuals will be able to  
 Identify basic cyber threats, risks and opportunities,  
 employ sound personal and workplace cyber security practices, 
 be aware of critical organisational assets,  
 be aware of the exploitation of the human element as attack vector,  
 understand policies and procedures to secure information systems, and  
 understand and recognise countermeasures. 
4) Overview of core content  
 Cyber risks, cyber threats and cyber attacks, 
 concepts of Intelligence, CI and CCI, 
 organisational policies and procedures, 
 insider threat, 
 techniques used by cyber actors, 
 data security and privacy, 
 personal security, 
 computer and mobile security, and 
 internet and email security.  
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5) FCCI: Calibration and pitching 
Our FCCI can be used as follows to select and calibrate content pitch at the 
awareness level:  
Table 9: Application of the FCCI in designing CCI awareness (Author) 
  LEVEL 
F                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
C 
C 
I 
 
B 
U 
I 
L 
D 
I 
N 
G 
 
B 
L 
O 
C 
K 
S 
# CONTENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1 Theory  
          
2 Organisation  
          
3 Intelligence  
          
4 Counterintelligence  
          
5 Cyber CI 
          
6 CCI Matrix  
          
7 Delineation  
          
8 CCI Process 
          
 
6) Delivery methods and techniques.  
Several methods or techniques can be used to deliver an awareness programme, 
namely classroom tuition, workshops, online courses, seminars and open lectures. 
Supplementary techniques include intranet postings, posters, videos, games, quizzes, 
etc. In this section we submitted a proposal on CCI awareness and now proceed with 
examining CCI fundamental training. 
14.3.4.2 CCI Fundamental Training (See Tier 2 – Figure 43) 
CCI training, to reiterate is essential for improving the effectiveness of the organisation 
in achieving its strategic objectives. Training addresses employee competencies 
(knowledge, skills and attitude), skills gaps, re-skilling and upskilling. Training 
programmes are structured according to proficiency levels (fundamental, functional and 
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advanced – see Figure 43) and customised, where relevant, as per the requirements of 
functions or roles.  
CCI fundamental training is at an entry level and provides functionaries with a sound, 
but not necessarily detailed, CCI knowledge. It is aimed at those with direct/indirect CCI 
responsibilities or those requiring an organisational CCI background for other 
organisational functions. Since CCI is multi-disciplinary, fundamental training should 
transfer a sound grasp of CCI as subset of CI and intelligence. It should also convey 
the CCI modes of active-offensive, active-defensive, passive-offensive and passive-
defensive.   
The key elements of CCI functional training can be summarised as follow:  
1) Description: A blended cyber security and CI training that is a bridging 
programme between CCI awareness and CCI functional training. This level 
covers a fundamental understanding of CCI skills, computer hardware, - software, 
- networks and- systems. It addresses both offensive and defensive dimensions.  
2) Target groups: Functionaries with direct/indirect CCI responsibilities, those  
wanting to enter the CCI realm or requiring an organisational CCI background to 
effectively fulfil other organisational functions.  
3) Objectives: After completing fundamental training, individuals will  
 Be equipped with knowledge, skills and tools to counter cyber threats, 
 have a grasp of CI and CCI’s history with a view on instilling a professional  
‘self-awareness’, 16  
 understand software security, networks security and systems security 
vulnerabilities,  
 understand and be able to apply software security, networks security and 
systems security measures, and  
 have been introduced to basic offensive and defensive CCI, cyber warfare 
and CCI strategies.  
  
                                                                
16  See in Caelli, Liu and Longley (2013) as cited in Section 3.2 (Chapter 3). Practically such a history 
and professional ‘self-awareness’ will be included in Building Block 1: Theory. 
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4) Overview of content 
 Information technology security (computer security, networks security, data 
security), 
 physical security, 
 cyber threat landscape, 
 cyber actors and attack vectors, 
 cyber intelligence (cyber collection) and deception, 
 social media and its role to cyber collection, threats and attacks, 
 policies, procedures and standards (CI, CCI  information and cyber security), 
 fundamentals of aspects such as penetration testing, cryptography, digital 
forensics, and   
 cyber resilience or cyber risk management based approach. 
5) FCCI: Calibration and pitching 
Our FCCI can be used as follows to select and calibrate content pitch at the 
awareness level:  
Table 10: Application of the FCCI in designing fundamental CCI training (Author) 
  LEVEL 
 
 
F                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
C 
C 
I 
 
B 
U 
I 
L 
D 
I 
N 
G 
 
B 
L 
O 
C 
K 
S 
# CONTENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1 Theory  
          
2 Organisation  
          
3 Intelligence  
          
4 Counterintelligence  
          
5 Cyber CI 
          
6 CCI Matrix  
          
7 Delineation  
          
8 CCI Process 
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6) Delivery methods and techniques  
Several methods or techniques can be used to deliver a fundamental programme, 
namely classroom tuition, online, hands-on or virtual and practical exercises. 
14.3.4.3 CCI Functional Training (See Tier 3 – Figure 43)  
CCI functional training is at an intermediate level. It is a role-based training because it is 
structured according to the functions and responsibilities of specific CCI occupational 
domains. Such occupational domains could include (but are not limited to): CCI 
Investigations, CCI Analysis, CCI Collection, CCI Deception Operations, CCI Technical 
Specialisation (Black 2014; Jaquire, Duvenage & von Solms 2018). The design and 
development of the training curriculum will differ according to specific skills as required 
by a particular role. In addition, each occupational domain has further areas of 
specialisation and/or progressions. CCI Analysis would, for example, be performed by 
technical-tactical – , operational – and strategic analysts. While analysts share a 
common skillset, there are simultaneously unique skills demanded on each of these 
levels, namely: technical/tactical –, operational –- and strategic.17 Consequently, each 
different level of CCI Analysis requires customised training. For illustration purposes 
this subsection uses strategic CCI Analysis to illustrate the FCCI’s application (See 
Table 11 on the next page ).  
Description: A blended CCI technical and CI training that builds on the knowledge and 
skills acquired in the fundamental CCI training. This training is structured according to 
the functions and responsibilities of specific CCI occupational domains. .  
1) Target group: The training for CCI workforce and all functions in both CCI 
offensive and defensive domains.  
2) Objective: After completing the awareness, individuals will be equipped with 
knowledge, skills, attitude and tools to conduct CCI functions according to a 
specific domain.  
  
                                                                
17 See Table 7, Chapter 11 for more detail. 
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3) Overview of content  
Although topics and pitching vary significantly between, and within, occupational 
domains, the following (predominately technical aspects) will usually be included 
in training for all domains: 
 Cyber threat intelligence, 
 collection (OSINT, CYBINT,HUMINT & SOCMINT), 
 digital forensics, malware analysis and reverse engineering 
 advanced networks, 
 cryptography, 
 vulnerability assessments, penetration testing and hacking, 
 exploitation and deception, 
 data analytics and incident response management, as well  
 cyber intelligence and counterintelligence analysis, 
4) FCCI: Calibration and pitching 
For illustration purposes this subsection uses strategic CCI Analysis to illustrate 
the FCCI’s application :  
 
Table 11: Application of the FCCI in designing functional training for CCI 
strategic analysis (Author) 
  LEVEL 
F 
C 
C 
I 
 
B 
U 
I 
L 
D 
I 
N 
G 
 
B 
L 
O 
C 
K 
S 
# CONTENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1 Theory  
          
2 Organisation  
          
3 Intelligence  
          
4 Counterintelligence  
          
5 Cyber CI 
          
6 CCI Matrix  
          
7 Delineation  
          
8 CCI Process 
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5) Delivery methods and techniques 
There are many methods or techniques for delivering a functional training programme 
such as classroom, online, hands-on or virtual practical, cyber games, emulation and 
simulation exercises (blue team, red team), research – and project-based assignments.  
14.3.4.4 CCI Advanced Training (See Tier 4 – Figure 43) 
This training proficiency level equips individuals with relevant specialist knowledge and 
skills. According to Toth & Klein (2013), this level “integrates training, education and 
experience with an assessment mechanism to validate knowledge and skills, resulting 
in the ‘certification ‘of a predefined level of competence”. For a certain part, this level of 
CCI training will thus draw on industry-based knowledge. Serving as examples are the 
training and assessment conducted by external certification bodies such as the EC-
Council, ISACA, (ISC)², SANS and CompTIA.  
Within statutory state security structures internationally, however, external industry-
based training is complemented by advanced in-house training in especially CCI's 
offensive dimensions. Given its specialized nature, this offensive CCI training is 
typically provided in small group and one-on-one format. It usually progresses from 
emulation and simulation exercises to ‘real world’ adversary engagement of as part of 
an experienced  CCI team. This being an unclassified thesis, advanced CCI training are 
not further elaborated upon. The following application of the FCCI in Table 12 (next 
page) gives and high-level indication of advanced training's calibration: 
 
Table 12 follows on the next page 
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Table 12: Application of the FCCI in advanced CCI training (Author) 
  LEVEL 
F                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
C 
C 
I 
 
B 
U 
I 
L 
D 
I 
N 
G 
 
B 
L 
O 
C 
K 
S 
# CONTENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1 Theory            
2 Organisation            
3 Intelligence            
4 Counterintelligence            
5 Cyber CI           
6 CCI Matrix            
7 Delineation            
8 CCI Process           
In this section we advanced a high level proposition a CCI ATP. This proposition 
consists of a four-tiered model which ranges from CCI awareness (Tier 1)  to Advanced 
CCI training (Tier 4). The next section concludes the chapter and this part of the thesis.   
14.4  CONCLUSION  
Part 4 of the thesis, which comprises Chapter 14, aimed to illustrate the FCCI as a 
conceptual construct practically useful to an organisation’s CCI Awareness and 
Training Programme (ATP). To this end we first provided context on the broader 
concept of CCI Awareness, Education and Training (AET) and its complexities. We 
proceeded with positioning CCI Awareness and Training Programme (ATP) as a subset 
of CCI AET. The generic organisational CCI ATP we then advanced consisted of a four-
tiered model which we depicted graphically and discussed narratively. As part of this  
proposition we illustrated our FCCI as tool useful for selecting training content and 
calibrating training pitch. In so doing , we  validated the thesis’ central  hypothesis on a 
credible an practically useful  FCCI which explain what CCI is and how it  ‘works’.   
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PART 5  
 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION  
 
 
Part 5 evaluates the problem statement, research questions and hypothesis are 
evaluated, and areas for further research on CCI are highlighted. It consists of Chapter 
15. 
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CHAPTER 15 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
  
15.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis by addressing the following: 
 Section 15.2: Research context 
 Section 15.3: Evaluation of the problem statement, research questions, 
hypothesis and research objective 
 Section 15.4: Observations on the significance of the research 
 Section 15.5: Limitations and suggestions on further research 
 Section 15.6: Conclusion  
15.2 RESEARCH CONTEXT  
This study was prompted by the challenges posed by the cyber threatscape which 
necessitates an integrated cybersecurity approach with CCI at its core. Sophisticated 
threats, we argued, increasingly have intelligence actions (such as espionage) as an 
essential feature. In Chapter 1, we emphasised the centrality of CCI in effectively 
engaging morphing high-end cyber threats. We asserted that CCI is central to 
coherently and proactively meeting these threats. Although only well-resourced entities 
can afford fully-fledged capacity in this field, a CCI mindset and approach could also 
benefit smaller organisations.  
 
Effective practice, however, requires good theory. We emphasised that conceptual 
models and frameworks are not 'nice to have' academic toys. Theory conditions our 
thinking and our approach to practice. What we therefore need for CCI is a sound 
overarching construct such as a framework. Throughout the thesis, we demonstrated 
academic theory and practice as two sides of the same coin. On an academic level, a 
framework has to consolidate and direct CCI research. On a practical level, a 
framework must serve as a template for performing CCI work in practice. On both 
accounts, we asserted, a framework is an idealisation – it is an aimpoint of what CCI 
should look like when everything goes as planned. 
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In this section, we discussed the research context of this study. We now proceed with 
an appraisal of the problem statement, research questions, hypotheses and research 
objective.  
15.3  EVALUATION OF PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
The introduction to this thesis (Section 1.1 of Chapter 1) as well as Chapter 2, showed 
the academic and practical importance of a conceptual FCCI. Yet, as far as we could 
ascertain, such framework is lacking in the consulted literature.  
15.3.1 RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, 
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Flowing from this void in the literature reviewed, we formulated the study's primary 
problem statement in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) as follows:  
"From the literature studied, no overarching conceptual CCI framework 
that can provide a premise for establishing CCI as an academic 
subdiscipline, a topic of instruction and a research field could be found."  
Based on the primary research question, the central research questions of the study 
posed (Section 1.2 of Chapter 1) were:  
"What academically credible conceptual framework can be advanced to 
notionally structure CCI? 
What should the features and components of the framework be, and how 
should they be configured?" 
Can conceptual constructs derived from Intelligence Studies (notably 
statutory intelligence and counterintelligence) be usefully applied to CCI 
and thus to the FCCI's design? 
In response to the research question, we advanced the following hypotheses to direct 
the study (Section 1.3 of Chapter 1): 
"The thesis’s central hypothesis is that an FCCI can be designed by 
means of an inductive, qualitative methodology. By postulating the critical 
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notional constructs which comprise CCI and by outlying the constructs’ 
relations, the framework can credibly explain what CCI is and how it 
‘works’. 
Accompanying the central hypothesis, the thesis’ two secondary 
hypotheses were:   
"Criteria can be formulated to derive the FCCI's features, components and 
configuration.  
Conceptual constructs from Intelligence Studies can be applied to CCI and 
utilised for the FCCI's design. " 
We concretised the hypotheses in the study’s primary objective which read as follows:  
"The study’s primary objective is to construct the FCCI as a conceptual 
framework for notionally structuring CCI as an emerging, multidisciplinary 
field of enquiry.  
This construction will follow an inductive qualitative methodology within the 
realist paradigm and will include an evaluative literature study to develop 
the FCCI and its components." 
 15.3.2  EVALUATION OF PART 1 (CHAPTERS 2 AND 3) 
To test the hypotheses and pursue the primary objective, we proceeded by laying the 
foundation for the construction of our FCCI. To this end, in Chapter 2 we identified the 
features with which an academically credible FCCI should comply. This chapter's 
outcome validated the secondary hypothesis, which reads "criteria can be formulated 
to derive the FCCI's features, components and configuration" (Section 1.3 of Chapter 
1).  
We subsequently conducted an evaluative literature review (Chapter 3). This 
corroborated our problem statement on the absence of an FCCI (in the consulted 
sources) and provided elements useful to constructing the FCCI in subsequent 
chapters. Chapter 3 was therefore in line with the quantitative methodology (inclusive of 
an evaluative literature review) referred to in the primary objective and the central 
hypothesis.  
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15.3.3  EVALUATION OF PART 2 (CHAPTER 4) 
To guide the reader to the actual construction of our FCCI, in Chapter 4 we provided a 
high-level blueprint and road map. This preview consisted of a graphical representation 
and a concise narrative overview of the integrated FCCI and its building blocks. The 
FCCI was graphically depicted in this chapter as follows: 
 
Since Chapter 4 is a preview of Chapters 5 to 13 (Part 3), its evaluation concurs with 
the assertions made per ‘Evaluation of Part 3’ (i.e. directly following Subsection 15.3.4). 
15.3.4  EVALUATION OF PART 3 (CHAPTERS 5–13) 
Part 3, comprising Chapter 5 -13, constituted the thesis' core.  For purposes of Part 3's 
evaluation, we appraise the central hypothesis and the secondary hypotheses 
separately.   
15.3.4.1 Evaluation: Central Hypothesis and Research Objective  
In Part 3(of the thesis, we proceeded with a step-by-step construction of our FCCI. This 
step-by-step construction consisted of eight sequential building blocks, the "critical 
notional constructs" we mentioned in the central hypothesis. We derived these 
building blocks by using the inductive qualitative methodology referred to in the 
objective and the central hypothesis.  
Throughout the thesis, we highlighted the academic and practical utility of each building 
block. In line with our central hypothesis, we discussed not only the building blocks 
but also the "relations" between them. This was done to test the hypothesis' contention 
that an FCCI so constructed will explain "what CI is and how it ‘works’".  
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To explain what CCI is, we:  
 Showed CCI as a micro-theoretical construct and positioned the FCCI as part of 
academic theory (Chapter 5) 
 Explained CCI as intricately linked to and part of the organisation as well the 
intelligence and CI endeavour (Chapters 6–8) 
 Defined CCI (Chapter 9)  
 Included a specific building block to delineate CCI (Chapter 12)  
Concurrently with explaining what CCI is, we explored our central hypothesis' 
assertion on how CCI 'works'. In this regard, we:  
 Showed the interface between CCI on the one hand and the organisation, 
intelligence and CI on the other hand. We explained CCI as a CI subset and its 
practical execution as being determined by the organisation's goals, strategy and 
intelligence endeavour (Chapters 6–8). 
 Provided a high-level overview of CCI tools (Chapter 9). 
 Advanced a CCI matrix which (1) synchronises CI and CCI tools, (2) aids the 
configuration of a CCI posture in accordance with the organisation's needs and 
(3) describes the levels on which CCI is executed. Furthermore, the CCI matrix's 
'working' was illustrated by means of a case study. 
 Provided a CCI process model which describes the sequential steps of 
performing CCI.  
Throughout Chapters 5 to 13, we presented the FCCI as a notional framework to 
structure CCI. Therefore, the aspects covered in our FCCI range from abstract theory 
(Chapter 5) to specific CCI tools and processes (Chapters 9-11 and 13). In doing so, 
we achieved the primary aim to "construct the FCCI as a conceptual framework for 
notionally structuring CCI”. 
 15.3.4.2 Evaluation: Secondary Hypotheses  
The thesis secondary hypothesis that "criteria can be formulated to derive the FCCI's 
features, components and configuration" was already substantiated in Chapter 2 (part 
1). Nonetheless, the construction of a FCCI (in Chapters 5 to 13) that explains what 
CCI is and 'how it works' further validates this secondary hypothesis.  
The thesis' other secondary hypothesis, namely that conceptual constructs from 
Intelligence Studies can be applied for the FCCI's design, was convincingly validated 
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throughout Chapters 5 to 13. Such concepts varied from the 'abstract' theoretical (e.g. 
positivist, realist positioning) to the more concrete (e.g. the CI process applied to CCI).  
15.3.5  EVALUATION OF PART 4 (CHAPTER 14) 
Part 4 illustrated the FCCI as a conceptual construct practically useful to an 
organisation’s CCI Awareness and Training Programme (ATP). Within the context of a 
CCI ATP, the FCCI was applied as a tool to convey what CCI is and how it ‘works’ – 
thus corroborating the central hypothesis. Since the FCCI was shown as useful to 
CCI training, Chapter 14 by extension also validated the secondary hypotheses on 
design criteria and the application of Intelligence Studies' concepts.  
15.3.6  SUMMARISED EVALUATION  
As is clear from the above, the research we conducted validated the central hypothesis 
and achieved the research objective of designing a framework that explains what CCI 
is and how it 'works'. By following an inductive, qualitative methodology, we constructed 
our FCCI by forwarding building blocks (critical notional constructs) and showing their 
interaction. The FCCI's construction was guided by a set of derived criteria (secondary 
hypothesis) and build on concepts from Intelligence Studies (secondary hypothesis. 
Since we validated the hypotheses and achieved the aim of the study, we succeeded 
in addressing the study’s problem statement and research questions.  
15.4  OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
RESEARCH  
The attainment of the research objective does of course not necessarily imply that the 
thesis comply with the requirements for a doctoral thesis. In line with international best 
practice, the University of Johannesburg (2018b) requires of a doctoral thesis to make 
“a significant and original contribution to the body of knowledge in the discipline or 
field.” The following three information sets support the notion that thesis, and the FCCI 
it advances, constitutes a credible, significant and original contribution to the field: 
 Subsection 15.4.1: Methodology  and approach 
 Subsection 15.4.2: Extensive peer-review and positive feedback  
 Subsection 15.4.3: Utilisation of research by other scholars and institutions 
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We are aware of the fact that previous chapters referred to FCCI research's 
significance and the use thereof by other academics/institutions (notably Chapter 1, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 10). For purposes of this section, excessive referencing to these 
chapters would have inconvenienced the reader and distracted from the reading 
experience. Therefore, in the interest of easier reading, the discussion of our FCCI 
research's significance in this section will to some degree overlap with previous 
chapters. For the reader’s convenience, we also recapitulate contextual information on, 
for example, the Mitre Corporation and Utica College. With these qualifications we now 
proceed with discussing the three information sets supporting the assertion of the thesis 
constituting a credible, significant and original contribution to the field 
15.4.1 Methodology and approach  
The FCCI can be deemed credible since its conceptualisation, design and construction 
followed an academically sound inductive, qualitative methodology. The FCCI’s overall 
design and was guided by criteria derived through extensive multidisciplinary research 
(Chapter 2). In addition, a comprehensive literature study (Chapter 3) not only informed 
our FCCI’s design and construction (Chapters 4-13), but – as was mentioned earlier – 
also convincingly substantiates the assertion of the FCCI being a significant and 
novel contribution to the field. The veracity of the literature review and assertions 
made therein, were confirmed by the successful peer-review of the work at the 17th 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 
2018a). The organisers ranked the literature review as one of the conference's best 
papers and an expanded version thereof was invited for publication by the Journal of 
Information Warfare (Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2018b). 
Furthermore, care was taken throughout the thesis to argue the academic and 
practical significance of not only the integrated FCCI, but also each of its building 
blocks.   
15.4.2  Peer-review and feedback  
The integrated FCCI and its respective building blocks were subjected to extensive 
peer review. A total of eight papers were presented and subsequently published in the 
proceedings of leading international conferences (Annexures A, B, D, E, F, G, I, J). 
Feedback received from peer-review panels was overwhelming positive and confirmed 
the FCCI and aspects thereof as an original and/or significant contribution to the 
field. In addition, two articles were published in a highly regarded international journal, 
namely the Journal of Information Warfare (Annexures C and H). A further two papers 
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were successfully submitted for peer-review and subsequently accepted for 
presentation at the 18th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security in July 
2019 (Annexures K and L). 
The above noted peer-review on the FCCI’s research significance was further 
corroborated by expert opinions during a University of Johannesburg benchmarking 
process which involved seasoned cybersecurity and intelligence practitioners. 
Remarking on the FCCI's  significance and originality, one of the experts stated 
(University of Johannesburg 2018c):  
[This research] ... not only consolidates the meagre existing knowledge on the 
applicable field (i.e. CCI), but also, and more pertinently creates new 
knowledge … The real value of the research lies in the conceptualisation of a 
proposed Conceptual Framework. Not only is this unprecedented, but it will 
also take the academic pursuit of CCI forward by leaps and bounds. 
In addition to academic peer-review, key aspects of the FCCI were included in 
papers/presentations on CCI at pre-eminent, non-academic events attended by IT 
executives and practitioners (See Chapter 1, Section 1.6). Hosts of conferences utilised 
to benchmark our FCCI research included authoritative entities such as ISACA, (ISC)2 
and IT Web. Also in this instance, the feedback received affirmed the FCCI's 
significance and novelty. 
15.4.3: Utilisation of research by other academics and institutions  
In addition to peer-review feedback, the utilisation of research by others could be used 
as an indication of an academic study’s credibility, significance and originality. Such use 
is inter alia reflected in citations and references. Citations and referencing rates are 
significant influenced by the nature of the particular study field and the academic 
interest it attracts. In this regard, note should be taken of CCI status as an emerging 
specialised subdiscipline with the already niche of area of CI (Prunckun 2018; Stech & 
Heckman 2018). Internationally, nation states’ security structures generate a 
voluminous body of classified CI material. In the public and academic domain, however, 
CI “remains little known or understood” (Van Cleave 2007, Prunckun 2014). Chapters 1 
and 3 observed on the surprisingly few works in the public domain which explain CI’s 
theory and practice (Prunckun 2012, Prunckun 2014, Van Cleave 2007, Duvenage 
2011). Consequently, and in comparison with other Intelligence Study fields, citations of 
even general, authoritative works on CI are far less prolific (cƒ. Prunckun 2014, Van 
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Cleave 2007). Within the young, emerging and specialised subdiscipline of CCI this is 
all the more so (Stech & Heckman 2018). Thus, for now, the key measure for CCI 
citations and referencing is rather the ‘who’ (i.e. person/ institution citing) than the 
‘how many’ (i.e. number of citations).  
 Within the context provided in the preceding paragraph, the following non-
exhaustive examples attest to the FCCI research presented in this thesis as 
being a credible, original and significant contribution to the study field: The 
Mitre Corporation is a prominent US federally funded institution with an 
estimated revenue of $1.4 billion (Bloomberg 2018). Branching out from their 
world-leading work on cyber denial and deception, Mitre researchers have 
recently been focusing on CCI (Stech & Heckman 2018). Flowing from this 
research, Stech and Heckman (2018) postulated a CCI framework for “active 
cyber defense”. This postulation extensively cites, incorporates, and further 
develops, concepts we originally advanced in our FCCI research. 18 With 
reference to our FCCI research’s significance, Stech and Heckman (2018) state: 
“[The] researchers are providing increasingly detailed concepts for implementing 
CCI in enterprises. We recommend such concepts, combined with cyber denial 
and deception, to cyber defenders.” 
 The US-based Utica College offers CCI as a post-graduate specialisation field. 
Utica holds designations of academic excellence from the US National Security 
Agency, the Department of Defense as well as the Department of Homeland 
Security (Utica 2018). In a recently completed Master of Science project 
completed at this college, Justiniano (2017) draws on several elements we 
advanced in the research leading up to this thesis. Justiniano (2017) describes 
our FCCI research as “perhaps the best effort towards academically framing 
and formalizing CCI to date”. 
 Five FCCI research papers (Duvenage & von Solms 2014; Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregidor 2015; Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016, Jaquire, 
Duvenage & von Solms 2018, Sithole et al 2019) incorporated in this thesis, 
appear on the recommended reading list of the prestigious US Naval War 
College (2018a, 2019). The US Naval War College was established in 1884 and 
has, according to its website, “trained more than 24,000 U.S. and international 
                                                                
18 For more detail please see Section 3.7 (Chapter 3) 
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military officers and hundreds of federal civilian executives across its six 
colleges and various academic centers.” (US Naval War College (2018b)   
 A research stream at the University of Johannesburg (UJ), to recapitulate, 
aims to develop a CCI maturity model with emphasis on governments and non-
state actors in emerging countries (University of Johannesburg 2018a). Our 
FCCI research is widely cited in the three internationally peer-reviewed research 
papers (Jaquire & von Solms 2017 a-c) and a recently completed doctoral thesis 
(Jaquire 2018) that flowed from this research stream.  
 An article featured in the Italian government’s Intelligence and Internal 
Security Agency’s public magazine contains extensive narrative and graphical 
extracts from our FCCI research (Teti 2016).  
 Our FCCI research was cited in a journal article by an academic associated with 
the Peoples’ Republic of China's (PRC) state security structures (Huang 
2015). 
This section provided context for assessing the significance and originality of the 
research contained in the thesis. We now proceed with observations on research 
limitations. 
15.5  LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ON FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
As was expected from the outset,  the study’s primary challenge pertained to limitations 
in CCI-focused literature available for an unclassified thesis. While CCI is practised and 
taught by various governments’ security apparatus, such material is not publically 
available. Nonetheless, the limited but growing body of academic, peer-reviewed CCI 
research provided insights valuable to the FCCI’s design. Furthermore, and also in line 
with expectations, concepts derived from Intelligence Studies’ literature proved useful to 
the FCCI’s construction. However, within the confines of a high-level theoretical 
framework only scant reference was made to academic disciplines and fields other than 
Intelligence Studies   
The FCCI we advanced in this thesis was thus qualified as a skeletal framework 
(Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2). Consequently, both the overall FCCI and its respective 
building blocks can admittedly benefit substantially from further research. With more 
rigorous and detailed research, the conceptual FCCI can be developed into a CCI 
model.  
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Although it is not possible to fully illustrate the outcomes of our FCCI's application 
within the confines of this thesis, several major and recent cyber breaches affirm the 
framework’s its 'real-world' utility. Case studies of such incidents will be central to 
evolving the FCCI into a CCI model and are thus proposed as an area for further 
research.  
 
In respect of both theorisation and case studies, a foremost priority item on the 
research agenda ought to be the interface and dynamics between CCI and 
information/cyber warfare. Currently, even outstanding works on information and 
cyber warfare make scant reference to CCI and vice versa (See Section 1.1, Chapter 1 
as well as Section 3.5 – 3.7, Chapter 3). This near void presents fertile, yet 
conceptually intricate, ground for further research.  It is hoped that the FCCI will provide 
a ‘scaffold’ for CCI to benefit academically from the rich and expansive body of 
literature focused on  information and cyber warfare.  
Earlier in this section and at various other junctures in the thesis (e.g. Subsection 2.2.3 
of Chapter 2 and Subsection 12.3.2 of Chapter 12), we mentioned that CCI is a 
multifaceted subject that ought to benefit from inputs from various academic disciplines. 
These disciplines include, to name a few, Intelligence Studies and International 
Relations (both part of Political Science), Computer Science and Informatics, Business 
Studies, Sociology, Psychology, Law, Linguistics and History. In Chapter 3 (Section 
3.2), for example, we noted that to be truly professional, “practitioners must clearly 
understand that discipline’s history“ (Caelli, Liu & Longley 2013). The importance of 
such a history for a field as young as CCI can thus hardly be overemphasised and it 
was further highlighted in Chapter 14, Section 14.3.4.2. In a similar vein, the other 
academic disciplines cited are their own particular relevance to CCI. Being a multi-
faceted field, CCI cannot be demarcated rigidly; instead it is "a mosaic of overlapping 
academic interests" (Subsection 12.3.2 of Chapter 12). To advance CCI as an 
academic field, one of the items on the CCI research agenda has to be identifying and 
describing these ‘overlaps’. This will provide pointers to the respective contributions the 
aforementioned academic disciplines can make to, and benefit from, developing 
multidisciplinary CCI.  
15.6  CONCLUSION  
This thesis showed CCI as an academic subdiscipline in its infancy with the agenda for 
its development in various respects unclear. Nonetheless, the budding body of 
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academic literature, which has been expanding over a short period of time, is showing 
great promise. We advanced a tentative conceptual framework (FCCI) to aid CCI's 
academic evolvement. However, the FCCI and its building blocks could not be 
explicated in detail within the confines of a thesis. Only the essential contours of, and 
rationale behind, the FCCI’s design were therefore provided. The FCCI was qualified as 
an exploratory postulation, hopefully constructive to practice and academic discourse.  
The FCCI is by its very nature a contestable academic construct. What is not 
contestable is the importance and practical significance of academic theory in meeting 
the demands posed by a threat landscape in which intelligence actors of various types 
continue to predominate.  
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Abstract— A paradigmatic shift in thinking on cyber security in the 21st century is 
gaining momentum. This turn in thinking is rooted in a widening acknowledgment that 
conventional cyber security solutions no longer offer adequate protection in the face of 
threats posed by role players such as nation states, criminal syndicates, corporate spies, 
terrorists, hacktivists and rogue individuals. It is clear that the securing of cyber space 
depends not only on raising the bar in respect of existing measures, but also need to 
involve proactive action focussing on threat agents. Views are, however, not so clear on 
what such proactive action should entail and how this should be integrated with 
conventional cyber security measures. Similarly, conceptual clarity is lacking on the 
configuration of an integrated response attuned to the fast changing threatscape.  
The paper firstly examines the cyber threatscape and the challenges this poses. It 
proceeds with advancing cyber counterintelligence as a conceptual and practicable 
alternative to coherently and proactively meeting cyber security challenges. Although 
cyber counterintelligence is not a novel concept, it is academically under-explored with 
open-source literature on this subject relatively sparse. In particular, the quest for an 
integrated conceptual model for cyber counterintelligence is still in its infancy. This 
paper does not purport to offer a refined model, but endeavours to advance a few 
building contours useful to its construction. Compiled for a wide target audience which 
includes business professionals and academia, the paper is underpinned by principles 
and constructs derived from statutory counterintelligence theory and practice.  
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Abstract: Businesses and governments alike are grappling with configuring their cyber security postures 
effectively in a manner to account for rapid changes in the cyber threatscape. Defensively security policies and 
measures (inclusive of software and hardware technologies) on their own are wholly inadequate in protecting 
against proliferating threats. An effective approach for securing and advancing cyber interests will have to 
combine more proactive defences with intelligence on, and the engagement of, adversaries. Offensive and 
defensive measures, in turn, should be integrated with an institution’s strategy and objectives. Appropriately 
conceptualised, Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) could meet these requirements and offer a practicable 
approach for governments, businesses and other sizable entities. There is a precondition. To be effective, CCI 
should be an integral part of multi-disciplinary Counterintelligence (CI) – conceptually and in practice.  
However, at least in as far as consulted academic literature is concerned, such conceptualisation is lacking. 
Disconcertingly, the theoretical discourse about CCI could be gaining momentum without a categorical 
explication of CI. This paper conceptualises CCI as part of CI. To this end a cursory primer on CI is provided. 
Building on this primer, the paper proceeds with advancing:   
(i) A definition of CCI. 
(ii) A three-tiered postulation for conceptually integrating CCI with multi-disciplinary CI, Intelligence and 
Strategy.   
(iii) A taxonomy of CCI tools, methods and means.  
(iv) A matrix that has the dual purpose of (a) categorising CCI tools, methods and means; and (b) plotting 
a CCI posture in accordance with the nature and the needs of a specific institution.  
 
Keywords: counterintelligence, cyber security, cyber counterintelligence.  
 
1. Introduction  
  
What was seen as a paradigmatic shift in thinking at the turn of this decade is now commonly accepted – 
conventional cyber security we have been relying on is deteriorating on all fronts (Lües 2012). As a result, 
cyber space is now probably more insecure than it has ever been (Bodmer et al 2012). It is also likely to be the 
most secure than it is going to be for the foreseeable future. It is, simply put, going to get much worse. In this 
regard, the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2104 Global Risk Report warned of “digital disintegration” when it 
stated: “The world may be only one disruptive technology away from attackers gaining a runaway advantage, 
meaning the Internet would cease to be a trusted medium for communication or commerce” (WEF 2014). The 
report continues with identifying the foremost “technological risks” for the immediate future as the 
breakdown of critical informational infrastructure and networks, an escalation of large scale cyber-attacks and 
incidents of data fraud an unprecedented scale (WEF 2014). Even early on in 2014, these are no longer risks 
but manifesting trends. Attesting to this is the continuing prominence in mass-media media reporting on the 
escalating detrimental impact of cyber criminals, hacktivists and other role-players. Simultaneously the 
pervasiveness of nation states’ cyber surveillance by the intelligence apparatuses of not only the United States 
(U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK), but also the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia continue to make 
headlines. 
 
With the awareness of conventional cyber security’s faltering, both state and non-state actors have been 
intensifying the quest for ways to more effectively protect and advance their cyber interests and, in the case of 
service providers and vendors, those of their clients. As could be expected, solutions offered in the market 
place vary considerably. Buzzwords and marketing slogans currently gaining favour include counter 
exploitation, threat intelligence, offensive measures, hacking back, threatscape and intelligence software 
analytics (IBM 2013, Helton 2013). Common to most of these solutions advocated, is recognition of the 
imperative of intelligence on threats actors and the need to engage threats pro-actively/offensively. There is a 
sense of taking the fight to adversaries. The use of such notions and phrases would have been encouraging if it 
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was indicative of more organisations “moving towards intelligence-driven risk management and decision-
making models.” (Helton 2013).  As it currently stands the use of these terms is, however, disturbing for three 
inter-related reasons. Firstly, the terms are used vaguely and without the proper context from the statutory 
intelligence practice from which they are often derived. In marketing jargon ‘intelligence’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘data and information.’ Consequently, solutions offered under the rubrics of ‘intelligence’ 
may not solve the problems for which they purport to be the fix. In a similar vein the opting for quick-fix 
offensive actions, not dovetailed with an appropriately configured defensive posture, is inviting disaster. 
Equally disconcerting, solutions and terms are sometimes thrown around without due and categorical 
stipulations that some aspects of cyber defence and offense are the exclusive prerogative of the state 
apparatus in most countries. These functions ought not to be ‘out-sourced’ to other entities. Secondly, 
solutions being offered are essentially technical and tactical in nature. As important as they are, technical and 
tactical measures on their own, were mentioned earlier, as being insufficient to confront the sophisticated 
threat actors about whom we are most concerned. Social engineering, to cite one example, “played a part in 
nearly every major hack or breach in 2013 yet it still stays in the background when we consider security 
controls. This is something that needs to change as we move forward.” (ISC2 2013).  Thirdly, these solutions are 
presented as neat ‘add-ons’ or ‘plugins’ to be used as a layer additional to existing cyber security measures. 
‘Add-ons’ seldom have, and certainly will, not in future, offer adequate protection against advanced 
adversaries. For sizable institutions with significant digital and information interests to face up to such 
adversaries, cyber security needs to be coherently part of their DNA and not mere feel-good plasters offering 
little real protection.  
 
 There is a way in which such synergy can be achieved and the tables turned on cyber adversaries. This paper 
posits cyber counterintelligence (CCI) as a practicable approach to effectively securing and advancing cyber 
interests. From this perspective, malicious cyber actions are not all bad news. The good news is that we can 
exploit malicious cyber actions to our advantage and the detriment of the adversarial instigators. There is, 
however, a precondition and there are no half measures. To be effective CCI needs to be properly 
conceptualised and implemented. If not, it is your highway to hell that could end in self-destruction. For a 
substantial part, this conceptualisation entails the application of time-tested counterintelligence (CI) notions to 
the cyber sphere. It is a case of going back to counterintelligence fundamentals in order to enable our 
prosperity in the cyber sphere today and in the future. It is thus a case, as suggested by the paper’s title, of 
going back in order to successfully move to a more secure cyber future.  
 
This paper’s primary aim is to provide a conceptual baseline that could aid in stimulating the academic 
discourse on CCI. Consequently, it ensues with a cursory overview of the status of CCI in the public and 
academic discourse on cyber security. An academic self-awareness of CCI under-theorised status is after all a 
first step in addressing this near void. The paper proceeds with advancing CI and CCI constructs hopefully 
useful to this discourse. Rather than aiming to impart radically new concepts, the emphasis is on presenting 
existing knowledge in a manner conducive to further academic debate. Such conceptual ‘building blocks’ 
include a definition and delineation of the CI as a CCI sub-discipline, a taxonomy for CCI methods and means  
as well as a CCI matrix for configuring an offensive-defensive posture. It concludes with some views on CCI’s 
future and by suggesting areas for further academic enquiry. 
 
As noted above, the following section reflects on CCI under-theorised status, since such awareness is an 
important first step in make progress with the academic discourse.  
 
2. Cyber Counterintelligence’s Under-Theorised Status 
      
In one form or the other cyber counterintelligence has been practised as part of the statutory 
counterintelligence functions in various intelligence communities for well over two decades. CCI has also been 
offered as service by a few niche companies for well over a decade. Until very recently, however, CCI has not 
really gained traction outside the statutory security structures and the small batch of clients the niche 
companies served.  Despite the key it holds to secure cyber interests for state and non-state actors, CCI 
entered the second decade of the 21st century underappreciated and underexplored in policies and other 
literature in the public domain. The overwhelming majority of governments’ cyber security policies do not 
make any references to counterintelligence. In the few instances that the concept is cited, counterintelligence 
is hardly at the centre. (Remark: A notable exception in this regard is the U.S.’ Comprehensive National Cyber 
Security Initiative that assigns a central role to with counterintelligence.  
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Anecdotal indications are that CCI has fast been gaining traction during the last two years. The 2013 
proceedings of the 12th European on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS), for example, comprise of 44 papers 
and is a voluminous 406 pages in length (Kuusisto & Kurkinen, 2013). Not one of these papers makes mention 
of CCI. There is in fact only one sentence in the whole of the proceedings that makes cursory reference to the 
concept counterintelligence generally (Kuusisto & Kurkinen, 2013: 244). One year on and ECCWS 2014 features 
a dedicated mini-track to Cyber Intelligence/ Counterintelligence. While this certainly reflects an increased 
awareness of CCI, contributions are scarce. As far as could be surmised from the listing of abstract titles, this 
was the only paper to be presented at ECCWS 2014 that has CCI as focus or counterintelligence in its title.   
 
While a few commendable books have been published on the subject, these are minuscule in comparison with 
the proliferating material on cyber security generally. The shift in emphasis towards CCI is nonetheless also 
apparent here.  An outstanding work by Bodmer et al was first published in 2012 with the title Reverse 
Deception – Organized Cyber Threat Counter- Exploitation (Bodmer et al 2012). The edition due for release in 
2014 – which as far as could be surmised from pre-launch advertising retained the core of the 2012 edition  is 
more aptly entitled Hacking Back: Offensive Cyber Counterintelligence (Bodmer et al 2014). 
   
Although CCI is set to gain in prominence, the participation in and agenda of this discourse will inevitably be 
influenced by the relative obscurity of CI in general.  CCI will be demonstrated in further sections as a sub-set 
of the broader, multi-faceted CI discipline.  It thus follows that contributions to CCI would need to be preceded 
by some grounding in CI. CI, however, and herein lies the glitch, is in itself academically obscure and 
underappreciated. This obscurity is as old as its inception as a formalised discipline in the run-up to the Second 
World War. Some would argue that this can be ascribed to the fact that a large part of CI work relies for its 
effectiveness on secrecy. Yet, as we are reminded by Meyer (1987), we do not need to reveal secrets to talk 
seriously about matters of Intelligence. A more likely reason for CI’s obscurity in the academic debate is to be 
found in the fact that it is arguably the most complex and least understood of all Intelligence disciplines 
(Godson 2001).  The following statement by a U.S. CI veteran in the midst of the Cold War has lost none of its 
relevance: “It is not easy, nor can one feel confident, to re-enter this world where, it has been said, the 
tortuous logic of counterintelligence prevails ... Unfortunately, there seems to be no easy way to explain 
counterintelligence ... Because effective counterintelligence is a combination of so many aspects.” (Miller, 
1980) Even among policy makers, scholars and “national security practitioners” in foremost intelligence 
communities such as those of the U.S., “the role of counterintelligence remains little known or understood” up 
to this day (Van Cleave 2007). 
 
Since the role, functions and importance of CI is opaque within statutory intelligence circles, the reluctance of 
‘techies’ to apply this concept to the cyber sphere is understandable. In a similar vein, those skilled and 
experienced in more conventional counterintelligence do not necessarily have a sound working knowledge of 
technical cyber. If we are not clear on a conceptual level, we can hardly make progress in the academic 
discourse, thereby eventually affecting our ability to implement sound solutions. In the conceptual difficulties 
of CI also lies the opportunity. If we can understand and explain CI, we can explain CCI and unlock the latter’s 
potential as force multiplier.    
 
This section illustrated the need for contributions to the budding field CCI to be clearly rooted in CI. In line with 
this contention, the next section provides a conceptual primer of CI.  
   
3. A Primer on Counterintelligence      
 
Counterintelligence has been practised and described for millennia. Some enduring principles were penned in 
500 B.C. by the much-quoted Sun Tzu in a specific chapter in his The Art of War devoted to the use of spies and 
counter-spies (Giles 2002).  The term in its contemporary connotations entered the English lexicon in the mid-
1930’s (Dictionary.com 2013). For some, counterintelligence is all about spies outgunning adversarial spies. For 
others, it invokes mundane security measures such as computer passwords, restrictions on the use of 
computing equipment, security guards, access control and the like. Counterintelligence is both of these 
aspects and so much more (Duvenage & von Solms 2013).  
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3.1 Delineating counterintelligence  
Counterintelligence can be defined as the collective of measures undertaken to identify, deter, exploit, 
degrade, neutralise and protect against adversarial intelligence activities deemed as detrimental or potentially 
detrimental to the own interests (Duvenage 2010). The term ‘counterintelligence’ is thus an abbreviated form 
for the countering of hostile intelligence activities. Adversaries engaging in hostile intelligence actions include 
nation states, corporate entities, criminals, activists, individuals and any combination of these.   
Adversarial intelligence activities include espionage, deception (disinformation), influencing and some other 
forms of covert action that can have disruptive and destructive outfalls. Of these different intelligence 
activities, espionage is the most central. Espionage to obtain protected information in order to gain a 
competitive advantage can be an end in itself; or such information can be used to further other malicious ends 
such as data manipulation, disinformation and disruption. Sophisticated adversaries execute their intelligence 
actions through the exploitation of humans (HUMINT) and technical means (TECHINT). The latter, in turn, 
comprise Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
(MASINT) and Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT). These conduits and their relation to adversarial intelligence ends 
can graphically be depicted as follow: 
  
 
Figure 1 Adversarial Intelligence: Conduits and Ends  
  
Several revelations by the whistle-blower Edward Snowden provide a practical illustration of the above. During 
September 2013, for example, The Guardian newspaper revealed that the British and U.S. Agencies run 
HUMINT operations to “help secure an insider advantage” (Ball et al 2013).  To this end the British 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) established a HUMINT Operations Team (HOT) 
"responsible for identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global telecommunications industry." 
(Ball et al 2013). These operations enabled the Agency to “tackle some of its most challenging targets" 
specifically in as far as the breaking of encryption was concerned (Ball et al 2013).  In this instance success in 
the field of CYBINT thus depended on the effectiveness of HUMINT operations. The reverse is of course also 
true. Given the high and growing digital dependence, CYBINT is often a critical enabler in the HUMINT sphere. 
To be effective CI needs to counter all types of adversarial intelligence activities and, in the case of high-end 
adversaries, it has to do so in more than one or all of the conduits.  
3.2 Counterintelligence: Measures, Means and Modes 
 
In order to execute its mission CI relies on measures and means that vary from the passive-defensive to active-
offensive. At the one end of the spectrum, passive-defensive measures strive to deny adversaries access to 
protected information assets. They aim to reduce vulnerabilities through a combination of policies, procedures 
and practices – sometimes referred to on a lighter note as “gates, guards, guns, and dogs.”(Francq 2001). 
Apart from denying opponents access, properly instituted passive-defences measures are like caste walls. In 
addition to preventing common intrusions, their presence discourages intrusion attempts and consequently 
serves a deterrence function. Examples of passive-defensive measures are access and movement control, 
perimeter security, alarm systems, safes and vaults, fire prevention measures, key control and the control of 
the removal and transfer of information from facilities where valued information is located.  At the other ends 
of the spectrum, offensive counterintelligence aims to neutralise a competitor’s intelligence efforts through 
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measures ranging from deception and manipulation to the neutralisation of adversarial intelligence activities 
and systems. Deception takes various forms and can be achieved through numerous means. Skilfully executed, 
deception attains a primary counterintelligence aim, which is the manipulation and control of an adversary. 
This is aptly encapsulated by Codevilla when he states: “Action against the enemy through the enemy’s own 
intelligence is the very consummation of CI.” There are of course also aggressive CI measures that overlap with 
CI’s sister-Intelligence discipline covert action. Under certain conditions, assassinations and even extra-
ordinary rendition can be classified as active-offensive CI neutralisation measures (Duvenage 2010).  
 
Between passive-defensive and active-offensive lies a wide array of other measures such as pre-employment 
personnel security; in-service personnel security; technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM); encryption; 
surveillance (physical, static, mobile and electronic); double agents; agents and continued monitoring.  In most 
instances, these measures can serve defensive or/and offensive purposes.  Defensive counterintelligence 
tactics and strategies provide information to, and act as triggers to alert the offensive side of the practice. 
Similarly, offensive operations (for example a source reporting on an adversary’s intentions and capabilities) 
inform the pro-active configuration of defences. It will also be noted that several of these are highly useful in 
the collection of information on internal vulnerabilities (e.g. organisational weakness and the insider threat), 
the external environment as well as actual and potential adversaries. It goes without saying that without such 
information being analysed CI would be blind and unable to execute the defensive-offensive interplay. The 
following matrix, depicted in Figure 2, is somewhat of an over-simplification but nonetheless useful in 
conveying the nuanced nature of the offensive-defensive interplay as well as the importance of collection: 
 
DEFENSIVE MODE 
Denies adversaries access to and generates information about adversaries 
Passive Defence 
Denies the adversary access to information 
through physical security measures and security 
systems. 
Active Defence 
The active collection of information on the adversary to 
determine its sponsor, modus operandi, network and targets. 
Methods include physical and electronic surveillance, dangles, 
double agents, moles and electronic tapping. 
OFFENSIVE MODE 
Aims to manipulate, degrade, control and neutralise adversaries 
Passive Offensive 
Reveals to the adversary what you want them to 
see. This could range from selective exposure of 
actual information to decoys and dummies.  The 
adversary is thus left to draw own inferences and 
interpretations.  
Active Offensive 
The adversary is fed with disinformation and its interpretation 
thereof manipulated. Disinformation can be channelled through 
for example double agents and ‘moles’.   
Active-offensive CI could include some forms of covert action. 
Covert action, in its use here, denotes the targeting of an 
adversary through the influencing of events, conditions, 
individuals, groups or institutions to the benefit of a sponsor in a 
manner not attributable to the sponsor or offering plausible 
deniability. Influencing is achieved through measures that vary 
from paramilitary and political actions to propaganda and 
intelligence assistance.  
 
Figure 2: A Four-Sector Counterintelligence Matrix (Compiled by the authors on the basis of narratives in Sims 
2009, Odom 2003 and Godson 2001)  
 
 
3.3 Counterintelligence Process  
 
The preceding matrix and discussion above, demonstrate CI as intricate and exhaustive discipline. It is not only 
about defences, but also the concrete advancement of own interest vis-à-vis adversaries. It could be surmised 
from the above, no matter how well-resourced, the CI endeavour cannot protect all assets and advance all 
interests all the time. The bodies of information that justify CI protection as well as the systems, processes, 
institutions and individuals in which such information resides must be identified and prioritised (Prunckun, 
2012). Since offensive action carries even higher risks and costs, CI should be crystal clear on it role in this 
regard. Such clarity in turn presupposes CI to be in synergy with Intelligence and at the centre of a 
government’s or business’ strategy. These are the critical roots of the CI premise.  
 While few would dispute CI’s premise, opinions are divided on the structuring of the CI process. This paper 
favours a process model that differs fundamentally from the traditional (positive) intelligence cycle and 
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Clarke’s target-centric process (Clarke 2004). This process model comprises the following steps (Duvenage & 
Hough 2011, Duvenage 2013):   
1. Identify own information and assets that warrant the expending of counterintelligence  resources.  
2. Assess own vulnerabilities that increase the risk of information being compromised.  
3. Scan the environment and identify actual or potential threat-agents. 
4. Collect information on threat-agents and appraise the risks. 
5. Re-assess own vulnerabilities and review defences. 
6. Develop sets of counterintelligence measures and projects (offensive and defensive).  
7. Implement the recommended countermeasures and projects.  
8. Continually assess and adapt the implemented countermeasures to compute the changing 
environment. 
The apparent simplicity of this model in certain respects masks some intricacies of the counterintelligence 
process. In the case of offensive counterintelligence, for example, espionage adversaries will be engaged 
through a pattern of activities interwoven with the broader counterintelligence processes. Offensive 
counterintelligence, in other words, will be performed as a sub-process of step 6 outlined above. This sub-
process draws an important distinction between an ‘espionage adversary’ and an ‘espionage target’. An 
‘espionage adversary’ is the ultimate sponsor of an intelligence effort, while the counterespionage target is the 
instrumentality with which intelligence activities are conducted. This instrumentality is targeted by an 
opposing entities counterespionage structure – hence the phrasing ‘counterespionage target’.  A nation state 
and its intelligence service would, for example, be espionage adversaries and the proxies for conducting the 
actual espionage, the counterespionage targets. Such proxies could be recruited agents or third entities (for 
example front companies). Employing this distinction, the offensive counterespionage process – which is 
executed per step 6 of the process model above - will typically have the following sub-steps (Duvenage & 
Hough 2011): 
6.1 Identification of espionage adversaries. 
6.2 Prioritisation of espionage adversaries. 
6.3 Investigation of espionage adversaries. 
6.4 The engagement of counterespionage targets.  
6.5 Exploitation of counterespionage targets. 
6.6 Neutralisation of targets and termination of operation 
 
This section provided a primer that demarcated CI, explained CI measures and modes and offered propositions 
on the CI process. Building on this overview of CI, the paper proceeds with conceptualising CCI.  
   
4. Conceptualising Cyber Counterintelligence  
 
This section provides a provisional definition of CCI, advances a model for integrating CCI with CI and 
Intelligence and outlines some CCI methods, means and modes. 
 
4.1 Defining and Delineating Cyber Counterintelligence 
 
While various definitions for CCI have been advanced, none of these specifically explicate the relationship 
between CCI and CI (cƒ. Carrol 2009, Bodmer et al 2012, Farchi 2012). In keeping with the paper’s central 
contention, CCI is defined as that subset of multi-disciplinary CI aimed at deterring, preventing, degrading, 
exploiting and neutralisation adversarial  attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A of 
valued information assets through cyber means. Expanding on this definition, it is postulated that CI delineates 
CCI on the following three tiers (Duvenage & von Solms 2013): 
 Applied to the cyber context, CI theory and practice provides a conceptual template for modelling CCI 
actions in the safeguarding and advancing of cyber interests. Mirroring CI, CCI has offensive and defensive 
missions that are distinguishable but not separable. 
 To be effective, cyber counterintelligence needs to be interlocked with all-field counterintelligence – 
defensively and offensively. In this sense, CI cements an integrated approach to securing the cyber space. 
CCI is thus about both the modelling of cyber actions on CI, and the integration of these offensive and 
defensive actions with conventional CI. 
 Effective CI protects and promotes the Intelligence endeavour and business strategy. Since CCI is part of 
CI, it is also integrated in business strategy and Intelligence.  
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Figure 3 depicts this three-tiered relationship graphically.  
  
 
 
Figure 3: The Cyber Counterintelligence Pyramid (created by the authors) 
The postulation, per the narrative and Figure 3, is admittedly cursory and does not purport to conform to the 
criteria of a conceptual model. However, it could provide a useful premise for further research and the 
development of a conceptual model for implementation in the cyber domain.  
 
4.2 Overview of Cyber Counterintelligence Methods, Means and Modes  
 
The section above made graphic and narrative reference to defensive and offensive CCI actions. Mirroring CI in 
general, CCI methods and means can be deployed in offensive and defensive modes, but defy categorisation in 
watertight compartments. At the very ends of this spectrum there are a few methods and means that could be 
designated clearly as active-offensive (notably cyber weapons with destructive purpose such as Stuxnet) or 
passive-defensive (e.g. access control and validation directives). In the main, however, offense-defensive and 
active-passive are not neat compartments, but rather the manner in, and end towards which, methods and 
means are deployed (Duvenage & von Solms 2013). This is illustrated in the following matrix, in Figure 4, which 
depicts the four cyber-counterintelligence modes (postures) an entity could assume:  
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Figure 4: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix (created by the authors) 
The CCI matrix per Figure 4 is more than a notional construct and can be applied practically by entities (with 
sizable cyber interest and assets) in the plotting of CCI methods and means. The matrix ensures that a 
presence is maintained, or at the very least that contingency planning is done in respect of all four quadrants. 
It furthermore facilitates innovation and creativity in the application of methods and means – within legislative 
parameters of course. Contrary to a misconception, for example, an Intrusion Prevention System can be 
configured with surprising positive results in executing aims in the other three quadrants. Consequently, the 
construction of a tabulated taxonomy of CCI methods and means could very well be an oversimplification. 
Even more so should the taxonomy endeavour to point to parallels that exist between CCI measures and those 
in CI generally. Nonetheless, at this early stage of conceptualising CCI such a simplification serves as a 
soundboard for further debate. With this caveat, a cursory taxonomy of CCI methods and means is provided in 
Table 1: 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Cyber Counterintelligence Methods and Means (Adopted from Duvenage & von Solms, 
2013) 
 
Defensive Mode 
Passive                                                                                                                                                            Active 
 Deny                                                        Detect                                                                  Collect 
Physical Defensive Personnel/User 
Defensive 
System Defensive 
Protects  against: 
 Unauthorised access to 
facilities and systems. 
 In loco theft of data, 
hardware. 
 Introduction of malware 
through physical access to 
systems.   
 Physical destruction. 
 Unauthorised reading 
(acoustic, visual, 
analogue, signals). 
 While not conventionally 
seen as a Physical 
Defence, supply-chain 
management has a 
physical defensive 
function.  It is also part of 
System Defences. 
 
Remark: Within the area of 
Physical Security, there is an 
extensive and strong 
convergence between CCI and 
conventional CI. In keep with 
the article’s central contention 
that CCI ought be seamlessly 
integrated with CI, the sub-
category ‘Physical Defensive’ 
is included in this taxonomy. 
Note is taken of the fact that 
with other classification 
criteria some of the measures 
listed above may excluded 
from CCI per se. 
Consists of aspects such as  
 IT and user personnel 
vetting, re-vetting and 
confidentiality agreements. 
 Personnel security measures, 
BYOD user parameters or 
exclusions. 
 User programmes in cyber 
security which cover policy 
and procedures for the 
handling of security incidents 
and malfunctions.  
 Overlapping with system 
defences, the use of 
software decoys to mitigate 
the insider threat.  
 Investigations focused on 
cyber security incidents 
involving personnel.  Could 
also include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 
Comprises a combination of  
 Hardware  and software such as  
 Network perimeter-based security (filters, 
certain firewalls, etc).  
 Malware scanners.  
 Integrated automated systems/tools (that 
collect and evaluate information about 
devices connected to a network, activities 
thereon – inclusive of intrusions). Examples 
of such tools, discussed further on in the 
table, are decoys and honeynets.  
 Overlapping with the latter, are IDS and IPS. 
Depending on its configuration, a honeynet 
can be defensive or offensive in type/mode. 
The term fish bowling denotes the 
defensive configuration. (Remark: See 
http://ids.cs.columbia.edu/content/ 
publications. html for extensive work that 
has been done on IDS/IPS). 
 Processes (such as supply- chain management, 
product verification and testing) are also in part 
system defences. 
 Vulnerability assessments and penetration 
testing. 
 Incident investigation and response. A CERT is 
per definition defensive – although it might 
contain offensive elements in its responsive 
action.  
 BYOD regulation in as far as network 
interfacing is concerned (Also part of Personnel 
Defenses). 
  The use of honeynets and software decoys to mitigate the insider threat is an 
overlap between personnel and system defensive measures. They are mostly active 
CCI means.  
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 Investigations focused on 
internal cyber security 
incidents involving personnel.  
May include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 Investigations of external cyber intrusions 
could be part passive and part active system 
defence. 
Offensive Mode 
 Passive                                                                                                                                                   Active  
Collect                      Disrupt                                         Exploit                                                    Destroy  
 Collection of information on and 
the monitoring of the cyber 
sphere to detect cyber 
adversaries and their exploitation 
of the cyber sphere in a manner 
that is not own-network 
restricted (i.e. requires more than 
deployment of systems described 
under defensive mode). Could, 
depending on configuration also 
include IDS/IPS, honey-client 
applications (as opposed to host-
based honeypots) and data 
mining.   
 The recruitment and handling of 
virtual agents on underground 
forums (under true or false flag) 
that can serve the purpose of 
collection and/or exploitation. 
(Under certain circumstances 
virtual agents can also develop 
into HUMINT assets).  
Measures taken to exploit and 
neutralise adversaries activities in 
the cyber sphere: 
 System and honeynet 
configured offensively with 
the aim of exploiting and 
deceiving adversaries. False 
information is displayed to 
adversarial reconnaissance 
tools, network scanners and 
listeners, etc. This has as one of 
its aims to lead adversaries in 
the direction of your own 
preference. 
 Utilisation of virtual agents for 
offensive purposes. 
Cyber warfare, in the full extent of the 
term, is typically excluded from the 
mandate of civilian intelligence 
communities. A cyber warfare capability 
should be flexible and allow utilisation 
without, or in conjunction with, kinetic 
war. 
 
Nevertheless, a top class civilian CCI 
outfit will need to have the authority 
and capacity to very selectively conduct 
operations that have cyber warfare 
characteristics. Such cyber CCI 
operations will share characteristics 
with covert action. (Covert action aims 
to influence role-players, conditions and 
events without revealing the sponsors 
identity.) 
 
Within business, the use of offensive 
measures will be determined by the 
legislative and regulatory framework 
within which the entity operates.   Cyberespionage on adversaries. Distinguishable from own-system 
collection (IPS, IDS, honeynets) on the basis that adversarial networks 
are actively targeted and exploited in accordance with strategic and 
operational objectives.   
  
Self-evidently, Table 1 samples only some of the wide array of CCI methods and means. Moreover, and given 
the length constraints of an article, on a very few of these are further elaborated upon, namely honeypots and 
decoys, cyber profiling and cyber-agent operations. 
 
It would have noticed that of the means cited above, honeynets feature prominently in the active, passive as 
well as the defensive and offensive modes. Honeynets have been in use for more than two decades with the 
principle objective to detect, monitor and gain intelligence on adversarial intrusion on a network (Bodmer et al 
2012). In recent years, the purposes of honeynets diversified from its original mostly defensive use to include 
also a much more active and/or offensive role. Concurrently, the different types of honeypots and 
configurations thereof continue are sharply increasing. In as far as architecture goes, and depending on 
specific needs and situations, honeynets can be centralised, distributed, federated, and confederated (Bodmer 
et al 2012). The diversifying aims of honeynets now include one or a combination of deception, disinformation 
and the draining of adversarial resources through labyrinths and “rabbit holes” (Nakashima 2013, Duvenage & 
von Solms 2013). In a similar vein, decoys are highly useful in disrupting external intrusion and/or mitigating 
the insider threat (Voris et al 2013). The more resourced and sophisticated the adversary, the greater the 
imperative to attune the staging of honeynets and the content filling of honeypots, honeyfiles and 
honeytokens in accordance with the opposition’s interests and modus operandi (Duvenage & von Solms 2013).   
  
Counter-action with matching sophistication, in turn, requires sound analysis of high-grade information on the 
environment and adversaries. Unsurprisingly cyber profiling which involves the application of criminal and 
intelligence profiling methods to the cyber realm is fast gaining field as a CCI specialisation area (Bodmer et al 
2012). In order to procure information on actual and potential adversaries, as well as to keep to tabs on 
hacking communities of all sorts, CCI outfits maintain a layered presence on nets and forums. This presence 
varies from the deployment of soft and hardware instrumentalities to the cyber equivalent of HUMINT 
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counterespionage, namely the recruiting, turning and handling witting/unwitting agents (Duvenage & von 
Solms 2013). 
 
4.3 Cyber Counterintelligence as a multi-disciplinary subset of Counterintelligence  
 
In line with the theoretical outline of the relationship between CCI and CCI (Figure 3 and Figure 4), the practical 
safeguarding and advancement of cyber interests is a multi-disciplinary endeavour. CCI is thus not only 
multidisciplinary in itself but is overlaid upon multi-disciplinary counterintelligence. This multi-disciplinary 
mind set is especially relevant in the face of sophisticated threats. As part of the Edward Snowden revelations 
it was, for example, reported that the USA and UK Intelligence communities rely on the recruitment and 
running of HUMINT sources networks in the global telecommunications industry to “tackle” some of their 
“most challenging targets” - inter alia in the cryptology field (Ball et al 2013).  In keep with such multi-
dimensional threats, a CI operation in the cyber field could entail a multi-disciplinary team comprising cyber 
security specialists, strategic analysts, tactical and technical analysts, HUMINT specialists (e.g. agent handlers 
and  intelligence psychologists), cyber-defense technical experts, language experts,  ethical hackers, 
sociologists and religious experts (Bardin  2011).  While a sharp edge on the offense, humans are also the 
weakest and possibly the most ruinous chink in the defensive armour. Powell et al (2013) asserts “an 
organizations insiders” as “primary threats to cybersecurity … [which are] ….the most difficult to mitigate.”  
Complementary to technical defences, CI personnel fidelity measures and HUMINT counterespionage practices 
are thus critical. This is being highlighted by unfolding detail around the Edward Snowdon incident.  
 
The convergence of cyber and HUMINT counterintelligence was furthermore demonstrated by a recent re-
evaluation of the Aurora attacks. This re-evaluation suggests the Aurora attacks were not, as was initially 
thought, a People Republic of China (PRC) operation targeting human-rights activists. It was in fact a Chinese 
counterintelligence operation to determine whether PRC intelligence operations and agents have been 
compromised to USA intelligence (Corbin 2013). Duvenage & von Solms (2013) cites as a further example of 
“an integrated CI initiative, a disinformation campaign as part of which the staging and content filling of a 
honeynet is harmonised with disinformation fed to an adversary through a HUMINT asset (e.g. double agent).”  
 
4.4 Cyber Counterintelligence and Counterintelligence – an integral part of Intelligence and Strategy 
 
CCI, to re-state the paper’s recurring theme, forms part of and is guided by the integrated CI endeavour. 
Consequently, CCI follows the CI processes discussed in Section 3.3. The CI processes, in turn, ought to function 
in synergy with Positive Intelligence. CI not only safeguards Intelligence operations, but renders inside 
information on competitors highly useful to executives. In addition; deception, disinformation and other such 
projects support a company in achieving its business objectives. This is thus a more a practical illustration of 
the theoretical postulations per Figures 3 and 4 which put business objectives and strategy as the pivot around 
which CI and CCI evolves.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper forms part of still spare yet fast growing body of academic literature which views CCI as a   
practicable approach for governments, businesses and other sizable entities for securing and advancing cyber 
interests. Proliferating threats and trends affecting cyber security are not all bad news. Contradictory as it may 
appear, the more extensive adversarial cyber action the greater the potential opportunity could be for 
counter-exploitation. The call for cyber CCI should not be misconstrued as a call for a free-for-all cyber Wild 
West. Performed haphazardly and in a silo, CCI is could be self-destructive.  
 
There are several pre-conditions for effective CCI. To be effective, CCI should be an integral part of multi-
disciplinary CI – conceptually and in practice. In consulted academic literature, however, such 
conceptualisation is lacking. For the most part they endeavour to progress with CCI theory construction, 
without a sound foundational explication of CI. Theory so formulated and models so constructed could hold 
serious negative repercussions on a practical level. Within counterintelligence, the price for bad theory is 
eventually costly failures. As pointed out in an earlier contribution:  “Conceptual models are not mere 
theoretical, academic constructs. Models condition our thinking and our approach to practice. What we 
therefore need is a sound overarching CCI model that can synergistically bind developing theory.” (Duvenage & 
von Solms 2013) 
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Therefore, this paper firstly aimed to put the counterintelligence in cyber counterintelligence. This was done 
through conceptualising CCI as part of multi-disciplinary CI and the applications of time-tested CI constructs to 
the cyber sphere. Secondly, the article offered a few conceptual constructs as contours towards the 
construction of such a model. So doing, it demonstrated the degree to which conventional, time-tested CI 
constructs can guide CCI’s conceptualisation. The actual construction of a credible model, however, will 
require extensive in-depth, multi-disciplinary research and debate.  
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Abstract: It is generally accepted that conventional cyber security generally has failed.  As 
such, Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) is fast gaining traction as a practicable approach to 
secure and advance our own interests effectively. To be successful, CCI should be an integral 
part of multi-disciplinary Counterintelligence (CI)–conceptually and in practice. With a view 
to informing sound CCI practice, this paper conceptualises CCI as a part of CI. It proceeds 
with going back to some time-tested CI constructs and applies these to the cyber realm. In so 
doing, this paper aims to offer a few building blocks toward a future of sound CCI theory and 
practice.  
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Introduction 
What was seen as a paradigmatic shift in thinking at the turn of this decade is now commonly 
accepted–that conventional cyber security which we have been relying on is deteriorating on 
all fronts (Lües 2012). As a result, cyber space is now probably more insecure than it has ever 
been (Bodmer et al. 2012). It is also likely to be the most secure than it is going to be for the 
foreseeable future. It is, simply put, going to get much worse. In this regard, the World 
Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2014 Global Risk Report warned of “digital disintegration” when 
it stated: “The world may be only one disruptive technology away from attackers gaining a 
runaway advantage, meaning the Internet would cease to be a trusted medium for 
communication or commerce” (WEF 2014). The report continues by identifying the foremost 
“technological risks” for the immediate future as the breakdown of critical informational 
infrastructure and networks, an escalation of large scale cyber-attacks, and incidents of data 
fraud continue on an unprecedented scale (WEF 2014). Even early on in 2014, these were no 
longer risks but manifesting trends. Attesting to this concern is the continuing prominence in 
mass-media media reporting on the escalating detrimental impact of cyber criminals, 
hacktivists, and other role-players. Simultaneously, nation states’ cyber surveillance by the 
intelligence apparatuses of not only the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), but 
also the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia continue to make headlines. 
 
With the awareness of conventional cyber security’s faltering, both state and non-state actors 
have been intensifying their quests for ways to more effectively protect and advance their 
cyber interests and, in the case of service providers and vendors, those of their clients. As 
could be expected, solutions offered in the marketplace vary considerably. Buzzwords and 
marketing slogans currently gaining favour include: counter exploitation, threat intelligence, 
offensive measures, hacking back, threatscape, and intelligence software analytics (IBM 
2013; Helton 2013). Common to most of these solutions advocated, is recognition of the 
imperative of intelligence on threat actors and the need to engage threats pro-
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actively/offensively. There is a sense of taking the fight to adversaries. The use of such 
notions and phrases would have been encouraging if it was indicative of more organisations 
“moving towards intelligence-driven risk management and decision-making models” (Helton 
2013).  As it currently stands, however, the use of these terms is, disturbing for three 
interrelated reasons. First, the terms are used vaguely and without the proper context from the 
statutory intelligence practice from which they are often derived. In marketing jargon 
‘intelligence’ is used interchangeably with ‘data and information’. Consequently, solutions 
offered under the rubrics of ‘intelligence’ may not solve the problems for which they purport 
to be the fix. In a similar vein, opting for quick-fix offensive actions, not dovetailed with an 
appropriately configured defensive posture, is inviting disaster. Equally disconcerting is the 
fact that solutions and terms are sometimes thrown around without due and categorical 
stipulations that some aspects of cyber defence and offense are the exclusive prerogative of 
the state apparatus in most countries. These functions ought not to be ‘out-sourced’ to other 
entities. Secondly, solutions being offered are essentially technical and tactical in nature. As 
important as they are, technical and tactical measures on their own are insufficient to confront 
the sophisticated threat actors about whom we are most concerned. Social engineering, to cite 
one example, “played a part in nearly every major hack or breach in 2013 yet it still stays in 
the background when we consider security controls. This is something that needs to change 
as we move forward” ([ISC]2 2013).  Thirdly, these solutions are presented as neat ‘add-ons’ 
or ‘plugins’ to be used as a layer additional to existing cyber security measures. ‘Add-ons’ 
seldom have, and certainly will not in the future offer adequate protection against advanced 
adversaries. For sizable institutions with significant digital and information interests to face 
up to such adversaries, cyber security needs to be a coherent part of their DNA and not mere 
feel-good plasters offering little real protection.  
 
 There is a way in which such synergy can be achieved and the tables turned on cyber 
adversaries. This paper posits cyber counterintelligence (CCI) as a practicable approach to 
effectively securing and advancing cyber interests. From this perspective, malicious cyber 
actions are not all bad news. The good news is that we can exploit malicious cyber actions to 
our advantage and to the detriment of the adversarial instigators. There is, however, a 
precondition: there can be no half measures. To be effective, CCI needs to be properly 
conceptualised and implemented. If not, it is likely to be self-defeating and could even end in 
self-destruction. For a substantial part, this conceptualisation entails the application of time-
tested counterintelligence (CI) notions to the cyber sphere. It is a case of going back to 
counterintelligence fundamentals in order to enable our prosperity in the cyber sphere today 
and in the future. It is thus a case, as suggested by the paper’s title, of going back in order to 
successfully move to a more secure cyber future.  
 
This paper’s primary aim is to provide a conceptual baseline that could help stimulate the 
academic discourse on CCI. Consequently, it ensues with a cursory overview of the status of 
CCI in the public and academic discourse on cyber security. An academic self-awareness of 
CCI’s under-theorised status is, after all, a first step in addressing this near void. The paper 
proceeds with advancing CI and CCI constructs hopefully useful to this discourse. Rather 
than aiming to advocate radically new concepts, the emphasis is on presenting existing 
knowledge in a manner conducive to further academic debate. Such conceptual ‘building 
blocks’ include a definition and delineation of the CI as a CCI sub-discipline, a taxonomy for 
CCI methods and means, as well as a CCI matrix for configuring an offensive-defensive 
posture. It concludes with some views on CCI’s future by suggesting areas for further 
academic enquiry. 
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As noted above, the following section reflects on CCI under-theorised status, since such 
awareness is an important first step in make progress with the academic discourse.  
 
Cyber Counterintelligence’s under-Theorised Status 
 In one form or the other, cyber counterintelligence has been practised as part of the statutory 
counterintelligence functions in various intelligence communities for well over two decades. 
CCI has also been offered as a service provided by a few niche companies for well over a 
decade. Until very recently, however, CCI has not really gained traction outside the statutory 
security structures and the small batch of clients the niche companies served.  Despite the key 
it holds to secure cyber interests for state and non-state actors, CCI entered the second decade 
of the 21st century underappreciated and underexplored in policies and in the literature in the 
public domain. The overwhelming majority of governments’ cyber security policies do not 
make any references to counterintelligence. And, in the few instances that the concept is 
cited, counterintelligence is hardly at the centre.  
  
Anecdotal indications are that CCI has fast been gaining traction during the last two years. 
The 2013 proceedings of the 12th European on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS), for 
example, consist of 44 papers and are 406 pages long (Kuusisto & Kurkinen 2013). Not one 
of these papers makes mention of CCI. There is, in fact, only one sentence in the whole of the 
proceedings that makes cursory reference to the general concept of counterintelligence 
(Kuusisto & Kurkinen, 2013). A mere one year later, and ECCWS 2014 featured a dedicated 
mini-track to Cyber Intelligence/Counterintelligence. While this certainly reflected an 
increased awareness of CCI, contributions remain scarce. Only one paper presented at 
ECCWS 2014 had CCI as focus or had ‘counterintelligence’ in its title.  
 
While a few commendable books have been published on the subject, these are minuscule in 
comparison with the proliferating material on cyber security in general. The shift in emphasis 
towards CCI is nonetheless also apparent here.  An outstanding work by Bodmer et al. was 
first published in 2012 with the title Reverse Deception – Organized Cyber Threat Counter-
Exploitation (Bodmer et al. 2012). The edition due for release in 2014–which, as far as could 
be surmised from pre-launch advertising, retains the core of the 2012 editionis  more aptly 
called Hacking Back: Offensive Cyber Counterintelligence (Bodmer et al. 2014). 
   
Although CCI is poised to gain prominence, the participation in and agenda of this discourse 
will inevitably be influenced by the relative obscurity of CI in general. CCI will be 
demonstrated in further sections as a sub-set of the broader, multi-faceted CI discipline.  It 
thus follows that contributions to CCI would need to be preceded by some grounding in CI. 
CI, however, (and herein lies the glitch), is in itself academically obscure and 
underappreciated. This obscurity is as old as its inception as a formalised discipline in the run 
up to World War II. Some would argue that this can be ascribed to the fact that a large part of 
CI work relies for its effectiveness on secrecy. Yet, we do not need to reveal secrets to talk 
seriously about matters of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Meyer 1987). A more likely 
reason for CI’s obscurity in the academic debate is to be found in the fact that it is arguably 
the most complex and least understood of all Intelligence disciplines (Godson 2001).  The 
following statement by a U.S. CI veteran in the midst of the Cold War has lost none of its 
relevance: “It is not easy, nor can one feel confident, to re-enter this world where, it has been 
said, the tortuous logic of counterintelligence prevails...Unfortunately, there seems to be no 
easy way to explain counterintelligence...Because effective counterintelligence is a 
combination of so many aspects” (Miller 1980). Even among policy makers, scholars and 
‘national security practitioners’ in foremost intelligence communities such as those of the 
 218 
 
U.S., “the role of counterintelligence remains little known or understood” up to this day (Van 
Cleave 2007). 
 
Since the role, functions and importance of CI is opaque within statutory intelligence circles, 
the reluctance of ‘techies’ to apply this concept to the cyber sphere is understandable. In a 
similar vein, those skilled and experienced in more conventional counterintelligence do not 
necessarily have a sound working knowledge of technical cyber. If we are not clear on a 
conceptual level, we can hardly make progress in the academic discourse, thereby eventually 
affecting our ability to implement sound solutions. In the conceptual difficulties of CI also 
lies the opportunity. If we can understand and explain CI, we can explain CCI and then we 
can unlock the latter’s potential as a force multiplier.    
 
This section illustrated the need for contributions to the budding CCI field to be clearly 
rooted in CI. In line with this contention, the next section provides a conceptual primer of CI.  
   
A Primer on Counterintelligence      
Counterintelligence has been practised and described for millennia. Some enduring principles 
were penned in 500 B.C. by the much-quoted Sun Tzu in a specific chapter in his The Art of 
War devoted to the use of spies and counter-spies (Giles 2002).  The term in its contemporary 
connotations entered the English lexicon in the mid-1930s (Dictionary.com 2014). For some, 
counterintelligence is all about spies outgunning adversarial spies. For others, it invokes 
mundane security measures such as computer passwords, restrictions on the use of computing 
equipment, security guards, access control, and the like. Counterintelligence is all of these 
things, and so much more (Duvenage & von Solms 2013).  
 
Delineating Counterintelligence  
Counterintelligence can be defined as the collective of measures undertaken to identify, deter, 
exploit, degrade, neutralise, and protect against adversarial intelligence activities deemed as 
detrimental or potentially detrimental to one’s own interests (Duvenage 2010). The term 
‘counterintelligence’ is thus an abbreviated form for the countering of hostile intelligence 
activities. Adversaries engaging in hostile intelligence actions include nation states, corporate 
entities, criminals, activists, individuals, and any combination of these.   
 
Adversarial intelligence activities include espionage, deception (disinformation), influencing, 
and some other forms of covert action that can have disruptive and destructive outcomes. Of 
these different intelligence activities, espionage is the most central. Espionage to obtain 
protected information in order to gain a competitive advantage can be an end in itself; or such 
information can be used to further other malicious ends such as data manipulation, 
disinformation, and disruption. Sophisticated adversaries execute their intelligence actions 
through the exploitation of humans (HUMINT) and technical means (TECHINT). The latter, 
in turn, comprise Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement 
and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT). These conduits 
and their relation to adversarial intelligence ends are graphically depicted in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Adversarial Intelligence: Conduits and Ends  
  
Several revelations by the whistle-blower Edward Snowden provide a practical illustration of 
the above. During September 2013, for example, The Guardian newspaper revealed that the 
British and U.S. Agencies run HUMINT operations to “help secure an insider advantage” 
(Ball, Borger & Greenwald 2013).  To this end the British Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) established a HUMINT Operations Team (HOT) "responsible for 
identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global telecommunications industry" 
(Ball, Borger & Greenwald 2013). These operations enabled the Agency to “tackle some of 
its most challenging targets", specifically, in as far as the breaking of encryption was 
concerned (Ball, Borger & Greenwald 2013).  In this instance, success in the field of 
CYBINT thus depended on the effectiveness of HUMINT operations. The reverse is of 
course also true. Given the high and growing digital dependence, CYBINT is often a critical 
enabler in the HUMINT sphere. To be effective, CI needs to counter all types of adversarial 
intelligence activities and, in the case of high-end adversaries, it has to do so in more than 
one of or in all of the conduits.  
 
Counterintelligence: Measures, Means, and Modes 
In order to execute its mission, CI relies on measures and means that vary from passive-
defensive to active-offensive ones. At the one end of the spectrum, passive-defensive 
measures strive to deny adversaries access to protected information assets. They aim to 
reduce vulnerabilities through a combination of policies, procedures, and practices–
sometimes referred to on a lighter note as “gates, guards, guns, and dogs” (Francq 2001). 
Apart from denying opponents access, properly instituted passive-defences measures are like 
caste walls. In addition to preventing common intrusions, their presence discourages intrusion 
attempts and consequently serves a deterrence function. Examples of passive-defensive 
measures are access and movement control, perimeter security, alarm systems, safes and 
vaults, fire prevention measures, key control, and the control of the removal and transfer of 
information from facilities where valued information is located.  At the other ends of the 
spectrum, offensive counterintelligence aims to neutralise a competitor’s intelligence efforts 
through measures ranging from deception and manipulation to the neutralisation of 
adversarial intelligence activities and systems. Deception takes various forms and can be 
achieved through numerous means. Skilfully executed, deception attains a primary 
counterintelligence aim, which is the manipulation and control of an adversary. This is aptly 
encapsulated by Codevilla (1992) when he states “Action against the enemy through the 
enemy’s own intelligence is the very consummation of CI”. There are of course also 
aggressive CI measures that CI shares with its sister--discipline, Covert Action. Under certain 
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conditions, assassinations and even extraordinary rendition can be classified as active-
offensive CI neutralisation measures (Duvenage 2010).  
 
Between passive-defensive and active-offensive lies a wide array of other measures, such as: 
pre-employment personnel security; in-service personnel security; technical surveillance 
countermeasures (TSCM); encryption; surveillance (physical, static, mobile, and electronic); 
double agents; agents; and continued monitoring.  In most instances, these measures can 
serve defensive or/and offensive purposes.  Defensive counterintelligence tactics and 
strategies provide information to and act as triggers to alert the offensive side of the practice. 
Similarly, offensive operations (for example a source reporting on an adversary’s intentions 
and capabilities) inform the proactive configuration of defences. It will also be noted that 
several of these are highly useful in the collection of information of internal vulnerabilities 
(such as organisational weaknesses and insider threats), the external environment, as well as 
actual and potential adversaries. It goes without saying that, without such information being 
analysed, CI would be blind and unable to execute the defensive-offensive interplay. The 
following matrix, depicted in Figure 2, is somewhat of an over-simplification, but is 
nonetheless useful in conveying the nuanced nature of the offensive-defensive interplay as 
well as the importance of collection: 
 
Defensive Mode 
Denies adversaries access to and generates information about adversaries 
Passive Defence 
Denies the adversary access to information 
through physical security measures and 
security systems. 
Active Defence 
The active collection of information on the adversary to 
determine its sponsor, modus operandi, network, and targets. 
Methods include physical and electronic surveillance, 
dangles, double agents, moles, and electronic tapping. 
Offensive Mode 
Aims to manipulate, degrade, control and neutralise adversaries 
Passive Offensive 
Reveals to the adversary what you want them 
to see. This could range from selective 
exposure of actual information to decoys and 
dummies.  The adversary is thus left to draw 
its own inferences and interpretations.  
Active Offensive 
The adversary is fed with disinformation and its 
interpretation thereof manipulated. Disinformation can be 
channelled through, for example, double agents and ‘moles’.   
Active-offensive CI could include some forms of covert 
action. Covert action, in its use here, denotes the targeting of 
an adversary through the influencing of events, conditions, 
individuals, groups, or institutions to the benefit of a sponsor 
in a manner not attributable to the sponsor or by offering 
plausible deniability. Influencing is achieved through 
measures that vary from paramilitary and political actions to 
propaganda and intelligence assistance.  
 
Figure 2: A Four-Sector Counterintelligence Matrix (Compiled by the authors on the basis of 
narratives in Prunckun 2012; Sims 2009; Odom 2003; Godson 2001)  
 
Counterintelligence Process  
The preceding matrix and discussion above demonstrate that CI is an intricate and exhaustive 
discipline. It is not only about defences, but is also about the concrete advancement of one’s 
own interest vis-à-vis adversaries’ interests. It could be surmised from the above, no matter 
how well-resourced, the CI endeavour cannot protect all assets or advance all interests all the 
time. The bodies of information that justify CI protection as well as the systems, processes, 
institutions, and individuals in which such information resides must be identified and 
prioritised (Prunckun 2012). Since offensive action carries even higher risks and costs, CI 
should be crystal clear on it role in this regard. Such clarity in turn presupposes CI to be in 
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synergy with Intelligence and at the centre of a government’s or business’ strategy. These are 
the critical roots of the CI premise.  
While few would dispute CI’s premise, opinions are divided on the structuring of the CI 
process. This paper favours a process model that differs fundamentally from the traditional 
(positive) intelligence cycle and Clarke’s target-centric process (Clarke 2004). This process 
model comprises the following steps (Duvenage & Hough 2011; Duvenage 2013):   
 
1. Identify information and assets that warrant the expending of counterintelligence 
resources.  
2. Assess vulnerabilities that increase the risk of information being compromised.  
3. Scan the environment and identify actual or potential threat-agents. 
4. Collect information on threat-agents and appraise the risks. 
5. Re-assess own vulnerabilities and review defences. 
6. Develop sets of counterintelligence measures and projects (offensive and defensive).  
7. Implement the recommended countermeasures and projects.  
8. Continually assess and adapt the implemented countermeasures to compute the 
changing environment. 
 
The apparent simplicity of this model in certain respects masks some intricacies of the 
counterintelligence process. In the case of offensive counterintelligence, for example, 
espionage adversaries will be engaged through a pattern of activities interwoven within the 
broader counterintelligence processes. Offensive counterintelligence, in other words, will be 
performed as a sub-process of step 6 outlined above. This sub-process draws an important 
distinction between an ‘espionage adversary’ and an ‘espionage target’. An ‘espionage 
adversary’ is the ultimate sponsor of an intelligence effort, while the counterespionage target 
is the instrument with which intelligence activities are conducted. This instrument is targeted 
by an opposing entity’s counterespionage structure–hence the phrasing ‘counterespionage 
target’.  A nation state and its intelligence service would, for example, be espionage 
adversaries and the proxies for conducting the actual espionage would be the 
counterespionage targets. Such proxies could be recruited agents or third entities (for 
example, front companies). Employing this distinction, the offensive counterespionage 
process–which is executed per step 6 of the process model above - will typically have the 
following sub-steps (Duvenage & Hough 2011): 
 
6.1 Identification of espionage adversaries. 
6.2 Prioritisation of espionage adversaries. 
6.3 Investigation of espionage adversaries. 
6.4 Engagement of counterespionage targets.  
6.5 Exploitation of counterespionage targets. 
6.6 Neutralisation of targets and termination of operation 
 
This section provided a primer that demarcated CI, explained CI measures and modes, and 
offered changes to the CI process. Building on this overview of CI, the paper proceeds with 
conceptualising CCI.  
   
Conceptualising Cyber Counterintelligence  
This section provides a provisional definition of CCI, advances a model for integrating CCI 
with CI and Intelligence, and outlines some CCI methods, means, and modes. 
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Defining and Delineating Cyber Counterintelligence 
While various definitions for CCI have been advanced, none of these specifically explicate 
the relationship between CCI and CI (for example, Carrol 2009; Bodmer et al. 2012; Farchi 
2012). In keeping with the paper’s central contention, CCI is defined as that subset of multi-
disciplinary CI aimed at deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting, and neutralising 
adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way to breach the C-I-A of valued 
information assets through cyber means. Expanding on this definition, it is postulated that CI 
delineates CCI on the following three tiers (Duvenage & von Solms 2013): 
 
 Applied to the cyber context, CI theory and practice provides a conceptual template for 
modelling CCI actions in the safeguarding and advancing of cyber interests. Mirroring CI, 
CCI has offensive and defensive missions that are distinguishable but not separable. 
 To be effective, cyber counterintelligence needs to be interlocked with all-field 
counterintelligence–defensively and offensively. In this sense, CI cements an integrated 
approach to securing the cyber space. CCI is thus about both the modelling of cyber 
actions on CI, and the integration of these offensive and defensive actions with 
conventional CI. 
 Effective CI protects and promotes the intelligence endeavour and business strategy. 
Since CCI is part of CI, it is also integrated in business strategy and intelligence.  
   
Figure 3 depicts this three-tiered relationship graphically.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Cyber Counterintelligence Pyramid  
The postulation, per the narrative and Figure 3, is admittedly cursory and does not purport to 
conform to the criteria of a conceptual model. However, it could provide a useful premise for 
further research and for the development of a conceptual model for implementation in the 
cyber domain.  
 
Overview of Cyber Counterintelligence Methods, Means, and Modes  
The section above discussed defensive and offensive CCI actions. Mirroring CI in general, 
CCI methods and means can be deployed in offensive and defensive modes, but defy 
categorisation in watertight compartments. At the very ends of this spectrum there are a few 
methods and means that could be designated clearly as active-offensive (notably cyber 
weapons with a destructive purpose, such as Stuxnet) or passive-defensive (for example, 
access control and validation directives). In the main, however, offense-defensive and active-
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passive are not neat compartments, but rather the manner in and end towards which methods 
and means are deployed (Duvenage & von Solms 2013). This is illustrated in the following 
matrix, Figure 4, which depicts the four cyber-counterintelligence modes (postures) an entity 
could assume:  
 
Figure 4: Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix  
 
The CCI matrix per Figure 4 is more than a notional construct and can be applied practically 
by entities (with sizable cyber interest and assets) in the plotting of CCI methods and means. 
The matrix ensures that a presence is maintained or, at the very least, that contingency 
planning is done with respect to all four quadrants. It furthermore facilitates innovation and 
creativity in the application of methods and means–within legal parameters, of course. 
Contrary to a misconception, for example, an Intrusion Prevention System can be configured 
with surprising positive results in executing aims in the other three quadrants. Consequently, 
the construction of a tabulated taxonomy of CCI methods and means could very well be an 
oversimplification. Even more so should the taxonomy endeavour to point to parallels that 
exist between CCI measures and those in CI generally. Nonetheless, at this early stage of 
conceptualising CCI, such a simplification can serve as a jumping off point for further debate. 
With this caveat, a cursory taxonomy of CCI methods and means is provided in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Cyber Counterintelligence Methods and Means (Duvenage & von 
Solms 2013) 
  
 
CI 
Legend 
           Cyber Counterintelligence: Methods & Means 
 
           Counterintelligence (All-discipline)    Intelligence and Strategy 
OFFENSIVE 
ACTIVE PASSIVE 
DEFENSIVE 
CI 
 
CI 
CI  CI IS  
S 
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DEFENSIVE MODE 
Passive                                                                                                                                                       Active 
 Deny                  >>                                       Detect                                 >>                                 Collect 
Physical Defensive Personnel/User Defensive System Defensive 
Protects  against: 
 Unauthorised access to 
facilities and systems. 
 In loco theft of data, 
hardware. 
 Introduction of malware 
through physical access to 
systems.   
 Physical destruction. 
 Unauthorised reading 
(acoustic, visual, 
analogue, signals). 
 While not conventionally 
seen as a Physical 
Defence, supply-chain 
management has a 
physical defensive 
function.  It is also part of 
System Defences. 
 
Remark: Within the area of 
Physical Security, there is an 
extensive and strong 
convergence between CCI and 
conventional CI. In keep with 
the article’s central contention 
that CCI ought be seamlessly 
integrated with CI, the sub-
category ‘Physical Defensive’ 
is included in this taxonomy. 
Note is taken of the fact that 
with other classification 
criteria some of the measures 
listed above may be excluded 
from CCI, per se. 
Consists of aspects such as  
 IT and user personnel 
vetting, re-vetting, and 
confidentiality agreements. 
 Personnel security measures, 
BYOD user parameters, or 
exclusions. 
 User programmes in cyber 
security which cover policy 
and procedures for the 
handling of security incidents 
and malfunctions.  
 Overlapping with system 
defences, the use of software 
decoys to mitigate the insider 
threat.  
 Investigations focused on 
cyber security incidents 
involving personnel.  Could 
also include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 
Comprises a combination of  
 Hardware  and software such as  
 Network perimeter-based security 
(filters, certain firewalls, etc.).  
 Malware scanners.  
 Integrated automated systems/tools 
(that collect and evaluate 
information about devices 
connected to a network, activities 
thereon–inclusive of intrusions). 
Examples of such tools, discussed 
further on in the table, are decoys 
and honeynets.  
 Overlapping with the latter, are 
IDS and IPS. Depending on its 
configuration, a honeynet can be 
defensive or offensive in 
type/mode. The term fish bowling 
denotes the defensive 
configuration. (Remark: See 
http://ids.cs.columbia.edu/content/ 
publications.html for extensive 
work that has been done on 
IDS/IPS). 
 Processes (such as supply-chain 
management, product verification, 
and testing) are also, in part, 
system defences. 
 Vulnerability assessments and 
penetration testing. 
 Incident investigation and response. 
A CERT is, by definition, 
defensive–although it might 
contain offensive elements in its 
responsive action.  
 BYOD regulation in as far as 
network interfacing is concerned 
(also part of Personnel Defenses). 
  The use of honeynets and software decoys to mitigate the insider 
threat creates an overlap between personnel and system defensive 
measures. They are mostly active CCI means.  
 Investigations focused on internal 
cyber security incidents 
involving personnel.  May 
include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 Investigations of external 
cyber intrusions could be 
part passive and part active 
system defence. 
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OFFENSIVE MODE 
 Passive                                                                                                                                           Active  
Collect                >>          Disrupt                         >>                 Exploit                  >>                  Destroy  
 Collection of information on and 
the monitoring of the cyber 
sphere to detect cyber 
adversaries and their exploitation 
of the cyber sphere in a manner 
that is not own-network 
restricted (i.e., which require 
more than deployment of 
systems described under 
defensive mode). Could, 
depending on configuration, also 
include IDS/IPS, honey-client 
applications (as opposed to host-
based honeypots) and data 
mining.   
 The recruitment and handling of 
virtual agents on underground 
forums (under true or false flag) 
that can serve the purpose of 
collection and/or exploitation. 
(Under certain circumstances 
virtual agents can also develop 
into HUMINT assets).  
Measures taken to exploit and to 
neutralise adversaries’ activities 
in the cyber sphere: 
 System and honeynet can be 
configured offensively 
with the aim of exploiting 
and deceiving adversaries. 
False information is 
displayed to adversarial 
reconnaissance tools, 
network scanners, and 
listeners, etc. This has as 
one of its aims to lead 
adversaries in the direction 
of your own preference. 
 Utilisation of virtual agents 
for offensive purposes. 
Cyber warfare, in the full 
extent of the term, is typically 
excluded from the mandate of 
civilian intelligence 
communities. A cyber warfare 
capability should be flexible and 
should allow utilisation without, 
or in conjunction with, kinetic 
war. 
 
Nevertheless, a top class civilian 
CCI outfit will need to have the 
authority and the capacity to 
very selectively conduct 
operations that have cyber 
warfare characteristics. Such 
cyber CCI operations will share 
characteristics with covert 
action. (Covert action aims to 
influence role-players, 
conditions, and events without 
revealing the sponsor’s 
identity.) 
 
Within business, the use of 
offensive measures will be 
determined by the legal and 
regulatory framework within 
which the entity operates.  
 Cyberespionage on adversaries. Distinguishable from own-system 
collection (IPS, IDS, honeynets) on the basis that adversarial networks 
are actively targeted and exploited in accordance with strategic and 
operational objectives.   
  
Table 1 samples only some of the possible CCI methods and means. Moreover, and given the 
length constraints of an article, only a very few of these are further elaborated upon, namely 
honeypots and decoys, cyber profiling, and cyber-agent operations. 
 
In the means cited above, honeynets feature prominently in the active and passive as well as 
the defensive and offensive modes. Honeynets have been in use for more than two decades 
with the principle objective to detect, to monitor, and to gain intelligence on adversarial 
intrusion on a network (Bodmer et al. 2012). In recent years, the purposes of honeynets 
diversified from its original mostly defensive use to include also a much more active and/or 
offensive role. Concurrently, the different types of honeypots and configurations are sharply 
increasing. In as far as architecture goes, and depending on specific needs and situations, 
honeynets can be centralised, distributed, federated, and confederated (Bodmer et al. 2012). 
The diversifying aims of honeynets now include one or a combination of deception, 
disinformation, and the draining of adversarial resources through labyrinths and “rabbit 
holes” (Nakashima 2013; Duvenage & von Solms 2013). In a similar vein, decoys are highly 
useful in disrupting external intrusion and/or mitigating the insider threat (Voris et al. 2013). 
The more resourced and sophisticated the adversary, the greater the imperative to attune the 
staging of honeynets and the content filling of honeypots, honeyfiles, and honeytokens in 
accordance with the opposition’s interests and modus operandi (Duvenage & von Solms 
2013).   
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Counter-action with matching sophistication, in turn, requires sound analysis of high-grade 
information on the environment and on adversaries. Unsurprisingly, cyber profiling, which 
involves the application of criminal and intelligence profiling methods to the cyber realm, is 
fast gaining field as a CCI specialisation area (Bodmer et al. 2012). In order to procure 
information on actual and potential adversaries, as well as to keep to tabs on hacking 
communities of all sorts, CCI outfits maintain a layered presence on nets and forums. This 
presence varies from the deployment of soft and hardware instrumentalities to the cyber 
equivalent of HUMINT counterespionage, namely the recruiting, turning, and handling of 
witting/unwitting agents (Duvenage & von Solms 2013). 
 
Cyber Counterintelligence as a Multi-Disciplinary Subset of 
Counterintelligence  
In line with the theoretical outline of the relationship between CCI and CCI (Figure 3 and 
Figure 4), the practical safeguarding and advancement of cyber interests is a multi-
disciplinary endeavour. CCI is thus not only multidisciplinary in itself but is overlaid upon 
multi-disciplinary counterintelligence. This multi-disciplinary mind set is especially relevant 
in the face of sophisticated threats. As part of the Edward Snowden revelations it was 
reported, for example, that the USA and UK Intelligence communities rely on the recruitment 
and running of HUMINT sources networks in the global telecommunications industry to 
“tackle” some of their “most challenging targets”-inter alia in the cryptology field (Ball, 
Borger & Greenwald 2013).  In keep with such multi-dimensional threats, a CI operation in 
the cyber field could entail a multi-disciplinary team comprised of cyber security specialists, 
strategic analysts, tactical and technical analysts, HUMINT specialists (such as agent 
handlers and intelligence psychologists), cyber defense technical experts, language experts,  
ethical hackers, sociologists, and religious experts (Bardin 2011).  While a sharp edge on the 
offense, humans are also the weakest and possibly the most ruinous chink in the defensive 
armour. Powell, Wick and Fergus (2013) assert “an organization’s insiders” are “primary 
threats to cybersecurity … [which are] ….the most difficult to mitigate”.  Complementary to 
technical defences, CI personnel fidelity measures, and HUMINT counterespionage practices 
are thus critical. This is being highlighted by unfolding detail around the Edward Snowdon 
breach.  
 
The convergence of cyber and HUMINT counterintelligence was furthermore demonstrated 
by a recent re-evaluation of the Aurora attacks. This re-evaluation suggests the Aurora attacks 
were not, as was initially thought, a People’s Republic of China (PRC) operation targeting 
human-rights activists. It was in fact a Chinese counterintelligence operation to determine 
whether PRC intelligence operations and agents had been compromised by USA intelligence 
(Corbin 2013). Duvenage & von Solms (2013) cite as a further example of “an integrated CI 
initiative, a disinformation campaign as part of which the staging and content filling of a 
honeynet is harmonised with disinformation fed to an adversary through a HUMINT asset 
(e.g. double agent)”.  
 
Cyber Counterintelligence and Counterintelligence–An Integral Part of 
Intelligence and Strategy 
To re-state the paper’s recurring theme, CCI forms part of and is guided by the integrated CI 
endeavour. Consequently, CCI follows the CI processes discussed in Section 3.3. The CI 
processes, in turn, ought to function in synergy with positive intelligence. CI not only 
safeguards intelligence operations, but also renders inside information on competitors highly 
useful to executives. In addition, deception, disinformation, and other such projects support a 
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company in achieving its business objectives. This is thus a more a practical illustration of the 
theoretical postulations per Figures 3 and 4 which put business objectives and strategy as the 
pivot around which CI and CCI evolve.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper forms part of a still spare yet fast-growing body of academic literature which 
views CCI as a practicable approach for governments, businesses, and other sizable entities 
for securing and for advancing cyber interests. Proliferating threats and trends affecting cyber 
security are not all bad. Contradictory as it may appear, the more extensive adversarial cyber 
action the greater the potential opportunity could be for counter-exploitation. The call for 
cyber CCI should not be misconstrued as a call for a free-for-all cyber Wild West. Performed 
haphazardly and in a silo, CCI is could be self-destructive.  
 
There are several pre-conditions for effective CCI. To be effective, CCI should be an integral 
part of multi-disciplinary CI–conceptually and in practice. In academic literature, however, 
such conceptualisation is lacking. For the most part researchers have endeavoured to progress 
with CCI theory construction, without a sound foundational explication of CI. Theory so 
formulated and models so constructed could hold serious negative repercussions on a 
practical level. Within counterintelligence, the price for bad theory is eventually costly 
failures. As pointed out in an earlier contribution:  “Conceptual models are not mere 
theoretical, academic constructs. Models condition our thinking and our approach to practice. 
What we therefore need is a sound overarching CCI model that can synergistically bind 
developing theory” (Duvenage & von Solms 2013). 
 
Therefore, this paper aimed to put the counterintelligence in cyber counterintelligence. This 
was done through conceptualising CCI as part of multi-disciplinary CI and the applications of 
time-tested CI constructs to the cyber sphere. Secondly, the article offered a few conceptual 
constructs as the beginning of the construction of such a model. In so doing, it demonstrated 
the degree to which conventional, time-tested CI constructs can guide CCI’s 
conceptualisation. The actual construction of a credible model, however, will require 
extensive in-depth, multi-disciplinary research and debate.  
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With the ineffectiveness of the defensive cyber security toolkit against advanced threats now commonly 
accepted, the quest is intensifying for viable and practical alternatives. While Cyber Counterintelligence 
(CCI) is gaining traction as such an approach, it is still in its infancy as a field of academic enquiry. This 
paper aims to contribute to an area largely underexplored, namely the conceptual structuring of the CCI 
process.   
The paper argues a proposition on the CCI process to be of critical academic and practical importance. 
On an academic level, such a proposition serves as a notional concept for directing and delineating 
further research into CCI. On a practical level, the conceptual outline of the process provides an 
organising template for performing CCI work in practice. On both accounts the proposition is an 
idealisation - where the CCI process appears to be optimally effective and where everything goes as 
planned.  
The paper is based on the premise that CCI can only be performed effectively as part of a multi-
disciplinary Counterintelligence (CI) process. Moving from this premise, a contextual overview is 
provided of some existing postulations on the Intelligence, CI and CCI processes. Since existing 
propositions do not sufficiently explain CCI, an alternative process model is presented in the form of a 
diagram and a narrative conceptual outline.  The aim is not to describe the process in detail, but to 
rather present a high-level theoretical framework.  
Keywords: cyber counterintelligence, cyber-counterintelligence process, offensive cybersecurity, cyber 
security. 
 
1. Introduction  
Key events during 2015 have affirmed the continued deterioration in cyber security and the degree to 
which the landscape for the foreseeable future will favour the aggressor. There are various reasons 
perpetuating this trend. One of these is that current security approaches, for the overwhelming part, 
remain stuck in antiquated processes models which are compliance-driven, defensive in posture and 
which emphasise technical solutions at the expense of a more holistic approach.  
 
In an endeavour to capitalise on the market demand for alternatives, commercial cyber-security vendors 
are increasingly drawing on concepts, principles and approaches that have their origin, and have been 
proven, in state security circles. Terms and marketing slogans that have thus been gaining popularity 
include “threat intelligence”, “cyber intelligence” “cyber threat intelligence” and to a lesser degree 
“cyber counterintelligence” (Deloitte 2014a-b, iSight 2014, Lee 2014a-e, Firestone 2015, INSA 2011). In 
this regard, KPMG (2013) states: “The number of cyber threat intelligence providers is on the rise and 
the concept of threat intelligence is now pervasive ..... Much can be learned from law enforcement and 
intelligence organizations. They have long recognized that intelligence-led decision making sits at the 
heart of their organizational culture and operations”.  More recently Kaspersky’s General Manager for 
Security Government Solutions, Adam Firestone (2015) warned that threat intelligence is being 
overemphasised at the cost of sound CCI, which draw on established CI practices.  Views and 
interpretations sharply diverge on what the said intelligence and CI-related approaches entail, and even 
more so on the processes, by which they are executed. (Deloitte 2014b, EMC2 2014, Firestone 2015, INSA 
2013, INSA 2014a-b, VeriSign 2012, Lee 2014a-e).  
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This paper holds CCI to be the most apt and viable in academically explaining and practically executing 
an integrated cyber security approach to confronting sophisticated threats. (The case for CCI has been 
argued in an earlier contribution – Duvenage & Von Solms 2013). While practised by state security 
structures for over twenty years, CCI remains poorly understood in the public and commercial domains. 
Also as a field of academic enquiry, CCI is in its infancy. While innovative research is important, it is 
equally imperative to first get the basics right. These basics entail the laying out and application of 
existing knowledge in a manner conducive to the CCI academic discourse. This paper builds on previous 
articles which defined various CCI concepts, positioned CCI as part of multi-disciplinary  
counterintelligence (CI) and explained CCI’s defensive and offensive modes (Duvenage & Von Solms 
2013, 2014). This paper is focussed on a further fundamental aspect, namely the CCI process. It seeks to 
address the problem statement: How can the counterintelligence process be structured conceptually?   
 
To this end, the paper firstly defines concepts that are central to unpacking CCI and the CCI process. 
Given the prolific and confusing use of the terms ‘threat intelligence’ and ‘cyber intelligence’ when it 
comes to cyber security processes, care is taken to distinguish these concepts from CCI. The paper 
proceeds with examining the concept of a process model with a view on answering: What is a process 
model and why is it needed?  This is followed by a brief examination of some existing process models. 
Existing postulations are demonstrated as describing aspects, but not the whole, of the CCI process. The 
paper proceeds with advancing a CCI process model which allows CCI to be executed as an integral part 
of the broader CI process. The paper concludes with highlighting the need for further research.   
 
2. What is Intelligence, Counterintelligence and where does Cyber Counterintelligence fit in?  
Any discussion of the CCI process firstly requires the clarification of the key concepts of ‘Intelligence‘, CI 
and CCI. We can, after all not describe the process if we are not clear about what processes we are 
talking about. Adding to the need for such clarification, is the earlier noted prevalence in the use of 
“threat intelligence”, “cyber intelligence” and  “cyber threat intelligence” – sometimes loosely and 
without due consideration of their original and actual meanings of these concepts (iSight 2014, EMC2 
2014, Verisign 2012, KPMG 2013, Lee 2014a-e, INSA 2011, 2013, 2014 a-b).  
 
Since these terms in an academic sense originate from conventional Intelligence Studies, the latter offers 
a useful premise. (In the interest of simplicity, and less otherwise qualified, the term Intelligence Studies 
is subsequently used as referring to both conventional  ‘Intelligence Studies’ [sub-discipline of Political 
Science] and ‘Business Intelligence’ [which includes Competitive Intelligence]). While there is no 
consensus within Intelligence Studies on a single denotative definition, the following description conveys 
the meaning of intelligence in the statutory context: “Intelligence is the process by which specific types 
of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to 
policymakers, the products of that process”,  the safeguarding of this information through 
counterintelligence and the carrying out of covert action  (Lowenthal 2012, Godson 2001). In what can 
be confounding, Intelligence Studies’ literature use CI juxtaposed with ‘intelligence’ (Sims 2009, Bodmer 
et al 2012). In this juxtaposed use, ‘intelligence’ is an abbreviated reference to the concept ‘positive 
intelligence’. This double meaning underpins ambiguous uses of concepts also in the cyber field in 
general, and cyber processes in particular. Since the paper is primarily focused on a cyber-related 
process, these concepts are now distinguished in more detail. The distinction is graphically depicted in 
Figure 1 and then explained:  
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Figure 1: Intelligence and its primary disciplines (Created by the authors) 
Simplified for the purpose of this paper, Intelligence is deemed to have three primary disciplines or 
fields, namely: 
 Positive Intelligence that primarily aims to provide information “to facilitate one’s own side 
achieving its ends.”  (Bodmer et al 2012).  This information varies from analysed open-sources 
to an opponent’s secrets obtained through espionage. As noted above, ‘Intelligence’ is 
frequently used interchangeably as referring to ‘Positive Intelligence’, with the context 
determining what meaning is implied (Sims 2009).  
 Covert action which targets an adversary through the influencing of events, conditions, 
individuals, groups or institutions to the benefit of the client in a manner not attributable to the 
sponsor or offering plausible deniability. In the information sphere, covert action can take the 
form of propaganda, deception and disinformation (Godson, 2001). 
 Counterintelligence is an abbreviated form for the countering of hostile intelligence activities. 
Counterintelligence defensively and offensively guards against adversarial intelligence (i.e. 
hostile positive, counterintelligence and covert action) operations (Prunkun 2012, Sims 2009).    
 
Intelligence involves the execution of these primary disciplines in a mutually supportive manner and with 
functions such as collection, analysis and management performed in all three. Of these disciplines, CI is 
central to this paper and requires some further unpacking. CI relies on, and informs Intelligence. 
Similarly, CI protects and utilises some forms of covert action. CI denotes the collective of measures to 
identify, deter, exploit, degrade, neutralise and protect against adversarial intelligence activities deemed 
as detrimental or potentially detrimental to its own interests. It is directed against the actions of 
adversaries which include nation states, corporate entities, criminals, activists, terrorists, individuals and 
others. CI includes but is wider than conventional passive security. It also entails active-offensive actions 
to exploit and pre-emptively neutralise adversaries. CI should engage adversarial intelligence thrusts on 
the human (HUMINT) and technical (TECHINT) level. The cyber sphere is of course one of the technical 
conduits increasingly used by adversaries. It is in the latter arena which CCI functions as part a broader CI 
endeavour. More definitively, CCI can be described as that subset of multi-disciplinary CI aimed at 
detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and neutralising adversarial attempts to collect, 
alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A of valued information assets through cyber means (Duvenage 
& Von Solms, 2014).  
 
The preceding definition of terms underscores the paper’s contention on the loose, confusing and often 
incorrect use of terms such as ‘threat intelligence’, ‘cyber intelligence’, ‘cyber threat intelligence’ and 
‘cyber counterintelligence.’ It is clear from the explanation ‘cyber intelligence’ could have two meanings. 
Firstly, and in its broader meaning, cyber intelligence denotes the collective of (i) positive intelligence 
gathered through cyber means on the environment and adversaries; (ii) cyber counterintelligence and 
(iii) covert action in the cyber sphere. Secondly, in a narrower connotation, ‘cyber intelligence’ refers to 
the positive cyber intelligence endeavour. Positive cyber intelligence, will involve focussing on aspects 
far wider than only cyber threat actors. In both its broader and narrow connotations, ‘cyber intelligence’ 
may entail the focussing, with cyber means, on actors who do not necessarily pose a cyber threat. 
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However, it is not uncommon to find ‘cyber intelligence’ and ‘cyber threat intelligence’ being used as 
referring to information collected and  analysed with a view on countering mostly high-end cyber threat 
actors (Deloitte 2014a-b, EMC2 2014, Firestone 2015, INSA 2013, INSA 2014a-b, VeriSign 2012, Lee 
2014a-e.) These terms are employed to describe intelligence and actions against high-end actors who 
themselves execute malicious cyber following, or as part of, intelligence operations. ‘Cyber intelligence’ 
and ‘cyber threat intelligence’, in their popular use, furthermore denote actions aimed at detecting, 
deterring and neutralising these adversarial attempts. Employing the definition of CCI provided above, 
however, it is clear that these terms then actual deal with some aspects of CCI. 
  
This section has delineated concepts key to the later unpacking of CCI process model. The next section 
reflects on the importance of a CCI process model.   
 
3. CCI process model – what is it and why is it important?  
 A CCI process model, in stating the obvious, is important since CCI is of pivotal importance. Properly 
conceptualised and executed, CCI offers a viable approach to proactively mitigate the high-end cyber 
threats.  Proper conceptualisation and execution in turn, has a sound process model as requisite. This is 
so, since CCI is an intricate process, involving a wide array of means, methods and actions; executed in 
various modes and manners; and for complementary ends. It is practically and academically infeasible to 
attempt describing the CCI process in all its detail. The strategic management and guidance of the CCI 
process and the demands of academic research, call for a simplification at higher level of abstraction. At 
this higher level, a ‘bird’s eye view’ ought to emerge of the overarching process that coherently binds 
and drives the work of CCI.  
 
As process models in general, the CCI process should be presented as a model that acts as “idealizations 
of processes that are more subtle and more complex in practice.” (Berkowitz & Goodman, 2000).  A 
model ought to be simultaneously congruent with reality and an idealised, simplified representation of 
reality. Since it is an idealisation, a model is “an aim point, of what the process should look like if 
everything goes as planned.” (Lowenthal, 2012) Academically, it serves as a notional concept for 
theorising and a premise or soundboard for research. More practically, it provides a template for the 
organised execution of CCI functions and activities. These activities are typically clustered in various 
steps or stages by means of which the CCI work is conducted.  
   
Proceeding from this demarcation of the CCI process, the next section examines some existing 
propositions.  
 
4. Current propositions on, or relating to, the Cyber Counterintelligence Process   
Right from the onset, the CCI process needs to be distinguished from the cyber security process. Over 
years, the term cyber security process has come to denote the cluster of compliance-driven activities, in 
which the technical aspects predominate. The implementation and adoption practices as prescribed by 
ISO27001 and ISO22301 were, and are still seen, as providing cyber-security processes for all types of 
entities. While critically important, such processes are individually and wholly insufficient.  
 
In as far as academic and published literature is concerned, contribution on models that pertinently deal 
with the CCI processes are rare. One of the most authoritative works on CCI, Bodmer (et al 2012) Reverse 
Deception – Organized Cyber Threat Counter- Exploitation, for example, does not advance such a 
process. A notable academic work, and one of few addressing the CCI process, is that of Sigholm & 
Bang’s (2013) entitled Towards Offensive Cyber Counterintelligence. With the qualification that  Sigholm 
& Bang’s (2013) work is placed within a statutory military context, their paper sets out to offer a 
“comprehensive process that bridges the gap between the various actors involved in CCI” (Sigholm & 
Bang 2013). The work subscribes to Clark’s (2004) “Target-centric Intelligence Process” which was 
specifically developed for statutory intelligence Analysis and not the whole range of Intelligence and CI 
functions. Graphically Clark’s model can be depicted as follows: 
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Figure 2: Target-Centric Intelligence Process (Adapted from Clark, 2004) 
 
Drawing on this model Sigholm & Bang (2013) postulate a model for the “offensive CCI attribution 
process”. Rather than an overarching, “comprehensive” CCI process, their proposition is on closer 
examination limited to one aspect of the CCI process, namely attribution and more specifically an 
information flow and analysis architecture to be employed for this (attribution) purpose. In their 
proposal, offensive CCI is neither incorporated with defensive CCI nor is it dovetailed with the broader CI 
process. This concept is illustrated in the following diagram provided by Sigholm & Bang (2013): 
 
                                 
  
Figure 3: A layout of the offensive CCI attribution process (Adapted from Sigholm & Bang, 2013) 
 
Literature published by cyber security entities offering CCI services do in some instances contain 
references to the CCI process. These vendors’ contributions are cursory, aimed at expanding market 
share and not substantiated academic research. None of the promotional publications reviewed, purport 
to offer a model specifically linked to the CCI process. However, as noted earlier, the terms ‘cyber 
intelligence’ and ‘cyber threat intelligence’ in popular use often denote what is actually CCI. 
Consequently, this paper’s review of the CCI process should also consider processes with these other 
tags.  Process propositions under the tags ‘cyber intelligence’, and ‘cyber threat intelligence’ are more 
common. Several of these propositions strongly draw on their descriptions of the ‘cyber intelligence’ 
process on what is known in Intelligence Studies as the traditional intelligence cycle. As it has done for 
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more than sixty years within Intelligence Studies and statutory intelligence practice (Hulnick 2007), the 
traditional intelligence cycle now strongly influences thinking on Intelligence and CI processes in the 
cyber realm. Reduced to its essence, the intelligence cycle consists of the execution in a circular flow of 
the following activities: direction of the process through the clients expressing its intelligence 
requirements collection of information, analysis and dissemination:  
 
Within cyber-security sphere, subscription to the intelligence cycle varies from simple adoptions at one 
end of the spectrum; to customised expansions at the other. Serving as an example of a simple adoption 
is VeriSign’s (2012) Establishing Formal Cyber Intelligence Capability (White Paper) which states: “To 
successfully mount and implement an intelligence capability, it’s essential to understand the intelligence 
lifecycle model… [the]…  Traditional Intelligence Cycle comprise of Direction, Collection, Analysis and 
Dissemination.”  This description concurs exactly with the cycle as described above.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, KPMG (2013) advances a customised, expanded proposition as a 
“Basic Intelligence Operating Model” for “cyber threat intelligence”. While dimensions such as “cyber 
intelligence strategy and budget” and “cyber intelligence sources” are added and described, the core of 
model – on closer analysis – still closely resembles the traditional intelligence cycle.  
 
As would have been noted, the intelligence cycle in its simple or expanded format does not explain and / 
or  mention CI. As is the case in Intelligence Studies, proponents of this cycle in cyber security realm may 
argue or imply that counterintelligence is performed throughout the cycle (cƒ Lee 2014 a-e, VeriSign 
2012). The counterintelligence processes, this argument proceeds, mirrors and protects the intelligence 
cycle. In reality, these ‘counterintelligence-throughout-the-cycle’ and ‘counterintelligence-follows-the-
cycle’ positions do simply not work. The intelligence cycle was originally conceived to explain positive 
intelligence and is not particularly good at that either. The following observation by distinguished 
Intelligence practitioner and scholar Arthur Hulnick (2007) is just as applicable to the cyber field: “[t]he 
intelligence cycle is a flawed vision, and thus poor theory. One need only ask those who have toiled in 
the fields of intelligence ... [C]ounterintelligence follows an entire different and unique path of its own ... 
It has nothing to do with the intelligence cycle. Instead there is counterintelligence methodology that is 
unique ... So when one looks at the pattern of counterintelligence functions, it does not look at all like 
the intelligence cycle.”  
If the intelligence cycle does not work for counterintelligence generally, it can of course not work in the 
cyber ream generally and for cyber counterintelligence specifically.  
 
5. Are there alternatives in Intelligence Studies that can be applied to CCI?  
Could Intelligence Studies offer a CI process that can be utilised as the basis for a CCI model? Contrary to 
what might have been expected, there are no current postulations offering a quick fix solution. 
Endeavours within Intelligence Studies over the past two decades to offer alternatives remains 
overwhelming directed to positive intelligence (Johnson 2007; Lowenthal 2012, Clark 2004). One of the 
very few propositions pertinently advanced for CI is that by Hulnick (2007). He proposes a 
“counterintelligence model” comprising of a five-clustered “pattern”, namely “identification”, 
“penetration”, “exploitation”, “interdiction” and “claim success”. Summarised, Hulnick’s description of 
the phases of the counterintelligence model are as follows:  
 the identification of espionage adversaries; 
 the penetration of adversarial espionage intelligence structures; 
 exploitation – as referring to the collection of information (on adversaries) and the institution of 
measures such as deception; 
 interdiction, which ensues when the “the case is turned over to law enforcement”;  and, 
 Public declarations by state authorities of successful counterintelligence actions. 
 
Hulnick (2007) explicitly limits the model above to “active counterintelligence”. In adding a qualification, 
“defensive measures in counterintelligence”, are described as not fitting into “either the traditional 
intelligence cycle or the model just described.” Within state security structures, these long-established 
defensive measures are commonly referred to as Operational Security (OPSEC) and comprise the 
following steps five steps (US 1996): Identify critical information and other assets, Analyse threats, 
Determine vulnerabilities, Asses risks and lastly develop and implement Countermeasures.  
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Effective CI requires the integrated execution of offensive/active and defensive/passive modes. They are, 
after all, different sides of the same coin. Are there examples of integrative proposals which combine 
defensive and offensive CI dimensions? While none could be found in conventional Intelligence Studies 
(cf Duvenage & Hough 2011), propositions exist within Business Intelligence which attempt to combine 
the offensive and defensive dimensions. A seminal model in this regard was forwarded by Nolan (1997). 
While copyright restriction prevents an inclusion of Nolan’s graphical depiction in this paper, subsequent 
Business Intelligence propositions, convey the same thinking. The following proposal by Brouard (2004) 
shown in Figure 4 is an example:   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Intelligence Gathering and Protection Intelligence Process (Brouard, 2004) 
Such models offer a useful contribution in their conceptual integration of sub-processes and the addition 
of a risk assessment methodology. Nonetheless, they insufficiently reflect the nature of the defensive 
and offensive counterintelligence thrusts as described above. They are also not granulated enough to 
serve either as an aiming point for practical execution or as a sounding board for further academic 
exploration.  
6. A proposed Cyber Counterintelligence Process 
This paper proposes a model that combines the respective steps of offensive and defensive CI into a 
single process. Within this process, the defensive and offensive sub-processes, while for a large part 
intertwined, also follow distinctive patterns. The paper limits itself to describing in more detail the 
offensive process. CCI, and to re-emphasize, is executed as part of the broader CI process. The CCI 
process thus looks, works and is inseparable from the CI process. Graphically, the CI process, with 
emphasis on CCI, is depicted in Figure 5 on the next page. This proposition builds on and contain extracts 
from Duvenage & Hough 2011.: 
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Figure 5: The Cyber Counterintelligence Process (Created by the Authors) 
Although Figure 5 shows a linear sequence (i.e. neat finalisation of one step, directly followed by the 
execution of the subsequent steps), the CCI process is in reality multi-directional with steps being 
repeated and overlapping. This qualification also applies to the narrative description of the model below.  
(1) Derive Requirements (Terms of Reference) 
Like CI in general, CCI is not an end in itself. It serves the interest of a particular client – be it a 
government or business. The client expects from its CI apparatus to not only safeguard its vital interests 
and objectives, but to actively advance these. Ideally, CCI (as part of the broader CI process) would 
commence with the client clearly expressing its expectations. These would include: what cyber assets 
should be protected and what CCI should do to pro-actively promote government or company interests. 
This is very rarely the case. CI and CCI requirements are mostly derived and not received. They are 
derived through a meticulous appraisal of the client’s objectives, intentions and strategy. Preferably 
these should be contained in Terms of Reference (ToR) endorsed by the client and within the parameters 
set by legal jurisdictions.  
(2) Identify Assets to be Protected and Interests to be Advanced 
Resources are finite and CCI can only execute its signature role to defend and neutralise in a highly 
prioritised and selective manner. The right place to start is to ascertain what assets and interests in the 
information-cyber sphere are worthy of protection. In the case of nation states (or other sizable role-
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players) these info-cyber assets and interests – identified on the basis of the ToR - are threefold. Firstly, 
assets the state possesses which is central for survival and prosperity. Such assets include critical bodies 
of information, systems and infrastructure. Secondly, assets the state aspires to procure through cyber 
means (such as the secrets of adversaries). Thirdly, critical interests refer to the conditions the state 
seeks to realise (for example, the gaining of a competitive edge through obtaining adversarial secrets, 
adding additional layers to its defences or offensively undermining the C-I-A of adversarial systems).  
(3) Initial vulnerability assessment and first-line defence 
Although there are exceptions, the CI doctrine requires offensive action to be preceded by solid defence. 
Applied to CCI, the identification of real and aspirational assets and interests described above, is 
therefore followed by identifying the vulnerabilities in defensive and cyber-security measures which 
protect these assets and interest. This process would typically result in remedial action in relation to 
cyber, information, physical and personal security. It thus also involves CI specialisation fields other than 
CCI. This sub-process is again performed, but more exhaustively, as part of step 6.2. Care should be 
taken not to summarily close all ‘holes’ in the cyber ‘fences’. Some of these could be exploited for 
offensive purposes later on in Step 6.   
(4)   Environmental scanning to identify threat-agents (actual & potential) 
The assessment performed in the previous step mostly considered internal weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. Effective CI needs to safeguard against and engage external threats. While opponents 
(competitors and adversaries) are common threat actors, risks can also be posed by technological and 
socio-political developments.  While all of these are not a CI and CCI concern, they are considered for 
inferring actual and potential threats agents (of CI relevance). A common pitfall is to identify threat 
agents mainly on the basis of actors known to be active, adversarial and well-capacitated. The result is a 
self-feeding, atrophic CCI process with risks posed by previously unknown threat actors going 
undetected. The importance of innovative environmental scanning, which aims to identify potential 
threat agents hardly be overemphasised.  
(5) Integrated  Risk Assessment and Strategy  
Considering the external and internal threats as well as vulnerabilities and weaknesses identified in 
preceding steps, the CCI process proceeds to perform an integrated risk assessment. The risk assessment 
identifies which CCI measures are obsolete, which require modification, and in which areas they are 
lacking.  Decisions taken on CCI are formulated as part of a broader CI strategy which combines 
defensive and offensive dimensions. A balance needs to be maintained between, to paraphrase Nolan 
(1997), defensive CI tasks to 'close holes in the fence', and offensive CI that seeks to exploit the offensive 
opportunities that vulnerabilities offer. 
(6) Design and implement CCI measures and programmes  
While offensive and defensive measures are designed and implemented in synergy each sub-process has 
a unique mission and thus pattern of execution. This paper limits itself to outlining the offensive pattern 
which consists of the following six steps: 
(6.1.1) Institute/reconfigure indicators and collection instruments  
Since espionage is both a precursor and end-aim of sophisticated cyber breaches , the offensive sub-
process commences with instituting and/or reconfiguring (a) indicators of adversarial cyber espionage 
and (b) own collection instruments. Whatever form these instruments take (honeynets, tarpits, 
footholds in on-line communities and sites, etc.), they will be developed and are constantly fine-tuned 
around most prized assets. In steps 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 these instruments will be further optimised to best 
collect on and then engage targets.  
 (6.1.2) Identify and prioritise intelligence opponents 
In addition to information obtained through the preceding step, CCI will draw on the broader, all-source 
CI picture to identify opponents who are and potentially are targeting their own entities though 
intelligence actions such of espionage, covert action, and so on. Even the well-resourced entities cannot 
offensively focus on all known and suspected opponents. Consequently, only prioritized opponents are 
elevated to actual/potential adversaries and pursued through further offensive action. 
(6.1.3)  In-depth ‘profiling’ of adversaries to arrive at targets  
These offensive actions firstly entail focused information collection on, and subsequent in-depth 
profiling of adversaries. The focused collection of information is high-risk and high cost measures and 
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could include cyber espionage. A crucial CCI collection requirement is to ascertain the instrumentalities 
and proxies adversaries use for intelligence activities.  To this end, information procured through other 
conduits such as HUMINT and other TECHINT are also used. Depending on various factors some of these 
adversaries, their proxies or campaigns are not suited for offensive exploitation and as such will be 
channelled to defensive CCI.  
(6.1.4) Engagement and exploitation of targets  
As is apparent from the above, the acquisition of targets (prioritised adversaries and their proxies) for 
offensive action is an exhaustive process. In certain respects the acquisition of targets is the most 
complex part of CCI work. To adopt a Clark (2004) target-centric-type view at the start of the process, 
would thus clearly be a gross over-simplification which skips over critical segments of the CCI 
methodology. The engagement and exploitation of targets are at offensive CCI’s core. These 
exploitations can take a myriad of forms and include escalated (more aggressive) collection, deception, 
manipulation, disinformation as well as the disruption of hostile intelligence activities. The ideal aim of 
CCI is the degrading and control of the adversary through their own cyber actions. The following 
observation by Codevilla (1992) rings true also in respect of CCI: “Action against the enemy through the 
enemy’s own intelligence is the very consummation of CI.”  Usually this is best achieved through 
combining CCI within other forms of offensive CI. Deception through honeynets and sock puppets could, 
for example, be supplemented through disinformation fed through a human double agent.   
(6.1.5) Neutralisation and termination  
While the targets are to a certain level neutralised through exploitation, offensive CCI operations would 
typically have a 'neutralisation and termination' phase at the end of their 'life-cycle'. Termination can 
either be opted for (i.e. at own initiative at a pre-determined time) or necessitated by circumstances 
(such as indications that an operation has been compromised). Whatever the case, termination should 
be planned for in advance with two purposes. Firstly, delivering the final neutralisation ‘blow’ to the 
adversarial campaigns being engaged. Secondly, if executed skilfully, providing  the 'seeds' for a 
subsequent 'generation' of CCI operations. 
(6.1.6) Acclamation, reflection and identification of further opportunities 
As with CI generally, CCI success ought to be followed by acclamation. There are two kinds of 
acclamations: Firstly, public acclamation in which aspects of the successful countering of hostile cyber 
intelligence activities would be cited. In the case of governments, such claiming of success is vital in 
justifying in the public eye the billions spent on Intelligence, CI and CCI. Moreover, public acclamation 
can be part of degrading an adversary. Secondly acclamation can be limited on the need-to-know 
principle. Sometimes entities should “try hard to keep successes secret so that they might be repeated. 
An oft-quoted CIA saying is, ‘The secret of our success is the secret of our success.’ “(Hulnick 2007). 
Whatever acclamation opted for, concluded CCI operations are assessed for lessons learned and to 
identify opportunities for further exploitation. 
(7) Monitor, synchronise and redirect 
Although indicated as a separate step in the interest of simplicity, CCI is continuously monitored and 
synchronised and redirected in accordance with the broader CI and Intelligence effort. The latter in turn, 
ought to be dovetailed with an entity’s Objectives and Strategy. Intelligence and CI of any kind are 
instruments and not ends in themselves. The intelligence and insights gained through this endeavour 
influence Objectives, Strategy and thus eventually the ToR of the on-going Intelligence process of which 
CCI is a part of. 
 
 7. Conclusion 
This paper moved from the premise that the nature of the current and future cyber threatscape 
necessitates an integrated cyber security approach with CCI at its core. Sophisticated threats, it was 
argued, have intelligence actions (such as espionage) as its essential feature. The paper explained the 
importance of process models and found existing propositions to be insufficient in explaining the CCI. 
Nonetheless, the discourse on the intelligence and CI process generally, did provide elements which 
were useful for the construction of a CCI process model. The paper proceeded with postulating a 
theoretical framework for the CCI process. This postulation does not purport to offer radically new 
insights. It is, instead, a tentative proposal intended to stimulate future debate and theory constructions.  
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Several escalating trends are affirming the centrality of Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) in effectively 
addressing advanced cyber threats of today and tomorrow. Yet, in comparison with the burgeoning 
academic and commercial literature on the related field of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), CCI remains 
vastly unexplored. Outside the circles of governments’ security apparatus, some large corporates and 
niche vendors that offer such specialised services, CCI is still obscure. While interest is gradually growing 
in CCI, this academic discipline is very young and largely uncharted. Leveraging off previous research by 
the aforementioned authors, this paper advances two further building blocks to contribute towards 
constructing this emerging discipline.  
Building block 1 comprises a distinction between CCI and CTI. Such a distinction is necessary for clarity 
and has the advantages of allowing CCI to benefit from the extensive research work done in the CTI field.  
Building block 2 consists of a multi-layered framework that explicates the different levels on which CCI 
functions, namely the strategic, operational and tactical functional levels. This framework progresses 
building block 1. While these functional levels have been described extensively in CTI literature, no such 
CCI-specific application could be found in literature within the public domain. Since it expounds CCI on 
the various levels that it functions, the framework contributes to a more nuanced academic 
conceptualisation of this discipline of CCI. On a practical level, the framework could serve as a notional 
guide for performing actual CCI work more effectively. The article concludes by reiterating the 
importance of CCI in addressing advanced threats and suggesting areas for further research.  
Keywords: cyber counterintelligence, cyber threat intelligence, offensive cybersecurity, cyber 
counterintelligence levels, cyber counterintelligence maturity.  
 
1. Introduction  
In what has become a recurring theme in recent years, industry threat reports for 2015 to 2016 
highlighted the escalating damage caused and threats posed by cyber actors of increasing sophistication 
(Kaspersky 2015, McAfee 2015, Crowdstrike 2016). This trend is accelerating despite a continuing 
increase in global spend on cyber security. In recent years, vendors have been pushing particularly Cyber 
Threat Intelligence (CTI) as a critical part of the ‘solution’ and it has evolved to one of the fastest growing 
cyber security sectors. The $1, 02 billion global spend on CTI in 2015, for example, represents a 129% 
increase compared to 2011 (Statista 2016, Info-security Magazine 2015).  Further attesting to threat 
intelligence’s rising prominence is the escalation in Google search results from a mere 18 700 in 2011 to 
381 000 in February 2016 (Chismon & Ruks 2015, Google 2016).   
As matters currently stand, the CTI market buzz and spending of resources have not by any measure 
translated in a corresponding mitigation of advanced threats – nor is it likely to do so in the near future. 
There are various reasons for this rather gloomy prognosis of which two will be highlighted in this paper.  
 
The first reason is that a significant portion of products and services and that are marketed as CTI is not 
intelligence at all. They are mere re-labelled data feeds or anti-virus packages. Of course products of this 
nature have a role, but they are wholly insufficient against higher-end threats. It can rightly be argued 
that sound CTI as part of an effective cyber-security approach would be effective in addressing advanced 
threats. This is indeed the case, but only partially. CTI employed as part of an effective cyber-security 
approach will address a substantial portion of cyber threats. It will, however, not be effective against 
those high-end threats that should top our concern. For CTI to be effective against these threats, it 
needs to be embedded in counterintelligence (CI).  
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The second reason for CTI not delivering on expectations is that CI is simply not being embraced. 
Organisations with significant cyber assets are too slow to realise that we are faced with CI challenges 
rather than cyber security problems. Perhaps, we are still too attached to outdated, neat tables linking 
specific cyber actor types to certain methods and aims. In reality, the distinction between what was 
conventionally labelled as state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and the actions of other 
actors is blurring fast. In its 2015 Global Threat Report, Crowdstrike (2016) states, for example, that “the 
primary motivation behind global cyber activity has now shifted from disparate activities carried out by 
individuals, groups and criminal gangs pursuing short-term financial gain, to skilled adversaries driven by 
broader agendas.” The cyber criminals’ aim, asserts PwC (2016), currently “goes beyond targeting 
financial information to include a company’s ‘crown jewels’ – customer data and intellectual property 
information, the loss of which can bring down an entire business.” Various types of threat actors can and 
do cooperate (INSA 2011). The tradecraft, activities and even aims of various classes of threat actors in 
cyber space are often difficult to separate and reflect high skill levels in intelligence and 
counterintelligence (Moyo 2015). For state and non-state actors (such as criminal groups, some 
corporate entities) multi-vectored espionage (e.g. human and technical means) has become a precursor 
to extensive breaches. The addressing of such threats is CCI’s signature role.  
 
While CI/CCI awareness within board rooms appears to be growing, these concepts are far less known 
than CTI (cf. SpearTip 2015, The Economist 2015). Moreover, the symbiotic relationship that should exist 
between CCI and CTI is seldom addressed. Therefore academia has a crucial role in conceptualising CCI 
clearly. This paper proposes two further building blocks that could aid in conceptualising this discipline. 
Firstly, CCI is distinguished from CTI and the relationship between these constructs examined. Secondly, 
a multi-layered framework is submitted to explicate the different levels on which CCI functions. 
Notionally and practically, this multi-levelled examination provides clarity on what CCI is, what it does 
and what its relation with CTI is.  
 
It needs to be emphasised that this paper builds on previous articles that defined various CCI concepts, 
positioned CCI as part of multi-disciplinary CI, detailed CCI’s defensive-offensive modes and advanced a 
process model (Duvenage & von Solms 2015; Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). While some 
aspects of previous work are concisely recapitulated (per Section 2.2), the latter is highly selective and 
could not address all aspect necessary for context.  
 
The foregoing introduction highlighted the importance of CCI in addressing current and future cyber 
threats. Subsequently, the need to further conceptualise CCI was underlined. The next section delineates 
CCI and CTI by offering definitions and discussing the relationship between the constructs.  
 
2. Conceptual clarification – what are ‘Threat Intelligence’ and ‘Cyber Counterintelligence’ 
As suggested above, CTI and CCI are interrelated yet distinct concepts. Delineating these two constructs 
is important, since each has a unique and complementary role in ensuring cyber security. Moreover, a 
clear differentiation would enable CCI to draw on extensive CTI literature in a manner that is 
academically credible and responsible.   
 
2.1 Defining ‘Cyber Threat Intelligence’  
The rapid market growth in the market of CTI products and services has been accompanied by a 
proliferation in terms and definitions. “Threat intelligence”, “cyber intelligence”, “cyber threat 
intelligence” are sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes with different connotations (Deloitte 
2014, Schoeman 2015, EMC2 2014, INSA 2013, INSA 2014a-b, Lee 2014a-b.).  A dissection of all these 
terms will distract from the paper’s main focus and be more confusing than helpful. In the interest of 
simplicity CTI is henceforth employed in the paper as the umbrella term. Schoeman (2015) rightly states 
that CTI has evolved in a “catchall term for a vast array of different technologies, methodologies and 
ideas.” Products and services sold under this banner can vary extensively in scope, usability, aims and 
contents (Chismon & Ruks, 2015). At the one end of the spectrum CTI can be just anti-virus signatures at 
a much higher cost; while at the other end, it can mean an overarching approach central to an 
organisation’s strategy (Schoeman 2015, Riley 2015).   
 
The term ‘threat intelligence’ has its roots in the concept ‘intelligence’ as used with state security 
apparatus and Intelligence Studies. Depending on context, ‘Intelligence’ can have several meanings 
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within Intelligence Studies. Intelligence can denote the overarching discipline that comprises Positive 
Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Covert Action. Sometimes Intelligence is often employed as a 
shortened reference to Positive Intelligence. The term Intelligence could furthermore refer to the 
outcome of a process that delivers actionable, analysed information. These meanings and applications 
thereof in the cyber realm were explored in an earlier article (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor, 2015). 
Suffice it to note here that ‘intelligence’ used in ‘cyber threat intelligence’ – and as henceforth applied in 
this paper – means actionable, assessed information on a cyber-related hazard to an entity. This is in line 
with Gartner’s defining of threat intelligence as: “evidence-based knowledge, including context, 
mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice, about an existing or emerging menace or 
hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject’s response to that menace or 
hazard” (Schoeman 2015). Deriving intelligence from information and data requires analysis performed 
by humans. Tools and data feeds cannot by themselves provide threat intelligence (Schoeman 2015). In 
this regard Lee (2014a) states “Intelligence of any type requires analysis. Analysis is performed by 
humans. Automation, analytics and various tools can drastically increase the effectiveness of analysts 
but there must always be analysts involved in the process.”  In summary it can thus be said that data is 
processed and refined to produce information. Information is in turn analysed and presented in a format 
that is actionable and constitutes intelligence.  In the case of CTI, this is intelligence produced on cyber-
related hazards.  
Ideally CTI should provide intelligence on a full spectrum of adversarial action in the cyber sphere from 
decision to execution. INSA (2013) provides the following breakdown of these actions and what cyber 
threat analysis should consider:  
 
 
Figure 1: Adversarial Pathway to an Attack as aid for Cyber Intelligence Analysts (INSA 2013).  
 
CTI is thus not a “collection discipline” but more of an “analytical discipline” that informs “decision 
makers on issues pertaining to all levels in the cyber domain”, namely the strategic, operational and 
tactical (Mattern et al 2014). On a strategic level, CTI should identify the intent, capability and 
opportunity that actual and potential malicious actors could have (Lee 2014a). On a tactical level, CTI 
identifies network threats and informs responses. Bridging the mostly non-technical strategic and 
narrow technical/tactical layers, the operational level is focussed on an organisation’s immediate 
operating environment (INSA, 2014a).  
Moving from the conceptualisation of CTI in the preceding paragraphs, the notion of CCI and its relation 
with CTI are now examined.    
 
2.2 Delineating Cyber Counterintelligence and its relation with Cyber Threat Intelligence  
What then is CCI, how does it differ from CTI and what is the relation between these fields? As will be 
shown in this subsection, CCI’s focus is paradoxically narrower and broader than that of CTI. CCI is 
narrower in that its external dimension is directed against a very specific category of “cyber hazards”, 
namely that of hostile intelligence actions playing out in the cyber sphere. However, CCI is also broader 
than CTI in several respects.  CCI is for one not limited to the producing and disseminating of intelligence. 
It also engages internal and external threats through a wide array of offensive and defensive measures. 
These measures are executed in synergy in accordance with the principles of traditional, multi-
disciplinary CI.  
 
2.2.1 Demarcating Counterintelligence 
Therefore, CCI and its relation with CTI, can only be understood and definitively defined within the 
context of CI generally. CI has been discussed in some detail in earlier contributions (Duvenage & von 
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Solms 2015; Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). Since familiarity with the concept CI is essential 
for further unpacking of CCI and for contextualising the CCI framework, a brief recapitulation is provided 
here.   
 
 As suggested by its composite terms ‘counter’ and ‘intelligence’, counterintelligence is essentially about 
the countering of hostile intelligence actions. Of these hostile intelligence actions, espionage (i.e. secret 
intelligence gathering) is perhaps the best known example. In addition to espionage, hostile intelligence 
activities also can include covert action (e.g. non-attributable influencing and deception). These hostile 
intelligence actions target valuable bodies of information as well as the people, processes, technologies 
and repositories wherein it resides. Hostile intelligence actors typically execute their actions through a 
combination of human (‘spies’) and technical means. The exploitation of the cyber sphere to realise 
intelligence ends is part of such technical means. 
 
The CI mission is to safeguard, but also to advance organisational strategy and assets actively. In order to 
execute its mission, CI has three main thrusts namely an offensive focus, a defensive focus and an 
intelligence function. These three dimensions constitute the CI trident. In execution of these three 
dimensions, CI relies on an extensive array of means, measures and methods. In traditional CI, this 
ranges from defensive information security measures to the offensive running of a mole or double 
agent. These thrusts and their relation with means, measures and methods are explained in more detail 
as part of the discussion on CCI.  
 
To summarise CI can be defined as the activities conducted to “identify, deter, exploit, degrade, 
neutralise and protect against adversarial intelligence activities deemed as detrimental or potentially 
detrimental to the own interests” (Duvenage, von Solms, Corregedor 2015).  Effective CI takes on, and 
guard against, hostile intelligence on a human (HUMINT) and technical (TECHINT) level.  This technical 
level includes the cyber sphere as one of its conduits.  
 
2.2.2 Defining Cyber Counterintelligence and its relation with Cyber Threat Intelligence  
Building on the preceding outline, CCI can be “described as that subset of multi-disciplinary CI aimed at 
detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and neutralisation of adversarial attempts to 
collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A [confidentiality, integrity and availability] of valued 
information assets through cyber means” (Duvenage & von Solms 2015; Duvenage, von Solms, 
Corregedor 2015). As is clear from this definition, CCI shares CI’s defensive and offensive missions 
(Bardin 2011).  Defensive CCI seeks to deny an opponent the access it seeks, to guard the organisation 
against insider threats and vulnerability (Bodmer et al 2012). Offensive CCI’s signature role is engaging 
and exploiting adversarial cyber actions to own advantage. It aims to neutralise a competitor’s 
intelligence efforts through measures ranging from deception and manipulation to the degrading of 
adversarial cyber intelligence activities and systems (Farchi 2012, Lee 2014b). This exploitation can take 
the form of deception, disinformation and degrading. The ultimate aim of offensive CCI should be the 
control and exploitation of an adversary through the manipulation of its cyber intelligence action.  
 
Effective defensive and offensive CCI cannot be executed blindly but is guided by intelligence. Similar to 
CTI, analysis is necessary to generate intelligence from information and data collected.  Since CCI is 
about the outmanoeuvring of intelligence adversaries, high-quality analysis is imperative. In this regard 
Godson (2001) states: “Perhaps the queen of the counterintelligence chessboard is analysis – both 
offensive and defensive.” CCI requires this high-grade intelligence on own cyber-relevant vulnerabilities 
(weaknesses of people, processes, facilities and technologies) actual and potential adversaries as well as 
on a strategic level, the macro-environment.  
 
CCI executes it offensive-offensive missions and the collection of data and information through a wide 
array of measures (Bardin 2011). It must be emphasised that care should be taken not to categorise a 
CCI measure or methods rigidly as defensive or offensive. In numerous instances a measure can be of 
service to both the defensive and offensive missions. In addition, several of the offensive-defensive 
measures collect data or information of relevance to the CCI intelligence mission. These measures and 
the multi-purposes they serve are shown in the taxonomy provided in Table 1 (next page).   
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Table 1:  A taxonomy of CCI Means, Methods and Measures (updated and adapted from Duvenage & 
von Solms, 2015) 
 
Defensive Mode 
Passive                                                                                                                                                                     Active 
                             Deny                                                    Detect                                                          Collect 
Physical Defensive Personnel/User Defensive System Defensive 
Protects  against: 
 Unauthorised access to facilities and 
systems 
 In loco theft of data, hardware 
 Introduction of malware through physical 
access to systems 
 Unauthorised altering or destruction of 
data 
 Physical destruction or access denial 
 Unauthorised reading (acoustic, visual, 
radiation, analogue, signals) 
 While not conventionally seen as a 
Physical Defence, supply-chain 
management has a physical defensive 
function.  It is also part of System 
Defences as an enabler. 
Consists of aspects such as: 
 IT and user personnel vetting, re-
vetting, confidentiality agreements and 
monitoring 
 Personnel security measures, BYOD 
user parameters or exclusions 
 User programmes in cyber security 
that cover policy and procedures for 
the handling of security-related 
incidents, malfunctions and recovery. 
 Overlapping with system defences, the 
use of software decoys and traps to 
mitigate the insider threat  
 Investigations focussed on cyber 
security incidents involving personnel.  
Could also include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 
Comprises a combination of: 
 Hardware  and software such as:  
 Network perimeter-based security (filters, certain 
firewalls, IDS and IPS etc.) Malware scanners. 
 Integrated automated systems/tools (that collect 
and evaluate information about devices 
connected to a network, activities thereon – 
inclusive of intrusions). Examples of such tools, 
discussed further on in the table, are decoys, 
honeypots and behavioural analyses toolsets.  
 Overlapping with the latter, depending on its 
configuration, a honeynet can be defensive or 
offensive in type/mode. The term fish bowling 
denotes the defensive configuration.  
 Processes (such as supply-chain management are 
also in part system defences). 
 Vulnerability assessments, penetration testing 
and verification testing (on products, systems, 
software and secure code). 
 Incident and threat monitoring, identification, 
investigation and response. A CERT is per 
definition defensive – although it might contain 
offensive elements in its responsive action.  
 Port level security and BYOD regulation in as far 
as network interfacing is concerned (Also part of 
Personnel Defences). 
  Commercial Cyber Threat Intelligence products, services and platforms.   
  The use of software decoys to mitigate the insider threat is an overlap between personnel and 
system defensive measures. They are mostly active CCI means.  
 Investigations focussed on internal cyber security 
incidents involving personnel.  May include digital forensic 
investigations. 
 Investigations of external 
cyber intrusions could be part 
passive and part active system 
defence. 
Offensive Mode 
 Passive                                                                                                                                                                    Active  
           Collect                                         Disrupt                                           Exploit                                            Destroy  
 Collection of information on and the monitoring/surveillance of 
the cyber sphere to detect cyber adversaries and their 
exploitation of the cyber sphere in a manner that is not own-
network restricted – (i.e. requires more than deployment of 
systems described under defensive mode). Could, depending on 
configuration also include IDS/IPS, honey-client applications (as 
opposed to host-based honeypots), luring and some forms of 
data mining.   
 The recruitment and handling of virtual agents on underground 
forums (under true or false flag) that can serve the purpose of 
enticement, collection and/or exploitation. (Under certain 
circumstances virtual agents can also develop into HUMINT 
assets).  
Measures taken to exploit and 
neutralise adversaries 
activities in the cyber sphere: 
 System and honeynet 
configured offensively 
with the aim of enticing, 
exploiting and deceiving 
adversaries. False 
information is displayed 
to adversarial 
reconnaissance tools, 
network scanners and 
listeners, etc. This has as 
one of its aims to lead 
adversaries in the 
direction of your own 
preference. 
 Utilisation of virtual 
agents for offensive 
purposes. 
Cyber warfare, in the full extent of the 
term, is typically excluded from the 
mandate of civilian intelligence 
communities. A cyber warfare capability 
should be flexible and allow utilisation 
without, or in conjunction with, kinetic war. 
 
Nevertheless, a top class civilian CCI outfit 
will need to have the authority and capacity 
to very selectively conduct operations that 
have cyber warfare characteristics, utilising 
cyberwarfare- related techniques. Such 
cyber CCI operations will share 
characteristics with covert action. (Covert 
action aims to influence role-players, 
conditions and events without revealing the 
sponsors identity.) 
 
Within business, the use of offensive 
measures will be determined by the 
legislative and regulatory framework within 
which the entity operates.  
 Cyberespionage on adversaries. Distinguishable from own-system collection (IPS, IDS, honeynets 
etc) on the basis that adversarial networks are targeted actively and exploited in accordance with 
strategic and operational objectives.   
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The preceding discussion and table show that CCI, in contrast to CTI, is not only about the delivery of 
intelligence products. It includes active and passive measures instituted as part of an integrated 
approach. Moreover, the intelligence that CCI generates covers a scope significantly wider than the 
actor-centric intelligence associated with CTI. From both these perspectives, CTI can thus be posited as a 
constituent part of CCI (cf Lee 2014b). Figure 2 – that should be read with the qualification on the term 
‘intelligence in subsection 2.2 – depicts this relationship graphically.   
 
 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between Cyber Counterintelligence and Cyber Threat Intelligence (authors) 
 
This section showed CCI as a multi-faceted CI sub-discipline that participates in, but extends beyond 
conventional cyber security. CCI was concluded to include CTI but to be much wider in respect of scope 
and nature of measures undertaken.  
 
3. Towards a multi-layered CCI framework   
Effective CCI is not only multi-facetted, but also stratified. To be optimal CCI needs to involve all 
organisational layers from the C-suite to line-functionaries. The levels conventionally ascribed to 
statutory intelligence –namely strategic, operational and tactical – provide a useful approach for 
explaining CCI. Although these levels are described in literature dealing with CTI, no postulation could be 
found in open-source literature on a multi-layered framework for CCI. Works of note in the CTI field 
include those by Mattern (et al 2014), Friedman & Bouchard (2015), Chismon & Ruks (2015) as well as a 
series of papers compiled by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA 2011, 2013, 2014a, 
2014b, 2015). The cited works were foundational to the framework provided in Table 2 and were also 
applied for the subsequent narrative description of the CCI levels.   
 
 Table 2: A multi-layered CCI framework  
 Strategic Operational Tactical/Technical 
CI mission  Advance and protect organisational interests through defence against, and the offensive engagement of, 
adversarial intelligence activities. This is achieved through the following functions: detect, deny, deter, 
deceive, degrade, and/or disrupt. 
CCI mission  As above, when the adversary uses cyber as a conduit or a cyber asset is a target. 
Leadership   C-level   Senior & Middle Management   Line and team leaders 
Interface with CI  Organisational, Intelligence and CI 
Strategies 
 All-source CI feed 
 Multi-disciplinary programmes 
and operations 
 Multi-disciplinary projects 
and continuous line-
functional interaction  
Referent objects 
 
 Organisation’s ‘crown jewels’ 
 Critical information and cyber-
assets sought (e.g. adversary’s 
‘crown jewels’) 
 Conditions (competitive 
advantage) 
 People, processes, systems, 
procedures (personal security, 
ICT architecture, supply-chain 
management)  
 Own intelligence programmes 
 
 Systems, networks, and 
devices 
 Network Security 
Operations 
 C-I-A (confidentiality, 
integrity and availability) 
Interrogatives  Who, why?  Who, Where, When, How?  What, How? 
Adversarial progression  
(Impact chain) 
 
 Motivation, intent and decision, 
objective 
 Objective  
 Avenue of Approach   
 Capability or perceived 
capability, develop access 
 Develop network 
access, implement, 
assess, restrike  
 Payloads and payload 
delivery mechanisms 
Level of 
adversarial role-player 
focussed   
 Sponsors, opponents, Intelligence 
capacity 
 Intelligence structures, 
groups, campaigns 
 Individuals, TTPs, 
incidents, actions (on-
the-network) 
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Within the confines of a conference paper, the framework above cannot be discussed in detail. Not even 
each of the vectors can be narratively explicated. The subsequent sub-sections thus do not rigidly mirror 
the table, but rather aim to provide a bird’s eye view of the different levels on which CCI is executed.   
 
3.1  Cyber counterintelligence on the strategic level 
In his benchmark work, Prunckun 2012 rightly asserts “executive responsibility” as CI’s “first and highest 
tenant”. For CCI to be successful, the organisation’s executive management (C-suite) need to understand 
and sanction CCI’s mission to advance and protect organisational interests through defence against and 
the exploitation of adversarial, cyber-related intelligence activities (cf INSA 2014b, Chismon & Ruks 
2015). Practically, the C-level executive assigned with leading the CI aspect will be responsible for also 
directing the CCI effort. The executive’s responsibilities include obtaining the collective executive 
management’s approval of CCI strategy, priorities and resourcing. In some instances the executive would 
selectively also seek endorsement – normally from the CEO – for high-risk and high-cost programmes. 
The actual CCI work on a strategic level is performed by a team consisting of seasoned CCI specialists, 
multi-disciplinary CI specialists, strategic analysts (business and CI) and various other experts relevant to 
the organisation’s core business. 
CCI informs the C-suite mainly through high-level products and presentations that include estimates, 
threat and risk assessments as well as advisories. These products are informed by appraisal all-source CI 
operational reports as well as an extensive all-source scanning of the macro-environment for CCI-
relevant trends and drivers that could affect the organisation (INSA 2014b). External CTI products 
sourced would mainly be white papers as well as commissioned and non-commissioned research papers 
(Chismon & Ruks 2015). A thorough knowledge of organisational strategy and planning is imperative, as 
is a clear grasp of the organisation’s information-related assets critical for it to exist and prosper – 
commonly referred to as the ‘crown jewels’ (INSA 2014b). It is these assets that CCI protects from 
adversarial intelligence activities and it is the organisational strategy that CCI should advance through 
the exploitation of adversaries in the cyber sphere.  
Strategic CCI differs from that in the operational and tactical level in that it takes a wider view of the 
macro-environment and a longer term view on the actual or potential emergence of threats (Bodmer et 
 Strategic Operational Tactical/Technical 
Indicators of targeting  
and compromise  
 Geo-political, sector/industry 
‘flags’ 
 Analogous  events  
 Adversarial strategy and 
business decisions 
 
 Operational disruption 
 Organisational and/or revenue 
decline 
 Information leakage 
 Breach in the  CIA of cyber 
and / or information 
security milieu 
 Identification of malicious 
code, intrusion, threat 
exploitation 
Analysis output   High-level, strategic appraisals 
 Strategic warning and advisories  
 Operational reports (CCI 
operations, threat, damage 
and vulnerability  assessments,  
alerts, warnings) 
 Trend analyses  
 Tactical and technical 
information reports 
 Alerts and warnings 
 
Consumers of CCI 
products 
 C-Level and operational 
management (selectively) 
 Line-functional managers, CI 
analysts and CCI specialists.  
 CCI analysts 
 CCI technical personnel  
Means, methods and 
measures  
(Offensive, defensive and 
collection) 
 Multi-discipline CI 
 Strategic direction of means, 
methods and measures in 
Table 1. 
 As in Table 1 
 Interlocked with operational and tactical CI. 
Cyber threat intelligence  
(Sourced) 
 White papers, commissioned 
and non-commissioned research. 
 Platforms.  Data feeds. 
Skillsets required 
(Line-functional) 
 Sound knowledge of business 
and industry 
 Specialised knowledge and skills 
in Intelligence, multi-disciplinary 
CI and CCI 
 Strategic analysis and 
management 
 
 Multi-disciplinary CI 
 CCI operational and/or 
technical specialisation 
 Operational management 
 Elements of both strategic 
and tactical 
 
 ICT, information security 
 Systems, software develop-
ment,programming, scripting, 
 Ethical hacking. 
 CI and CCI tactical /technical 
specialisation (also HUMINT) 
 Technical cyber defence and 
collection 
 Social sciences, languages 
 Engineering and Reverse 
Engineering 
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al 2012, Mattern et al 2014). Strategic CCI would for instance identify intelligence principals/sponsors 
who have plausible motive, intent and capacity to target the own organisation through cyber means. 
(See Table 2 – “Adversarial Progression”) These principals or sponsors will not necessarily execute the 
actual intelligence activities but are they are the ultimate benefactors (such as a nation state). The actual 
implementers of hostile cyber as well as associated tactics are those that carry out the task of 
operational and tactical CCI. While the implementers will determine the operational and tactical avenue 
of approach, the strategic decisions (e.g. to pursue objectives via human and/or technical means) in this 
regard will be taken by the Intelligence principal. The pathway of adversarial progression guiding CCI 
therefore differs from that of CTI (compare Figure 1). 
 Strategic CCI is furthermore tasked with detecting high-level indicators that the organisation is being 
targeted or has been compromised. Similarly, strategic CCI should identify drivers and trends suggesting 
a rise in the risk of internal compromise (insider threat). Equally important is the detection that 
organisational strategy and decision-making are being unduly influenced by deceptive, adversarial cyber 
operations. Strategic CCI will advise on countermeasures to best exploit adversarial cyber activities. To 
be successful cyber counter-deception and exploitation have to be fully synchronised with such actions 
in other CI fields (such as agent and double agents operations). Therefore, it is imperative for CCI to 
ensure that countermeasures are aligned with CI and organisational strategy.  The design and filling of 
honeypots on the operational and tactical levels, for example, will ultimately be informed by strategic 
CCI’s direction on counter-deception (cf Bodmer et al 2012).  
3.2  Cyber Counterintelligence on the operational level  
As on the strategic level, CCI on the operational level strictly pursues the CCI’s central mission of 
defensively and offensively advancing CI-relevant interests in the cyber sphere. Adherence to the 
mission at all three levels CCI ensures a coherent approach and an optimised CCI effort.  
Operational CCI is driven by senior and middle management as well as specialists in the field of CCI 
operations and analysis. It functions as conduit and advisory to C-Level leadership in matters such as CCI 
strategic objectives, financials, financial projections and other resource requirements, projects, statistics 
and reporting.  
Operational leadership is responsible, among other, for the following main functions (INSA 2014a, 
Mattern et al 2014): (i) operationalise the CCI strategy as set jointly by the executive management, 
operational management and CCI experts, (ii) develop and implement CCI structures and acquire 
resources, (iii) develop and implement operational plans and identify focus areas and (iv)drive daily 
operations and performance.   
Operational CCI is responsible for safeguarding the people, processes, procedures and systems in which 
the organisation’s critical cyber-related assets reside. Consequently, it includes a wide spectrum of 
organisational functions such as personal security, physical security, procurement, supply chain 
management, ICT-user management and much more. In addition to conducting CCI operations against 
adversaries (discussed below), it safeguards the organisation’s own information and cyber intelligence 
operations. It provides operational cyber counterintelligence reports on operations, cyber threats and 
threat actors, damage and vulnerabilities (as identified through assessments), alerts, warnings and 
trends to the strategic CCI, line-functional managers, analysts and CCI specialist (Riley 2015). It also self-
analyses the reports’ output with a view to driving reports’ outcomes to action (INSA 2013, 2014a).  
Operational CCI interfaces with the larger CI function through multi-disciplinary programmes and 
operations, specifically focussing on the cyber part of CI. Its main concern is whom the adversaries are, 
their location, capabilities (such as the ability to utilise or develop malware), intentions (either 
pronounced or unpronounced) and modus operandi (Chismon & Ruks 2015). Together with this, it is 
concerned with the adversaries’ intelligence structures and their intelligence campaigns (either planned 
or existing). 
With regard to a traditional defensive approach, CCI similarly has a dual proactive-reactive focus to 
identify indicators of cyber targeting and compromise. Such indicators include a disruption in the 
organisational operations, tell-tale declines in organisational functionalities and/or information leakage. 
From a reactive perspective, CCI seeks to counter such instances by identifying its origin and addressing 
the compromise (through either defensive or offensive means). From a proactive approach, it identifies 
such possible capabilities and campaigns and addresses threats (by either defensive or offensive means)( 
Bardin 2011).  
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Operational CCI is persistently seeking exploitable opportunities presented by adversarial cyber 
campaigns, operations and actions. Through counter-operations these opportunities are pursued either 
pro-actively or re-actively – depending on the circumstances.    
The skillsets required to capacitate operational CCI are multi-disciplinary and include elements such as 
general management, advanced operational management, CCI analysis, cyber security, cyber defence 
and offensive CCI techniques and other fields of technical expertise (Bodmer et al 2012).         
3.3 Cyber counterintelligence on the tactical and technical levels 
The aim of tactical and technical CCI is to achieve the organisations CCI mission though tactical and 
technical means. It is driven and executed by line-functional leadership as well as team leaders, role 
leaders, CCI technical and tactical experts, security analysts and other technical personnel. It has an 
advisory responsibility to both the operational and executive management that includes matters such as 
CCI threats and opportunities, defensive and offensive measures, systems and toolsets, CCI analyses and 
financials (Riley 2015; INSA 2013, 2015). This advisory responsibility is usually fulfilled through 
submitting tactical products to the operational and in some instances directly to the strategic CCI level. 
Prior to submission to the executive, tactical CCI inputs are normally contextualised at the operational 
and strategic levels.  
Tactical CCI is responsible, among others, for the following main functions (cf INSA 2015): (i) concretise 
operational direction into action; (ii) identify, design and implement systems, toolsets and reporting 
mechanisms (both defensive and offensive), (iii) carry out tactical taskings through combined technical 
and HUMINT measures and (iv) identify, analyse and action CCI threats and opportunities. 
Tactical CCI performs the daily management, configuration (including identification and/or compromise 
in the case of offensive measure implementation) of both defensive and offensive systems, networks, 
devices, network operations and security operations (INSA 2015). It is responsible for ensuring the C-I-A 
of the organisation’s cyber and information security environment, as a defensive tactic and measure. In 
the case of an offensive or exploit tactic (that must be congruent with operational objectives and the 
organisational strategy) tactical CCI further strives to degrade the C-I-A of an adversary’s cyber and 
information security.  Tactical CCI interfaces with the larger CI function through multi-disciplinary 
projects and continuous line-functional interaction. Tactical and operational CCI has a shared focus on 
on-the-network threats and/or opportunities, threat actors’ capabilities or possible capabilities as well as 
the deployment of and expansion of capabilities. Tactical CCI is concerned with engaging individual 
groups or individuals, their specific network actions, TTPs and specific technical issues such as malware 
signatures (Chismon & Ruks 2015). 
Tactical and technical CCI processes feed into information reports and focus on specific issues such as 
breaches, the identification and/or creation of malicious code, intrusion, threat and exploitation. The 
process leads to the compilation of tactical and technical reports, alerts, warnings, defensive and 
offensive solution and action reports, campaign proposals, etc. These are provided to CCI analysts, 
tactical leadership, operational leadership and the executive in the manner described above (Friedman & 
Bouchard 2015). 
The skillsets required for tactical and technical CCI are, as is the case with strategic and operational CCI, 
multi-disciplinary. They include elements of tactical and line-functional management, ICT security, 
development of systems and software, programming, scripting, developing offensive and defensive 
toolsets, CCI technical specialisation, HUMINT and intelligence collection, as well as language and social 
science expertise (used in for example penetration of hacking forums), ethical hacking, technical 
defensive and offensive measures as well as reverse engineering (Bodmer et al 2012). 
4. Conclusion 
This paper emphasised the centrality of CCI to engage morphing high-end cyber threats effectively. 
Although only well-resourced entities can afford a fully-fledged capacity in this field, a CCI mindset and 
approach could benefit smaller organisations. Within the context of CCI’s infancy as an academic 
discipline, the paper sets out to contribute two further conceptual building blocks, namely a CCI–CTI 
differentiation and a multi-layered framework. Constructs such as these are important since they 
condition our approach to the practice. Since considerable further research is required, both constructs 
presented are qualified as tentative soundboards intended to stimulate future debate.  
 253 
 
There is no consensus on definitions of CCI and CTI and this paper’s differentiation is inevitably 
contestable. It nonetheless offers a start. The framework explicated activities on different organisational 
levels. As it stands, it provides more clarity on what CCI is and what it is supposed to do. With further 
research this framework can be developed to a scalable template for the practical execution of CCI on all 
organisational levels.  
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For those connecting the dots, major cyber breaches continue to affirm the necessity of having cyber 
counterintelligence (CCI) at the core of a proactive cybersecurity approach. While practitioners and 
executives engaging high-end adversaries in the ‘real world’ are progressively warming up to the 
opportunities CCI presents, the mentioning of ‘theory’ is likely to evoke a cool response. Theory is 
typically regarded as abstract thinking that has little bearing on, or use in, ‘real world’ cybersecurity 
trenches. Theory may even be deemed to be the opposite of practice. This is of course not the case – 
theory is highly relevant to practice and practice ought to inform theory. In the words of Lewin (as cited 
by Greenwald 2012): "There is nothing so practical as a good theory."  
Especially for a field as complex as CCI, effective practice presupposes a sound theoretical foundation. 
The price for poor CCI theory will ultimately be paid through more costly failures and damaging 
breaches. Theoretical constructs are thus clearly not ‘nice to have’ academic ‘toys’. These constructs, 
which include frameworks and models, condition our thinking and our approach to practice. In addition 
to its application to practice, theory should of course also be at the heart of academic disciplines and 
fields.  
Herein lies the challenge – as an emerging multi-disciplinary academic field, CCI is in its infancy.  Given 
CCI’s incipient status, one of the priority agenda items ought to be a conceptual framework that (albeit 
tentatively) delineates and provides a coherent view of the research object – i.e. CCI. This conceptual 
framework can furthermore systemise existing knowledge and provide a scaffold for further research. 
Equally important, it can be an instrument to explain to diverse audiences what CCI is and how it works. 
Clearly then, a conceptual framework for CCI is theory that really matters. 
This paper’s primary aim is to advance the outlines of such a conceptual Framework for CCI (FCCI). Our 
FCCI consists of eight notional blocks we deem essential to an academic credible and practically useful 
FCCI. In designing the FCCI, we synthesised and added to previous contributions on CCI to inter alia 
recent European Conferences on Cyberwarfare and Security (ECCWS).   
For obvious reasons, the FCCI and its building blocks cannot be explained in any detail within the 
confines of a single conference paper. Consequently, suffice it to provide the essential contours of, and 
rationale behind, our FCCI’s design. We qualify our FCCI as a tentative postulation, hopefully constructive 
to the theoretical discourse and academic practice.  
Keywords: cyber counterintelligence, theory, offensive cybersecurity, active defence, conceptual 
framework.   
 
1. Introduction  
For those connecting the dots, several recent cyber breaches have affirmed what we have known for 
more than  two decades – state and non-state actors’ use of the cyber sphere for Intelligence operations 
is set to continue to increase sharply (cƒ. Molander et al 1996, Stroz Friedberg 2017). While the motives 
for such Intelligence operations vary from the influencing of world politics and cyber espionage to pure 
criminal gains, the distinction between modus operandi and tradecraft is blurring (Crowdstrike 2016). 
Some of the better known 2016 incidents attesting to this trend include the hacking of Bangladesh Bank, 
the US Democratic Party National Convention and Yahoo.  
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These, and numerous other breaches, underline anew the necessity of having cyber counterintelligence 
(CCI) at the core of a proactive cybersecurity approach. CCI is now more relevant than ever before and 
can be expected to gain further traction in the boardrooms of companies with sizable assets (Jaquire 
2017, SpearTip 2015, The Economist 2015). CCI is, however, not a quick-fix solution. It is not a neat plug-
in or add-on that starts and ends with on-the-network actions. Like cybersecurity in general, CCI is 
anchored in our organisational DNA. Effective CCI also presupposes a profound understanding of long-
established Intelligence and Counterintelligence concepts. Yet, and although  “practised by state security 
structures for over twenty years, CCI remains poorly understood in the public and commercial domains.”  
(Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015).  Academic theory and research can of course play a pivotal 
role in this regard. However, we have a dilemma – we need CCI theory to inform sound practice but such 
theory is lacking. This paper aims to contribute a conceptual Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence 
(FCCI) as a construct, hopefully useful to this field’s academic development and practice.  
To be academically credible, we need to explain and contextualise our approach to the FCCI’s design. 
This is addressed in Section 2 and 3. Section 2 defines a ’conceptual framework’ and describes how this 
fits in with 'theory' (Section 2).  We then proceed with discussing the requirements to which the FCCI’s 
design should comply (Section 3). Guided by these requirements, we then present the outlines of the 
FCCI and its eight building blocks (Section 4). The FCCI we present synthesises, develops and adds to 
previous contributions on CCI (Duvenage & von Solms 2013; Duvenage & von Solms 2015; Duvenage von 
Solms & Corregedor 2015, Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016). Since we, within the confines of a 
conference paper, only provide a bird’s eye view of the FCCI’s contours and then conclude with 
observations on further research (Section 5).  
2. What is a ’Conceptual Framework’ and how does it fit in with ‘theory’? 
 
Since it will impact on the design of our FCCI, we have to be clear on what a ‘conceptual framework’ is 
and how this fits in with ‘theory’.  To this end, this section firstly reflects on the notion 'theory' and then 
proceeds to define a ‘conceptual framework’. We concluded by applying this definition and positioning 
to the FCCI. 
 
In a general sense, ‘theory’ can be described as  the interrelated collective of definitions, concepts, 
constructs (i.a. models and frameworks) as well as propositions to explain and understand a 
phenomenon/phenomena and/or  aspects thereof. It is important to note that the ‘theory’ of an 
academic subject is not always a homogeneous body of thinking, but more often competing bodies of 
thinking. These bodies of thinking vary in their focuses from the abstract and broad to the more concrete 
and specific. Postulations on the meta-paradigm and paradigmatic levels are abstract and broad in 
scope, while meso-theories are more concrete and specific.  These layers of theories’ different purposes 
are aptly summarised by Gill (2006) in his distinction between “theories of intelligence” and “theories for 
intelligence”.  Theories of intelligence asserts Gill (2006), are developed to “help academics research 
intelligence, come to understand it, and better explain it”. Theories for intelligence “relate immediately 
to the needs of practitioners”  ... In one sense there is no conflict between these two. A good theory of 
intelligence should, by definition, be useful for intelligence”. 
 
Within the above context, we can broadly define a ‘conceptual framework’ as a theoretical construct 
that narratively and/or graphically conveys the “essential or underlying structure, a provisional design, 
an outline; a connectional scheme or system” of a particular study object (Oxford Dictionary 2016). 
While a conceptual framework is per definition skeletal and tentative, it can nonetheless “provide a 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon... Conceptual frameworks are [thus] not merely 
collections of concepts but, rather, constructs in which each concept plays and integral role” (Jabareen 
2009). A conceptual framework can serve as (i) a theory of a study object, (ii) theory for a discipline and 
(iii) a combination of these two.  
 
Moving from this general definition, we define the FCCI simply as a theoretical schema that explains CCI 
by means of a collection of concepts (i.e. building blocks). As will be shown in Section 4, the FCCI is for 
the most part a theory for CCI, but also includes elements of abstract, higher-order theories.   
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3. A ’Conceptual Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence' – what it should do and why it matters?   
 
The foregoing description of a conceptual framework provides us with a foundation for deriving the 
requirements to which our FCCI should comply. Essentially, the requirements are a response to the 
question:  What should the FCCI look like and what should it be able to do (functions)? The requirements 
will guide the design of our FCCI’s design in Section 4. Ultimately the application of these requirements 
determines the FCCI’s effectiveness, uses and benefits. It is these benefits that demonstrate why the 
FCCI is a theoretical construct that ought to matter for academics and practitioners.  
 
The FCCI’s requirements, functions and benefits are closely related and overlapping. In the interest of 
simplicity we addressed all these by means of the following consolidated list in which we assert that the 
FCCI should:  
 Be academically credible and practically useful. 
 Graphically and narratively, describe what CCI is, of what it comprises (building blocks) and how it 
works. 
 Be simultaneously “congruent with reality and an idealised, simplified representation of reality.” 
(Duvenage, von Solms, Corregedor, 2015).  Since it is an idealisation, the FFCI has to be an aiming 
point of what CCI should encapsulate if executed flawlessly. 
 Serve as a conceptual template for CCI practice and its synergetic execution with the broader 
organisational endeavour.  
 Be a nexus for linking CCI with other fields of practice and multi-disciplinary academic enquiry. 
 Position itself as part of the theoretical discourse.  
 Be scalable in that it should be able to explain CCI on the strategic, operational, tactical and 
technical layers.  
 Serve as a scaffold to structure knowledge and research. 
 Be derived through a qualitative (grounded theory) process that draws on the researcher’s 
experiential knowledge, existing theory and research.   
 Be qualified as a tentative artefact that is subject to validation and constant modification. 
In this part of the paper we listed some aspects that can guide the design of our FCCI. This design is the 
focus of the next section.  
4. An outline of the conceptual Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence (FCCI) 
 
This section designs and presents an outline of the FCCI. We present the FCCI by means of a progressive 
block-by-block construction of the framework.  At each of the respective building blocks, we:  
 Graphically, depict the addition of the building block to the FCCI.  
 Explain why the particular building block is essential to our FCCI.  
 Offer a cursory outline (contours) of the building block in question. This outline comprises of a 
concise description/definition of concepts and a brief mentioning of facets that can direct further 
research and theorisation.  
 
The paragraph above described our approach to presenting the FCCI in this paper. We now proceed with 
discussing the first building block namely a ‘Theoretical Anchor’.  
 
4.1 Building Block 1: Theoretical Anchor  
Graphically the FCCI's theoretical anchor can be depicted as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Building Block 1 – Theoretical Anchor 
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4.1.1 Why is this building block needed?  
To be academically credible the FCCI has to duly consider, and position itself as part of the existing 
theoretical discourse. Such anchoring provides a nexus for linking CCI with other academic fields. The 
anchoring of our FCCI in theory is also important from a practical point of view. As was noted earlier, 
theory conditions our thinking and thus our approach to practice. Consequently, the theoretical anchor 
will determine both the way in which we design the rest of our FFCI and ultimately CCI practice.  
 
4.1.2 Building block contours  
Section 2 and 3 explained the FCCI predominantly as a theory on a lower level of abstraction. 
Accordingly, the FCCI’s first building block comprises the linking of the FCCI with levels of higher 
abstraction, namely on the meta-paradigmatic, paradigmatic, theory and meso-theory levels. The 
building block has to clearly indicate the core theoretical contentions on which the FCCI is based.   
Although CCI is a multi-disciplinary field, it has its primary taproot within Intelligence Study and Political 
Science (notably International Relations) theory. Intelligence and Political Science theory is of course not 
a homogenous body of thinking and the discourse is one of competing narratives that include inter alia 
Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Radicalism, Poststructuralists and Critical Realism. In our view, 
Realism best explains Intelligence, CI and CCI (cƒ. Duvenage & Hough 2011). Through a Realist lens, the 
contours of the FCCI’s first building blocks are as follow: 
 On the meta-paradigmatic level, we subscribe to a Positivist position. An objective world (reality) is 
deemed to exist separately from the researcher/practitioner. Extended to the FCCI, we assert that 
this framework can objectively identify, describe and guide the pro-active mitigation of ‘real’ threats 
and risks to the Organisation. 
 On the paradigmatic layer, we take a Realist stance as was mentioned prior. Accordingly, the state 
(or more generically the ‘Organisation’) is seen as a rational, self-interested entity driven by the 
pursuit of its security and expanding its vital interests vis-à-vis other actors. The Organisation’s 
relative power is a key factor in this quest. These vital interests are pursued against other actors in 
the political, social, technological, economic, military, ecological (environmental) and information 
sectors. Intelligence and cyber form part of the information sector.  
 Extending Realism to the Grand Theory level, we view Intelligence as simultaneously a class of vital 
interests and category of power. Within this context ‘cyber’ is exponentially increasing its centrality 
as a tool and asset.  
 On the meso-level, Counterintelligence and therefore CCI, is the Intelligence element tasked with 
protecting and advancing the Organisation’s interests in the face of other role-players’ hostile 
Intelligence actions. 
 
Properly designed the first building block presented above serves as a theoretical roadmap for the 
design of further FCCI building blocks. Since building blocks repeat and expand different theoretical 
positions, building block 1 acts as the central notional node that binds all further FCCI theory. It is the 
anchor to which we constantly refer back.   
 
4.2 Building Block 2: Organisation 
With the CCI theoretically anchored, the FCCI’s pivot that is the Organisation can be constructed. 
Graphically, we can depict this building block as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Building Block 2 – The Organisation 
 
 4.2.1 Why is the building block needed?  
The Organisation is advanced as the FCCI’s pivot for reasons of theory and practicality. In line with our 
Realist theoretical position, the Organisation and the pursuance of its interests predominate. Seen 
through this lens, CCI is ultimately about maximizing the Organisation’s power through protecting and 
advancing interests. Therefore CCI exists because of, and for the organisation, it serves. Also practically, 
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effective CCI crucially depends on a profound knowledge of the Organisation.  Against sophisticated 
adversaries, for example, the Organisation’s staging of honeynets and the content filling of honeypots, 
honeyfiles and honeytokens have to be attuned to the Organisation’s itself, its adversaries and its 
environment (Bodmer et al 2012, Duvenage & von Solms 2013). 
 
4.2.2 Some building block contours  
The ‘Organisation’ is a generic concept that can refer to various types of entities, ranging from nation 
states and multi-national corporates to smaller businesses and non-governmental organisations.  
Regardless of the type of entity we are dealing with, aspects to be addressed in explicating the 
Organisation as an FCCI building block are the following: 
 The Organisation's vision, goals and the vital interests it wants to protect and procure in order to be 
more secure and prosperous. Although these vital interests exist in various domains, it is central to 
the later configuration of the CCI effort, to identify and concretely describe vital informational 
interests. 
 The Organisation’s strategy for pursuing its vision and objectives.  
 Organisational strengths (inclusive of the vital interests and instruments of power it possesses) and 
weaknesses (vulnerabilities). Also in this case, particular attention should be given to the information 
sphere.  
 The environment in which the Organisation functions. Of particular importance are the implications 
of current as well as anticipated trends on the Organisation reaching its objectives and expanding 
prosperity. 
 Actual and potential competitors/adversaries and, also in this instance, the implications thereof on 
the Organisation attaining its objectives.  
 
This subsection discussed the addition of the ‘Organisation’ as an FCCI building block. We emphasised 
the importance of being clear about the Organisation ’s Interests, Gaols and Strategy (IGS – se Figure 4, 
Subsection  4.3.2). Within the context of the latter, CCI is but part of a much broader organisational 
endeavour, namely Intelligence. In the next subsection we therefore propose Intelligence as the FCCI’s 
subsequent building block.  
 
4.3 Building Block 3: Intelligence ( ‘toolkit’) 
Graphically, the addition of Intelligence as an FCCI building block can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Building Block 3 – Intelligence 
 
4.3.1 Why the building block is needed? 
While an indispensable instrument, CCI cannot secure and pursue an Organisation’s interests all by, and 
for, itself. This has to be done as part of an Organisation’s Intelligence endeavour. CCI, by way of 
analogy, is but one ‘tool type’ within an Organisation’s Intelligence ‘toolkit’. Academia and practitioners 
serious about CCI have to have a sound grasp of Intelligence (toolkit) as well as Intelligence’s three 
toolsets (Positive Intelligence, Covert Action and Counterintelligence). Since these are also performed 
within CCI, clarity is furthermore needed on Intelligence functions (such as management, analysis and 
collection).  
 
4.3.2 Building Block contours 
In order to contour ‘Intelligence’ as an FCCI building block, it needs to be defined. With the qualification 
that there is no commonly accepted description, we define ‘Intelligence’ as: 
the process by which specific types of information important to an Organisation's vital interests 
are requested, collected, analysed, and provided to the decision makers, the products of that 
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process; the safeguarding and advancement of informational interests by counterintelligence 
activities; and the carrying out of other sanctioned informational operations (Lowenthal 2012, 
Godson 2001).  
 
Underpinning the definition is the notion that Intelligence (toolkit) consists of the three interrelated 
elements (toolsets). As part of our contouring, we now very briefly describe the three Intelligence 
elements (Duvenage, von Solms, Corregedor 2015):  
 Positive Intelligence aims to provide information “to facilitate one’s own side achieving its ends.” 
(Bodmer et al 2012). This information varies from analysed open-sources to opponents’ secrets 
obtained through espionage. 
 Covert action targets an adversary through the influencing of events, conditions, individuals, groups 
or institutions to the benefit of the client in a manner not attributable to the sponsor or at least 
offering plausible deniability (Duvenage, von Solms, and Corregedor 2015).  In the information 
sphere, covert action can take the form of propaganda, deception and denial, disinformation and 
perception management. 
 Counterintelligence is an abbreviated form for the countering of hostile intelligence activities and it 
is discussed in more detail in subsection 4.4  
 
Traversing and performed in all toolsets, are specialised Intelligence functions such as management, 
analysis and collection. These Intelligence functions, which are also performed within CCI, bind the three 
Intelligence elements. 
 
Diagrammatically this relationship can be depicted as follow:  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Intelligence and its three elements – Positive Intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action 
 
Since the foregoing explanation is but a cursory contour, it risks being an oversimplification. A thorough 
explication of Intelligence as an FCCI building block will have to describe concretely the synergy 
between, on the one hand CCI, and, on the other hand, Intelligence elements and functions. It will 
explain how CCI depends on and benefits from all three Intelligence elements. Of these elements, and 
for reasons discussed below (Section 4.4), counterintelligence and its relation with CCI are of particular 
importance. So important in fact, that Counterintelligence is advanced in the next section as a distinctive 
CCI building block.  
 
4.4 Building Block 4: Counterintelligence (‘Toolset’) 
Graphically, the addition of Counterintelligence (CI) as the FCCI’s fourth building block can be depicted as 
follows:    
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Figure 5: Building Block 4 – Counterintelligence 
 
4.4.1 Why the building block is needed? 
In the preceding section we positioned CI (and thus CCI) as part of an Organisation's Intelligence 
endeavour. In this section we advance CI as the subsequent building block of our FCCI because we 
cannot conceptually structure and understand CCI, if we do not understand CI of which CCI is part. CCI is 
by way of analogy one of the ‘tool types’ within the CI ‘toolset’. Practically and conceptually, CCI is linked 
with the whole of the multidisciplinary CI effort. CCI is, in other words, not a neat compartment within 
CI. It involves, and requires clarity of, all other CI fields.  
 
4.4.2 Some building block contours  
To delineate CI as an FCCI building block, we also in this instance offer a definition. Expanding on earlier 
contributions (Duvenage & von Solms, 2013; Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms, 2016), we define CI for 
purposes of this paper as the collective of measures an Organisation undertakes to identify, deter, 
exploit, degrade, neutralise and protect against adversarial intelligence activities and internal risks 
deemed as detrimental or potentially detrimental to the organisation’s vital informational interests and 
the pursuance thereof. Such hostile intelligence actions “include espionage as well as other actions that 
could degrade the integrity and/or availability of valued information, information systems and 
processes” (Duvenage & von Solms 2013).  Differently phrased, the adversarial intelligence that CI 
engages comprises of adversarial positive intelligence (inter alia espionage), covert action and 
adversarial CI. To perform this role, CI relies on a wide range of measures. CCI is involved in, and is in 
some way or another,  reliant on most CI measures (see third bullet in paragraph below – Five clusters of 
CI measures).  
 
In order to explain CCI, this building block has to describe CCI’s link and relation with the whole of the CI 
endeavour. To this end, aspects that have to be addressed and their application to cyber explained, 
include but are not limited to the following: 
 CI principles and doctrine. 
 CI’s offensive and defensive missions as well as CI’s passive and active modes (Prunckun 2012, 
Duvenage & von Solms 2015, Duvenage, Jacquire & von Solms, 2016). 
 The clusters of CI measures namely (i) Physical Security, (ii) Information and Technological Systems 
Security, (iii) Personnel Security, (iv) Counterintelligence Monitoring, Investigation, and Collection; 
and (vi) Counterintelligence Exploitation, Deception and Neutralisation (Prunkun 2012, Duvenage 
2013, Prunckun 2012).  
 The difference and interplay between strategic, operational and tactical CI (Duvenage, Jacquire & 
von Solms, 2016).  
In this section CI was advanced as an FCCI building block. In the next section we submit the FCCI fifth  
component, namely CCI.  
 
4.5 Building Block 5: Cyber Counterintelligence ( ‘Tool type’) 
The addition of CCI as the FCCI fifth building block can be graphically illustrated as follows:  
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Figure 6: Building Block 5 – Cyber Counterintelligence  
 
4.5.1 Why the building block is needed?  
In order to illustrate the interlock between CI and CCI, the diagram above deliberately depicts the two 
fields in the same ring and on the same level. This is done to graphically reflect this paper’s recurring 
theme namely that CCI is but a tool type within the broader CI toolset. Hence, CCI is defined as “that 
subset of multi-disciplinary CI aimed at detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and the 
neutralisation of adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A 
[confidentiality, integrity and availability] of valued information assets through cyber means and/or 
where cyber assets are targeted” (Duvenage, von Solms, Corregedor 2015). As is clear from this 
definition and the term Cyber Counterintelligence, this FCCI building block explicates CCI a as a technical 
toolset. This toolset comprises of an extensive range of tools (technologies, measures and techniques). 
Most of these tools are not unique to CCI. What is unique, is the application thereof in combination with 
other CI tools and in a manner best achieving CI’s missions. 
 
4.5.2 Some building block contours 
 A more detailed explication of CCI as an FCCI building would therefore entail the describing of the 
application to the CI context of the said technologies, measures and technologies. The following serve as 
some examples (Bodmer et al 2012, Heckman et al 2015, Jaquire 2017):  
    
 Host–based tools (Antivirus, Digital forensics, Security 
management tools) 
 Network-based Tools (Firewall, IDS/IPS) 
 Incident Management and coordination (Detection, 
Analyses, Response, Recovery)  
 Profiling, Attribution and Decisions models. 
 Data mining, modelling and reporting  tools 
 Sock puppets as tools of collection, deception, 
influencing and neutralisation. 
 Scripting, penetration, hacking and exploitation  
 
 Active engagement procedures (Internal and 
External to network). 
 Denial and Deception Technologies (tarpits, 
black holes, honeynets, honeywalls, content 
staging and filling). 
 Malware analysis, engineering, reverse 
engineering and development.  
 Insider Cyber Threat Mitigation tools and 
measures.  
 Cyber Supply Chain (Allied to CCI - Threats  
and Opportunities)   
 
This subsection advanced and contoured CCI as an FCCI building block. The next subsection adds the CCI 
matrix as a further building block.  
 
4.6 Building Block 6: CCI Matrix 
Graphically the adding of the CCI matrix to the FCCI can be illustrated as follows:  
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Figure 7: Building Block 6 – Application of the CCI Matrix  
 
4.6.1 Why the building block is needed? 
Subsection 5.5 noted that CCI tools should be used in a manner best achieving CI offensive and defensive 
missions. CCI tools can seldom be pigeonholed as having only a defensive or an offensive purpose. In 
various instances they can be useful to more than one.  Furthermore, a significant part of tools can be 
deployed in an active or passive mode. To add to the complexity, effective CCI requires the integrated 
execution of offensive/active and defensive/passive modes. They can, after all, be described as different 
sides of a cube. The configuration of the CCI’s passive-active and defensive-offensive endeavour is 
complex and unique to each Organisation. In order to explain and guide this configuration, we require a 
conceptual construct as part of the FCCI.  
 
4.6.2 Some building block contours  
To meet this requirement, the FCCI advances, a four-quadrant matrix as such a conceptual construct. 
This matrix explains the defensive-offensive and active-passive CCI postures. Similar to several other 
constructs, this matrix is derived from multi-disciplinary CI. A more detailed description of the matrix as 
an FCCI building block would firstly involve the narrative description of each of the four quadrants. 
Secondly, the matrix will have to be populated with the CCI tools available, and in accordance with the CI 
needs of the Organisation. Concretely the matrix’s population entails the plotting on the matrix of CCI 
tools. Ideally, the plotting of the matrix can be informed by taxonomy of CCI tools (for a more detailed 
explanation of the matrix and taxonomy see Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2015, Duvenage & von 
Solms 2015).   
In this subsection, the CCI matrix was explicated as the FCCI’s sixth building block and we now proceed 
with introducing ‘Delineation and Cooperation’ as the next component. 
 
4.7 Building Block 7: Delineation and Cooperation 
We can illustrate the addition of ‘Delineation and Cooperation’ as the FFCI’s next building block as 
follows:  
 
 
Figure 8: Building Block 7 – Delineation and Cooperation 
 
4.7.1 Why this building block is needed? 
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By its very nature, the cyber-sphere is one of an interconnected reality.  Even with all the previous 
building blocks in place, an Organisation would seldom be able, or legally allowed, to execute the whole 
of the CCI endeavour on its own. Business entities would, for example, be legally prohibited and not 
have the resources to undertake some active-offensive cyber campaigns undertaken by nation-states. In 
a similar vein, nation-states have to cooperate with non-state actors to achieve national goals. 
Consequently and although ultimately driven by each actor’s self-centred interests, effective CCI requires 
cooperation with other actors and a delineating respective roles.  
Delineation is also important in the academic context. Treating CCI as a too wide and encompassing field 
will result in the loss of focus. Simultaneously, CCI must be clear on its relation with various other 
academic subjects and on the areas of multi-disciplinary research.  
 
4.7.2 Some building block contours  
The ‘Delineation and Cooperation’ building block typically consists of a narrative description of areas of 
cooperation. In the academic arena, comparative studies and multi-disciplinary research are useful for 
refining CCI’s focus and exploring areas of cooperation.  
In this part, we proposed ‘Delineation and Cooperation’ as the FCCI’s seventh building block. In the 
subsection to follow, we discuss the FCCI’s last building block, namely the CCI process.  
 
4.8 Building Block 8: CCI Process 
The addition of the CCI Process as the FCCI’s eighth and last building block can be depicted as follows:  
 
 
Figure 9: Building Block 8 – The Conceptual Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence  
 
4.8.1 Why this building block is needed? 
Properly contextualised, the foregoing building blocks provide all the ‘parts’ necessary to academically 
explain and practically execute CCI. At this juncture, these parts – and thus the FCCI – are still ‘static’.  
They lack the dynamism that synergistically combines and drives these different parts as an integrated 
process. Consequently, the FCCI proposes a CCI process model as its last component.  
 
4.8.2 Some building block contours 
A process model typically consists of a graphically depicted and narratively explained step-by-step 
action. Seeing that its part of Intelligence and CI, the design of the CCI process has to consider existing 
propositions on the Intelligence, CI and CCI processes. In a previous contribution, the authors evaluated 
some salient existing propositions and found that these do not sufficiently explain CCI (Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregedor 2015).  These propositions, neither “reflect the defensive and offensive 
counterintelligence thrusts” nor are they “granulated enough to serve … as an aiming point for practical 
execution or a sounding board for further academic exploration”  of a CCI process model (Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregedor 2015). The said authors proceeded with presenting the contours of a process model 
that consists of a flow diagram and a narrative description of the CCI process. This model, albeit on a 
high level, provides the contours of a workable CCI process model.  
In this section we presented our FCCI by means of progressive block-by-block construction. In the next 
section, we conclude with observations on ongoing and further research.  
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5. Conclusion  
 
This paper set out to present the approach to, and outlines of, a conceptual Framework for Cyber 
Counterintelligence (FCCI).In the ‘real world’ of cybersecurity practice, CCI is an intricate field. CCI is 
distinctive from, yet intertwined with, various other specialisation fields. Its successful execution, 
therefore, depends on diverse skillsets. Within this diversity and intricacy, we risk losing clarity and 
focus. The FCCI we advanced is hopefully a simplified notional construct with some explanatory power.  
 
The FCCI has been qualified as tentative proposition and subject to refinement. This refinement requires 
constructive  criticism and further research. Our current research is focussed on a more detailed 
explanation of the FCCI and subjecting this research to cross-disciplinary peer review. Feedback received 
so far is positive and the FCCI is currently being used as the basis for a CCI maturity model. We also 
foresee in the near future to use a considerably expanded FCCI as the basis for a multi-tiered CCI training 
programme.  
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Abstract: For state and non-state actors with sizable cyber interests, numerous breaches during this decade affirmed the 
necessity of having cyber counterintelligence (CCI) at the centre of cybersecurity efforts. Concurrent with the growing 
interest in CCI in corporate boardrooms and the corridors of governments, CCI is evolving from a field of academic enquiry 
to a distinctive academic sub-discipline. The growing body of CCI-focused literature clearly attests to this evolvement. A 
review of such literature not only has self-evident benefits for CCI’s academic progression, but is also of use to the 
increasing number of practitioners specialising or interested in this area. Attempting a comprehensive literature review 
within the confines of a conference paper will be over-ambitious and, in the case of CCI, pre-mature. Therefore, the aim 
with this paper is to submit a tentative, selective review on CCI literature. This tentative ‘bird’s eye view’ will hopefully 
provide a premise for progressing towards a more extensive and in-depth literature review.  
Keywords: cyber counterintelligence, cyber warfare, cyber security, literature, theory, denial and deception.   
 
  
1. Introduction  
For state and non-state actors with sizable cyber interests, numerous breaches during this decade affirmed the 
necessity of having cyber counterintelligence (CCI) at the centre of cybersecurity efforts. Concurrent with the 
growing interest in CCI in corporate boardrooms and the corridors of governments, CCI is evolving from a field 
of academic enquiry to a distinctive academic sub-discipline. Attesting to the growing interest in CCI is the 
expanding body of peer-reviewed, academic contributions specifically focused on CCI. These contributions 
include numerous conference papers (e.g. Sigholm & Bang 2013; Jaquire & von Solms 2017a-c; Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregidor 2016) and several completed post-graduate studies (e.g. Knowles 2013, Black 2014, Fieber  
2015, Putnam 2015, Justiniano 2017, Jaquire 2018, Duvenage 2018). As we will illustrate in this paper, 
commercial literature on CCI has equally been growing steadily. A literature review not only has self-evident 
benefits for CCI’s academic progression, but is also of use to the increasing number of practitioners specialising 
or interested in this area.  
Attempting a comprehensive literature review within the confines of a conference paper will be over-
ambitious and, in the case of CCI, pre-mature. Therefore, the aim with this paper is to submit a tentative, 
selective literature review on CCI.  To this end the paper is structured as follows: 
 Section 2 explains in more detail the purpose and benefits of a selective literature review on CCI. 
 Section 3 defines the scope and explains the nature of the selected literature review. 
 In Section 4, we present the literature review. This is done with reference to four literature 
categories, namely (1) peer-reviewed papers and articles, (2) masters and doctoral studies, (3) books 
and (4) other literature.  
 We conclude in Section 5 with key findings and recommendations.  
2. The purpose and benefits of a selective literature review for CCI  
 
There are various types of reviews which serve different purposes (Grant & Booth 2009, Mallett et al 2012, 
Kim 2018). Some of these better known examples (of review types) include: argumentative- , integrative-, 
historical-, systematic-, methodological- and theoretical reviews. From these types, systematic reviews have 
for good reasons, been gaining prominence in academic circles (cƒ. Mallett et al 2012, Grant & Booth 2009). 
While systemic reviews hold various benefits, it is an exhaustive and extensive process.  
Even for an academic sub-discipline as young as CCI, it would have been overambitious to endeavor a rigorous 
systematic review within the confines of a single conference paper. In a similar vein, we do not purport the 
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tentative overview presented in this paper to adhere to the requirements of one of the other review types. 
Instead, we follow a less formalistic and selective approach. Hopefully, this selective approach - which is 
further described in Section 3 -  produces a review that has the following value:  
 Highlight salient contributions to CCI which are of significant practical and/or academic importance.  
 Provide some contours of the state of knowledge and the key directions of CCI research. Phrased  
 Provide a 'scaffold' for identifying and positioning future research topics.  
 Because our review deals with salient research done thus far, it could provide some insight into CCI's 
academic origin, emergence and development. As is the case with other academic subjects, a self-
awareness of its origin and evolvement could contribute to consolidate CCI as a distinctive sub-
discipline.  
 Identify research projects/institutions focused on CCI and by so doing hopefully encouraging academic 
interaction in this field.  
3. Qualifying the nature and scope of the selective CCI literature review  
In the paper thus far, we emphasised the ‘selective’ nature and scope of the CCI literature review we are going 
to advance. For the review to be academic credible, we of course need to be clear on what the term ‘selective’ 
denotes. Our literature review is selective in that it limits its focus in the following three respects:  
1) We firstly deem 'available literature' as works in the public domain. Due cognisance is taken of the fact 
that state security structures internationally generate and possess CCI-relevant research and training 
material, of which some are unclassified, but not freely available. The same applies to some corporate 
entities and cybersecurity vendors which, for various considerations, do not openly share CCI material. 
For self-evident reasons, we categorically exclude from our review such material and, as far as possible, 
insights derived from such material. We secondly deem 'available literature' to refer to work published 
in English. Our search did consequently not cover untranslated CCI-research possibly published in other 
languages. 
2) Our literature review is furthermore ‘selective’ in that we predominantly focus on material which 
explicitly addresses CCI. While overlapping themes (such as cyber denial and deception, insider threat 
mitigation, cyber intelligence and cyber threat intelligence) is important to CCI, a review of such 
literature would distract from our paper’s aim. For purposes of this paper we define CCI (as the referent 
object of the literature overview) as that sub-discipline of counterintelligence (CI) " aimed at detecting, 
deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and neutralisation adversarial attempts to collect, alter or 
in any other way breach the C-I-A of valued information assets through cyber means." (Duvenage, von 
Solms & Corregedor 2016).   
 
3) Thirdly, our literature review is selective in that it does not purport be an inventory of all CCI-focused 
work within available literature. Instead, we reflect on peer-reviewed, published academic work 
featured in selected platforms, namely: Scopus, EBSCO, IEEEE Explore, Springer Link, Google Scholar and 
Proquest.  
 
4) Lastly, the literature review covers selected contributions published up to 31 January 2018.  
 
In this section we qualified the literature overview’s scope and approach. With these qualifications in mind, we 
now proceed with advancing the literature overview's structuring.  
 
4. Selective CCI literature review 
 
In order to appropriately structure our literature review, we considered the outcomes envisaged in Section 2. 
On the one hand, the conventional approach of dividing reviews per literature category (e.g. articles, papers, 
books) would arguably have been the best suited to plot existing, and to provide a scaffold for positioning 
future, CCI research.  
On the other hand, a chronological literature review would be more effective to track CCI’s academic origin 
and development. To strike a balance, we decided on an approach which incorporates a chronological thread 
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with literature type. Practically, this means that we structured the review per literature type. Since the bulk of 
academic work was produced per peer-reviewed articles and papers, we used this literature category (i.e. 
peer-reviewed articles and papers) to chronologically explain CCI's evolution. In tabulated format this can be 
depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 1: Structural approach to the selective literature review on Cyber Counterintelligence  
 
4.1 Peer-reviewed articles and papers  
 
In this section, we will address some evolutional aspects of CCI, with specific reference to peer-review articles 
and papers. Although somewhat of an over-simplification, we divided CI’s progression as a distinctive 
academic sub-discipline as follows: 
 4.1.1 Foundational phase (pre-2009) 
 4.1.2 Cyber Counterintelligence’s emergence as an academic research theme (2009 -2012) 
 4.1.3 Cyber Counterintelligence crystallisation as a distinctive academic sub-discipline  (2012 – 
present) 
4.1.1 Foundational phase (pre-2009) 
As far as we could surmise from available literature, the explicit term ‘cyber counterintelligence’ first emerged 
from the United States of America (USA) statutory security establishment during the early 2000’s (cƒ. US 2004, 
French & Kim 2009). Prior to the 2000s, however, CCI existed de facto in the statutory security establishment 
of the USA and the security structures of some other countries. In this regard, French & Kim (2009) asserts that 
“cyber CI has existed de facto since the introduction of IT to intelligence, defense, and national security and 
has grown as FISs [Foreign Intelligence Services’] have embraced cyber tradecraft.”   
Concurrent with CCI’s de facto existence in statutory security circles, a few sporadic academic articles in the 
1980 and 1990s expounded key CCI notions - although without using the actual term ‘cyber 
counterintelligence’.  Such notions included the advocating of an integrated CI approach, which not only has 
defensive and offensive missions, but also synchronises human and technical resources. The earliest peer-
reviewed article found in consulted literature referring to such application of a CI approach to the IT realm is 
contained in the electronic library of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (I.E.E.E.). This item, 
authored by Stone & Tucker (1988), is entitled ‘Counterintelligence and Unified Technical Security Programs in 
Security Technology’. The authors expound effective CI as “unified multi-disciplinary concept” consisting of 
“proactive and defensive” missions”. It is further argued that “advanced technology” is part of this multi-
disciplinary entirety and serves both “proactive” (offensive) and defensive missions. While Stone & Tucker’s 
(1988) paper centres on rectifying perceived deficiencies in the USA national CI endeavour thirty years ago, 
their key contentions on an integrated CI effort hold relevance up to this day.  
In a related further contribution in the I.E.E.E. library, Stone and Bluitt (1993) further expanded on the idea of 
executing “advanced technological countermeasures” as part of “a pervasive counterintelligence (CI) 
mandate.”  Also Stone & Bluitt (1993) directed their paper specifically at the US statutory CI effort.  
We found no articles or papers of direct CCI-relevance in consulted literature for the seven year period 1994 – 
2001. The first peer-reviewed article we identified that specifically employs the term “cyber” in conjunction 
Subsection Literature category 
4.1 Peer-reviewed articles and 
papers 
  Subsection 4.1 provides the chronological thread and 
context 
4.2 Masters’ and doctoral studies ↓ 
Subsections 4.2 – 4.4 build on the chronology provided per 
Subsection 4.1. 
4.3 Books  
4.4 Other literature  
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with “counterintelligence” appeared in a 2002 issue of the Journal of Information Warfare. As suggested by the 
title of their article ‘Dominating the attacker: Use of intelligence and counterintelligence in cyber warfare’, 
Davey & Armstrong (2002) examine Intelligence and CI's role in augmenting cyber warfare. Cyberwarfare in 
turn, is firmly positioned as a subset of Information Warfare. By “employing intelligence and 
counterintelligence techniques that are superior to those of the attacker”, argue Davey & Armstrong (2002), 
the “cyberwarfare defender” is more likely to prevail. Davy & Armstrong (2002) urge a more “aggressive” 
posture which includes deception. One such example cited, is allowing the “attacker [to] gain access to 
information that is actually incorrect, thus providing incorrect intelligence.” In respect of CCI’s conceptual 
evolvement and especially CCI's relation to cyber warfare, the contribution of Davy & Armstrong (2002) 
represents a milestone.  
As those by Stone & Tucker’s (1988) and Stone & Bluitt (1993), the work of Davey & Armstrong’s (2002) was 
part of CCI’s foundational phase which, if gauged by academic publications, was characterised by a few 
sporadic contributions. In as far as consulted literature go, no CCI-relevant publications appear for the next five 
years (2002-2008)  
4.1.2 Cyber Counterintelligence’s emergence as a research theme (2009 -2012) 
In contrast to the sporadic foundational phase, 2009 marked CCI’s emergence as a specific research theme 
attracting growing interest. In that year a seminal article appeared in the launch edition of the National 
Intelligence Journal (French & Kim 2009). This was the first academic publication (in consulted literature) to 
use the term "cyber counterintelligence". In this article, entitled ‘Acknowledging the revolution: The urgent 
need for cyber counterintelligence’, French & Kim (2009) called on the US intelligence community to move 
away move away from the notion that CCI is mostly part of “defensive Information Warfare”. Instead, French 
& Kim (2009) urged the USA to be more active and offensive in its approach to CCI. The work's relevance 
extends beyond the USA context. French & Kim (2009) explicitly define CCI, explain CCI’s missions within the 
context of CI, and offer various other insights on aspects useful to the further development within this field. 
Such aspects include the role of CCI in information warfare, critical infrastructure protection, and the CCI 
process and strategy.  
The fact that we found no other peer-reviewed articles and papers in consulted literature for the 2009-2012 
period, belies CCI’s emergence as a research theme for two reasons. Firstly, as we shall show in Sections 4.2 – 
4.4 of this paper, a constant stream of CCI contributions emerged in other literature categories during this 
period. Secondly, the nature and extent of academic contributions on CCI from 2013 onward, strongly suggest 
that CCI attracted research interest in the preceding years (2009-2012).  
4.1.3 Cyber Counterintelligence crystallisation as an academic sub-discipline  (2013 – present)  
As from 2013, the concurrent and consistent publication of numerous peer-reviewed papers and articles 
signalled CCI’s emergence as an academic sub-discipline with significant contributions from researchers in the 
USA, Sweden and South Africa. 
The bulk of academic contributions from the USA stemmed from Utica College’s Master of Science 
Cybersecurity programme which offers CCI as a specialisation subject. This programme resulted in several 
“capstone project” papers (comparable to mini-dissertations in other countries) as well as a thesis, with CCI as 
a specific focus (Knowles 2013, Black 2014, Fieber 2015, Putnam 2015, Justiniano 2017). Since these 
contributions flow from a Master’s programme, they are later discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. Suffice 
to state here that this Utica research constitutes indispensable contributions to CCI on the conceptual, 
theoretical and praxis.  
Albeit considerably more limited in scope than the research in the USA, papers delivered at two I.E.E.E. 
endorsed conferences in 2013 reflected growing interest also outside the USA. In August 2013, at the 
European Intelligence & Security Informatics Conference in Sweden, Sigholm and Bang’s (2013) submitted a 
paper entitled ‘Towards offensive cyber counterintelligence: Adopting a target-centric view on advanced 
persistent threats.’ Moving from a statutory military perspective, the paper is primarily aimed to advance a 
“comprehensive process that bridges the gap between the various actors involved in CCI”. Sigholm & Bang 
(2013) present this model to specifically configure the “offensive CCI attribution process”. The model 
essentially consists of an all-source information flow and analysis architecture to be employed for attribution 
purposes.  
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 On the heels of Sigholm & Bang in 2013, Duvenage & von Solms (2013) presented ‘The case for cyber 
counterintelligence’ at the 5th International Conference on Adaptive Science and Technology hosted in South 
Africa. The paper defines key CCI concepts and advance conceptual constructs which explain CCI and its 
relation to CI.  
Duvenage & von Solms’ (2013) paper formed parts of a dedicated CCI research project initiated at the 
University of Johannesburg’s Cybersecurity Centre (UJCC) from which several other contributions would follow 
(University of Johannesburg, 2018). UJCC’s website describes the project’s aim as establishing CCI as a multi-
disciplinary field of academic enquiry within the South African context (University of Johannesburg, 2018). To 
this end, the UJCC project pursues two complementary, yet parallel research streams, aimed respectively at 
(1)  Designing an overarching framework for conceptualising and explicating CCI as a distinctive academic 
field of enquiry, and: 
(2)  Develop a framework for a CCI maturity model for application by state and non-state actors within 
developing countries.  
Building on Duvenage & von Solms (2013), UJCC’s first research stream progressively advanced conceptual 
constructs to academically explain what CCI is, how it works and how it dovetails with other academic 
disciplines and theory. Such notional constructs, include a CCI-posture matrix model, CCI process model as well 
as a taxonomy of CCI tactics, tools, techniques and procedures (TTTPs). These notional constructs were 
submitted per the following peer-reviewed papers and a journal article:   
 Duvenage & von Solms (2014) ‘Putting counterintelligence in cyber counterintelligence’ in Published 
Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Piraeus, Greece.  
 Duvenage & von Solms (2015) ‘Cyber counterintelligence: Back to the future’ in the Journal of 
Information Warfare.   
 Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor (2015) ‘The cyber counterintelligence process – a conceptual 
overview and theoretical proposition’ in the Published Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on 
Cyber Warfare and Security, Hatfield, United Kingdom.   
 Duvenage, Jaquire, & von Solms (2016) ‘Conceptualising cyber counterintelligence – Two tentative 
building blocks’ in the Published Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Munich, Germany. 
 Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms (2017) ‘A conceptual framework for cyber counterintelligence – theory 
that really matters!’ in Published Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Dublin, Ireland. 
UJCC’s second research stream, to recapitulate, aims to develop a CCI maturity model with emphasis on 
governments and non-state actors in emerging countries (University of Johannesburg, 2018). Peer-reviewed 
papers presented in this regard are as follow: 
 Jaquire & von Solms (2017a) ‘Towards a cyber counterintelligence maturity model’ in the Published 
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Wright State 
University, Air Force Institute of Technology, Dayton (US).   
 Jaquire & von Solms (2017b) ‘Developing a cyber counterintelligence maturity model for developing 
countries’ in the Published Proceedings of the 2017 IST–Africa Conference, Windhoek, Namibia.  
 Jaquire & von Solms (2017c) ‘Cultivating a cyber counterintelligence maturity model’ in Published 
Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Dublin, Ireland.  
In this section we examined CCI’s the academic evolvement at the hand of an overview of peer-reviewed 
articles and papers. In the next section, we explore masters and doctoral research focused on CCI.  
4.2 Masters and doctoral studies 
The search term ‘cyber counterintelligence’ (and variations thereof) showed numerous masters and doctoral 
studies of possible relevance to our CCI literature review. On closer analysis, however, most of these studies 
do not have CCI as a primary focus and CCI is not explored in depth. Instead, CCI is cursory referred to as part 
of the broader statutory CI mandate and mostly addressed within challenges faced by the USA Intelligence 
Petrus Duvenage, Victor Jaquire and Sebastian von Solms 
 
278 
 
community. Ferguson’s (2012) thesis entitled Increasing the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence: Domestic 
and international micro-restructuring initiatives to mitigate cyber espionage serves as one such example.   
Bucking this trend, Masters studies completed at Utica College from 2013 onwards delivered contributions 
which are pioneering and invaluable in respect of CCI’s academic crystallisation and evolvement.  As was noted 
earlier, these studies are mostly “capstone projects”. While also conducted within the context of USA national 
interests and security, these studies have application and academic relevance wider than the USA. On the 
whole, important contributions are made to explicating CCI on the conceptual, theoretical and praxis levels. 
The following are some examples: 
 In his research entitled Applying computer network operations for offensive counterintelligence 
efforts, Knowles (2013) identifies key aspects of Computer Network Operations (CNO). These aspects 
are then aligned with the broader intelligence and CI processes. In so doing “counterintelligence skills 
and techniques” are leveraged to “assimilate cyber activities” into an organisation’s Intelligence 
endeavor.   
 Effective CCI, argues Black (2014), is multidisciplinary and involves unique skill sets. In his thesis, 
entitled The complexity of cyber counterintelligence training, Black (2014) proceeds with identifying 
the implications thereof for CCI training. Black then advances two useful notional constructs namely 
(1) a CCI training model and (2) a CCI training proficiency path. 
 As suggested by the research title, Putnam’s (2015) Digital mirrors casting cyber shadows - the 
confluence of cyber technology, psychology, and counterintelligence emphasizes CCI’s 
multidisciplinary nature. Putnam (2015) points out that a successful CI (and thus CCI) programme 
should consider the opportunities that technology presents as well as certain psychological “principles 
of persuasions” and motivation. The study details some offensive and defensive CCI applications of 
these opportunities and principles. Emphasis is placed in this regard on optimizing the CCI targeting 
and the recruitment processes.  
 The interplay between practice and theory which characterises Utica College’s research is reflected in 
Fieber’s (2015) commendable contribution The Iranian computer network operations threat to U.S. 
critical infrastructures. Fieber (2015) analyses “the Iranian computer network operations (CNO) threat 
to U.S. critical infrastructures” and proceeds with recommending defensive measures to mitigate this 
threat. The paper culminates in a handy proposition on a phased, CCI process model “designed to 
mitigate conditions favorable to the attacker and restore the advantage to the organizational 
defenders.” 
 In a further outstanding and pioneering contribution, Justiniano (2017), with the research title 
Advancing the capacity of a theatre special operations command (TSOC) to counter hybrid warfare 
threats in the cyber gray zone, examines CCI's role in the USA military milieu while focused on the 
hybrid threats posed by Russia and the role of CCI in mitigating and engaging this threat, Justiniano’s 
(2017) research is indispensable reading for examining CCI’s role in hybrid warfare more generally. 
The study identifies critical CCI roles and skillsets before proceeding to propositions on integrating CCI 
with the USA Cyber Mission Assurance (C-MA) process in a manner supportive of Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC).  
Although the bulk of post-graduate CCI studies in consulted literature originated from Utica College’s Masters 
programme, the research project of the University of Johannesburg’s Cyber Security Centre (UJCC) mentioned 
earlier, recently resulted in a Masters dissertation and Doctor's thesis focussing on CCI. These studies, which 
mirror UJCC’s two CCI research streams (discussed in Subsection 4.1.3) are as follow: 
 Jaquire (2018) A framework for a cyber counterintelligence maturity model, unpublished Doctor of 
Commerce thesis, University of Johannesburg.  
 Duvenage (2018) A conceptual framework for cyber counterintelligence, unpublished Master of 
Commerce dissertation, University of Johannesburg.  
In this subsection, we examined academic peer-reviewed literature on CCI. In the next section, we examine 
books published on the subject.  
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4.3 Books 
The past two decades has seen an exponential rise in the number of books from reputable publishers dealing 
with aspects of cybersecurity. However, even outstanding books which address aspects of high relevance to 
CCI, make scant reference to CI and CCI. One such recent example is Heckman et al's (2015) Cyber denial, 
deception and counter deception – A framework for supporting active cyber defense. Despite this work 
arguably setting the standard for future works on cyber denial and deception in general, only four sentences in 
the entire book mentions the term 'counterintelligence' and there is no mention of ‘cyber counterintelligence’.  
In our search, we identified only one book which specifically and substantially focuses on CCI. This benchmark 
work was first published in 2012 with the title Reverse deception – Organized cyber threat counter-exploitation 
(Bodmer et al. 2012). Pitched as practicable guide for "IT security professionals”, this book is also highly 
significant from an academic perspective. The book comprehensively examines the role of CCI in countering 
cyber threats through the engagement of hostile actors. In addition to CCI tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTTPs), the authors explore CCI on a conceptual level. This includes postulations on CI missions, the CCI 
interface with CI and Intelligence, and other Intelligence fields. In nutshell, Bodmer et al (2012) is essential 
reading for any researcher interested in CCI.  
4.4 Other literature   
As with books, other forms of literature dealing with cybersecurity are continuing their sharp increase. 
Especially during the past eight years, there has been an upsurge in literature dealing with “threat 
intelligence”, “cyber intelligence” and “cyber threat intelligence” (Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor 2015). 
This is in part fuelled by cybersecurity vendors which are increasingly modelling their products and services on 
concepts derived from the state security and intelligence realms. In contrast to the bourgeoning discourse on 
for example threat intelligence and cyber intelligence, contributions to CCI are scarce but growing. In the main, 
contributions offer high-level explanations of what CCI is and point to the advantages that CCI practices could 
have in proactively addressing cyber insecurity. While ‘commercial’, such works nonetheless contribute to 
explicating CCI in concrete terms and, in some instances, are consequently also of academic value. Of such 
works, those by Lee (2014) and Bardin (2011), need to be singled out. The following examples of article 
headlines give a sense of the nature of contributions in commercial online literature: 
 ‘Cyber counter intelligence’, in Defense Tech Magazine (Carrol 2009). 
 ‘Ten commandments of cyber counterintelligence’ by Bardin (2011), first featured on the IDG News 
Service's online platform CSO Online.  
 ‘Offensive counter-intelligence and cyberwarfare – A paradigm shift in information security’ on the 
Information System Control and Audit Association (ISACA) website (Farchi 2012). 
 ‘To thwart hackers, firms salting their servers with fake data’, in The Washington Post (Nakashima 
2013) 
 ‘Cyber counter-intelligence makes a difference’, featured on the South African ITWeb website (von 
Solms 2014).  
 ‘Cyber counterintelligence: From theory to practice’ by Lee (2014), first published on the website of 
the cybersecurity vendor Tripwire.  
 ‘Shifting paradigms: The case for cyber counter-intelligence’, in InformationWeek (Firestone 2015). 
 ‘Counter-intelligence techniques may help firms protect themselves against cyber-attacks’, published 
in The Economist (2015). 
In this subsection, we cited some examples of commercial literature on CCI. In section to follow, we conclude 
the paper with key findings and suggestion on further research.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper advanced a tentative, selective literature review on CCI. This review shows CCI to have evolved, in 
less than a decade, from a research theme to a distinctive academic sub-discipline. In as far as consulted 
literature is concerned; the bulk of academic CCI research was conducted at Utica College and the University of 
Johannesburg. The nature and focus of these institutions’ CCI research is inevitably influenced by the 
respective contexts of a super power and an emerging mid-income country. Perhaps as a result of these 
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differences, the work done is complementary in several respects. Collectively, the research covers diverse 
topics ranging from general theory and conceptualisation; to CCI training, process models, maturity 
frameworks as well as CCI’s application to the military sphere.  
Although it is gaining traction internationally, CCI is still in its academic infancy and thus offers numerous 
exciting research opportunities. There is, for example, especially a need for extensive research into CCI’s 
interface with other academic disciplines. In addition, a comprehensive literature review, much broader in 
scope than this paper, will be an invaluable tool for CCI’s progression.   
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Abstract: For those connecting the dots, the threat landscape continues to affirm the 
necessity of having Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) at the centre of cybersecurity efforts. 
Concurrent with the growing interest in CCI in corporate boardrooms and the corridors of 
governments, CCI is evolving from a field of academic enquiry to a distinctive academic sub-
discipline. The growing body of CCI-focused literature clearly attests to this evolution. A 
review of such literature has self-evident academic and practical benefits. This article 
advances a tentative, selective review of CCI literature that demonstrates the need for a more 
extensive and in-depth appraisal. 
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Introduction 
For state and non-state actors with sizable cyber interests, numerous breaches during this 
decade have affirmed the necessity of having Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) at the centre 
of cybersecurity efforts (Prunckun 2018; Stech & Heckman 2018; The Economist 2015). 
Concurrent with the growing interest in CCI in corporate boardrooms and in the corridors of 
governments, CCI is evolving from a field of academic enquiry to a distinctive academic sub-
discipline. Attesting to the growing interest in CCI is the expanding body of peer-reviewed, 
academic contributions specifically focused on CCI. These contributions include numerous 
conference papers (such as Sigholm & Bang 2013; Jaquire & von Solms 2017a-c; Duvenage, 
von Solms & Corregedor 2015) and several completed post-graduate studies (for example 
Knowles 2013; Black 2014; Fieber 2015; Putnam 2015; Justiniano 2017; Jaquire 2018; 
Duvenage 2018). As will be shown in this article, commercial literature on CCI has also been 
growing sharply in recent years. 
 
A literature review not only has self-evident benefits for CCI’s academic progress, but it will 
also be useful to the increasing number of practitioners specialising or interested in this area. 
Attempting a comprehensive and representative literature review within the confines of a 
single journal article will be over-ambitious. Moreover, in the case of a field as young as 
CCI, such an extensive review would arguably be pre-mature. Therefore, the article’s aim is 
to submit a tentative, selective literature review on CCI. Such a pilot literature review reveals 
the need for a much more comprehensive and inclusive appraisal of CCI literature. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: 
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 First, the purpose and benefits of a selective literature review on CCI are discussed in 
more detail. 
 Secondly, the scope and the nature of the selective literature review are defined. 
 Subsequently, the literature review is presented with reference to four literature 
categories, namely (1) peer-reviewed papers and articles, (2) masters’ and doctoral 
studies, (3) books and (4) other literature. 
 Finally, the conclusion submits key findings and observations regarding the way 
forward. 
 
The Purpose and Benefits of a Selective Literature Review on CCI 
Within academic research in general, there are various types of literature reviews which serve 
different purposes (Grant & Booth 2009; Mallett et al. 2012; Kim 2018). Some better-known 
examples (of review types) include: argumentative-, integrative-, historical-, systematic-, 
methodological- and theoretical reviews. From these types, systematic reviews have, for good 
reasons, been gaining prominence in academic circles (Mallett et al. 2012; Grant & Booth 
2009). While a systemic review has many benefits, its compilation is an exhaustive and 
extensive process. 
 
As suggested earlier, even for an academic sub-discipline as young as CCI, it would have 
been over-ambitious at this stage to endeavour to create a rigorous systematic review of CCI 
literature and to present the outcome thereof in a single journal article. In a similar vein, the 
tentative overview presented in this paper does not purport to adhere to the requirements of 
one of the other review types cited above. Instead, the article follows a less formalistic and 
selective approach in its review of CCI literature. This selective approach—further scoped 
and qualified in the next section (‘Qualifying the Nature and Scope of the Selective CCI 
Literature Review’)—provides a number of benefits: 
 
 It highlights salient contributions to CCI that are of significant practical and/or 
academic importance; 
 It provides some contours of the state of knowledge and the key directions of CCI 
research; 
 It establishes a 'scaffold' for identifying and positioning future research topics; 
 It provides a premise for a more comprehensive, systematic CCI literature survey; 
 Because it deals with salient research done thus far, it offers an insight into CCI's 
academic origin, emergence, and development. As is the case with other academic 
subjects, such a self-awareness of origin and evolution could contribute to 
consolidating CCI as a distinctive sub-discipline; and  
 It identifies research projects/institutions focused on CCI and, by so doing, 
encourages academic interaction in this field. 
 
Qualifying the Nature and Scope of the Selective CCI Literature Review 
This article has thus far emphasised the ‘selective’ nature and scope of the CCI literature 
review to be advanced. For the review to be academically credible, the meaning of the word 
‘selective’ needs to be clarified. The review of literature advanced in this article is selective 
in that it limits its focus in the following five respects: 
 
1) 'Available literature' is deemed as works in the public domain. Due cognisance is 
taken of the fact that state security structures internationally generate and possess 
CCI-relevant research and training material, some of which is unclassified but not 
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freely available. The same applies to some corporate entities and cybersecurity 
vendors that, for various reasons, do not openly share CCI material. Such material is 
categorically excluded from this review. 
2) ‘Available literature' is secondly deemed as referring to work published in English. 
The search which informed the review did not cover untranslated CCI-research 
possibly published in other languages. 
3) The literature review is furthermore ‘selective’ in that it predominantly focuses on 
material which explicitly addresses CCI. While overlapping themes (such as cyber 
denial and deception, insider threat mitigation, cyber intelligence, and cyber threat 
intelligence) are important to CCI, a review of such literature would distract from the 
article's aim. For purposes of the article, CCI—which constitutes the literature 
overview's referent object—is defined as that sub-discipline of counterintelligence 
(CI) "aimed at detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and 
neutralis[ing] adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-
A of valued information assets through cyber means" (Duvenage, von Solms & 
Corregedor 2015). 
4) The literature review is selective in that it does not purport be an inventory of all 
CCI-focused work. Instead, in terms of academic works, the review reflects on peer-
reviewed, published work featured in selected platforms, namely Scopus, EBSCO, 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Explore, Springer Link, 
Google Scholar, and Proquest. 
5) Lastly, the literature review only covers selected contributions published as of 30 
April 2018. 
 
Moving from the foregoing calibration of the CCI literature overview’s selective scope, the 
next section explains the structural approach to be followed. 
 
Structural Approach to the Selective CCI Literature Review 
A literature review should, of course, be structured in a manner optimally achieving its aim 
and benefits. Given this literature review’s earlier discussed aim and benefits, structuring the 
review per either (a) literature category or (b) chronology of publication was considered. On 
the one hand, the conventional approach of dividing reviews per literature category (such as 
articles, masters’ and doctoral studies, books) would arguably have been the best suited to 
plot existing and to provide a scaffold for positioning future CCI research. On the other hand, 
a chronological literature review would be more effective to convey CCI’s academic origin 
and development. To draw on the advantages both these styles offer, this article opted for a 
hybrid approach which incorporates a chronological thread with literature type. Practically, 
this means that the review overall is structured per the literature categories, namely peer-
reviewed articles and papers, masters’ and doctoral studies, books, and other literature. 
However, since the bulk of CCI academic work was produced per peer-reviewed articles and 
papers, this literature category (peer-reviewed articles and papers) is presented 
chronologically in order to convey CCI's origin and evolution. 
 
This hybrid structural approach to the selective CCI literature review is depicted in Figure 1, 
below. 
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Figure 1: Structural approach to the selective literature review on Cyber Counterintelligence 
 
Peer-Reviewed Articles and Papers 
In line with Figure 1, this section enumerates CCI’s evolution with specific reference to 
peer-reviewed articles and papers. Although somewhat of an over-simplification, CCI’s 
progression as a distinctive academic sub-discipline consists of the following phases: 
 
 Foundational phase (pre-2009), 
 Phase in which Cyber Counterintelligence’s emerged as an academic research theme 
(2009-2012), 
 Current stage in which Cyber Counterintelligence crystallised into a distinctive 
academic sub-discipline (2012-present). 
 
Foundational phase (pre-20 
As far as could be surmised from available literature, the explicit term ‘Cyber 
Counterintelligence’ first emerged in the United States of America (U.S.) statutory security 
establishment during the early 2000s (see U.S. 2004; French & Kim 2009). Prior to the 
2000s, however, CCI was practiced in the statutory security establishment of the U.S. and the 
security structures of some other countries. In this regard, French and Kim (2009) rightly 
assert that “cyber CI has existed de facto since the introduction of IT to intelligence, defence, 
and national security and has grown as FISs [Foreign Intelligence Services] have embraced 
cyber tradecraft”. 
 
Concurrent with CCI’s de facto existence in statutory security circles, a few sporadic 
academic articles in the 1980s and 1990s expounded key CCI notions—although without 
using the actual term ‘Cyber Counterintelligence’. Such notions included advocating for an 
integrated CI approach, which not only has defensive and offensive missions, but which also 
synchronises human and technical resources. The earliest peer-reviewed article found in 
consulted literature referring to such application of a CI approach to the IT realm is contained 
in the electronic library of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This 
item, authored by Stone and Tucker (1988), is entitled ‘Counterintelligence and unified 
technical security programs in security technology’. The authors expound effective CI as a 
“unified multi-disciplinary concept” consisting of “proactive and defensive” missions. Stone 
and Tucker (1988) further argue that “advanced technology” is part of the multi-disciplinary 
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CI entirety and thus serves both “proactive” (offensive) and defensive missions. While Stone 
and Tucker’s (1988) paper centres on rectifying perceived deficiencies in the U.S. national CI 
endeavour thirty years ago, their key contentions regarding an integrated CI effort are still 
relevant today. 
 
In a related further contribution in the IEEE library, Stone and Bluitt (1993) further expanded 
on the idea of executing “advanced technological countermeasures” as part of “a pervasive 
counterintelligence (CI) mandate”. Also, Stone and Bluitt (1993) directed their paper 
specifically at the U.S. statutory CI effort. 
 
No articles or papers of direct CCI-relevance were found in consulted literature for the seven-
year period from 1994 through 2001. The first peer-reviewed article that specifically employs 
the term “cyber” in conjunction with “counterintelligence” appeared in a 2002 issue of the 
Journal of Information Warfare. As suggested by the title of the article, ‘Dominating the 
attacker: Use of intelligence and counterintelligence in cyber warfare’, Davey and Armstrong 
(2002) examined Intelligence and CI's role in augmenting cyber warfare. Cyberwarfare, in 
turn, is firmly positioned as a subset of Information Warfare. By “employing intelligence and 
counterintelligence techniques that are superior to those of the attacker”, argue Davey and 
Armstrong (2002), the “cyberwarfare defender” is more likely to prevail. Davy and 
Armstrong (2002) urge a more “aggressive” posture that includes deception. One such 
example cited includes allowing the “attacker [to] gain access to information that is actually 
incorrect, thus providing incorrect intelligence”. In respect to CCI’s conceptual evolution and 
especially CCI's relation to cyber warfare, the contribution of Davy and Armstrong (2002) 
represents a milestone. 
 
Like the work of Stone and Tucker (1988) and Stone and Bluitt (1993), Davey and 
Armstrong’s 2002 article was part of CCI’s foundational phase which, if gauged by academic 
publications, was characterised by only a few sporadic contributions. In as far as consulted 
literature goes, no CCI-relevant publications appear for the next five years (2002-2008). 
 
Cyber Counterintelligence’s emergence as a research theme (2009 -2012) 
Following a sporadic foundational phase, 2009 marked CCI’s emergence as a specific 
research theme attracting growing interest. In that year, a seminal article appeared in the 
launch edition of the National Intelligence Journal (French & Kim 2009). This was the first 
academic publication (in consulted literature) to use the term “Cyber Counterintelligence”. In 
‘Acknowledging the revolution: The urgent need for Cyber Counterintelligence’, French and 
Kim (2009) call on the U.S. intelligence community to move away from the notion that CCI 
is mostly part of “defensive Information Warfare”. Instead, French and Kim (2009) urge the 
U.S. to be more active and offensive in its approach to CCI. The work's relevance extends 
beyond the U.S. context. French and Kim (2009) explicitly define CCI, explain CCI’s 
missions within the context of CI, and offer various other insights on aspects useful to the 
further development within this field. Such aspects include the role of CCI in information 
warfare, critical infrastructure protection, and the CCI process and strategy. 
 
No other peer-reviewed articles and papers were found in consulted literature for the 2009 
through 2012 period. It must, however, be emphasised strongly that the absence of academic 
articles on CCI in consulted literature belies CCI’s emergence as a research theme for three 
reasons. First, there were several CCI contributions during this period in other literature 
categories (see subsequent section entitled ‘Other literature’) and in publications not covered 
by this article’s selective review. (See, for example, U.S. Naval War College 2018, 
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“Counterintelligence: Cyber Threat”.) Thirdly, the nature and extent of academic 
contributions regarding CCI from 2013 onward strongly suggest that CCI attracted research 
interest in the preceding years (2009-2012). Phrased differently, research was done in the 
2009-2012 timeframe, but the fruits thereof, in the main, are only reflected from 2013 
onward. 
 
Cyber Counterintelligence crystallisation as an academic sub-discipline 
(2013-present) 
From 2013, a consistent stream of peer-reviewed papers and articles signalled CCI’s 
emergence as an academic sub-discipline with significant contributions in English from 
researchers in the U.S., Sweden, and South Africa. 
 
The bulk of academic contributions from the U.S. stemmed from Utica College’s Master of 
Science Cybersecurity programme that offers CCI as a specialisation subject. This 
programme resulted in several “capstone project” papers (comparable to mini-dissertations in 
other countries) as well as a thesis, with CCI as a specific focus (Knowles 2013; Black 2014; 
Fieber 2015; Putnam 2015; Justiniano 2017). Since these contributions flow from a master’s 
programme, they are discussed in more detail in a later section, which focuses on masters’ 
and doctoral studies). Suffice to state here that this Utica research constitutes indispensable 
contributions to CCI on the conceptual, theoretical, and praxis levels. 
 
Also, in recent years in the U.S., the concept of CCI has attracted interest from researchers at 
the Mitre Corporation. Branching out from their leading research on denial and deception in 
active cyber defence, the “applications of cyber counterintelligence” to “cyber defense” was 
subsequently examined (Heckman et al. 2015; Stech & Heckman 2018). Flowing from this 
research, Stech and Heckman (2018) contribute a book chapter, which is a undoubtedly one 
of the most incisive and significant works on CCI to date. (This contribution is discussed in 
more detail under ‘Books’.) 
 
Albeit considerably more limited in scope than the research in the U.S., papers delivered at 
two IEEE-endorsed conferences in 2013 reflected growing interest also outside the U.S. In 
August 2013, at the European Intelligence & Security Informatics Conference in Sweden, 
Sigholm and Bang (2013) submitted a paper entitled ‘Towards offensive cyber 
counterintelligence: Adopting a target-centric view on advanced persistent threats’. Coming 
from a statutory military perspective, the paper is primarily aimed to advance a 
“comprehensive process that bridges the gap between the various actors involved in CCI”. 
Sigholm and Bang (2013) present this model to specifically configure the “offensive CCI 
attribution process”. The model essentially consists of all-source information flow and 
analysis architecture to be employed for attribution purposes. 
 
On the heels of Sigholm & Bang in 2013, Duvenage & von Solms (2013) presented ‘The case 
for cyber counterintelligence’ at the 5th International Conference on Adaptive Science and 
Technology in South Africa. The paper defines key CCI concepts and advances conceptual 
constructs which explain CCI and its relation to CI. 
 
Duvenage and von Solms’ (2013) paper formed part of a dedicated CCI research project 
initiated at the University of Johannesburg’s Cybersecurity Centre (UJCC) from which 
several other contributions would follow (University of Johannesburg 2018). UJCC’s website 
describes the project’s aim as establishing CCI as a multi-disciplinary field of academic 
enquiry within the South African context (University of Johannesburg 2018). To this end, the 
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UJCC project pursues two complementary yet parallel research streams, aimed respectively 
at: 
 
1) Designing an overarching framework for conceptualising and explicating CCI as a 
distinctive academic field of enquiry, and; 
2) developing a framework for a CCI maturity model for application by state and non-
state actors within developing countries. 
 
Building on Duvenage and von Solms’ 2013 contribution, UJCC’s first research stream 
progressively advanced conceptual constructs to explain (in an academic context) what CCI 
is, how it works, and how it dovetails with other academic disciplines and theory. Such 
notional constructs include a CCI-posture matrix model and a CCI process model, as well as 
a taxonomy of CCI Tactics, Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTTPs). These notional 
constructs were submitted per the following peer-reviewed papers and a journal article: 
 
 Duvenage and von Solms (2014), ‘Putting counterintelligence in cyber 
counterintelligence’ in Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security, Piraeus, Greece. 
 Duvenage and von Solms (2015), ‘Cyber counterintelligence: Back to the future’ in 
the Journal of Information Warfare. 
 Duvenage, von Solms, and Corregedor (2015), ‘The cyber counterintelligence process 
– a conceptual overview and theoretical proposition’ in Proceedings of the 14th 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Hatfield, UK. 
 Duvenage, Jaquire, and von Solms (2016), ‘Conceptualising cyber counterintelligence 
– two tentative building blocks’ in Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on 
Cyber Warfare and Security, Munich, DE. 
 Duvenage, Sithole, and von Solms (2017), ‘A conceptual framework for cyber 
counterintelligence—theory that really matters!’, Proceedings of the 16th European 
Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Dublin, Ireland. 
 
UJCC’s second research stream, to recapitulate, aims to develop a CCI maturity model with 
emphasis on governments and non-state actors in emerging countries (University of 
Johannesburg 2018). Peer-reviewed papers presented in this regard are as follow: 
 
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017a), ‘Towards a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model’, in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Wright State University, Air Force Institute of Technology, Dayton, OH, 
U.S. 
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017b), ‘Developing a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model for developing countries’ in Proceedings of the 2017 IST–Africa Conference, 
Windhoek, Namibia. 
 Jaquire and von Solms (2017c), ‘Cultivating a cyber counterintelligence maturity 
model’ in Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and 
Security, Dublin, Ireland. 
 
This section examined CCI’s academic evolution via an overview of peer-reviewed articles 
and papers. The next section explores contributions to the field in the form of masters’ and 
doctoral research. 
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Masters’ and Doctoral Studies 
The search term ‘Cyber Counterintelligence’ (and variations thereof) showed numerous 
masters’ and doctoral studies of possible relevance to a CCI literature review. On closer 
analysis, however, most of these studies do not have CCI as a primary focus, and CCI is not 
explored in depth. Instead, CCI is cursorily referred to as part of the broader statutory CI 
mandate and mostly addressed within challenges faced by the U.S. Intelligence community. 
Ferguson’s (2012) thesis entitled Increasing the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence: 
Domestic and international micro-restructuring initiatives to mitigate cyber espionage serves 
as one such example. 
 
Bucking this trend, masters’ studies completed at Utica College from 2013 onwards delivered 
contributions that are pioneering and invaluable with respect to the academic crystallisation 
and evolution of CCI. As was noted earlier, these studies are mostly “capstone projects”. 
Also conducted within the context of U.S. national interests and security, these studies have 
much broader application and academic relevance than just in the U.S. Overall, important 
contributions have been made to explicating CCI on the conceptual, theoretical, and praxis 
levels. The following are some examples: 
 
 In his research entitled Applying computer network operations for offensive 
counterintelligence efforts, Knowles (2013) identifies key aspects of Computer 
Network Operations (CNO). These aspects are then aligned with the broader 
intelligence and CI processes. In so doing, “counterintelligence skills and techniques” 
are leveraged to “assimilate cyber activities” into an organisation’s Intelligence 
endeavour. 
 Effective CCI, argues Black (2014), is multidisciplinary and involves unique skill 
sets. In his thesis, entitled The complexity of cyber counterintelligence training, Black 
proceeds with identifying the implications thereof for CCI training. Black then 
advances two useful notional constructs, namely (1) a CCI training model and (2) a 
CCI training proficiency path. 
 As suggested by the research title, Putnam’s (2015) Digital mirrors casting cyber 
shadows - The confluence of cyber technology, psychology, and counterintelligence 
emphasises CCI’s multidisciplinary nature. Putnam points out that a successful CI 
(and thus CCI) programme should consider the opportunities that technology presents 
as well as certain psychological “principles of persuasions” and motivation. The study 
details some offensive and defensive CCI applications of these opportunities and 
principles. Emphasis is placed in this regard on optimizing the CCI targeting and the 
recruitment processes. 
 The interplay between practice and theory which characterises Utica College’s 
research is reflected in Fieber’s (2015) commendable contribution: The Iranian 
computer network operations threat to U.S. critical infrastructures. Fieber analyses 
“the Iranian computer network operations (CNO) threat to U.S. critical 
infrastructures” and proceeds with recommending defensive measures to mitigate this 
threat. The paper culminates in a handy proposition on a phased, CCI process model 
“designed to mitigate conditions favorable to the attacker and restore the advantage to 
the organizational defenders” (Fieber 2015). 
 Justiniano’s 2017 outstanding and pioneering contribution, entitled Advancing the 
capacity of a theatre special operations command (TSOC) to counter hybrid warfare 
threats in the cyber gray zone, examines CCI's role in the U.S. military milieu with a 
focus on the hybrid threats posed by Russia and the role of CCI in mitigating and 
engaging this threat. Justiniano’s (2017) research is indispensable reading for 
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examining CCI’s role in hybrid warfare more generally. The study identifies critical 
CCI roles and skillsets before proceeding to propositions on integrating CCI with the 
U.S. “Cyber Mission Assurance (C-MA)” process in a manner supportive of “Theater 
Special Operations Command (TSOC)”. 
 
Although the bulk of post-graduate CCI studies in consulted literature originated from Utica 
College’s Master’s programme, the research project of the University of Johannesburg’s 
Cyber Security Centre (UJCC), mentioned earlier, recently resulted in a master’s dissertation 
and doctoral thesis focussing on CCI. These studies, which mirror UJCC’s two CCI research 
streams (discussed in the article’s previous section), are as follow: 
 
 Jaquire (2018) A framework for a cyber counterintelligence maturity model, Doctor of 
Commerce thesis, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 Duvenage (2018) A conceptual framework for cyber counterintelligence, Master of 
Commerce dissertation, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 
The preceding two sections focused on academic, peer-reviewed literature—which ranges 
from papers and articles to masters’ and doctoral studies. In the next section, books published 
on CCI are reviewed. 
 
Books 
The past two decades has seen an exponential rise in the number of books from reputable 
publishers dealing with aspects of cybersecurity. However, until very recently, even 
outstanding books that address aspects of high relevance to CCI make scant reference to CI 
and CCI. One such example is Heckman et al.’s (2015) Cyber denial, deception and counter 
deception – A framework for supporting active cyber defense. Despite the likelihood that this 
work sets the standard for future works on cyber denial and deception in general, only four 
sentences in the entire book mention the term 'counterintelligence', and there is no mention of 
‘Cyber Counterintelligence’. 
 
The first book identified by the survey conducted for this article that has a significant CCI 
focus was published in 2012 with the title Reverse deception—Organized cyber threat 
counter-exploitation (Bodmer et al. 2012). Pitched as a practical guide for “IT security 
professionals”, this text is highly significant from an academic perspective. The book 
comprehensively examines the role of CCI in countering cyber threats through the 
engagement of hostile actors. In addition to describing CCI Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (TTPs), the authors also explore CCI on a conceptual level. This includes 
postulations on CI missions as well as CCI's interface with CI and other Intelligence fields. In 
nutshell, Bodmer et al. (2012) is essential reading for any researcher interested in CCI. 
 
The next book to include a pertinent and significant CCI focus appeared under the editorship 
of Prunckun (2018) and is entitled Cyber weaponry: Issues and implications of digital arms. 
While the book has several chapters useful to CCI, Chapter Two is specifically dedicated to 
CCI. Under the title, ‘Human Nature and Cyber Weaponry: Use of Denial and Deception in 
Cyber Counterintelligence’, Stech and Heckman (2018) make a masterful contribution which 
anyone serious about CCI should consult. The chapter’s primary aim is to advance a “cyber 
counterintelligence framework in active cyber defences”. This system is “referred to as the 
cyber deception chain, to mitigate cyber spy actions within the cyber espionage ‘kill chain’” 
(Stech & Heckman 2018). To lay a foundation for their CCI framework, Stech and Heckman 
explain the need for CCI. They proceed by appraising CI definitions, status, and existing 
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frameworks with a view on application to active defense in CCI. The text also observes the 
existing body of CCI academic research. Proceeding from this basis, Stech and Heckman 
(2018) present their CCI framework for “active cyber defense”. This framework applies and 
synergises earlier postulations by Duvenage and von Solms (2014) and Prunkun (2014). 
Stech & Heckman (2018) demonstrate the framework's application by means of a 
hypothetical case involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Other Literature 
In the past eight years, there has been an upsurge in literature dealing with “threat 
intelligence”, “cyber intelligence”, and “cyber threat intelligence” (Duvenage, von Solms & 
Corregedor 2015). Cybersecurity vendors, who are increasingly modelling their products and 
services on concepts derived from the state security and intelligence realms, in part fuel this 
upsurge. In contrast to the bourgeoning discourse on, for example, ‘threat intelligence’ and 
‘cyber intelligence’, contributions to CCI are more limited but are growing. In the main, 
contributions offer high-level explanations of what CCI is and point to the advantages that 
CCI practices could have in proactively addressing cyber insecurity. While ‘commercial’, 
such works nonetheless contribute to explicating CCI in concrete terms and, in some 
instances, are consequently also of academic value. In this regard, works by Bardin (2011), 
Farchi (2012), and Lee (2014) can be singled out. 
 
The following examples of article headlines give a sense of the nature of contributions in 
commercial online literature: 
 
 ‘Cyber counter intelligence’, in Defense Tech Magazine (Carrol 2009); 
 ‘Ten commandments of cyber counterintelligence’ by Bardin (2011), first featured on 
the IDG News Service's online platform CSO Online; 
 ‘Offensive counter-intelligence and cyberwarfare—A paradigm shift in information 
security’ on the Information System Control and Audit Association (ISACA) website 
(Farchi 2012); 
 ‘To thwart hackers, firms salting their servers with fake data’, in The Washington Post 
(Nakashima 2013); 
 ‘Cyber counter-intelligence makes a difference’, featured on the South African 
ITWeb website (von Solms 2014); 
 ‘Cyber counterintelligence: From theory to practice’ by Lee (2014), first published on 
the website of the cybersecurity vendor Tripwire; 
 ‘Shifting paradigms: The case for cyber counter-intelligence’, in InformationWeek 
(Firestone 2015); and 
 ‘Counter-intelligence techniques may help firms protect themselves against cyber-
attacks’, published in The Economist (2015). 
 
While videos are not typically included in literature reviews, CCI’s incipient status as well as 
the merits of a contribution in video format, warrant an exception. This video covers a 
presentation by Evron (2014), then chairman of the board of the Israeli Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT). This high-level presentation provides a concise, yet incisive and 
conceptually sharp overview of key CCI fundamentals. 
 
This section reviewed some examples of other literature on CCI. In the section that follows, 
the article concludes with findings and observations regarding the way forward. 
 294 
 
Conclusion 
This article advanced a tentative, selective literature review on CCI. This review shows CCI 
to have evolved, in less than a decade, from a research theme to a distinctive academic sub-
discipline. As far as consulted literature is concerned, the bulk of peer-reviewed academic 
CCI research—documented in papers, articles and post-graduate studies—was conducted at 
Utica College (U.S.) and the University of Johannesburg (South Africa). The nature and 
focus of these institutions’ CCI research are inevitably influenced by the respective contexts 
of a super power (U.S.) and an emerging mid-income country (South Africa). Perhaps 
because of these differences, the work done is complementary in several respects. 
Collectively, the research covers diverse topics ranging from general theory and 
conceptualisation; to CCI training, process models, and maturity frameworks, as well as 
CCI’s application in the military domain. With respect to books and other literature 
categories, outstanding contributions include works by Stech and Heckman (2018), Evron 
(2014), Bardin (2011), Farchi (2012), and Lee (2014). 
 
Although CCI is gaining traction internationally, this literature review shows that it is still in 
its academic infancy and, thus, offers numerous exciting research opportunities. A 
comprehensive literature review, much broader in scope than this article, would be an 
invaluable tool for CCI’s progression. Such a review would have to cover research in 
languages other than English and in numerous other databases. Initial research on a 
comprehensive literature review is being conducted and is already delivering promising 
results. Those interested in cooperating in this venture are invited to contact the article 
authors. 
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Abstract: “Years ago, small groups working together ‘or lone wolves (ninjas)’ were the ones who hacked into systems. The 
days of old have come and gone, and the criminals are now working together without fear of impunity more than ever” 
[Bodmer et al, 2012]. Bodmer et al [2012] also indicate that this situation is true for both the hacker and the defender, “as 
it is easier and safer to work in numbers on the Internet, especially since evidence collection and attribution are so difficult 
for all involved parties”.  
In a real world scenario where appropriate cyber counterintelligence (CCI) human resources are scarce and/or expensive 
and where limited relevant educational sources are available, it is imperative to identify the necessary people, teams and 
skills to anthropomorphise and mature the CCI effort in order to achieve an organisation’s strategic CCI objectives.  
In a world where suitable cyber related human resources are scarce and expensive, the process of identifying and building 
an appropriate, cost effective and functional CCI dream team is essential to ensure that an organisation's’ CCI strategic 
initiatives are achieved.      
This paper contributes to the series of previous papers on cyber counterintelligence (CCI) maturity. It aims to add to the 
emerging considerations on CCI through a discussion on a process of building an ideal CCI dream team as part of an 
organisation's CCI maturity. It highlights the effectiveness of cybersecurity when incorporating it in an integrated CCI 
approach. It further deliberates an integrative approach of CCI practices in conjunction with traditional defensive and/or 
offensive cyber measures in order to leverage on, and further develop existing skilled people. Lastly, it culminates in the 
discussion of the high level functions required within a CCI environment, setting the basis for putting together the ideal 
dream team as part of the establishment and / or maturity of a CCI capability that can be tailored for a government and/or 
private sector environment alike. 
 
Keywords: cyber counterintelligence, dream team, cyber threat intelligence, defensive and offensive cybersecurity, cyber 
counterintelligence maturity  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Farchi [2016] refers to the requirement for counterintelligence within the private sector. He focusses on the 
need for a particular form of counterintelligence namely CCI and states that it entails utilising, ‘defensive’ and 
‘offensive’ Counterintelligence approaches, with the aim of safeguarding organizations [Farchi, 2016].  In a 
conceptual overview and theoretical proposition Duvenage, von Solms & Corregedor [2015], describe CCI as 
“the subset of multi-disciplinary CI aimed at detecting, deterring, preventing, degrading, exploiting and 
neutralisation of adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A (confidentiality, 
integrity and availability) of valued information assets through cyber means”.  
Farchi [2016] further refers to the escalating tendency of information security companies, emphasising their 
service offering on “gathering information on specific threats against organizations”, instead of only the 
traditional focus on providing defensive solutions.  
There are countless volumes written on various Intelligence, Counterintelligence and CCI concepts and 
approaches. Although some of the previous writings in this regard establishes the basis for CCI and focuses on 
some of these concepts, there is a notable lack in the availability of literature that provides guidance in both 
the form of a framework for a CCI maturity model, as well as the associated resources and skills required for 
such an undertaking.  
The implementation of a CCI capability is dependent on an organisation's strategy, risk profile and unique 
requirements. The question then with regard to the requirements for relevant CCI people, skills or focus teams 
remains, since its requirements can be as diverse as the diversity of every organisation out there.    
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Due to the complexity of CCI, some guidance on identifying relevant people, skills, focus teams etc. is prudent 
that can assist organisations in transitioning their traditional defensive-only approach when securing 
cyberspace, to a more evolved approach in line with the demands for advanced threat mitigation of the 
present, and beyond. A beneficial starting point for such guidance (among others), emanates in the form of a 
discussion on an approach.  
 
2. The Approach 
A country, government and/or private sector business requires an efficient method to incorporate CCI within 
their whole security plan and to mature it over a set period into a fully functional CCI ability. This will include 
the implementation and maturity of CCI teams, skills and focus areas.  
CCI is not necessarily a separate structure. It is rather a manner for existing and some new functionalities 
within the organisation to work together in a multi-disciplinary approach to achieve the CCI strategic vision 
and desired outcomes [Jaquire & von Solms, 2017 (1)]. In order then for an organisation to construct the ideal 
CCI team, it will be judicious to consider the functions that the CCI environment will perform within that 
organisation, in line with organisational strategy. This will allow the organisation to identify the CCI team 
functions accordingly, from which the ideal CCI team can be constructed. This will also provide the 
organisation with the opportunity to leverage on its existing resources, to assist in the implementation of the 
CCI capability in a cost effective way.   
Even though there are CCI focus areas that will be identified in line with the organisational strategy for each 
different organisation, which will be specific to that organisation [Bardin, 2011], some base level functions, or 
grouping of functions will be the same within all organisations. These base level functions will form the 
foundation for the construction of any CCI team. From this core, further lower level functions and team 
requirements can be identified and implemented accordingly as per the organisations’ needs and CCI maturity 
plan. 
 
3. Constructing the ideal CCI dream team 
When considering a CCI capability, all functions within a CCI maturity model can be grouped within five main 
high level functions [Jaquire, 2018]. These are the main functions that would be essential within all 
organisations, which require establishment and / or maturity for the purposes of a CCI capability. These main 
functions will form the centre for the constructing or identifying of an ideal CCI dream team and they are as 
follows: 
1. Senior Executive – C Level 
2. Management 
3. Analyses 
4. Technical Specialisation 
5. Incident / Situation Management and Coordination 
 
All five of these functions are principal to the effective functioning and maturity of all the Categories within 
CCI. From these five base functions, all further CCI sub-functions, resources and team requirement can flow in 
line with the organisational strategy. We will briefly discuss each of these functions within the following 
sections (Sections 3.1 to 3.5), relating each of them to the effort of building the ideal CCI dream team.   
 
3.1. Function 1 - The Senior Executive (C-Level) 
Kajava et al (2006) refer to the numerous information security awareness programmes within organisations, 
and stresses “top management often shies away from them”. It is argued that the “damage caused by an 
individual employee may have far-reaching consequences for a company, but when damage is inflicted by 
senior management, the effects may be devastating” [Kajava et al, 2006].  
Likewise, it is therefore not only imperative to ensure that the senior executive management endorse the CCI 
strategy, programme and efforts unequivocally, but also for the senior executive to understand CCI, cyber and 
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information security in order to take full control and responsibility thereof and actively participate and show 
their support [Kajava et al, 2006]. 
The senior executive is responsible for the overall strategy and direction of the organisation. CCI, just as is the 
situation with other organisational efforts, should be in line with the business objectives of the organisation. It 
is the senior executive who will decide the level of the intensity of focus on each of the dimensions within a 
CCI framework, as well as the level of maturity required for each of the dimensions within a CCI maturity 
model.  
These decisions will be made in line with the strategic requirement of the organisation as per the organisations 
unique business realities, requirements and risk profile. These decisions include, among other, issues such as 
strategy development and approval (including CCI policy development and implementation), Financial 
Commitment and Strategic Operational Approval.   
In order for the senior executive to make effective decisions, it is their responsibility to understand the cyber 
threats that the organisation faces, to understand the impact that a cyber-attack (in its various forms) can have 
on the assets of the organisation, and to instil this understanding and situational appreciation within the 
management and employees of the organisation.  
For the senior executive to achieve this, they need to be skilled and trained to understand cyber-related 
threats that their organisation faces in line with their industry, area of business and own realities. They also 
need to be skilled and trained in appropriate remedial and proactive actions, as well as related strategies and 
thought processes in order to develop appropriate strategies and make informed decisions with regard to CCI 
for their organisation (cʄ Duvenage, Sithole & von Solms, 2017).  Senior executives should also be trained and 
skilled to fully understand CCI and the related CCI maturity model for their organisation, and they should 
ensure that the management below them are fully trained in this as well. 
The senior executive function (accountable for the CCI programme) will therefore be the first essential part of 
the ideal CCI dream team.    
 
3.2. Function 2 - Management 
Management usually deals with general management issues such as (but not limited to) the following:  
 Alignment with organisational strategy,  
 Financial management,  
 Operational management,  
 Coordination, 
 Approvals.  
  
Within a technical, Information security or cyber related environment, managers also deal with the non-
technical aspects of cyber and information security related issues such as the following [Soomro et al, 2016]: 
 “Security policy development,  
 Awareness and related training,  
 Acquisition of security hardware and software,  
 Internal control and decisions regarding data processing”.  
 
Due to the nature of such technical environments, there are numerous writings advocating the notion that 
“the safeguarding of information assets and data security can be ensured through the integration of technical 
and managerial activities” [Young & Windsor, 2010]. This is specifically the situation with regard to managers 
who are responsible for every condition within a multi-disciplinary CCI environment. Management, just as is 
the case with senior executives should be:  
 Skilled and trained to fully understand the CCI environment under their control,  
 Skilled and trained to fully understand:  
o How their environment fits into the larger CCI programme and strategy 
o What is required from their environment in line with the CCI effort 
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o All the technical and non-technical processes and tasks to be performed by the technical and 
non-technical personnel and systems under their control – without necessarily becoming an 
expert on every field within their area of responsibility. 
 Skilled and trained on the entire CCI process, especially the CCI maturity strategy and plan.    
 
Apart from this, management should also, (in line with the training and skills development for senior 
executives), be trained and skilled in, among other: 
 Threat identification, evaluation and management, including appropriate remedial and proactive 
actions,  
 CCI methodologies including active, passive, defensive and offensive strategies, denial and deception 
techniques, operations and technical requirements. 
 
Management should also realise their managerial authority and capabilities, especially when dealing with 
offensive and deception strategies, and be able to guide technical and non-technical personnel within their 
environment, in line with the organisational CCI strategy. 
The CCI management function (responsible for the CCI programme) will therefore be the second essential 
addition to the ideal CCI dream team. 
 
3.3. Function 3 - Analysis 
In his benchmark contribution on Counterintelligence, Godson (2001) states: “Perhaps the queen of the 
counterintelligence chess board is counterintelligence analysis, both offensive and defensive.” Since CCI is a 
subset of Counterintelligence, Godson’s (2001) statement also rings true within CCI. This section argues the CCI 
analysis function as being:   
 Multi-layered in that it pertains to appraisals on the tactical-technical, operational and strategic levels. 
 Multi-disciplinary in that it draws from numerous fields of study, specialisation and expertise.  
 An all-source endeavour in that it draws from data and information which could range from data feeds 
to information obtained from human sources. CCI thus includes, but is much wider than, data science.  
 An appraisal process which combines various types of analysis – from automated technical analytics to 
analysis performed by humans.  
Maisey [2014] reflects on the current automation of SIEM tools that “focus on automated, predictive analysis 
of attacks using data mining techniques as a way to reduce the load on analysts”. He notes that the “idea is 
superficially attractive, and can be effective at spotting and preventing simple cases” [Maisey, 2014].  
He further cautions that in situations like “fraud detection, similar tools have been found wanting against 
advanced adversaries such as organised criminals”. He relates to the writings by Wilhelm [2014], who noted, 
“These adversaries are adaptive, and will change behaviour in order to evade specific detection tactics. 
Automatically derived rules tend to perform poorly when compared to those used by human analysts because 
they tend to focus on more robust indicators of fraudulent behaviour” [Willhelm, 2014]. Analysis (as one of the 
main drivers within the CCI domain), needs to heed these cautions [Maisey, 2014].  
Analysis has both an internally and externally focussed responsibility. It is also the main player in identifying 
the level of CCI required within an organisation, based on the organisations strategic needs and unique 
environment. Borum et al (2014), allude to this type of analyses when referring to “Cyber-related 
considerations that matter in a strategic sense are the ones that impact an organization’s ability to achieve its 
overarching mission objectives. Examples might include answers to the following [Borum et al, 2014]: 
 “Does the organization operate in a high, moderate or low cybersecurity risk industry? 
 What is the value of the organization’s information and information flows to potential threat actors? 
 What are the confidentiality, availability and integrity risks to the organization’s assets? 
 What legal liabilities exist related to the type of information stored, such as personally identifiable 
information…?” 
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Analysis further includes numerous fields of study, specialisation and expertise [Recorded Future, 2015], again 
depending on an organisations risk profile, strategic needs and unique environment, including, but not limited 
to analysis with regard to:  
 Technical and non-technical defensive and offensive behaviours and strategies, 
 Denial, deception and counter deception behaviours and strategies,   
 Technical and non-technical behavioural and anomaly identification,  
 Historical analyses,  
 Predictive analyses,  
 Predictive analytics – which can further be grouped under a region, a group of people, a country of 
origin etc.  
 Trending – (Local, Regional, International),  
 Language,  
 Religion,  
 Legal,  
 Psychological and behavioural scientists,  
 Data Science, 
 HUMINT 
 
The training and skills development requirement for CCI analysis needs to keep all these factors in mind to 
ensure that all requirements are efficiently addressed during the CCI maturity life cycle, in line with a Cyber 
Counterintelligence Maturity Model (CCIMM). 
The analysis function will therefore be the third essential addition to the ideal CCI dream team. The specific 
analysis needs for each organisation will depend on the strategic CCI requirements of the organisation, and will 
include a focus on several of the areas within the analysis fields as listed above. 
 
3.4. Function  - Technical Specialisation 
Seeing that CCI primarily focusses on counterintelligence within the cyber domain, technical operations 
(together with the analysis function as discussed above) forms the heart of CCI. Due to the numerous possible 
fields of technical focus within the cyber environment, technical specialisation in a multi-disciplinary approach 
(see the discussion within Sections 2 and 3.3), especially on a technical/tactical as well as an operational CCI 
level is essential.  
To further strengthen this approach, in our experience the inclination is always there to split defensive and 
offensive operational and technical/tactical functioning. From a training and skills development point of view, 
there are major overlaps in the requisite training and skills requirements within both defensive and offensive 
requirements, as can be highlighted with the following figure:  
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Offensive
Command / Control
Cryptography
Software Exploitation
Persistence on host
Social engineering
Defensive
Cryptography, 
Cryptanalyses and 
Reverse Engineering
Software Security - A
Network Security and 
Telecommunications
Intrusion, 
Penetration and 
ethical Hacking
Incident 
Management
AnalyticsComputer Forensics
Software Security - B
 
FIGURE 1: (NON-COMPREHENSIVE EXAMPLE) OVERLAP IN DEFENSIVE, OFFENSIVE CCI TRAINING, AND SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS (CREATED BY THE AUTHORS) 
 
Even though Figure 1 is merely an example / extract and not an extensive comparison, and although there are 
specific areas of specialisation that are unique to each discipline (defensive or offensive) a definite functional 
skills overlap is noted within the requirements between Defensive and Offensive CCI. This at least as far as 
base knowledge is concerned, allowing for field of interest specialisation. 
This integrative approach of CCI practices in conjunction with traditional defensive and/or offensive cyber 
measures can be done within both a government and/or private sector environment in order to leverage on, 
and develop existing skilled cyber and information security functions within a CCI environment.  
It further indicates that the leveraging on existing cyber and information security functions within an 
organisation, allows for the cross functional utilisation of these same existing functions for the establishment 
and maturity of CCI in a CCIMM.    
It also further strengthens the notion that cyber counterintelligence is not necessarily a separate unit within an 
organisation.  As indicated earlier, CCI is therefore, more often than not, not a structure, but rather a way of 
‘functioning’, through the maturity of existing and new functionality within an organisation to fulfil the CCI 
requirement - to achieve the CCI strategic vision and desired outcomes in a cost effective manner. 
To this end, structures and activities that we might acknowledge as forming part of the cyber and information 
security realm can be allocated to each of the five CCI dimensions [Jaquire & von Solms 2017(2)].  
Although this may vary from organisation to organisation, the allocation can be demonstrated within an 
example look as follows (see Figure 2):  
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FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF AN ALLOCATION OF EXISTING FUNCTIONS / ACTIVITIES PER CCI DIMENSION 
(CREATED BY THE AUTHORS) 
 
When studying Figure 2, we can utilise a basic Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) structure as 
an example (this structuring will be uniquely customised by each different organisation). In this example, the 
CSIRT is the main entity responsible for the activities allocated to the Active Defensive dimension (B), as well 
as a contributing entity responsible for the activities within the Passive Offensive dimension (C).   
In an organisation, the CSIRT, for example, might be an existing functioning structure with existing specified 
activities to fulfil in line with the organisational strategy. In order to integrate this structure into the integrated 
CCI effort, its existing activities can be taken into account in order to slot them in correctly with the 
organisations own customised CCIMM, within the correct dimension. Examples (non-exhaustive) of CSIRT 
activities within the Active Defensive dimension may for instance include the following: 
 Alerts and warnings 
 Vulnerability assessments and penetration testing 
 Secure code analyses 
 Artefact handling 
Further examples (non-exhaustive) of CSIRT activities within the Passive Offensive dimension may, among 
other, include the following: 
 Implementation, monitoring and analysis of honeynets,  
 Implementation, monitoring and analysis of tar pits and sandboxing, 
 Identification and location tracking of perceived threatening IP addresses. 
 
In examples like these, the exiting activities of the CSIRT within the organisation will form part of the 
organisations own customised CCIMM and will, because they are already existing activities, already be on a 
higher stage of maturity than the activities that are specified within a CCIMM, but which are not currently 
performed by such a CSIRT. All of these existing and newly identified activities need can then be specified 
within the organisations CCIMM within the sub-categories as Compliance Indicators. In the same way, all other 
relevant existing functions within the organisation can be integrated within the CCI programme to ensure that 
existing technical expertise, specialisation and technical generalists are utilised. 
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The technical specialisation function will therefore be the fourth essential addition to the ideal CCI dream 
team. As is the case with the analysis function, the specific technical specialisation skills or team focus 
requirements (examples of which are highlighted within domains A to D within Figure 2), as well as its intensity 
of utilisation will depend on the organisations CCI strategy. 
   
3.5. Function 5 - Incident / Situation Management and Coordination                                                                                     
Kulikova et al [2012], indicate that “security incidents vary widely in their severity”, and that “the composition 
of the incident response team should reflect the impact the incident has on the organization” [Kulikova et al, 
2012]. In the same way, throughout the CCI process, all CCI related outcomes, situations, incidents and efforts 
needs to be coordinated and managed accordingly.  
Although the day-to-day management of the CCI environment is done by the relevant management, and 
although basic incidents are handled through the normal cyber incident-management functions, certain events 
and/or situations require a dedicated control from the moment that it is conceived or identified, until fruition 
and post mortem evaluation.  
Either these situations can be planned activities flowing from strategic, operational or technical/tactical needs, 
or they may originate as a result of the analyses outcome, based on the various analyses spheres [as discussed 
within Section 3.3 above], such as specific incidents reported from the operational or technical/tactical 
environment.  
This function can also be described as a specialised project management function, which requires extensive 
insight within the CCI field, as well as extensive experience with regard to CCI, the CCI maturity life cycle and 
within the different CCI related domains. It especially requires extensive knowledge and experience within the 
CCI analysis field as in our experience, continuous situational analyses throughout the process is required.     
As an example. The incident / situation management and coordination function includes, among other, the 
following: 
 Coordination of Incident / situation handling efforts between strategic, operational and technical / 
tactical environments, including: 
o Escalation. 
o Resolution authorisation (when the resolution of a specific situation requires approval from 
management or the executive), 
o Incident / situation handover – Should the handling of the incident or situation require 
expertise and / or resolution by a third party or external organisation.  
 Inter programme coordination of incident / situation handling efforts and resolution, 
 Inter organisational coordination of  incident / situation handling efforts and resolution 
 
The incident / situation management function will therefore be the fifth and last essential addition to the ideal 
CCI dream team. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In today’s reality, the defensive-only solutions, habitually trusted throughout the decades are no longer 
sufficient to safeguard our environments and our way of life. The advancement of solutions to recognise and 
deal with the assaults against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and infrastructure 
endures as decisive defensive measures, but it is no longer efficient as a comprehensive resolve. 
 
As identified within the approach, an organisation requires an efficient method to incorporate cyber 
counterintelligence within their whole security plan and to mature it over a set period into a fully functional 
cyber counterintelligence ability. This approach will include the implementation and maturity of CCI teams, 
skills and focus areas. 
Victor Jaquire, Petrus Duvenage and Sebastian von Solms 
 
310 
 
Constructing a CCI team is very much dependent on what the organisation aims to achieve within its CCI 
strategy. Building the ideal CCI dream team will require careful consideration between current functions, new 
functions and costs.  
 
Following a multi-disciplinary and integrated methodology can assist an organisation to utilise its existing skills, 
teams and functions, together with newly identified requirements as highlighted within its CCI maturity 
strategy, in order to realise these strategic team requirements. 
The approach to align team considerations with the five main functions that would be essential within all 
organisations for the establishment and / or maturity of a CCI capability, is a promising starting point in 
building the CCI team. This team can further evolve, together with all the other focus areas as highlighted 
within an organisations CCI maturity strategy, towards the ideal cyber counterintelligence dream team. 
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Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that conventional cyber security solutions alone are wholly insufficient in 
the face of threats posed by role players such as nation states, criminal syndicates, corporate spies, terrorists, 
hacktivists and rogue individuals. The securing of cyber space depends not only on raising the bar in respect of 
defensive measures, but also needs to involve proactive action focussing on threat agents. For organisations 
with sizable assets, cyber counterintelligence (CCI) offers a practicable approach which combines both the 
defensive and offensive dimensions. CCI's effective implementation and execution above all requires a 
coherent organisational awareness and training programme (ATP). For larger organisations, A cyber 
counterintelligence awareness and training programme (CCI ATP) programme has to be multi-tiered and will 
typically range from the elementary (e.g. basic cybersecurity awareness and skills training for all personnel) to 
the advanced (e.g. courses for CCI specialists on the cyber frontlines). The design of such a multi-tiered 
programme is self-evidently a daunting task and published academic research on this topic is very limited. This 
proverbial elephant thus needs to be eaten one bite at a time. This paper advances three such first 'bites', 
namely (i) the conceptualisation and contextualisation of a CCI ATP;  (ii) a proposition on the structuring of the 
CCI ATP's design and implementation process; and (iii) a high-level structuring of a multi-tiered CCI ATP.  The 
multi-tiered CCI ATP we advance in this paper consists of four tiers which are explicated with reference to inter 
alia target group, training objectives and training content. The paper concludes with observations on the CCI 
ATP research conducted thus far.  
Keywords: Cyber security, cyber counterintelligence, offensive cybersecurity, threat intelligence, training. 
1. Introduction 
Cyber security is a continuously changing and fast growing field which demands of an organisation's work force 
at all levels to keep up the pace. It is also widely acknowledged that conventional cyber security solutions 
alone are wholly insufficient to deal with sophisticated and fast-growing cyber risks and threat actors who take 
advantage of vulnerabilities availed by emerging technologies. There is growing recognition that the security 
and prosperity of organisations require a more proactive, intelligence-driven approach in mitigating cyber 
risks. Especially for larger organisations with sizable interests such a proactive approach need to incorporate 
cyber counterintelligence (CCI).  CCI can be defined as measures to “identify, deter, exploit, neutralise and 
protect against adversarial attempts to collect, alter or in any other way breach the C-I-A [confidentiality, 
integrity and availability] of valued information assets and where cyber is a principal instrumentality and/or a 
target” (Duvenage & von Solms, 2013; Duvenage & von Solms, 2015). 
CCI's effective implementation and execution above all requires a skilled CCI workforce as well as CCI-
conscious employees. Such awareness and skilling is best achieved as part of an organisation's broader CCI 
awareness, education and training (AET) endeavour. Ideally, this CCI AET endeavour would have  a multi-tiered 
CCI training and awareness programme (CCI ATP) as a main thrust. The design and implementation of a CCI 
ATP is a daunting task. Factors contributing to the complexity of this task include the following: 
 Unclassified information and research on CCI ATP is scarce. This can in part be ascribed to CCI being a 
relatively new academic field with very limited published academic research on CCI awareness, education 
and training in general. In as far as surveyed literature is concerned, only two (outstanding and 
commendable contributions) could be found, namely (Black, 2014; Van Derwerken & Ubell, 2011) 
 CCI cuts across multiple disciplines and involves several skillsets. Ideally, CCI ATP would draw an all these 
disciplines and skillsets – with self-evident implications for the (CCI ATP’s) design process.  
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 Organisations differ vastly not only in strategic objectives, but also in their workforces’ CCI-relevant 
skilling and awareness. Therefore, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' CCI ATP. Instead, a CCI ATP's design should 
be congruent with an organisation's unique features and strategic objectives.  
As is clear from the above, the design of a CCI ATP is a proverbial elephant that needs to be eaten one bite at a 
time. This paper advances three such first 'bites', namely:  
 Conceptualisation and contextualisation of a CCI ATP.  
 A proposition on the structuring of the CCI ATP's design and implementation process. 
 A high-level structuring of a multi-tiered CCI ATP.  
In this section we motivated the need for CCI ATP and highlighted some challenges pertaining to the design of 
such a programme. Subsequently, we introduced the three propositions this paper aims to advance. In the 
next section, we discuss the first of these propositions, namely CCI ATP's conceptualisation and 
contextualisation.  
2. Conceptualising and contextualising of a CCI ATP 
 
Conceptually, and in practice, an effective CCI ATP is designed with due cognisance of an organisation's (i) 
strategy, intelligence and counterintelligence efforts and (ii) CCI broader awareness, education and training 
(AET) endeavour. 
An effective CCI ATP is thus not a standalone 'plug in' or 'add on'. An effective CCI ATP is conceptualised and 
executed as part of the broader organisational CCI awareness, education and training (CCI AET) endeavour. 
The AET in turn forms part of the wider organisational strategy, intelligence and counterintelligence efforts. 
This interconnectedness, which will ultimately shape the CCI ATP's design, is graphically depicted in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: CCI three-tiered relationship with Strategy, CI and Cyber (Duvenage & von Solms, 2015) 
The design, development and implementation of a CCI AET is typically dependent on objectives described in an 
organisation's holistic AET policy. CCI AET is further dependent on the expertise of workforce that the 
organisation already has and the target group, that is, does the organisation has an assigned CCI team? If not, 
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does the organisation need to train the existing counterintelligence (CI) personnel in cyber or existing cyber 
workforce in CI, or recruit new personnel to be trained in the CI and cyber? In this regard, care should be taken 
not to confuse CCI as being a duplicate to cyber security. Instead, CCI  is a combination of traditional CI and 
cyber security as well as advanced technical abilities (Black, 2014). Figure 1 shows CCI as being proactive and 
including offensive dimensions. It is therefore linked with, but goes beyond cyber risk management.  
A skilled specialised CCI team alone, however, is insufficient. In fact, most smaller organisations will not have 
such a dedicated team. In this regard, Jaquire, Duvenage & von Solms (2018) state: 
CCI is not necessarily a separate structure. It is rather a manner for existing and some new 
functionalities within the organisation to work together in a multi-disciplinary approach to achieve 
the CCI strategic vision and desired outcomes.  
In addition, employees in general remain the weakest link in the organisational armour and continue to be the 
main reason of data breaches resulting from cyber incidents link (Thomason, 2013; Monk, et al 2010; Dtex, 
2017). Since it is important that every employee know and understand their roles and responsibilities, a CCI 
AET has to, at the very least, provide for CCI awareness to all employees regardless of occupational group.  
As AETs in general, a CCI AET should thus not be considered as a single, uniform “training” program but as 
having three different functions, namely 'Awareness', 'Education' and 'Training' (cf. Kissel & Wilson, 2010). 
Each of these functions differs in target group, specific objectives, outcomes, content and approaches (Kissel & 
Wilson, 2010). These functions can be differentiated in more detail as follow:  
 Awareness is about being cognisant or knowledgeable of a situation or one’s surrounding. It is an AET's  
critical base function - the first line of defence that affords employees with an opportunity to learn about 
the importance of personal security as well as protecting organisation’s critical information systems 
assets. The NIST Special Publication 800-16 defines an awareness as “a learning process that sets the 
stage for training by changing individual and organisational attitudes to realise the importance of security 
and the adverse consequences of its failure” (de Zafra, et al., 1998).  
 
 Education is about the facilitation of learning or teaching and the gaining of knowledge. Caballero (2017) 
defines education as “a formal curriculum created for the purpose of educating individuals in a broad 
array of security topics that will build a body of knowledge essential for a career in information security” 
(Caballero, 2017). 
 
 Training is about the acquisition of competence (knowledge, skills and attitude) to improve performance 
and enhance expertise for a specific job or function. Amankwa et al (2014) define training as “any 
endeavour that is undertaken to ensure that every employee is equipped with the information security 
skills and information security knowledge specific to their roles and responsibilities by using practical 
instructional methods such as seminars and workshops” (Amankwa, Loock & Kritzinger, 2014)  
For purpose of this paper, 'Education' is deemed as a function provided by tertiary and training institutions 
outside the organisation. Our proposition in this paper, however, centres on an organisational CCI awareness 
and training programme (ATP). The CCI ATP thus excludes 'Education' but includes 'Awareness' as its first 
proficiency level. Our CCI ATP then subdivides the 'Training' function in three further proficiency levels namely:  
fundamental, functional and advanced. These resultant four proficiency levels of our CCI ATP can graphically 
be depicted as follow:  
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Figure 2: Proficiency Levels (Tiers) of a Cyber Counterintelligence Awareness and Training Programme (CCI ATP) 
(Authors) 
 
This section conceptualised and contextualised a CCI ATP as part of organisational strategy and the 
organisation's broader awareness, education and training (AET) endeavour. This was done to infer the four 
proficiency levels of a CCI organisational awareness and training programme (CCI ATP). In the next section we 
advance a structural outline for the process by means of which the CCI ATP can be designed and implemented.   
 
3. Structural Outline of the CCI ATP's Design and Implementation Process   
 
The proficiency levels as discussed in the previous section, provide a scaffold for the design and 
implementation of a CCI ATP. This design and implementation are done by means of structured process 
comprising the four steps depicted in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: CCI ATP Design and Implementation Process (adapted from MacCauvlei Learning Academy, 2016) 
 
The four critical steps, depicted in Figure 3, that need to be followed for the CCI ATP's design and 
implementation, can concisely  be described as follow (adapted from MacCauvlei Learning Academy, 2016): 
1) An awareness and training needs analysis determines the organisation’s awareness and training needs 
according to the strategic objectives. It looks at the skills and knowledge required by the workforce 
generally and the CCI team specifically, with due cognisance of the organisation's strategy well as its 
intelligence and counterintelligence thrusts.  
 
2) The programme design and development derives the programme objectives from the training needs and 
then design and develop the training material. It determines content, the duration of the programme, the 
training methods and techniques. The three proficiency of CCI training (fundamental, functional and 
advanced – see Figure 2) will be designed according to the functional specialities such as CCI collection, 
CCI analysis, CCI investigation, CCI offensive and CCI defensive 
 
3) The programme implementation, communicates the training implementation to the respective target 
groups and their management echelons.  Various training methods can be used for the implementation 
of awareness and training, such as classroom, online, practical, simulations, on-the-job training and so 
on. 
 
4) Programme evaluation and follow-up appraises the effectiveness of the programme in terms of the   
increase in knowledge and skills and the improvement of attitude on the job as a result of the awareness 
and training programme. Follow-ups are done in the workplace after a certain period about the 
sustainability of knowledge, skills and attitude.  
In this section, we advanced a structured process which can be applied for the design and implementation of a 
CCI ATP. In the next section a high-level outline of the programme itself is provided.  
 
4.  A High-level Outline of the multi-tiered CCI Awareness and Training Programme 
 
A multi-tiered CCI Awareness and Training Programme (CCI ATP) can of course not be presented in any detail 
within the confines of a conference paper. In this section we thus only provide some high level contours of a 
CCI ATP. To this end, we discuss each of the four proficiency levels (see figure 2) with reference to the key 
elements of target group, objectives, content and delivery methods and techniques.  
 
1
Awareness and 
Training Needs 
Analysis
2
Programme Design 
and Development
3
Programme 
Implementation
4
Programme 
Evaluation and 
Follow-up
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4.1 CCI Awareness – the first line of defence and offence (Tier 1 – Figure 2) 
 
Since employees cannot protect information systems against something they are oblivious of, e CCI awareness 
is a foundation and fundamental to enlighten employees of the cyber threats faced individually and as an 
organisation. A CCI awareness programme is a first line of defence and a foundation for the stronger cyber 
security posture of an organisation. Awareness focuses on people rather than technology with the key purpose 
of an awareness programme is to direct the attention of people to information security (Toth & Klein, 2013) It 
conveys the possible cyber risks and cyber threats faced by the organisation and provides skills to mitigate 
basic cyber-related  risks and counter cyber threats (Roper, Grau, & Fischer, 2006). 
 
The key elements of CCI awareness are as follow:  
  
1) Description: A blended cyber security and CI awareness programme that increases employee awareness 
on the cyber threat landscape, type of adversaries and their techniques, and provide appropriate 
countermeasures. The emphasis is on personal and workplace practices which will limit the risk of 
individuals being exploited as an attack vector.  
 
2) Target group: All employees including new employees, contractors and, in some instances, third-party 
service providers. 
 
3) Objectives: After completing the awareness, individuals will be able to  
 Identify basic  cyber threats and risks,  
 employ sound personal and workplace cyber security practices, 
 be aware of  critical organisational assets,  
 be aware of the exploitation of the human element as attack vector,  
 understand policies and procedures to secure information systems, and  
 understand and recognise the countermeasures. 
 
4) Overview of content 
 Cyber risks, cyber threats and cyber attacks 
 what is CI and CCI 
 policies and procedures 
 insider threat 
 techniques used by cyber actors 
 data security and privacy 
 personal security 
 computer and mobile security 
 internet and email security 
 
5) Delivery methods and techniques.  
Several methods or techniques can be used to deliver an awareness programme, namely classroom 
tuition, workshops, online courses, seminars and open lectures. Supplementary techniques include 
intranet postings, posters, videos, games, quizzes, screensavers, etc 
 
4.2 CCI Fundamental Training (Tier 2 – Figure 2) 
CCI training, to reiterate is essential for improving the effectiveness of the organisation in achieving its 
strategic objectives. Training addresses employee competencies (knowledge, skills and attitude), skills gaps, re-
skilling and upskilling. Training programmes are structured according to proficiency levels (fundamental, 
functional and advanced – see figure 2) and customised, where relevant, as per the requirements of functions 
or roles.  
Since CCI training is multi-disciplinary, fundamental training should transfer a sound grasp of CCI as subset of 
counterintelligence and intelligence. It should also convey the CCI modes of active-offensive, active-defensive, 
passive-offensive and passive-defensive. To this end, the eight notional building blocks described by Duvenage, 
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Sithole & von Solms 2017) in their’ Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence’ could be of value. This 
framework can graphically be depicted as follows:   
 
Figure 5: Conceptual Framework for Cyber Counterintelligence (Duvenage, Sithole, von Solms 2017) 
CCI fundamental training is an entry level for functionaries with direct/indirect CCI responsibilities and serves 
as the foundation for functional and advanced training later on.  
 
The key elements of CCI functional training can be summarised as follow:  
 
1) Description: A blended cyber security and CI training that is a bridging programme between CCI 
awareness and CCI functional training. This level covers a fundamental understanding of CI skills, 
computer hardware, software, networks and systems. It introduces both offensive and defensive 
domains so that CCI team at the fundamental level will be able to, on a basic level,  counter cyber 
intelligence threats  
 
2) Target group: Functionaries with direct/indirect CCI responsibilities CI and personnel wanting to enter the 
CCI realm.   
 
3) Objectives: After completing after completing fundamental training,  individuals will  
 be equipped with knowledge, skills and tools to counter cyber threats, 
 understand the cyber threat landscape, 
 understand software security, networks security and systems security vulnerabilities,  
 understand and can apply software security, networks security and systems security measures, 
 have been introduced to  basic offensive and defensive CI, cyber warfare and CCI strategies, and  
 be able to demonstrate CI and fundamental CCI skills. 
 
4) Overview of content 
 Information Technology Security (computer security, networks security, data security) 
 Physical security 
 Cyber Threat landscape 
 Cyber actors and attack vectors 
 Cyber intelligence (cyber collection) 
 Social Media and its role to cyber collection, threats and attacks 
 Policies, Procedures and Standards (CI, Information and Cyber Security) 
 Fundamentals of aspects such as penetration testing, cryptography, digital forensics, etc.  
 Cyber resilience or cyber risk management based approach. 
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5) Delivery methods and techniques.  
Several methods or techniques can be used to deliver a fundamental programme, namely classroom 
tuition, online, hands-on or virtual and practical. 
 
4.3 CCI Functional Training (Tier 3 – Figure 2)  
CCI functional training is at an intermediate level. It is a role-based training because it is structured according 
to the roles and responsibilities of the CCI job or position, depending on how the CCI function is structured in 
an. Design and development of the training curriculum will differ according to specific skills as required by a 
particular role.  Some of the suggested roles such as CCI investigation, CCI Analysis, CCI Collection organisation, 
CCI technical specialisation (Black, 2014; Jaquire, et al., 2018).  
 
1) Description: A blended cyber security and CI training that builds on the knowledge and skills acquired in 
the fundamental CCI training. This training structured according to the roles and responsibilities of the 
CCI job or position.  
 
2) Target group: The training for CCI workforce and all functions in both CCI offensive and defensive 
domains. 
 
3) Objectives: After completing the awareness, individuals will be able to  
 equipped with knowledge, skills, attitude and tools to conduct CCI functions according to specific domain.  
 As CCI is multi-disciplinary, some of the training objectives and skills development will overlap as 
illustrated by Jaquire, et al. (2018) in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: (Non-comprehensive example) overlap in defensive, offensive CCI training, and skills development - 
(Jaquire, Duvenage, & von Solms, 2018). 
4) Overview of content - the topics are for both offensive and defensive CCI training, the list is not 
exhaustive. Each topic can be broken down into sub-topics. 
 Cyber threat intelligence 
 Data collection: OSINT, HUMINT & SOCMINT 
 Digital Forensics 
 Advanced networks 
 Cryptography 
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 Penetration testing 
 Vulnerability assessment 
 Exploitation 
 Ethical hacking 
 Incident response management 
 cyber intelligence analysis 
 data analytics 
 
5) Delivery methods and techniques 
There are many methods or techniques that exist to deliver a functional training programme:  
classroom, online, hands-on or virtual practical, cyber games, emulation and simulation exercises 
(blue team, red team), research. 
  
4.4 CCI Advanced Training (Tier 4 – Figure 2) 
 
This training proficiency level equips individuals with relevant specialist knowledge and skills. According to 
Toth & Klein (2013), this level “integrates training, education and experience with an assessment mechanism 
to validate knowledge and skills, resulting in the ‘certification ‘of a predefined level of competence”. For a 
certain part, this level of training thus draws on industry-based knowledge. Serving as examples are the 
training and assessment conducted by external certification bodies such as EC-Council, ISACA, (ISC)², SANS and 
CompTIA. Within statutory state security structures internationally, however, external industry-based training 
is complemented by advanced in-house training in especially CCI's offensive dimensions.  
   
5. Conclusion 
Cyber counterintelligence offers a proactive approach in countering cyber threats and cyber-attacks. This 
paper presented the outlines of a four-tiered CCI training programme with reference to inter alia target group, 
training objectives, training content and delivery methods or techniques. The design and development of the 
CCI ATP must follow the four step training cycle as it will ensure continuous update and relevance of the 
content.  
The CCI ATP's proficiency levels discussed were awareness, fundamental training, functional training and 
advanced training. All these levels have content that incorporates both the CI and cyber skill sets. Within the 
confines of a conference paper only some contours of CCI ATP could be provided. Furthermore, and for self-
evident reasons of sensitivity, some aspects of functional and advanced CCI training are not reflected in 
academic research in the public domain.  
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Abstract: While cyber counterintelligence (CCI) has been a distinctive specialisation field for state security structures 
internationally for well over a decade, there has of late been growing recognition of CCI’s significance to also non-state 
actors. CCI is gaining main stream traction and is seen a central to proactively mitigating cyber risk and exploiting 
opportunities. The cybersecurity vendor Panda Labs (2018), for example, recently observed that CCI has increasingly 
become “more significant among larger companies.” Also for smaller role-players which do not have resources for a fully-
fledged capacity, CCI offers a way of thinking and an approach towards more robustly asserting their cyber interests. With 
the growing recognition of CCI’s significance, comes an acknowledgment of its complexity. CCI is not an easy to use add-on 
or plug-in. It is all about the meticulous outthinking and outwitting of both actual and potential adversaries. This paper 
advances a matrix that on practical level can serve as a concise, high-level ‘pocket guide’ for outsmarting adversaries by 
means of a robustly configured CCI endeavour. The matrix’s uses include (i) guiding the optimal deployment of offensive 
and defensive tools; (ii) synchronising CCI with broader organisational processes; and (iii) enabling the configuration of a 
CCI posture most attuned to particular organisations’ requirements.  
Keywords: Cyber security, cyber counterintelligence, risk management, offensive cybersecurity, threat 
intelligence. 
1. Introduction 
The breach of the hospitality giant Marriott International - which made headlines in 2018 and exposed more 
than 500 million customer records - was the second largest to date (Harvard 2018). The Marriot hack is 
surpassed only by Yahoo’s admission in 2017 that breaches affected around three billion of its user accounts 
(Harvard 2018). Although attribution is contested, both the Marriott and Yahoo hacks are now widely deemed 
as the work of nation-state sponsored intelligence actors. These actors are also responsible for numerous 
other damaging cyber-attacks on non-state actors not previously deemed as the in the cross hairs of state 
intelligence structures. Concurrently, non-state organisations are also increasingly targeted by also other 
classes of actors with significant intelligence capacities such as crime syndicated, competitors and some 
corporate entities (coats 2018). Unsurprisingly, then cyber counterintelligence (CCI) has increasingly become 
“more significant among larger companies” (Panda 2018). For smaller role-players which do not have 
resources for a fully-fledged capacity, CCI offers a way of thinking and an approach towards more robustly 
assert their cyber interests (Jaquire, Duvenage & von Solms 2018). With the growing recognition of CCI’s 
significance, comes an acknowledgment of its complexity. CCI is not an easy to use add-on or plug-in. It is all 
about the meticulous outthinking and outwitting of both actual and potential adversaries. This paper advances 
a matrix that can serves as a concise, high-level ‘pocket guide’ for outsmarting adversaries through a robust 
CCI endeavour. Premised on CCI’s passive-defensive and active-offensive dimensions, the matrix (i) guides the 
optimal deployment of offensive and defensive tools (iii)  synchronises CCI with the organisational processes, 
(iii) and aids the configuration of a CCI posture best- suited for  organisations’ varying requirements.  
The rest of the paper consists of the following of five parts:  
 A cursory overview of the CCI matrix and its two composite parts (namely a vertical plane and a 
horizontal   plane) 
 Expounding the CCI matrix’s horizontal plane which explains CCI’s passive-active and defensive-
offensive modes. 
 Discussing the CCI matrix’s vertical plane by means of which we explicate the different levels of CCI’s 
execution, namely strategic, operational and tactical-technical. 
 Presentation of a case study to illustrate the CCI matrix’s application.  
 Conclusion and observations on future research. 
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2. Overview of the CCI Matrix  
The CCI matrix we advance in this paper comprises a vertical and horizontal plane which can graphically be 
presented as follow:  
 
Figure 1: The Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix (Authors) 
The CCI matrix's horizontal plane depicted in Figure 1, represents the four quadrants of the CCI postures, 
namely: 
(1) Passive-defensive  
(2) Active-defensive  
(3) Active-offensive  
(4) Passive-offensive 
The CCI matrix's vertical plane aligns CCI with broader organisational processes (such as counterintelligence - 
CI) at the three organisational levels/layers on which CCI operates, namely:  
(1) Strategic 
(2) Operational 
(3) Tactical/Technical  
In this section, we briefly outlined the CCI matrix’s composition. In the next section, the CCI matrix's vertical 
plane is discussed.  
3. Horizontal Plane of the Matrix: The Cyber Counterintelligence Modes 
 In the paper’s introduction we observed that CCI is a CCI is not an easy to use add-on or plug-in. To be 
effective, CCI needs to be executed as part an organisation’s CI endeavour. As a subset of CI, CCI are 
underpinned by time-tested CI principles and notions.   
3.1 Counterintelligence fundamentals underpinning the CCI matrix 
Our CCI matrix’s horizontal plane is premised on such two fundamental CI notions. Firstly, that, for a significant 
part, the wide array of CI measures and tools can be used for defensive and/or offensive purposes. Secondly, 
that both offensive and defensive tools can be deployed passively and/or actively. Flowing from these two 
assertions, we can thus infer four modes for deploying CI tools, namely: passive–defensive, active-defensive, 
passive-offensive and active-offensive. Within CI generally, these modes can be summarised in tabulated 
format as follows (adapted from Duvenage & von Solms 2014, as compiled from narratives in Prunckun 2012, 
Sims 2009): 
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Table 1: Four-sector Counterintelligence Matrix (adapted from Duvenage & von Solms 2014) 
 
DEFENSIVE MODE 
Denies adversaries access and gathers intelligence on adversaries 
Passive Defence Mode 
Denies the adversary access to information 
through physical security measures and other 
security systems.  
Active Defence Mode 
The active collection of information on the adversary 
to determine its sponsor, modus operandi, network 
and targets. Methods include physical and electronic 
surveillance, dangles, double agents, moles and 
electronic tapping.  
 
OFFENSIVE MODE 
Primarily aims at exploit, manipulate, degrade and neutralise adversarial intelligence. Also 
gathers intelligence on adversaries’ intelligence activities. 
Passive Offensive Mode 
Reveals to the adversary what you want them to 
see. This could range from selective exposure of 
actual information to decoys and dummies. The 
adversary is thus left to draw its own inferences 
and interpretations.  
Active Offensive Mode 
The adversary is fed with disinformation and its 
interpretation thereof manipulated. Disinformation 
can be channelled through for example double 
agents and ‘moles’.  
Active-offensive CI could include some forms of 
covert action. * 
 
*  Covert action, in context of its use in the table, denotes the targeting of an adversary through the 
influencing of events, conditions, individuals, groups or institutions; to the benefit of a sponsor in a 
manner not attributable to the sponsor or offering plausible deniability. Influencing is achieved through 
measures that vary from paramilitary and political actions to propaganda and intelligence assistance. 
 
3.2 Application of the four sector counterintelligence matrix to cyber counterintelligence  
 
The four-sector CI matrix is applicable to the full spectrum of CCI tools. At the one end of the spectrum, 
conventional intrusion prevention systems (IPS)/intrusion detection systems (IDS) serve as examples of 
passive–defensive tools. At the other end of the spectrum, a cyber weapon designed to destroy, disrupt or 
manipulate an opponent's systems constitutes an active-offensive tool. CCI tools can seldom be pigeonholed 
as having only a defensive or offensive purpose, or as being either active or passive. For the most part, to 
reiterate, one of the paper’s recurring emphases, tools are useful to two or more of the four modes. A 
honeynet, for example, can be used passive-offensively (e.g. to feed disinformation to an adversary) and 
active-defensively (e.g. to collect information on an opponent). Graphically, this can be depicted as follows: 
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Figure 2: Some CCI Tools Plotted on the CCI Matrix's Horizontal Plane (Authors) 
 
As an academic construct, Figure 2 is useful for the categorisation of CCI tools and to explain their 
relationship with CI tools in fields other than the cyber field. In CCI practice, Figure 2 could have the 
following three uses: 
 
(1) Ensure each CCI tool is utilised to maximum effect. Since most tools can have more than one purpose, 
they should be measured against the CCI matrix with the question ‘In addition to its initially intended 
role, in what other modes can the tool be used?’ Figure2, for example, depicts a honeynet deployed in 
both the active-defensive and passive-offensive modes. To expand on the example used in Figure2. A 
honeynet can (if required and depending on circumstances) also be used to facilitate hacking back and 
the deployment of cyber weapons (active-offensive). If otherwise configured, a honeynet could 
furthermore be deployed in tandem with IDS/IPS (passive-defensive). In this hypothetical example, a 
honeynet is therefore relevant to all four modes. 
 
(2) Synchronise CCI tools/actions with other CI tools/actions. The plotting of CCI and other CI 
tools/actions in Figure 2 will aid the synchronisation of efforts and thus optimise the effectiveness and 
integration of the CI efforts. The feeding of disinformation through a human agent, to use the example 
depicted in Figure 2 (passive-offensive mode), should be congruent with disinformation 'planted' in an 
organisation's honeynet. Incongruencies between these two 'feeds' of disinformation could comprise 
both CI HUMINT and CCI operations. Similarly, the CCI matrix can be utilises to plot and synchronise 
CCI tools and actions with those in other Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) fields.  
 
(3) Configure the CCI posture in accordance with the type and needs of a specific organisation. Statutory 
military and intelligence services, for example, will typically have a substantial amount of resources 
directed to the active-offensive mode. The same will not be the case in relation to, for example, a 
healthcare provider. Figure 2 can accordingly be used as a template for plotting and appropriately 
configuring an organisation's CCI posture (See for example Jaquire 2018, Appendix6). For purposes of 
this paper, we suffice with the following (admittedly oversimplified) comparison: 
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Figure 3: Juxtaposing CCI postures of a nation-state security structure and health care provider 
(Authors) 
 
Implicit to the comparison per Figure 3 is the notion that the configuration of the organisation’s CCI posture on 
the strategic (interests, goals and strategy) levels will ultimately shape CCI activities on the operational and 
tactical-technical level. These different levels are discussed in the next section as the CC matrix’s horizontal 
plane. 
   
4. Vertical Plane of the CCI Matrix: Levels of Execution  
The CCI matrix's vertical plane explains the various levels on which CCI functions and integrates CCI with the 
broader organisational postures and processes. Since CCI is a CI subset, the importance of synchronising and 
integrating CCI with especially the organisational CI endeavour on all levels can hardly be overemphasised. As 
was the case with the development of the horizontal plane, we based our design of the vertical plane on an 
established CI notion, namely the three levels/layers of execution (strategic, operational and tactical). These 
levels and there interplay have been described in more detail in existing research (van Niekerk & Duvenage 
2016; Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016; Stech & Heckman 2018, Jaquire 2018). Therefore, this paper 
suffices with the following synopsis:  
 
Table 2: Synopsis of the Levels of CCI Execution (adapted from Duvenage, Jaquire & von Solms 2016) 
 
Table 2 follows on the next page  
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  Strategic  Operational  Tactical/Technical  
CI mission  Advance and protect organisational interests through defence against and the offensive engagement of 
adversarial intelligence activities. This is achieved through the following functions: detect, deny, deter, 
deceive, degrade and/or disrupt. 
CCI mission  As above, when the adversary uses cyber as a conduit or a cyber asset as a target. 
Leadership  
 
 C-level   Senior and middle 
management  
 Line and team leaders 
Interface with CI  Organisational, intelligence and CI 
strategies 
 All-source CI feed 
 Multidisciplinary programmes 
and operations 
 Multidisciplinary projects and 
continuous line-functional 
interaction  
Referent objects 
 
 Organisation’s ‘crown jewels’ 
 Critical information and cyber-
assets sought (e.g. adversary’s 
‘crown jewels’) 
 Conditions (competitive 
advantage) 
 People, processes, systems, 
procedures (personal security, 
ICT architecture and supply-
chain management)  
 Own intelligence programme 
 Systems, networks and 
devices 
 Network operations 
 Security operations 
 CIA (confidentiality, integrity 
and availability) 
Interrogatives   Who, why?  Who, where, when, how?  What, how? 
Level ofadversarial 
role-player (CCI focus) 
 Sponsors, opponents and 
Intelligence capacity 
 Intelligence structures, groups 
and campaigns 
 Individuals, TTPs, incidents 
and actions (on-the-network) 
Indicators of targeting  
and compromise  
 Geo-political, sector/industry 
‘flags’ 
 Analogous events  
 Adversarial strategy and business 
decisions 
 
 Operational disruption 
 Organisational and/or revenue 
decline 
 Information leakage 
 Breach in the C-I-A of cyber 
and/or information security 
milieu 
 Identification of malicious 
code, intrusion and threat 
exploitation 
Analysis output   High-level, strategic appraisals 
 Strategic warning and advisories  
 Operational reports (CCI 
operations, threat, damage 
and vulnerability assessments, 
alerts and warnings) 
 Trend analyses  
 Tactical and technical 
information reports 
 Alerts and warnings 
 
Tools – means, 
methods and measures 
(offensive, defensive & 
collection) 
 Multidiscipline CI 
 Strategic direction of means, 
methods and measures 
 For a taxonomy of the wide array of CCI tools see (Duvenage, 
Jaquire& von Solms 2016; Jaquire 2018). 
 
 Interlocked with operational and tactical CI 
Cyber threat 
intelligence  
(sourced) 
 White papers, non-commissioned 
and non-commissioned research 
 Platforms  Data feeds 
Skill sets required 
(line-functional) 
 Sound knowledge of business and 
industry 
 Specialised knowledge and skills in 
intelligence, multidisciplinary CI 
and CCI 
 Strategic analysis and management 
 
 Multi-disciplinary CI 
 CCI operational and/or 
technical specialisation 
 Operational management 
 Elements of both strategic and 
tactical 
 
 ICT and information security 
 Systems, software 
development, scripting and  
programming 
 CCI and CCI technical 
specialisation 
 Ethical hacking 
 Technical cyber defence and 
collection 
 Humanities, social sciences 
and languages 
 HUMINT 
 Engineering and reverse 
engineering 
 
In this section we CCI levels of execution as the CCI matrix’s vertical plane. We now proceed with illustrating 
the matrix’s application by means of Stech and Heckman’s (2018) hypothetical case study.  
 
3.3 The CCI matrix in practice – a hypothetical case study  
 
As was observed in Section 3.2, the organisation’s CCI posture on the strategic (interests, goals and strategy) 
level will shape CCI activities on the operational and tactical-technical levels. It then logically follows that 
strategy and operational objectives will determine the offensive-defensive, passive-active modes on a tactical-
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technical level. This point, as well as the application of our CCI matrix, are illustrated by Stech and Heckman’s 
(2018) proposition on a "Cyber Counterintelligence Framework in Active Defense". Utilising a hypothetical case 
study of a NATO campaign against “advanced persistent threat actors associated with Russia, APT28 and 
APT28”, Stech and Heckman (2018) pose the following as NATO’s strategic CCI goal and operational objectives: 
• “Support NATO strategic deception goal: convince Russian authorities their cyber intelligence 
supports propaganda but is not ready for kinetic war against NATO; 
• Active & Passive CCI Defense: Reduce and eliminate effectiveness of APT28 tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for espionage; Eliminate or counter APT28 and APT29 malware and tradecraft; 
• Passive CCI Offense: Poison APT28 and APT29 intelligence stream with deception materials; eliminate, 
corrupt, or covertly take over control of attackers' command and control; and 
• Active CCI Offense: Feed Russian espionage units with false information (e.g. feed APT29 false 
information about actions and effects of APT28, and vice versa). 
• Support apparent intrusion successes with cyber and non-cyber strategic NATO deception 
operations.” 
 
In extending the strategic goal and operational objectives to the tactical-technical level, Stech and 
Heckman (2018) apply our four-sector matrix (advanced per Duvenage & von Solms 2013 and further 
developed in Table 2 of this paper) advanced earlier in this paper)  – as follows: 
 
Table 3: Hypothetical NATO Cyber CI Operations against cyber espionage threat (Stech & Heckman 2018) 
 
Modes Passive Cyber CI Active Cyber CI 
Defensive mode Deny access and collect on espionage threat 
Passive defense: Active defense: 
Harden endpoint and server 
configurations 
Gather intelligence on on-going intrusions 
Use honeypots to gather late-stage implants and 
unpatched exploits 
Share actionable indicators across 
NATO intelligence partners 
Share indicators to force infrastructure and 
"toolkit" rotations 
Offensive Mode Manipulate, degrade, control and neutralize espionage threat 
Passive offensive: Active offensive: 
Use honeypots to deliver deception 
materials 
Counter-hack hop points and control servers 
Trolling "bait victims" to lure attackers to 
controlled boxes 
Sinkhole APT28 hop points 
Identify APT28 operatives Operating controlled boxes as double agents to 
inject beacons, double-hacked backdoors, etc. 
into APT28 control environment 
 
In this section, we illustrated the application of our four-mode, three-tiered matrix by citing Stech& Heckman’s 
(2018) hypothetical NATO case study. We now proceed with observations in conclusion.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper is submitted within the context of non-state entities’ growing adoption of CCI in the face of 
escalating targeting by intelligence actors of various categories. CCI undoubtedly offers a practicable approach 
to protect and advance organisational interests. There is, however, a precondition and qualification. CCI not 
meticulously configured, is more likely to be self-defeating than beneficial. Moving from this premise, key 
findings of this paper include the following: 
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 A CCI matrix can aid the configuration of a robust cybersecurity posture and the exploitation of 
opportunities. 
 Such a CCI matrix can be constructed by combining (i) CCI's Passive-Active and Defensive-Offensive 
modes; and (ii) CCI's levels of execution namely: Strategic, Operational and Tactical-Technical. 
On an academic level, the CCI matrix could be useful to conceptually structure aspects of research in this fast 
growing field. 
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Abstract: Cyber intelligence is a growing discipline related to cyber security, resulting in a number of 
whitepapers, advisories and services from cyber security companies and professional bodies. Global spending 
on cyber threat intelligence services has demonstrated rapid increases, yet a corresponding mitigation of 
advanced threats is yet to be seen. Despite this growth, there is still variation on the definition and the focus of 
cyber intelligence, which could account for the limited gains. Cyber intelligence is important for understanding 
both the threat environment and identifying what is relevant to the user’s context based on a number of 
internal factors to the organisation or nation. This paper provides a document analysis of a number of publicly 
available cyber intelligence and cyber threat intelligence documents (in the form of advisories and 
whitepapers) using text mining, content analysis, and thematic analysis. These techniques are relevant to both 
qualitative research and intelligence analysis and are employed here for assessing similarities amongst the 
documents, identifying common themes and categories, assessing the emphasis thereof, and identifying gaps 
common to these documents. Gaps in the coverage of the documents are identified in that they do not 
consider cyber counterintelligence or the legal considerations for cyber intelligence, and cyber intelligence 
collection operations are only briefly mentioned. Cyber counterintelligence and cyber intelligence collection 
operations are sub-disciplines of cyber intelligence, alongside cyber threat intelligence. The analysis also 
indicates that documents on cyber intelligence and cyber threat intelligence do not align. Such occurrences 
and some implications thereof are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Qualitative analysis, Cyber Intelligence, Cyber Counterintelligence, Cyber Law 
1. Introduction 
The 2019 US National Intelligence Strategy is placing emphasis on cyber security (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2019); by extension this implies increasing focus on cyber intelligence. Cyber threat 
intelligence services have seen a great deal of attention and an increase in subscriptions, with a growth of 
129% in four years (Duvenage & van Niekerk, 2016), however this has not yet translated into widespread 
effective mitigation of cyber threats. Despite the increase in the prevalence of cyber threat intelligence, there 
is still uncertainty surrounding the definitions and the focus of cyber intelligence. This uncertainty can 
negatively affect the understanding of the topic and ultimately the effectiveness of implementations, which 
could account for the limited gains.  
 
It is worthwhile to provide the definition of intelligence, as this useful to distinguish amongst various concepts 
covered in this paper. Intelligence is a product of the collection, processing, analysis, and interpretation of 
information about nations, actors, threats, and operational areas (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013); it needs to be in 
context and actionable. There is a difference between cyber intelligence and cyber espionage: cyber 
intelligence seeks to gain information and insights about relevant cyber threats, whereas cyber espionage is 
the use of cyber techniques to steal secrets (Duvenage & van Niekerk, 2016). 
 
Lee (2014a; 2014b) considers cyber intelligence to be comprised of the following sub-disciplines: cyber threat 
intelligence (CTI) (Lee, 2014e), cyber intelligence collection operations (Lee, 2014c) and cyber 
counterintelligence (CCI) (Lee, 2014d). CTI can be seen as subscription services providing information input for 
intelligence analysis, whereas collection operations can be considered as obtaining specific external and 
internal information for analysis. Counterintelligence is both provocative and defensive intelligence 
operations: mitigating adversary collection operations whilst seeking to learn more regarding their objectives 
and techniques (Lee, 2014b; 2014d). These components are depicted in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Components of Cyber Intelligence 
 
Both intelligence and cyber security are multi-disciplinary topics. Cyber security traditionally will contain the 
technical subjects; however, the strategic political and legal aspects are coming to the fore. Similarly, 
intelligence studies have a traditional focus on politics and history, but there is a growing situation where 
other disciplines can contribute to intelligence studies (Marrin & Madison, 2017); particularly with the growth 
of computing and cyber security. In the same manner, academic research methodology can be useful in 
intelligence analysis for cyber security. 
 
The Introduction continues below in Section 1.1. where an overview of related research and publications are 
provided. Section 2 presents the methodology, introducing the documents and the techniques used to assess 
them. Section 3 provides the results of the analysis of the texts, which is followed by a discussion of the results 
in Section 4. A discussion on the techniques used in this study and their multi-disciplinary use for cyber 
intelligence analysis is provided in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
1.1 Related Research and Publications 
A number of previous research outputs have considered cyber intelligence from different perspectives. One of 
the first works considering cyber intelligence was by Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, and Jones (2012), which 
focussed on counter intelligence principles for network security. Yucel Koltuksuz (2014) provide a list of articles 
for topics such as cyber espionage, open source intelligence, social media intelligence, threat and intrusion 
detection, and cyber weapons. Falk (2016) proposes an initial ontology describing aspects related to CTI. 
Sample, Cowley, Watson, and Maple (2016) investigate the possibility of cultural influences in CTI, and found 
possible links between national culture and activities of the threats, which could conceivably be used for 
attribution or deception. Duvenage, Jaquire, and von Solms (2016) consider the relationship between CCI and 
CTI, and categorise offensive and defensive CCI. Bellaby (2016) motivates for cyber intelligence whilst warning 
against misuses, and considers some legal aspects to guide conducting cyber intelligence operations. One of 
the gaps that has not been assessed are the cyber intelligence documents produced by professional bodies to 
guide organisations and cyber security professionals. This paper analyses eight selected texts from three 
professional bodies. The next section describes the texts and analysis techniques in more detail. 
2. Methodology 
Qualitative analysis of cyber intelligence whitepapers and best practices is conducted, in particular content 
analysis and thematic analysis of the documents. In total eight documents were selected from professional 
bodies based on their relationship with the topic. These texts include: ISACA Tech Brief on Threat Intelligence 
(2017), Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure Threat Intelligence whitepapers by Context (2015) 
and MWR InfoSec (2015), and Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) documents as listed below: 
 Cyber Intelligence – Setting the Landscape for an Emerging Discipline (INSA, 2011); 
 Operational Levels of Cyber Intelligence (INSA, 2013); 
 Strategic Cyber Intelligence (INSA, 2014a); 
 Operational Cyber Intelligence (INSA, 2014b); 
 Tactical Cyber Intelligence (INSA, 2015). 
 
The software NVivo was used to conduct the analysis – this provides content analysis in terms of the frequency 
of major words in the texts. Thematic analysis provides an indication of the prevalent themes in the texts. 
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Document correlation and cluster analysis is also performed. This indicates relationships amongst the various 
themes and documents. 
3. Analysis of Cyber Intelligence White Papers 
Figure 2 provides a cluster analysis of the documents based on word similarity, determined using Pearson’s 
correlation. There are two main clusters: the documents focussing on threat intelligence, and the INSA 
documents focussing on the operational levels of cyber intelligence. From the cluster, it can be seen that the 
document on tactical cyber intelligence is closest to the threat intelligence documents, followed by operational 
and then strategic. This indicates that the focus on the threat intelligence is tactical in nature, aligning more to 
the cyber-security analysts rather than aiding organisational or national decision makers in defining cyber-
security strategies. 
 
Figure 2: Sources Clustered based on Word Similarity 
 
The overall word frequency is visualised in Figure 3. The larger the word, the more common. Despite there 
being more documents in cyber intelligence operational levels (five of the eight), the word ‘cyber’ is not as 
prevalent as the word ‘threat’. The words following this in prevalence are: ‘information’, ‘security’, 
‘organisation’ and ‘network’. 
 
Figure 3: Word Cloud from all Texts 
 
The content analysis determines the frequency of words. Figure 4 clusters these words to determine key 
themes across the texts (indicated on the right). Key themes that emerge are: collection and sharing of 
information; technical intelligence; business requirements; actors; new threats; intelligence analysis; attacker 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs); targets; incident response; system security data; Actors activities 
and capabilities; tactical aspects in organisations sectors; national cyber consideration e.g. public vs private; 
strategic intelligence and risk; decision making levels; and operational considerations. 
 
From the clustering of the words, it is implied that threat intelligence is tactical and focussed at the 
organisational level, whereas strategic cyber intelligence is more related to a national focus. Aspects that are 
noticeably absent from the word cloud and word cluster analysis are the concept of cyber intelligence 
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collection operations, cyber counterintelligence, and any legal or governance aspects related to cyber 
intelligence. The linkages of analysis techniques to the usage of intelligence is also not covered in detail. 
 
 
 
 
Collection and sharing of information 
Technical intelligence – specific 
identification of attacks 
Business / collection requirements 
Actors / Attackers – 
groups/governments/organisation 
New threats 
 
Analysis of intelligence – threats & 
malware 
Attacker TTPs: IOC 
Targets 
Incident response 
System security data 
Actors activities and capabilities 
Tactical: organisation & sector 
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National cyber; public & private 
Strategic intelligence: risk information 
Levels of decision making and 
network support 
Operational considerations: 
resources, environments, capabilities 
Figure 4: Cluster Analysis of Key Words 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
The discussion is divided into two section: the first (Section 4.1) provides a discussion on the explicit content 
analysis. The second (Section 4.2) provides a discussion on the gaps of content coverage that are indicated 
above. 
4.1 Discussion of Document Analysis 
The two distinct clusters in the document correlation implies that threat intelligence and cyber intelligence are 
not the same; and that there is some misalignment between those considering cyber intelligence holistically 
and those considering threat intelligence. The tactical cyber intelligence appears closest to the threat 
intelligence, indicating that the focus of the threat intelligence is towards detection of possible indicators at an 
analyst level, and there is limited threat intelligence to aid strategic decision makers. This view concurs with 
that of Lee (2014e).  
 
There appears to be a focus on CTI. As Lee(2014b) and Duvenage, Jaquire, and von Solms (2016) indicated, the 
focus on CTI is more due to a catch-phrase in marketing services than real understanding of the concepts. CTI 
as is provided cannot be considered true intelligence as it is a stream of data; it is not in context and it is 
limited in how actionable it is. Whilst network security devices and cyber security analysts can use CTI as an aid 
in detecting possible threats, the real intelligence is the analysis and interpretation of any indicators that have 
found matches in the network. Therefore, CTI on its own is of limited use; it needs to correlated with internal 
data (processing) to provide possible threat detections, which can then be analysed and interpreted to form an 
improved view of the threat environment.  
4.2 Gaps in Document Coverage 
As is indicated in Section 3, there are gaps in the coverage of the documents. This includes the concept of 
cyber intelligence collection operations and cyber counterintelligence (Section 4.2.1), legal and governance 
considerations (Section 4.2.2), and the linkage of analysis techniques and usage (Section 4.2.3). 
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4.2.1 Cyber Intelligence Collection Operations and Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI) 
None of the documents consider cyber counterintelligence, and cyber intelligence collection is only briefly 
considered at a high level. As is evident from Figure 3, the term "collection" does not occur frequently. These 
are key constructs in cyber intelligence, and the limited coverage illustrates the gaps in professional literature. 
 
Intelligence collection is considered at a high level, however specific techniques for collection are not covered 
in detail. Certain sources may be best suited for a specific level of intelligence (tactical/technical, operational, 
or strategic), and the collection methods for those sources may differ. The INSA (2014b) document provides 
the most detail for the collection processes and considerations. As CTI is essentially a data stream with a very 
broad context, collection operations are important to gain insights into the internal environment against which 
the CTI can be correlated. This is known as passive collection (Lee, 2014c).  Active collection is the process of 
obtaining intelligence off of an adversary’s network (Lee, 2014c). This activity is considered unethical or illegal 
for non-state actors to conduct, as is outlined by the Singapore Norm Package by the Global Commission on 
the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSS, 2018), which will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.2.  
 
It is also important to note that the network environment can influence the choice of collection techniques. 
For instance, industrial control networks are particularly sensitive, therefore collection operations from critical 
infrastructures may have unintended adverse impacts resulting in downtime of the control systems. The 
increase of connected ‘smart’ devices (Internet of Things) through the Fourth Industrial Revolution can provide 
challenges.  These devices can increase the attack surface, and due to the quantity of the devices, there may 
be an overload of information, which may result in additional pre-processing to filter out.  As many devices can 
connect in an ad-hoc or uncontrolled manner, they may be invisible to collection operations if they are not 
connected during the period of the collection. Therefore, insecure devices could be missed, giving an 
inaccurate picture of the threat exposure. 
 
Cyber counterintelligence is an important concept as this can be seen as defending against adversary network 
intrusions and espionage or intelligence collection operations, whilst obtaining critical information regarding 
their tactics, techniques, procedures and objectives. Offensive CCI interacts with the adversary (Lee, 2014d) in 
order to gain an understanding of their objectives and preferred methods. This involves the use of deception 
such as fake online profiles to engage with the adversary, or the use of honeypots and honeynets to monitor 
their activity (Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones, 2012). The use of deception has been debated from legal 
and ethical viewpoints and will be discussed further in Section 4.2.2. Defensive CCI can use red teams and 
threat analysis techniques to identify specific areas for cyber security improvement specifically based on an 
organisation's threat and vulnerability landscape (Lee, 2014d). During the past four years it was especially 
cyber intelligence’s component of cyber counterintelligence that has been gaining traction in main stream 
business (The Economist, 2015; Panda Security, 2018). The growing commercial prominence of cyber 
intelligence and its subsets raises the academic imperative to clearly delineate concepts within this emerging 
(academic) field. 
4.2.2 Legal and Governance Considerations 
With reference to Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones (2012,108), every country or organisation has the 
capabilities in terms of rules or governance to restrict counterintelligence activities, preventing it from 
invading the rights of its private citizens. However, in some countries, absolute power belongs to the State, 
under the pretence of representing freedom and liberty for all its citizens. Therefore, prudence is warranted as 
counterintelligence professionals conduct their operations. Cyberspace poses a particular challenge as online 
activities, spread at rapid pace from country to country, with the ability to gather information. 
 
Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones (2012,410), further state that since this many be the case, a number of 
national and international cyber laws have been developed and are applicable in various countries. The 
implications of which need to be understood, regardless of the country an individual may reside in or who is 
hosting the IP address. While some countries may choose to remain unaffected or indifferent, countries like 
the US, intend prosecuting those individuals (Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones, 2012: 410). 
 
The South African King IV Report Section 13d provisions for the "proactive monitoring of intelligence to 
identify and respond to incidents.” This includes any adverse social media activities as well as cyber-attacks 
(Institute of Directors Southern Africa (IoDSA), 2016) 
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The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 2018’s Singapore Norm Package states that “Non-state 
actors should not engage in offensive cyber operations and state actors should prevent and respond to such 
activities if they occur.” With reference to Nijman (2010), non-state actors do not have a legal personality, 
which creates the challenge concerning the legality of intelligence collection from adversary networks by non-
state actors. This creates a legal challenge when a government entity attempts to utilise the services of non-
state actors as part of their intelligence operations. Since non-state actors have no legal personality within the 
context of International Law, the question of attribution of liability may arise. With reference to the United 
Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), companies may enter into an international contract 
regarding various services, but in so doing they also incur obligations and responsibility under international 
law. While the Convention may apply to some shared responsibility between states and international 
organisations, it can be argued that non-state actors, on the basis of the “contract”, would be responsible for 
wrongful acts and thereby be in breach of the contract. This, however, still falls outside the ambit of 
International Law, and may just be attributable in terms of a “contractual obligation” (d’Aspremont, 
Nollkaemper, Plakokefalos and Ryngaert, 2015). 
 
The next consideration is the legality of using “honeypots” for the purpose of counter intelligence. According 
to Spitzner (2003) there are three main issues that are commonly maintained regarding honeypots which are 
entrapment, privacy, and liability. By definition entrapment is "a law-enforcement officers or government 
agent's inducement of a person to commit a crime, by means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to 
later bring a criminal prosecution against that person" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed). From the definition, 
honeypots do not qualify as a form of entrapment, as the “attacker”, usually breaks into a honeypot on their 
own initiative and coercion is not involved. Regarding privacy, the use of honeypots does affect privacy. The 
exemption under Service Provider Protection means that security technologies can gather information on 
people including attackers, as long as that particular technology is being used for the protection of the 
environment, which results in these technologies are exempt from privacy restrictions (Spitzner, 2003). 
Spitzner (2003) states that liability implies a person can be sued if their honeypot is used to harm others, 
however, it is a civil matter and not a criminal one. 
 
There remains the need for cyber intelligence governance as cyber intelligence needs to cooperate with legal 
counsel pertaining to the issues (Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones, 2012: 169). 
4.2.3 Analysis Techniques and Usage 
Depending on the sector or organisation type, the use of cyber intelligence, and therefore the analysis 
techniques, may differ. The intelligence required for a private organisation will be different to that of a nation 
state, where the military, intelligence community, and law enforcement are producers and consumers of cyber 
intelligence. Non-state organisations are more likely to be intelligence consumers, where the processing may 
be limited to distilling the intelligence further to make it more relevant to the organisation's context. The 
various organs of state mentioned above will be required to provide collection, processing, analysis and 
interpretation within their mandates to achieve their objectives; they are therefore both producers and 
consumers of cyber intelligence. 
 
As with the cyber intelligence collection operations, the INSA (2014b) document has the most detail of 
potential analysis techniques for cyber intelligence. The analysis techniques need to be carefully selected, as 
they need to be relevant to the data types and the objectives of the intelligence product. As an example, 
Heuer and Pherson (2015) describe seven structured analytical techniques to achieve twelve objectives in 
analysis. Specific cases of employing these techniques are illustrated in Beebe and Pherson (2015). As an 
extension to this, Section 5 discusses the research methodology used in this paper as a relevant intelligence 
analysis technique. 
5. Research Methodologies and Intelligence Analysis Techniques 
This section reflects on research methodology used in this paper and its relevance to cyber intelligence 
analysis. The research process is very similar to that of intelligence analysis: a problem or question is identified, 
data is collected, process, and analysed to provide interpretations that are then compiled into an output (a 
dissertation, paper, or intelligence report).  
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The qualitative analysis using tools such as Nvivo can quickly provide insights into large bodies of text which 
will be very time consuming for human analysts to process and assess. Data sources could be official 
documents (as is used in this paper), or forum discussions on social media or the dark web, or transcripts from 
speeches.  A specific use case could be the assessment of foreign cyber security strategies. By clustering the 
documents, an analyst could gain an insight into possible influence and/or collaboration amongst nations. This 
could also simplify analysis of a national cyber security posture as similar nations can be identifies and 
experience from previous analyses can be leveraged. 
 
On its own, this analysis will not be sufficient. There still needs to be interpretation of the results, where bias in 
the analysis can still occur. As Heuer and Pherson (2015), critical analysis has led to major intelligence 
mistakes; therefore, this technique needs to be followed by other analytics techniques to validate the 
interpretation. This concern is common both the academic research and intelligence analysis. Therefore, the 
structured analytic techniques advocated by intelligence analysts may prove to be very beneficial in academic 
research. 
6. Conclusion 
Cyber intelligence is a rapidly growing field; however, it still suffers from being poorly defined. This paper 
analysed selected texts from professional bodies. The results indicate that there is a possible misalignment 
between the drive for cyber threat intelligence and the growth of cyber intelligence as a discipline. Aspects 
that were found to be omitted are cyber counterintelligence and the legal and governance aspects, with more 
focus on cyber intelligence collection operations and analysis techniques required. For cyber intelligence to 
mature as a discipline, the inclusion of these areas, and aligning all areas is imperative. Due to the increasing 
prevalence in industry, there is a need to ensure that academic studies in these areas grow. The qualitative 
research methods employed in this paper may prove to be useful in cyber intelligence analysis, and 
intelligence analysis techniques can be used to improve academic research. 
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